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## PREFATORY NOTE

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Since the establishment of the Carl Newell Jackson Lectureship, it has become customary to print the text of the lectures in these *Studies*. Accordingly, this volume presents, as a single article, two lectures on the *Ajax* of Sophocles, delivered on March 2 and 3, 1959, by Professor Bernard M. W. Knox, of Yale University, third holder of the Jackson Lectureship.

Although the chief purpose of the *Harvard Studies* is to publish articles by instructors and graduate students at Harvard, scholars in other institutions are invited to submit articles. Manuscripts should be sent to The Editorial Committee, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 320 Boylston Hall, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

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## THE *AJAX* OF SOPHOCLES

BY BERNARD M. W. KNOX

THE key to an understanding of this harsh and beautiful play is the great speech in which Ajax debates his course of action and explores the nature of man's life on earth (646-692). These lines are so majestic, remote, and mysterious, and at the same time so passionate, dramatic, and complex, that if this were all that had survived of Sophocles he would still have to be reckoned as one of the world's greatest poets. They are the point from which this discussion starts and to which it will return, for in the play all the poetic and thematic threads which make up the stark pattern of the *Ajax* start from and run back to this speech. These magnificent, enigmatic lines, alternately serene and passionate, and placed almost dead center in the action, offer us the only moment of repose and reflection in a play which begins in monstrous violence and hatred, and maintains that atmosphere almost unbroken to the end.

It is a puzzling play. Ever since scholars started to work on it, it has been criticized as faulty in structure, and the schoolmasterish remarks of the ancient scholiast on this point<sup>1</sup> have often been echoed, though in more elegant and conciliatory terms, in the writings of modern critics. Apart from the structural problem, it is only too easy for the modern critic and reader to find the characters repellent: to see in Athena a fiendish divinity,<sup>2</sup> in Ajax a brutalized warrior,<sup>3</sup> in the Atridae and Teucer undignified wranglers, and in Odysseus a cold self-seeker.

In recent years a host of new and more sympathetic critics have tried to rehabilitate the play;<sup>4</sup> most influential among them is H. D. F. Kitto, who, working on the unassailable basis that Sophocles knew more about dramaturgy than both Schlegels and Tycho von Wilamowitz rolled into one, assumes that the play is a dramatic success and then attempts to explain why. In his best-known book<sup>5</sup> (though he has modified the position considerably in his latest work on the subject)<sup>6</sup> he found the solution of the difficulty in the importance of Odysseus, which he called the "keystone" of the play.<sup>7</sup> Kitto's chapter on the *Ajax* is so well written (and so welcome a relief after the self-satisfied strictures of nineteenth-century critics) that it is at first reading overwhelmingly persuasive, but when the reader changes books and gets back to Sophocles, his difficulties return. For Ajax, dead and alive, imposes his gigantic

personality on every turn of the action, every speech. When he is not speaking himself, he is being talked about; there is only one subject discussed in this play, whether the speaker is Ajax, Athena, Odysseus, Tecmessa, the messenger, Teucer, Menelaus, or Agamemnon — and that subject is Ajax. Ajax is on stage in every scene, first alive, then dead. The rest of the characters follow him wherever he goes; Odysseus tracks him to his tent, and later Tecmessa and the chorus follow his tracks to the lonely place on the shore where he has killed himself.<sup>8</sup> The hero's death, which normally in Attic tragedy is described by a messenger who accompanies the body on-stage, takes place before our eyes in the *Ajax*, and to make this possible Sophocles has recourse to the rare and difficult expedient of changing the scene; when Ajax moves, the whole play follows after him. Further, as Kitto indeed points out, the poetry of the play (and it contains some of Sophocles' most magnificent lines) is all assigned to Ajax. Brutal and limited he may be, but there can be no doubt that Sophocles saw him as heroic. The lamentations of Tecmessa, Teucer, and the chorus express our own sense of a great loss. The tone of the speeches made over his body in the second half of the play emphasizes the fact that the world is a smaller, meaner place because of his death. The last half of the play shows us a world emptied of greatness; all that was great in the world lies there dead, impaled on that gigantic sword, while smaller men, with motives both good and bad, dispute over its burial. The unheroic tone of the end of the play (with its threats and boasts and personal insults)<sup>9</sup> has often been criticized as an artistic failure; surely it is deliberate. Nothing else would make us feel what has happened. A heroic age has passed away, to be succeeded by one in which action is replaced by argument, stubbornness by compromise, defiance by acceptance. The heroic self-assertion of an Achilles, an Ajax, will never be seen again; the best this new world has to offer is the humane and compromising temper of Odysseus, the worst the ruthless and cynical cruelty of the Atridae. But nothing like the greatness of the man who lies there dead.

The poetry of the play is in the speeches of Ajax, and there is one speech of Ajax which is Sophoclean poetry at its greatest. ἅπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος. . . . "All things long uncounted time brings forth from obscurity and buries once they have appeared. . . ." The opening lines of the speech raise the problem which the play as a whole explores: the existence of man in time and the changes which time brings. It is significant that the *Ajax*, contrary to Sophoclean practice as we know it from the extant plays, brings an Olympian god on stage,<sup>10</sup> for the difference between men and gods is most sharply defined in their rela-

tionship to time — mortality and immortality are conditions of subjection to and independence of time.

This difference between man and the gods, the transitory and the permanent, is a theme which Sophocles returns to in his last play, where Oedipus, at Colonus, spells out for Theseus what the difference is. "Dearest son of Aegeus, only for the gods is there no old age or death. Everything else is confounded by all-powerful time." He goes on to describe the changes which time brings to all things human in terms strikingly reminiscent of lines written many years before, in the *Ajax*.<sup>11</sup> The theme of man, the gods, and time is from first to last one of the main concerns of Sophoclean tragedy.

In the *Ajax* this theme is developed through the exploration of one particular aspect of human activity, the working of an ethical code. This code was already a very old one in the fifth century B.C., and although more appropriate to the conditions of a heroic society, it was still recognized in democratic Athens as a valid guide to conduct. *Τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς* — to help your friends and harm your enemies. A simple, practical, natural rule. From the point of view of a Christian society it is a crude and cynical rule, but for all that it is often followed. But whereas we today pay at least lip service to a higher ideal of conduct, the fifth-century Athenian accepted this simple code as a valid morality.<sup>12</sup> It was a very old rule (a strong point in its favor for a people in whose language the word *νέος*, "new," had a "collateral notion of *unexpected, strange, untoward, evil*");<sup>13</sup> it seemed like sound common sense; and it had the authority of the poets, who were, for fifth-century Athens, the recognized formulators of ethical principles, the acknowledged legislators.

Plato's Socrates, who begins the great argument of the *Republic* by rejecting this formula as a definition of justice, denies that the poets could have said any such thing. "We shall fight them, you and I together," he says to Polemarchus, "— anyone who says that Simonides or Bias or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed men said it. . . . Do you know whose saying I think this is, that justice consists of helping your friends and harming your enemies? I think it is a saying of Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban or some other such man . . ." <sup>14</sup>

Plato, of course, when he tries to make this saying the exclusive property of a bloodthirsty Corinthian tyrant, a Macedonian barbarian, a Persian despot, or a Theban intriguer, is writing with his tongue in his cheek. For the maxim "Help your friends, harm your enemies" stares out at us from the pages of the poets. It is to be found in Archilochus,<sup>15</sup> in



Solon,<sup>16</sup> in Theognis,<sup>17</sup> in Pindar,<sup>18</sup> and was attributed to Simonides.<sup>19</sup> It continued to be a rule of conduct universally accepted and admired in spite of Plato's rejection of it, and something very like it is rejected by Christ in the first century A.D.: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, love your enemies."<sup>20</sup>

This is of course *our* ideal of conduct, the ideal to which, in our better moments, most of us try to rise. Even if, regrettably, we continue to live by the old rule, we have the vision of a higher ideal. But this was not the case in the Athens of Sophocles. The simple formula, "Help your friends, harm your enemies," was generally accepted, not just as hard-headed practical advice, but as a moral principle, a definition of justice, a formulation of the *arete*, the specific excellence, of man.

The *Ajax* of Sophocles examines the working of this code. It is a theme which springs naturally from the figure of Ajax as Sophocles found it already formed in saga and drama, the figure of a man of fierce impulse and action, whose hate for his enemies led him to attempt a monstrous act of violence and, when it failed, to kill himself.

Sophocles' treatment of this theme, however, reveals an attitude which differs from that of Christ and of Plato. It is thoroughly Sophoclean and fifth century; that is to say, it is at once intellectual and practical, and at the same time ironic and tragic. Christ's rejection of the way of the world (and the interpretation of the Mosaic law which was used to support it) is justified by a summons to a higher morality: "Love thine enemy. If ye love them which love you, what reward have ye?" Plato's rejection of the ancient maxim is based on its inadequacy as a definition of justice: the enemy you harm may be a just man, and in any case, even if he is unjust, harming him will only make him more so.<sup>21</sup> But the Sophoclean presentation of the old code in action makes the comparatively simple point that it is unworkable. The objective may be good, but in the world in which we live, it is unattainable. The old morality is exposed as a failure in practice.

Τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, to do good to your friends — no one objects to that (though Christ rejects it as not enough); it is the other half of the commandment, τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, that raises problems. "To harm your enemies": this accepts and justifies hatred. The *Ajax* is full of hatred and enmity. The hatred of Ajax for Odysseus was proverbial; it is immortalized in one of the greatest passages of the *Odyssey*, and in Sophocles' play it is given full expression, together with his hatred for the Atridae, their hatred for him, and the hatred between them and Teucer. No other play of Sophocles contains so many bitter speeches;

Ajax dies cursing his enemies (and his curses are repeated by Teucer at the end of the play), and after his death the venomous disputes between the Atridae and Teucer make the last half of the play a noisy, scurrilous quarrel to which only the last-minute intervention of Odysseus restores some measure of dignity. The Greek words for enmity and hate (and there are many of them, with a great range of subtle distinctions)<sup>22</sup> dominate the vocabulary of the play. "I see you," says Athena, addressing Odysseus, in the first lines of the play, "I see you always hunting for some occasion against your enemies." This prologue sets before us, with brilliant dramatic economy, three attitudes toward the traditional code, and, as is to be expected of the superb dramaturgy of Sophocles, they are not described but expressed in action.

The simplest attitude is that of Ajax, who has lived in this faith and is shortly to die in it.<sup>23</sup> He represents the savagery of "harm your enemies" in an extreme form; he glories in the violence he is dispensing to the animals he takes for his enemies. He believes that he has killed the sons of Atreus, and is proud of it;<sup>24</sup> he relishes in advance the pleasure he will feel in whipping Odysseus before killing him. When Athena urges him to spare the torture, he tells her sharply to go about her own business. He goes back to his butcher's work with evident gusto: *χωρῶ πρὸς ἔργον* — "Back to work" (116).<sup>25</sup>

He is mad, of course, and the madness has been inflicted on him by Athena. But it consists only in his mistaking animals for men; the madness affects his vision more than his mind.<sup>26</sup> All the verbs used by Athena make it clear that she is not producing the intention to murder the Achaean kings; she merely diverts, hinders, checks, limits, and encourages a force already in motion.<sup>27</sup> The intent to torture and murder was present in Ajax sane; when he recovers from his delusions his only regret is that his victims were sheep instead of men, his disgrace is that he failed in his murderous attempt. Ajax did not need to be driven mad to attempt to harm his enemies; once restored to sanity he never for a moment doubts that his attempt was justified. We learn later from Tecmessa that he laughed loudly in the midst of his cruelties.<sup>28</sup> This enjoyment of the shame and helplessness of his enemies is, of course, according to the old morality, his right and privilege. If it is right to harm your enemies, there is no reason why you should not enjoy it. There is in fact every reason why you should.

There is a goddess on stage throughout this scene, and in her we are shown a divine attitude to the traditional morality. It is exactly the same, point for point, as that of Ajax. *Τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς*. Ajax is her enemy. As we learn later in the play, he has angered her by an insulting and

contemptuous reply. She harms her enemy. She exposes him in his madness before his adversary Odysseus, and lets him convict himself out of his own mouth.<sup>29</sup> Athena mocks Ajax as he mocks *his* enemies, calling herself his "ally"<sup>30</sup> and ironically accepting his insulting commands. She harms and mocks her enemy, Ajax, and helps her friend, Odysseus, who in this scene emphasizes his devotion to her and is assured by the goddess of her continued favor.<sup>31</sup> Athena is the traditional morality personified, in all its fierce simplicity.

The third figure on stage during the prologue, Odysseus, has come hunting his enemy. He is told by the goddess that Ajax intended to kill him, and then he hears Ajax insist on torturing the animal he takes to be Odysseus himself. Odysseus is given the mandate to inform the Achaeans of Ajax's criminal intentions, and so becomes the instrument of his enemy's fall. And he is invited by the goddess to rejoice in his enemy's disaster, to mock, to echo Ajax's laughter at the imagined sufferings of his enemies. Odysseus has every reason in the world to rejoice at the spectacle revealed to him by Athena, but he cannot do it. "I pity him," he says, "although he is my enemy." The authority of the ancient heroic code and the explicit invitation of the goddess both fail, overwhelmed by this sudden feeling of pity. Odysseus abandons the traditional morality at the moment of victory and exultation. He does so because he puts himself, in imagination, in his enemy's place, "considering not so much his case as my own," to use his own words.<sup>32</sup> In the ruin of Ajax he sees, beyond the fall of a man who was, and still is,<sup>33</sup> his most dangerous enemy, a proof of the feeble and transitory condition of all men, himself included.<sup>34</sup> "All of us who live are images, or weightless shadows."<sup>35</sup> That the great Ajax has been reduced to this state of deluded impotence is no occasion for triumph for a fellow man, but rather a melancholy reminder of the instability and tragic frailty of all things human.

Of these three attitudes to the traditional morality the most disturbing for the modern reader is that of the goddess. The audience in the theater of Dionysus had seen gods on stage before, but, as far as we can tell, they had seen nothing as vengeful and fierce as this Athena since Aeschylus put the Eumenides on stage; this Athena seems to derive from the same concept of divinity as that which later inspired the Aphrodite and Dionysus of Euripides.<sup>36</sup> Her rigid adherence to the traditional code and the added refinement of mockery of her victim seem all the more repellent by contrast with the enlightened attitude of Odysseus.

But we must remember that for Sophocles and his contemporaries gods and men were not judged by the same standards.<sup>37</sup> The Christian



ideal, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your father in heaven is perfect,"<sup>38</sup> would have made little or no sense to a fifth-century Athenian, whose deepest religious conviction would have been most clearly expressed in opposite terms: "Do not act like a god." Sophocles clearly admires the attitude of Odysseus, but we must not therefore assume that he criticizes the attitude of Athena. She is a goddess, and her conduct must be examined in a different light.

Her attitude is consistent. Odysseus, whom she helps and rewards, has always been her friend, and Ajax, whom she thwarts and mocks, is an enemy of fairly long standing. His insulting treatment of the goddess in the prologue is not an erratic phenomenon produced by his madness, for much earlier, in full control of his senses, he had insulted her in exactly the same way and in almost exactly the same words, as the messenger later tells us.<sup>39</sup> By his "dreadful words which should never have been spoken" Ajax provoked the anger of Athena, which she satisfies in the mockery of the opening scene.

But her attitude is not only consistent, it is also just. Ajax deserves punishment not only because of his slaughter of the cattle (the common property of the Achaean army) and the men in charge of them<sup>40</sup> (whom Ajax characteristically never even mentions), but also because the real objectives of his murderous onslaught were the sons of Atreus and Odysseus, the kings and commanders of the army. Athena in the prologue is a minister of justice. Her insistence, against the indignant and repeated protests of Odysseus, on exposing Ajax in his madness before his enemy is not merely vindictive, it is a necessary step in his condemnation. The proof of Ajax's deeper guilt, his intention to murder the kings, must come from his own mouth before a witness.<sup>41</sup> What Athena does is to prevent Ajax, by deluding his vision, from committing the great crime he had planned, and to reveal to Odysseus undeniable proof that the lesser crime he *has* committed would, but for her intervention, have been a slaughter of kings instead of animals. Surely this is the working of justice. The goddess thwarts and mocks her enemy, but it could also be said that she baffles and convicts a wrongdoer. The working of the fierce old code, in the action of the goddess, is the working of justice.

That she takes a merciless delight in his humiliation is, in terms of the accepted morality, natural and right; in theological terms it is at least logical. A strict conception of justice has no place for mercy, which might temper punishment and restrain exact retribution. That Athena, in addition to inflicting full punishment, also takes delight in the wrongdoer's fall is, for our modern Christian sensibility, hard to accept, and yet even the Christian consciousness, shot through as it is with the ideal

of mercy, can on occasion feel something similar. In the *Divina Commedia* Dante's savage mockery of the tortured Pope Nicholas is warmly approved by Virgil.<sup>42</sup> And the same *anima naturaliter Christiana* sharply reproves Dante's pity for the grotesquely mutilated prophets. This passage is an interesting parallel to the prologue of the *Ajax*. What excites Dante's pity is "our image so twisted," *la nostra imagine sì torta* — a feeling like Odysseus' sympathy for Ajax "yoked to cruel delusion." Virgil's reproof is harsh and bitter. "Are you still one of the fools, like the rest? Here pity is alive when it is truly dead": *Qui vive la pietà quand' è ben morta*.<sup>43</sup>

Athena's attitude is that of a merciless but just divinity who punishes the wrongdoer. At the same time it is the attitude of the victorious enemy who returns evil for evil and exults in the fall of his opponent. In this respect it is exactly that of Ajax, a point emphasized through the repetition of the same words and sentiments in the speeches of the goddess and the hero. "Is not laughter at one's enemies the kind that gives most pleasure?" Athena asks Odysseus, and Ajax describes an imaginary Odysseus awaiting torture inside the tent as "the prisoner who gives me most pleasure."<sup>44</sup> Athena ironically begs Ajax not to "humiliate" his prisoner, but this is exactly what she is doing to Ajax, as he realizes later: "the strong goddess, daughter of Zeus, humiliates me even to death."<sup>45</sup> In their uncritical adherence to the traditional code and their full exploitation of the harshness it enjoins there is no difference between the goddess and the man.

But this does not constitute, as the modern reader instinctively feels it does (and as it would in Euripides),<sup>46</sup> a criticism of Athena. Rather it is the measure of the heroic presumption of Ajax. He assumes the tone and attitude of a god. And in him this is no recent development. He has always felt and acted like this. When the messenger, later in the play, describes his insulting reply to Athena's encouragement before the battle, he defines the nature of Ajax's pride. Ajax was not "thinking like a man." And he also quotes the words of Calchas, which describe Ajax as one who "born a man by nature, does not think as a man."<sup>47</sup> The tone of Ajax's speeches in the prologue is not the product of his delusion, it is the expression of his nature as it has always been.<sup>48</sup> And that tone is unmistakable. He talks and acts like a god; he assumes not merely equality with Athena, but superiority to her. Athena mockingly recognizes this conception of their relationship by her use of the word "ally" (*σύμμαχος*) to describe herself; the word in Athenian official parlance (it was the official designation of the subject cities and islands of the empire) suggests inferiority,<sup>49</sup> and it is clear that this is how Ajax regards her.

He gives her orders, ἐφίεμαι (112), a strong word which he repeats a few lines later (116);<sup>50</sup> he roughly and insultingly refuses her request for mercy for Odysseus, and when she tells him to do whatever he sees fit, he condescendingly orders her to be just that kind of an ally to him always, that is, a subservient one.<sup>51</sup>

Ajax's assumption of godlike confidence is only an extreme expression of his fierce dedication to the traditional morality. In pursuing the heroic code to the bloodthirsty and megalomaniac extremes the prologue puts before us, he is acting not like a man but like a god. "May Zeus grant me," sang that bitter and vengeful poet Theognis, "to repay my friends who love me and my enemies who now triumph over me, and I would seem to be a god among men."<sup>52</sup> Ajax acts and thinks like a god among men. Like a god he judges, condemns, and executes his enemies, with speed, certainty, and righteous wrath. The gods do indeed act like this, but they can do so because they have knowledge. "Learn," says Athena to Odysseus, "from one who knows."<sup>53</sup> But man is ignorant. "We know nothing clear," says Odysseus. "We are adrift." The same standard of conduct will not be valid for man in his ignorance and gods in their knowledge. What is wrong for one may be right for the other.

For the gods, in fact, the old rule, to help friends and harm enemies, is a proper rule. The proviso that Socrates adds to the rule in the *Republic* — "if our friends are good and our enemies bad"<sup>54</sup> — does hold true for the gods. Athena, in harming her enemy Ajax, is punishing a wrongdoer. And in her closing words she makes a claim to this general identification of friend with good and enemy with bad for the gods as a whole: "The gods love those who are self-controlled, and hate the bad."<sup>55</sup> But no man can make any such claim, to distinguish certainly, as the gods can, between good and bad men. "We know nothing clear, we are adrift."

A man cannot know with certainty whether his friends are good or bad, and so with his enemies. But his ignorance is even more profound. He cannot even know for sure who his friends *are*, and by the same token, he cannot know who his enemies are either. Human relationships (and this is demonstrated by the action of the play) are so unstable, so shifting, that the distinction between friend and enemy does not remain constant. Human life is a flux in which everything is in process of unending change. "One day," says Athena, "brings to their setting and raises up again all human things."<sup>56</sup> The name of the flux in which all things human dissolve and reform is time, χρόνος. "All things long uncounted time brings forth from obscurity and buries once they have appeared. And nothing is beyond expectation." So Ajax tells us, in words which recall those of Athena.<sup>57</sup>



The statement is especially true of relations between man and man, friendship and enmity. In time, friends turn into enemies and enemies into friends. The *Ajax* itself is a bewildering panorama of such changed and changing relationships. Ajax came to Troy as the ally of the sons of Atreus, but he turned into their enemy, and tried to murder them. "We expected," says Menelaus over Ajax's body, "that he would be an ally and friend of the Achaeans, but have found him . . . a more bitter enemy than the Trojans."<sup>58</sup> Tecmessa, a Trojan, an enemy of the Greek invaders, saw her city destroyed by Ajax, and became his prisoner and concubine. Yet she is the only one that truly loves him; the man that destroyed her city and enslaved her<sup>59</sup> is, she says, everything to her — mother, father, country, riches. Ajax and Hector were enemy champions, and fought before the ranks of the assembled armies in single combat;<sup>60</sup> when the light failed, and no decision had been reached, they exchanged gifts, in mutual respect, and parted friends. The sword which Ajax carries as he makes his great speech, on which he is in the end to kill himself, is the sword of Hector, his enemy-friend. Ajax and Odysseus, once comrades in arms and in the embassy to the tent of Achilles,<sup>61</sup> are now the bitterest of enemies. The most striking example of the mutability of human relationships offered by the play is one that Ajax will not live to see: Odysseus, his archenemy, feels pity for him and will fight for him against Agamemnon, to make possible the burial of his body. In human life, which is subject to time, nothing remains stable, least of all friendship and enmity. In such a world, "Help your friend and harm your enemy" is no use as a guide. How can a man help his friends and harm his enemies when they change places so fast?

Ajax comes at last to his moment of unclouded vision, in which he sees the world man lives in as it really is. He explores, for himself and for us, the nature of the ceaseless change which is the pattern of the universe. The famous speech in which he does so has caused a dispute among the critics which is still alive; there are two main schools of thought about it. One believes that the speech is a sincere recantation of stubbornness, a decision to submit to authority, human and divine, and so go on living. The other believes that the speech is a disguised and ambiguous reassertion of the hero's will for death, and though different critics of this majority school<sup>62</sup> differ in their estimates of how much of the speech is sincere and how much not, they are all united on the point that the speech is intended to deceive Tecmessa and the chorus.

The first of these two positions, most recently argued with his customary clarity and eloquence by Sir Maurice Bowra, must face formidable objections. For one thing it presents us with an Ajax who later, off stage

and without preparation or explanation, changes his mind on the crucial issue of life or death, and Bowra can justify this only by assuming a fresh access of madness sent by Athena, for which of course there is no evidence in the Sophoclean text.<sup>63</sup> But, more important, this reading of the speech ignores completely the striking fact that the language of Ajax in these lines is that of a man obsessed by the thought of death; the words insistently and emphatically bring our minds back to the theme of death. He will "hide" his sword; time, as he has just told us in a phrase which refers to death, "hides all things once they have appeared," and later Tecmessa will find the sword of Hector "hidden" in his body.<sup>64</sup> "I shall go to bathe" — *πρός τε λουτρά* — the word he uses is the regular word used to describe the washing of the corpse before burial, and is so used at the end of the play when Teucer and the chorus prepare to bury Ajax.<sup>65</sup> "Let night and Hades keep it there below," he says of the sword, a phrase with ominous suggestions, for the word *κάτω* (below) in Sophocles always refers, when it is used in this locative sense, to the dead, the underworld,<sup>66</sup> as it does in Ajax's last speech, where he announces that he will talk "to those below in the house of Hades": *ἐν Αἰδου τοῖς κάτω* (865).

These ominous phrases are typical of the speech as a whole;<sup>67</sup> everywhere in it the language hints, sometimes subtly, sometimes broadly, at death. If the speech is meant to convey a sincere decision to renounce suicide, reconcile himself with his enemies and the gods, and live, it uses strange terms — inept terms, in fact. Even in a lesser artist such an insensitive use of language would be remarkable. In Sophocles it is unthinkable.

Is the speech a *Trugrede*, then? Does Ajax intend to deceive his hearers, masking his unchanged purpose, death, with ambiguous words? There can be no doubt that he does deceive Tecmessa and his sailors; Tecmessa later complains bitterly that she was "cast out from his love and deceived."<sup>68</sup> But does Ajax consciously and deliberately deceive her and the chorus?<sup>69</sup> If so, we are faced with a problem as difficult as that raised by the other point of view — a serious inconsistency of character. The character of Ajax is Achillean; it may be all too easily tempted to extremes of violence, but not to deceit.

Many learned and subtle critics of the play have tried to skirt this difficulty, to present us with an Ajax who deliberately deceives and yet remains the simple direct outspoken hero of the tradition, but they are attempting the impossible. They succeed at best in finding a more complicated and euphemistic formula<sup>70</sup> for the fact that, according to this view, Ajax consciously and deliberately deceives his hearers. And that,

as Bowra forcefully (and rightly) points out, is the last thing we can imagine Ajax doing.<sup>71</sup>

Not only does this intent to deceive strike us as uncharacteristic; it also seems insufficiently motivated. Why *should* he deceive his hearers? In the previous scene he made it perfectly clear that he intended to kill himself, announced his decision firmly, refused to argue the matter, and brutally silenced Tecmessa's attempt to dissuade him. Why should he conceal his intention now? The only plausible reason critics have been able to suggest is that he wishes to die alone in peace, and must deceive Tecmessa and the chorus so that he will be allowed to go off alone, unmolested, with his sword. But this, especially when the scene is imagined theatrically, is not really adequate.<sup>72</sup> Would Tecmessa or the all too prudent sailors of the chorus dare oppose the will of this gigantic, imperious, raw-tempered and raw-tongued man who has just come out carrying a naked sword? If he stalked off now announcing that he was going to find a lonely place to kill himself, can we really imagine the chorus and Tecmessa putting any effective resistance in his path? They appealed to him as strongly as they dared in the previous scene, and were roundly told to mind their own business; one thing that emerges clearly from that scene is that Ajax of all men is master in his own house.<sup>73</sup> The idea that he would have to lie in order to escape from Tecmessa and his sailors is one that could never have occurred to Ajax. The intent to deceive is not only uncharacteristic of Ajax, it has no adequate motive in the dramatic circumstances.

All this merely replaces the dilemmas faced by previous critics with another dilemma, which appears to be equally insoluble. If Ajax is not trying to deceive Tecmessa and the chorus, masking an unbroken resolve for death with ambiguous phrases, and if he is not on the other hand trying to tell them, sincerely and without reservations, that he will make his peace with gods and men, and live, then what is he trying to tell them?

There is only one possible answer. He is not trying to tell them anything at all. He is talking to himself.<sup>74</sup> During the first part of his speech he is oblivious of their presence,<sup>75</sup> totally self-absorbed in an attempt to understand not only the nature of the world which has brought him to this pass but also the new feelings which rise in him and prompt him to reconsider his decision for death.

This solution of the difficulty, that the first thirty-nine lines of Ajax's speech are soliloquy and therefore rule out the question of his intentions toward Tecmessa and the chorus, is suggested by an unusual feature of the speech, which has not been given the attention it deserves.<sup>76</sup> The



speech comes directly after the closing lines of a choral stasimon, and thus opens the scene. But contrary to usual practice, it plunges abruptly into the philosophical reflections on time, without any form of address to the chorus or Tecmessa. In the theatre of Dionysus the vast size of the auditorium, the distance between even the closest spectators and the actors, and, above all, the masks excluded that play of facial expression which in the modern theater makes clear at once the direction of the actor's remarks; we can see, and do not have to be told, whom the actor is addressing. But the Athenian dramatist (and this was especially true of the opening moments of a new scene) felt obliged to establish firmly, clearly, and at once the relationship between the opening speaker and his dramatic audience. He put the opening speaker in some clear verbal rapport with the other person or persons on the stage or in the orchestra, by means of a choral introduction, a vocative formula, or a verb in the second person.<sup>77</sup> But in this speech there is nothing whatsoever to indicate whom Ajax is talking to, nothing until the fortieth line of the speech.

Such an opening speech is almost unparalleled in Sophoclean tragedy. In fact there is only one parallel. It is in this same play, the *Ajax*; it is the last speech Ajax makes. And here of course the absence of verbal rapport with the others is easy to understand; there *are* no others, not even the chorus. Ajax is alone on stage.

The opening lines of the great speech on time give the impression that Ajax is talking to himself, just as he does later when he *is* alone. And that impression is maintained. For thirty-nine lines there is no indication that he is talking to anyone else, no vocative formula, no verb in the second person. The only reference to anyone on stage, to Tecmessa, is a reference which makes it perfectly clear that at any rate he is not talking to *her* — "by this woman," he says, *πρὸς τῇσδε τῆς γυναικός*. "I pity her," he goes on, *οἰκτίρω δέ νιν* — as if she were not there at all. Finally he comes to the end of his reflections. His mind is made up. And now he turns to the others, and the words he uses sound like a formula of transition from private reflection to direct communication. *Ἀλλ' ἀμφὶ μὲν τούτοιςιν εὖ σχήσει*: "Well, in these matters, it will turn out well." And then, *σὺ δέ*, "You" — at last he speaks to Tecmessa.

The speech is not a *Trugrede*, then; the first part of it is *selbstgespräch*, a soliloquy. Ajax is working out his own course of action with that same furious self-absorption we have already been shown in the previous scene, where he poured out his laments and curses unaffected by, hardly hearing, the questions and advice of the chorus.<sup>78</sup> Here, for the first thirty-nine lines of the speech, he is oblivious of the presence of anyone

else; locked in the prison of his own passions, he fights his battle with the new feelings and the new vision of the world which have come to him since he made his decision to die. Only when at last he sees the nature of the world and his own best course of action does he recognize the presence of the others, and give them their orders. In these final lines of his speech there is no ambiguity; his words are clearly a last will and testament, a handing over of responsibility. "Tell Teucer, if he comes, to take care of me, and of you . . ." What else can this mean but "take care of my body and assume my responsibilities?"<sup>79</sup> Ajax never in his life asked anyone to take care of him; he was the one, as Teucer never tires of repeating later in the play, who rescued others. The harsh frankness of his closing lines surely rules out any possibility of intention to deceive in the earlier part of the speech; when he turns to Tecmessa and the chorus to give them their orders he speaks plainly enough. If they are deceived about his intentions because they misunderstood the course of the agonized self-communing through which he found his way to the decision, they have no one to blame but themselves. Though Tecmessa later complains with pardonable bitterness that she has been "deceived," the chorus blames, not Ajax, but itself. "I was completely deaf, ignorant, careless": ἐγὼ δ' ὁ πάντα κωφός, ὁ πάντ' αἰδρις κατημέλησα (911-12).<sup>80</sup>

The great speech of Ajax, for most of its length, is not meant for anyone but himself; since he is a character in a play, that means that it is meant exclusively for us, the audience. He is not trying to deceive, but to understand, to understand the nature of the world which once seemed (and was) so simple, but in which he has now lost his way, to understand what his place is in this new-found, complicated world, and to decide on his next step. Ajax, we are told by the poet Pindar, who loved and admired his memory, was a man "with no gift of tongue, but stout of heart."<sup>81</sup> In this speech the man whose hands had always spoken for him finds a tongue, and it is the tongue of a great poet. The lines in which he reassesses the world and time and his part in them are the first beam of light in the darkness of violence and failure which the play has so far imposed on us; in that light we can see in their true dimensions what has already passed, and the greater things still to come.

The speech begins abruptly with a description of the action of time. "All things long uncounted time brings forth from obscurity and buries once they have appeared. And nothing is beyond expectation." This is a world in which anything can happen; in the course of time, things which appeared unconquerable find their master. "The dreadful oath and the heart hard as steel are overcome." These are not random examples. The oath Ajax swore, to be the loyal ally of the Atridae in their fight to

recapture Helen, an oath mentioned later on by Teucer, has been broken by his attempt to kill them<sup>82</sup> And his own heart, hard as steel, has been belatedly softened in the interval since we last saw him announce that it was too late to educate him to new ways, by Tecmessa's appeals. "I pity her," he says, using the same words Odysseus used about him in the prologue. He feels this new compassion undermining his resolve to kill himself, and the discovery that he could be softened, deflected even for a moment from his chosen course by a woman's plea, leads him to understand the nature of the changing world, the uncertainty in which he lives. But the terms in which he expresses these new emotions betray the fact that they are rejected by his deepest instincts; the words which come to his lips to describe his new-found pity reveal that in the very attempt to formulate it he has already left it behind. "I too, who was so dreadfully resolved just now, like iron in the dipping, I have had my edge softened by this woman here." His metaphor<sup>83</sup> is drawn from the sword he carries as he speaks, and the word he uses, ἐθελώνθην, literally "made effeminate," is a word that Ajax can apply to himself only in contempt.<sup>84</sup> We can see, in the words he uses, the heart harden afresh, the sword regain its edge.

He cuts these disturbing reflections short with a decision to act. Ἀλλ' εἴμι — "I will go . . ." He will go to the meadows by the shore, to bury in the ground the sword of Hector; let night and Hades keep it there below. The words he uses, as we have seen, are heavy with the sound of death; they stem from the deepest springs of his heroic nature. But the lines which follow show that, on the conscious level, he is still deliberating on his proper course. He gives his reason for wanting to bury the sword: "Since I received this sword from Hector, my bitterest enemy, I have got no good from the Argives." He looks back to the duel with Hector and sees the exchange of gifts as the turning point in his career, the beginning of his misfortunes. The sword of Hector, in the hands of Ajax, sought out and came near to killing the Atridae and Odysseus, Hector's enemies. Ajax now repudiates the gift of Hector: "The gifts of enemies are no gifts, and bring no good." His present troubles he now sees as caused by the sword, which, given to him by an enemy who turned into a friend, is a harsh reminder of the unpredictability of human relationships, a grim token of the inconstant shifting allegiances in which Ajax has lost his bearings. The possession of Hector's sword, the sword of the enemy commander and champion, had marked Ajax out as a man apart and alone among the Achaeans; it may have been the cause, he seems to feel, of the jealousy which lost him the arms of Achilles. To bury it might be seen as a gesture of his willingness to



accept again the authority of the kings. One thing is sure: the sword, and Hector's friendship, has brought him nothing but disaster. "Therefore" (τοιγάρ), he goes on, "I shall in future know how to give in to the gods and show reverence for the sons of Atreus. They are the rulers, so one must give in to them. . . ." But once again he expresses his new feelings in words dictated not by the intelligence which has brought him to this conclusion but by the passion deep inside him which rejects it. "Give in to the gods and show reverence for the sons of Atreus." He should have said, as the scholiast points out,<sup>85</sup> "give in to the sons of Atreus and show reverence for the gods." The terms he uses are loaded with his passionate obstinacy, they make acceptance of authority appear harder than it really is, and this indicates his hardening resolve to refuse. "To show reverence for the sons of Atreus" is a hyperbolic phrase which presents submission in terms that Ajax of all men could never accept, and yet it also expresses a psychological truth. For Ajax, the mildest gesture of submission is as hard as abject surrender. And the phrase also indicates his instinctive realization of an objective truth. If he is to make his peace with the kings whom he tried to murder in their beds, he will have to renounce all pride, humble himself, and beg for mercy. These words express at once the nature of the action demanded by his new conciliatory mood and the psychological and objective impossibility of its fulfillment. The will to surrender is suppressed in the very moment and through the very process of its formulation. "Time," as Ajax told us, "brings things forth from obscurity and buries them once they have appeared."

The magnificent lines which follow, which state the argument for retreat, concession, and change, become, with this significant prologue, a description of the world in which Ajax, now that he has at last recognized its nature, cannot and will not live. "Things dreadful and most headstrong yield before prerogatives . . . Winter which covers the paths with snow makes way for fruitful summer. The weary round of night stands aside for white-horsed day to set the light ablaze. The blast of dreadful winds puts to rest the moaning sea, and all-powerful sleep releases what he has bound, does not keep what he has taken forever." This is the world subject to time. The forces of nature, which govern the physical world, "things dreadful and most headstrong," observe discipline, withdraw, stand aside, to take their place in the pattern of recurring change, which is time. In such a world Ajax too, who is "dreadful and headstrong" like the forces of nature,<sup>86</sup> will have to bend and give way. ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς οὐ γνωσόμεσθα σωφρονεῖν; "In such a world how shall I not be forced to learn discipline?" Most translations and explanations

of that line give us an Ajax who is reconciled (momentarily or ironically) to the necessity of surrender, but that is not what the words mean. The future of *γινώσκω*, wherever it occurs in Sophocles, has a special sense (dictated by the context)<sup>87</sup> of "learn against one's will, learn to one's cost," and so here: "How shall I not be forced to learn" or "learn to my sorrow," rather than Jebb's influential "Must we not learn discretion?" And *σωφρονεῖν*, to observe discipline, is in the context of this play a harsh word, which like *γνωσόμεσθα* marks one more stage in the hardening of Ajax's determination to repudiate not the sword of Hector but the world of time and change. It is used throughout the play to describe the attitude proper to a subordinate. Ajax himself uses it when he orders Tecmessa to leave him in peace: "Do not question or examine. It is good to observe discipline," *σωφρονεῖν καλόν* (586). It is the word which both the Atridae use to describe the attitude they think proper to inferiors. "Without fear," says Menelaus, "no army would be commanded in a disciplined fashion" (*σωφρόνως*, 1075). Agamemnon, telling Teucer that as a barbarian he has no right to speak, issues this word to recall him to a sense of his inferiority (*οὐ σωφρονήσεις*; 1259). And it is the word Athena uses in her announcement that the gods love the "self-controlled" (*σώφρονας*, 132) and hate the bad; she is contrasting Odysseus' acceptance of divine guidance with Ajax's rejection of it. These words, *γνωσόμεσθα* and *σωφρονεῖν*, like the use of the word *σέβειν*, reveal that Ajax's attempt to formulate the alternative to heroic suicide convinces him of its impossibility.

In the lines which follow, the description of what the pattern of eternal change means in the sphere of human relationships, Ajax's heart has hardened completely for death; the sarcastic contempt of these lines is unmistakable. "For I have recently come to understand that we must hate our enemy only to the extent permitted by the thought that we may one day love him, and I shall be disposed to serve and help a friend as one who will not remain my friend forever." His next words make it clear that this cynical prospect is for others, not for him. "For to the many, the harbor of friendship is untrustworthy." A world in which friends and enemies change places, and the old heroic code of "Harm your enemies, help your friends" is no sure guide, is no world for Ajax. He breaks off his absorbed reflection with a phrase that announces the end of his deliberation: "concerning these things, it will be well." He is satisfied and resolved on his course of action, and he now at last addresses Tecmessa and the chorus, for whom he has so far had no word. It is characteristic of him that when he does speak to them, it is to give them orders. They are clearly the orders of a man who is taking his

leave and handing over his responsibilities: "Tell Teucer, if he comes, to take care of me . . ." He needs Teucer now to save his body from insult, but his reputation, his great name, he will save himself, by death. "You will soon hear that, unfortunate though I am now, I am saved." And he stalks off, carrying the sword of Hector.<sup>88</sup>

This great speech explores the dilemma posed by the changing nature of human relationships; the heroic code of friendship and enmity proves useless in a world where friends and enemies change places, a world in which nothing is permanent. Friendship and enmity, day and night, summer and winter, sleep and waking, one succeeds the other, and nothing remains forever — ὥς αἰὲν οὐ μενούντα. This word αἰεί, "always, forever," and its opposite οὐποτε, "never," are used, not only in Ajax's speech, but throughout the play, to point the contrast between time and eternity, between man's life and divine immortality.<sup>89</sup>

Ἀεί, "always". It is the very first word of the play. "Always," says Athena, "I see you always hunting for some occasion against your enemies." It is true that this has always been typical of Odysseus, but on this occasion, when his enemy is offered up to him, mad and ruined, for his enjoyment, he suddenly and unexpectedly changes, and pities his enemy instead of mocking him. The word "always" is belied by the action of Odysseus. "Nothing is beyond expectation"; he defies expectation, ours and Athena's, deviates from what had seemed a permanent pattern. Ajax too belies the word. Tecmessa describes him weeping when he realizes that he has failed ignominiously in his attempt to kill his enemies. "Cries such as I never<sup>90</sup> heard from him before (ἄς οὐποτ' αὐτοῦ πρόσθεν εἰσήκουσ' ἐγώ, 318) . . . he used to explain that always laments like this were the mark of a cowardly and depressed spirit" (κακοῦ τε καὶ βαρυψύχου γόους/τοιούσδ' αἰεί ποτ' ἀνδρὸς, 319-20). "Kindness," says Tecmessa to an unrelenting Ajax, "*always* begets kindness" (χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστίν ἢ τίκτους' αἰεί, 522) — she gets no kindness from him. On the lips of Ajax the word is of frequent occurrence; he is obsessed with the idea of permanence. "Here is my command to you," he says to Athena, "*always* to stand by me as an ally . . ." (τοιάνδ' αἰεί μοι σύμμαχον παρεστάναι, 117). Odysseus he sees as "the instrument of evil *always*" (αἰὲ κακῶν ὄργανον, 379-80). He uses the word twice with hyperbolic exaggeration. "Will Teucer spend eternity on this raiding?" (τὸν εἰσαεὶ . . . χρόνον, 342-43) he asks impatiently, and he commands that his son Eurysaces be taken home to his aged mother "to be her support in old age forever" (γηροβοσκὸς εἰσαεὶ, 570).<sup>91</sup> In all these cases the context casts an ironic light on the word; it is exposed as inappropriate by the reality. And in the great speech which shows us Ajax wrestling with the



problem of man's life in time, he uses the word only with a negative: he speaks of the friend "who will not remain so forever" (αἰὲν οὐ μενοῦντα, 682), and of sleep, which "does not keep forever what he has taken" (οὐδ' αἰεὶ λαβὼν ἔχει, 676).

For human beings, subject to time, the word αἰεὶ, as Ajax realizes in his speech and as the play demonstrates in one passage after another, has no meaning. There is nothing in human life to which it can properly be applied, except to places — Salamis is "conspicuous to all men always" (πᾶσιν περίφαντος αἰεὶ, 599). But apart from the fixed unchanging landscape, a permanence to which Ajax turns in salutation in his farewell speech, "always" is the mode of existence not of man but of the gods, θεοὶ αἰὲν ἔχοντες, and it is with them that the word is associated when it means what it says. Ajax's father told him, when he set out for Troy: "Wish to conquer, but to conquer always with the god's help" (σὺν θεῷ δ' αἰεὶ κρατεῖν, 765). Ajax rejected this advice with contempt and claimed that he would "snatch glory apart from them." But he has met defeat. And in his final speech he recognizes the connection between "always" and the gods; he calls on the Erinyes to avenge him, divinities who are "always virgin, always all-seeing (αἰεὶ τε παρθένους/αἰεὶ θ' ὀρώσας, 835-36). And when later Teucer tries to explain the complicated process by which Hector and Ajax perished each one through the other's gift, he says: "These things, and all things always, the gods contrive for men" (Τὰ πάντ' αἰεὶ . . . μηχανᾶν θεοῦς, 1036-37).

Only for the gods do things "remain forever." "There is one race of men," says Pindar in a famous ode, "and one of gods. We breathe both from one mother. But there is a difference between us, in our power; the one is nothing, and for the other the brazen heaven, a sure foundation, remains forever" (ἀσφαλὲς αἰὲν ἔδος μένει οὐρανός).<sup>92</sup> This phrase of Pindar's, ἀσφαλὲς αἰὲν ἔδος, is of course a reminiscence of a famous passage in the *Odyssey*, a description of Olympus, the home of the gods. Athena goes to Olympus, where, they say, is the sure foundation of the gods forever (ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ, 6.42). The next lines of the Homeric passage may well have been in Sophocles' mind when he wrote the lines in Ajax's speech which describe the alternations of the seasons. For on Olympus there are no seasons, no change. "It is not shaken by winds, or wet by rain, no snow falls on it, but cloudless air is spread there, a white radiance runs over it." There is no alternation of summer and winter, of night and day, no winds. When Ajax speaks of those conditions which on earth exemplify for man the imperative of change, he is emphasizing the difference between the human condition and the divine. The man who refuses to change, to conform to the pattern of alternation

followed by the forces of nature more dreadful and headstrong than he is, is thinking not like a man, οὐ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονῶν, but like a god.

In the world of time and change, the world in which human beings act and suffer, nothing remains forever. Permanence, stability, single-mindedness — these are the conditions and qualities of gods, not of men. For man the word αἰεί is an illusion; man's condition is described by other words, words which define the fluctuating, unstable nature of human reality. The verb ἀλάσσειν, for example. The night brings a situation different from that of the day (ἐνῆλλακται, 208); "a god," says Menelaus, "has reversed the situation" (ἐνῆλλαξεν, 1060), and the same speaker, gloating over the death of Ajax which gives him his turn to use violence, sums it all up in a powerful phrase: "these things go by turn and turn about" (ἔρπει παραλλάξ ταῦτα, 1087). The play is full of gnomic, antithetical lines which stress this theme incessantly: "everyone laughs and weeps, under the dispensation of the god"; "many are friends now and then bitter enemies." And Athena has stated it, in the prologue, as the gods see it: "one day brings to their setting and raises up again all human things."

In such a world human attitudes do not remain fixed; they flow, like water. "The gratitude of one who has been loved flows away," Tecmessa says accusingly to Ajax (ἀπορρεῖ, 523),<sup>93</sup> and Teucer similarly reproaches Agamemnon: "how swiftly among men the memory of gratitude felt to a fellow man flows away, and is proved traitor" (διαρρεῖ, 1267).<sup>94</sup> It is no accident that Ajax, in his last speech, dwells insistently on the fact that the sword on which he intends to throw himself is "set" and "fixed." "There it stands firm" (ἔστηκεν, 815), he says. "It is fixed in the enemy Trojan soil" (πέπηγε, 819). "I fixed it myself" (ἔπηξα, 821). The sword is still fixed in the earth (πηκτόν, 907) when Tecmessa finds him impaled on it. The repetition of this word (the natural opposite of ρεῖν, to flow)<sup>95</sup> defines the context of Ajax's suicide. The steady immovable sword on which he kills himself is the one fixed point in a world of which change and movement are the only modes of existence.

The great speech of Ajax defines the world of time which is man's place and illustrates the impracticality of the traditional code. But it does something more. It discusses the plight of man, time's subject, not only in terms of his relation to gods and his private relation to other men, friends and enemies, but also in terms of his relation to the community. The dilemma of Ajax illuminates not only the metaphysical and moral aspects of man's life on earth, but also the political and social.<sup>96</sup>

Ajax is presented to us in this play as the last of the heroes. His death is the death of the old Homeric (and especially Achillean) individual

ethos which had for centuries of aristocratic rule served as the dominant ideal of man's nobility and action, but which by the fifth century had been successfully challenged and largely superseded (in spite of its late and magnificent flowering in the poetry of Pindar) by an outlook more suitable to the conditions of the polis, an outlook which reached its most developed form in democratic Athens. Ajax is presented to us throughout in terms of this heroic morality; this is the function of the wealth of Homeric reminiscence which editors have noted in the language of the play. The words used by Ajax and about him recall the epic atmosphere of the heroic age, and since many of these words are spoken by his enemies, we are shown a full critique of the ideal, its greatness and also its limitations.

Ajax is μέγας, "big, great."<sup>97</sup> His whip in the first scene is big, and so are his words; his strength and courage are "the greatest," and for the sailors of the chorus he is one of the "great-souled" men on whose protection lesser men such as themselves depend.<sup>98</sup> But this word can be used by his enemies with a different emphasis; to them he is a "big body" — Agamemnon calls him a "big ox".<sup>99</sup> The great size of his physical frame and of his ambitions makes him a man apart, alone, μόνος. This is a word which is applied to him over and over again — in peace as well as war he is a man alone.<sup>100</sup> He is a man of deeds, ἔργα,<sup>101</sup> not words, and when he does speak he speaks with an unassailable sense of his own superiority; his speech is κόμπος, the unabashed assertion of one's own worth.<sup>102</sup> His courage is described in words which recall the warriors of the *Iliad*: he is valorous, ἄλκιμος, impetuous, θούριος, blazing, αἰθων, stout-hearted, εὐκάρδιος, and terrible, δεινός.<sup>103</sup> His courage and audacity, τόλμη, θράσος, are exercised for a personal objective, fame, κλέος, εὐκλεία, and for the prize of supremacy in battle, ἀριστεία, of which he has been deprived by the award of Achilles' arms to Odysseus.<sup>104</sup> These are all qualities of a man who is self-sufficient; he has also the defects of these qualities. He has no sense of responsibility to anyone or anything except his own heroic conception of himself and the need to live up to the great reputation of his father before him. He is stubborn-minded, στερεόφρων, unthinking, ἀφρόνως, ἀφροντίστως, uncalculating, δυσλόγιστος, unadaptable, δυστράπελος, and, a word which is applied to him repeatedly, he is ὠμός, raw, wild, untamed — his nature is that of the wild animal, the figure in which he is seen in the hunting images of the prologue.<sup>105</sup>

Qualities and defects alike mark him as unfit for the type of ordered, cohesive society in which the individual's position is based on consent and cooperation. And this is brought home to us sharply by the presence



of Odysseus, who is by nature most adapted to the conditions of life in the polis, the ordered society. All that we hear about Odysseus in the play comes from the lips of his enemies, so that the words which describe the man most adapted to society are all hostile estimates. But the words of Odysseus himself, and still more his actions, show us the other side of the coin. As in the case of Ajax and the heroic ideal, we are shown both the qualities and the defects of the Odyssean ideal.

Odysseus is willing to take direction from the goddess. "In all things," he says to her, "I am steered by your hand, as in the past so in the future."<sup>106</sup> There could be no clearer contrast with the unruliness of Ajax, as we see it in the prologue and hear of it later from the messenger. Ajax sums up this capacity of Odysseus to take direction in a contemptuous phrase: Odysseus, he says, is "the instrument of evil always." The chorus sees Odysseus as a man of words; "shaping whispered words, he persuades," and his lies are "persuasive".<sup>107</sup> Persuasion is of course the normal mode of operation for a man in an ordered and lawful society, and in the last scene of the play, where Odysseus persuades Agamemnon to allow burial for Ajax's body, we see this "persuasion" in a different and better light. To Ajax, Odysseus is a man who "would do anything",<sup>108</sup> a man "who will put up with much", *πολύτλας* (a recurrent phrase used about Ajax by his friends is that he "would not have put up with . . .", *οὐκ ἂν ἔτλη*). But here again, in the last scene of the play we are shown another side of this tolerance; Odysseus will indeed "do anything" — he will go so far as to pity his enemy in distress and earn Agamemnon's contemptuous rebuke by fighting for that enemy's right to honorable burial. But it is only to be expected that Ajax should see all these qualities of Odysseus as defects, for he despises and rejects the conditions of human society in which they are the highest virtues.

Ajax, like Achilles before him,<sup>109</sup> is a law unto himself; his ideal is the Homeric one: "always to be best, and superior to the others." The virtues demanded of a man in a society of equals — tolerance, adaptability, persuasiveness — have no place in his make-up. In fact, the situation in which he finds himself at the beginning of the play is a result of his defiance of the community; he has reacted with violence against the decision of the judges who awarded the prize for bravery, the arms of Achilles, not to him but to his enemy Odysseus. Sophocles does not elaborate on the nature of the tribunal which made this award, but he describes it in terms which clearly associate it with the court of law as the fifth-century Athenian audience knew it: the words *δικασταῖς* (1136), *ψηφίζειν* (449), and *κριταῖς* (1243) do not occur in any other Sophoclean

play, and they are all words which conjure up the atmosphere of the contemporary Athenian court.<sup>110</sup>

But Ajax recognizes no such communal authority. He sees things always in terms of individuals; for him the award of the arms of Achilles to Odysseus is the work of the Atridae, who "procured" (ἐπράξαν, 446) them for the man who "would do anything." If he had had his way, he says, they would never have lived to "vote such a judgment against any other man."<sup>111</sup> If Achilles had been alive to award the armor (again he sees it purely in terms of personalities), there would have been no question; "no one else would have seized (ἐμαρψεν, 444) them but me" — the word betrays his natural violence and his utter incapacity to understand what the concept of communal decision means.

And yet, in this claim, he is surely right. Achilles *would* have recognized a kindred spirit. More, he would have recognized the truth that Ajax is the greatest of the Achaean warriors after him, a truth which Odysseus himself states at the end of the play, thereby admitting that the tribunal which awarded him the arms made the wrong decision.<sup>112</sup> It is no accident that Ajax, in the later fifth-century tradition, is the great prototype of the simple heroic man caught in the snares of the legal process; he appears in this context not only in Pindar,<sup>113</sup> but also in Plato's *Apology of Socrates*, where, together with Palamedes (another opponent of Odysseus), he is described as "one of the men of old who met his death through an unjust judgment."<sup>114</sup>

But the decision was to be expected. The appointment of a tribunal to award the armor of Achilles is a mythic event which marks the passing of the heroic age, the age which Achilles dominated while he lived, an age of fiercely independent, undisciplined, individual heroism. The rewards life has to offer will no longer be fought for and seized by the strongest, whose authority is his might, but will be assigned by the community. And once the decision is taken out of the hands of the individual and entrusted to a representative body, it is inevitable that the man most fitted to shine in courts and assemblies, to persuade, to yield at the right time, to control his feelings, to intrigue, to "do anything", will triumph over the man who lives by imposing his will on his fellow men and on circumstances by the sheer force of his heroic nature.

This political and social context of the dilemma of Ajax lies behind an important section of his great speech. His vision of the world as a pattern of change and concession, exemplified in the disciplined succession of the seasons, starts from and returns to the phenomenon of change in the relationship between man and man. And as is to be expected of an Attic dramatist writing in the fifth century B.C., this relationship is described

in terms which recall Athenian democratic procedure. This part of Ajax's speech is full of words which for the audience were of contemporary significance. The Atridae, Ajax says (668ff.), are rulers, so one must give in to them: ἄρχοντές εἰσιν ὥσθ' ὑπεικτέον. This use of the participle ἄρχοντες as a noun occurs only here in Sophocles, and is of course the usual word for the Athenian magistrates.<sup>115</sup> The lines which follow, with their description of the orderly succession of the seasons, of night and day, reinforce the point, for the archons did not remain permanently in office, but yielded annually to their successors. This implied comparison explains the appearance of the unexpected word τιμαῖς in v. 670 — a word which suggests the meanings "dignities, prerogatives, office."<sup>116</sup> Things dreadful and most headstrong yield to authority, to office. A few lines later "the weary circle of night *resigns* in favor of white-horsed day," for ἐξίσταται is a word frequently used of resignation, withdrawal, in a political context.<sup>117</sup>

Ajax's new vision of change in the natural world is expressed in terms that point to the operation of change and alternation in human society; these terms prepare our minds for what follows — his scathing rejection of the parallel phenomenon in human relations. "We must hate our enemy as one we will one day love, and I shall be disposed to serve and help a friend as one who will not remain so forever." It was notorious that in democratic states men changed sides (and with them friends and enemies) fast and lightly; later in the play Agamemnon describes this adaptability, shown by Odysseus, with the word ἐμπληκτος, "mobile, capricious" — the word Thucydides uses to characterize the swift shifting of allegiances in the bloody troubles at Corcyra.<sup>118</sup> The audience which heard Ajax speak these words had no doubt about his attitude to this mobility, for he was echoing a saying of Bias of Priene, which they all knew: "Love as if you would one day hate. For most people are bad."<sup>119</sup> Ajax goes on to complete the quotation, and makes it clear that this cynical prospect is not for him. But Sophocles, by a seemingly insignificant change in the wording of the old saw, made it contemporary and pointed: "For, to the many, the harbor of friendship is untrustworthy." "To the many," τοῖς πολλοῖσι — this phrase, unexampled elsewhere in Sophocles, is a cliché of Athenian democratic language,<sup>120</sup> and puts Ajax's contemptuous refusal to live as other men do in terms of the society of Sophocles' own time and place.

Ajax is indeed unfit for the new age, the political institutions which impose rotation and cession of power, which recognize and encourage change. "Unadaptable" (δυστράπελος) the chorus calls him later in the play (914). It is a significant word (and occurs only here in the whole



range of Greek tragedy), for it is the opposite of the word Pericles uses in the Thucydidean Funeral Speech to describe one of the key qualities of the Athenian democratic ideal — *εὐτράπελος*, “adaptable, versatile.”<sup>121</sup>

Ajax belongs to a world which for Sophocles and his audience had passed away — an aristocratic, heroic, half-mythic world which had its limitations but also its greatness, a world in which father was like son and nothing ever changed, in which great friendships, and also great hatreds, endured forever.

But in the world as Ajax has at last come to see it, nothing remains forever (*ὥς αἰὲν οὐ μενοῦντα*). The man best equipped to live in that world is of course Odysseus. When Ajax makes his contemptuous formulation of the way the πολλοί must live, with a nicely calculated balance of love and hate, he is thinking above all of Odysseus. And the Odysseus of the play uses exactly the language which Ajax, with fierce sarcasm, rejects. “Many are friends now and then turn into bitter enemies,”<sup>122</sup> says Odysseus to Agamemnon. “I am ready,” he says to Teucer, “to be just as much a friend now as I was an enemy then.”<sup>123</sup> Agamemnon calls him “inconstant” (*ἐμπληκτοι*, 1358) and dismisses his attitude as selfish (1366). But in the circumstances the attitude of Odysseus is noble. His change of sides, his renunciation of hatred for his dead enemy, is magnanimous, and casts a fierce light on the triumphant hatred of the Atridae, who pursue the old morality to its logical and atrocious extreme — the exposure of the enemy’s corpse. It is true that Odysseus explains his new attitude throughout in terms of self-interest. “I pity him . . . considering my own case as much as his,” he says to Athena. And to Agamemnon’s indignant question, “You want me to allow him burial?” he answers, “Yes. For I too shall come to this.” “Every man works for himself,” says Agamemnon bitterly, and the answer of Odysseus is: “Who else should I work for?” Odysseus does not try, as the Atridae do, to dress his motives up as moral or political principle; he is thinking of himself, and he says so. But it is an enlightened self-interest. It stems from his vision and acceptance of the tragic situation of man, his imprisonment in time and circumstance. “We know nothing sure, we are adrift.” “All of us that live are nothing but images, weightless shadows.” These lines are the real basis of Odysseus’ attitude. The ruin of an enemy, far from being an occasion for joy, is another human defeat, a portent of one’s own inevitable fall. The recognition of time imposes a tolerance and restraint which is the mood of the new age, and of Athenian democracy at its best. The individual can no longer blaze like Achilles, a star brighter than all the rest, but must take his place in a community,

"observe degree, priority and place, office and custom in all line of order," adapt himself, learn discipline and persuasion, accept the yoke of time and change.

Menelaus and Agamemnon, like Ajax, hold fast to the old morality. They do what Athena does and what Odysseus will not do: they exult in Ajax's fall. They mock his corpse, are ready to trample on it, and intend to prevent its burial. They take full advantage of the circumstances which make them victorious over Ajax. "We couldn't rule him alive," says Menelaus shamelessly, "but we will dead." They accept the old morality, in their hour of triumph, for all it is worth. But their attitude does not stem from an obsession with permanence such as that which holds Ajax in its grip. They talk and act not in terms of heroic constancy, of "always," but in terms of Ajax's great speech of exploration and refusal; like Odysseus, they recognize and accept the world of time and change. But they are incapable of the tragic sense that world demands. Menelaus, like Odysseus, can see himself in his enemy's place. "If one of the gods had not extinguished his attempt on us, *we* would be lying there dead and disgraced," he says over Ajax's body. He understands even more. "These things go by alternation," he says.<sup>124</sup> "Before this *he* was the fiery pride and violence, and now *I* am the one with big thoughts." But from this vision of time's revenges he does not draw the Odyssean conclusion. "I forbid you to bury his body," he goes on.

And Agamemnon shows the same insensibility. "You rashly insult me . . ." he says to Teucer, "in defense of a man who is dead, who is now a shadow."<sup>125</sup> That last word reminds us of Odysseus' description of all human beings — "images or weightless shadows." Agamemnon's words expose his failure to understand the attitude which acceptance of the world's change and flux demands.

The two kings bluntly and brutally enjoy their triumph in the name of the old morality. The ignobility of their attitude is emphasized by the tragic humility of Odysseus, who abandons the traditional code at the moment of victory and exultation, and even more by the stubborn defiance of Ajax, who reaffirms its validity in the moment of defeat.

Odysseus and the Atridae, with different reactions, recognize and accept the lot of man in time. Ajax recognizes it, in fact he is the one who defines it in his famous speech, but he will not accept it. He claims eternity, permanence, the absolute,<sup>126</sup> and if the world denies him what he asks, he will leave it. His son, after him, is to be like him: "Lift him up. He will not flinch at the sight of blood . . . He must be broken like a colt to his father's raw ways, become like him in his nature. My son, be luckier than your father, but in everything else, like him." He is speaking

in terms of *ἀεὶ*, "always." His son will carry on his personality. So will Teucer, who after Ajax's death is as intransigent and undaunted as his greater brother.

After the great speech of Ajax, the chorus impulsively concludes that he has come to terms with the world of change he describes so eloquently. They repeat his words.<sup>127</sup> "All things great time damps and fires."<sup>128</sup> I would say that nothing is impossible now that, beyond expectation, Ajax's mind has been changed." But we know that Ajax worked his way through to a knowledge of the world of time only to reject it. And we see him for the last time with the sword of his friend-enemy Hector, its hilt buried in the ground;<sup>129</sup> he makes his last speech not to men, but to eternal beings and things.

He calls on Zeus to bring Teucer to the defense of his body, on Hermes to put him to sleep easily, and on the Erinyes, ever-maiden, ever-seeing, for vengeance — vengeance on the sons of Atreus and on the whole Achaean army. As the confidence of Odysseus contracts so that he cannot contemplate the suffering even of his worst enemy without pity, so the confidence of Ajax widens to include in his prayer for vengeance all those who unlike him accept the shabby world of time. He will be absolutely alone. His last words, the address to the sun and the farewell to the landscapes of home and of Troy, are the words of a man who is already beyond time. "I address you for the very last time and never afterwards again."<sup>130</sup> "Never" is as absolute a statement as "always": he used it boastfully to the goddess once,<sup>131</sup> but now it will not be contradicted by circumstances, belied by time. It lies in his power, and his alone, to make it true, and in a few moments, with a swift effortless leap,<sup>132</sup> he will do so. He has left men and time far behind; his final words are addressed to things eternal, unchanging, timeless. "Daylight, holy soil of my native Salamis, foundation of my father's hearth, famous Athens and its people, my kinsmen, streams and rivers of this place, and the plains of Troy, I address you all — farewell, you who have kept me alive. This is Ajax's last word to you. All else I have to say, I shall say to those below, in Hades." He is going, as he said himself, where he must go. "All-powerful sleep," he said in his great speech, "releases what he has enchained, does not keep forever what he has seized." But Hades does not release those he has taken; death holds them forever. In death Ajax enters the kingdom of "always." His tomb, as the chorus proclaims prophetically while the dispute about his burial is still going on, will be "remembered forever" (*ἀείμνηστος*, 1166).

The nature of man's life in time, its instability, is recognized by all three parties, Ajax, Odysseus, the Atridae. The only code of conduct



proper to such a vision of the human condition is that of Odysseus, a tolerant and tragic humility. Ajax, who stubbornly maintains the old code and its claims for permanence, renounces life. But the Atridae, fully conscious of the instability of all things human, stick by the old code and blindly enjoy their moment of triumph. They condemn themselves out of their own mouths. Their calculating appeals to order, discipline, reasons of state, fail to mask the ignobility of their attitude, which is exposed by the tragic acceptance of Odysseus on the one hand and the tragic defiance of Ajax on the other.

Ajax's defiance of time and its imperative of change consists not in his suicide (which was in any case his only way of escape from ignominious death)<sup>133</sup> but in his final reassertion of hatred, his passionate vindication of the old heroic code. The problem which faces Ajax is not whether to live or to die, for die he must, but in what mood to die. He dies, as he had lived, hating his enemies. He does not know, and we are made to feel that he would not want to know, that his most hated enemy, Odysseus, will champion his cause against the Atridae. He would rather die than have to recognize Odysseus as a friend. He dies to perpetuate his hatred. His last fierce, vengeful, and beautiful speech is an attempt to arrest, for one man at least, the ebb and flow of relationship between man and man; he may be utterly alone, but he at least will hate his enemies forever.

His brother Teucer understands this. That is why he will not let Odysseus take part in the burial of Ajax. Ajax killed himself to defy a world in which he might one day have to help or feel gratitude to Odysseus. "I shrink from letting you put your hands on his body to help bury him. I am afraid it would offend the dead man."<sup>134</sup> Teucer is right, of course. Ajax hates Odysseus more than any other man. And these words of Teucer remind us, as they must have reminded and were doubtless meant to remind the Athenian audience, of Odysseus' own account, in Homer, of his meeting with the shade of Ajax in the lower world: "Only the shade of Ajax . . . stood apart in anger . . . 'Ajax,' I said, 'so you were not going to<sup>135</sup> forget your anger against me, even in death . . . Come here to me, my lord, hear what I have to say. Subdue your pride and noble spirit.' So I spoke to him. He made no answer, but strode off after the other shades to the dark house of the dead and gone." *Οἷη . . . νόσφιν ἀφειστήκει κεχολωμένη*, alone, apart, in anger. This is the permanence Ajax has chosen. It is an eternity of hatred and loneliness, but it is the permanence he longed for — he will hate always, forgive never. His yearning for the absolute, the permanent, is fulfilled by his everlasting existence as a proud and silent hater of his enemy, alone, but free, free of the shifting pattern of constant change, free of time.



# NOTES

1. Σ on 1123.
2. F. Allègre, *Sophocle* (Lyon, Paris 1905) 103: "méchante et cruelle .. partiale . . . capricieuse enfin . . . un fond de rancune qu'on ne pardonnerait pas à une mortelle." More recently John Moore, in the introduction to his excellent translation (*Sophocles II, The Complete Greek Tragedies*, Chicago 1957), describes the role of Athena as "perplexing, not to say fiendish" (p. 5).
3. The most extreme example of this attitude is to be found in Marshall MacGregor's *Leaves of Hellas* (London 1926) 83-109, "A Military Man."
4. Notable among recent discussions of the *Ajax* are: S. M. Adams, *Sophocles the Playwright* (Toronto 1957) 23-41; C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944) 16-62; I. Errandonea, "Les Quatre Monologues de l'*Ajax* et leur Signification Dramatique," *Les Etudes Classiques*, vol. 26, no. 1 (January 1958) 21-40; J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Ajax of Sophocles* (Leyden 1953); G. M. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama* (Ithaca 1958) 47-49, 101-10, 160-62; Richmond Lattimore, *The Poetry of Greek Tragedy* (Baltimore 1958) 62-80; F. J. H. Letters, *The Life and Work of Sophocles* (London, New York 1953) 123-46; Ivan M. Linforth, *Three Scenes in Sophocles' Ajax* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1954); C. H. Whitman, *Sophocles* (Cambridge, Mass. 1951) 59-80 (cf. also index). See also (for bibliography as well as discussion) Albin Lesky, *Die Tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* (Göttingen 1956) 108-13.
5. *Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study* (London 1939).
6. *Form and Meaning in Drama* (London 1956). See pp. 179-98.
7. *Greek Tragedy* 123. Cf. also p. 122: "The end is rather the triumph of Odysseus than the rehabilitation of Ajax."
8. This point is emphasized by Teucer's διώκων ἀξιχνοσκοπούμενος (997), cf. ἰχνεύω πάλαι (20), κατ' ἰχνος ἔσσω (32).
9. The words of lines 1319-24 define the tone for us: βοήν . . . αἰσχίστους λόγους . . . φλαῦρα . . . ἔπη κακά . . . αἰσχρά.
10. Apart from the *Ajax*, the only certain appearances of Olympian gods on stage in Sophocles (the deified Heracles of the *Philoctetes* belongs to a different category) occur in the *Scyrioi* and the *Ichneutae*, both of them satyr plays.
11. *Ajax* 683: ἄπιστός . . . ἑταιρείας λιμήν. O.C. 611: βλασάνει δ' ἀπιστία. *Ajax* 1359: ἡ κάρτα πολλοὶ νῦν φίλοι καὶ θις πικροί. Cf. O.C. 614-15: ἐν ὑστέρω χρόνῳ τὰ τερπνὰ πικρὰ γίνεται καὶ θις φίλα.
12. In both Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.35 and Plato *Meno* 71e, it is proposed as a definition of a man's arete, ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν. In Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.14 (and, for what it is worth, in Plato *Clit.* 410a), it is attributed to Socrates himself. In Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.11, it is counted as a mark of the greatness of the younger Cyrus that he followed this code. In the *Choephoroi* of Aeschylus (120-23) Electra asks the chorus whether a prayer for an avenger to kill in return is pious in the eyes of the gods (εὐσεβῇ θεῶν πάρα;), and receives the indignant answer: "How could it fail to be? To repay one's enemy with evil!" (πῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν ἐχθρὸν ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς;). Cf. also Plato *Crito* 49b: ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, and Isocr. 1.26.
13. *LSJ*<sup>9</sup> 2.2 s.v.
14. *Rep.* 335e.
15. Arch. 65 (Bergk): ἐν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα / τὸν κακῶς <με> δρῶντα δεινοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς.

16. Solon 13.5ff. (Bergk): εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρόν, / τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν.

17. 869-72: "Ὡς μοι ἔπειτα πέσοι μέγας οὐρανὸς εὐρύς ὑπερθεῖν . . . εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ τοῖσιν μὲν ἐπαρκέσω οἷ με φιλοῦσιν / τοῖς δ' ἐχθροῖς ἀνίη καὶ μέγα πῆμ' ἔσομαι. Cf. also 337-39, quoted below, note 52.

18. Pyth. 2.83ff. (Bowra): φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν, ποτὶ δ' ἐχθρόν ἄτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκην ὑποθεύσομαι. Isthm. 4.52: χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ' ἀμυνῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν.

19. Apart from the passage referred to in Plato *Rep.*, 331e (which seems to mean what Polemarchus says it does), Xenophon attributes the idea to Simonides in *Hiero* 6.12 and 2.2.

20. Matt. 5.43: Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου καὶ μισήσεις τὸν ἐχθρόν σου.

21. *Rep.* I, 334c-35b.

22. Cf. Ellendt, *Lexicon Sophocleum* s.vv. ἐχθρός, δυσμενής, ἐνστάτης, πολέμιος, ἔχθρα, ἔχθω, ἐχθαίρω, ἐναντίος, φθόνος, and μισῶ (on which cf. Kirkwood, p. 231).

23. It still governs his mind in his search for a course of action; he rejects the idea of a glorious death attacking the Trojans because it would benefit his enemies, the Atridae (469: ἀλλ' ὧδέ γ' Ἀτρείδας ἂν εὐφράναιμί που).

24. 96: κόμπος πάρεστι . . .

25. It is remarkable that Thucydides, in his description of the savage party strife on Corcyra, uses almost exactly the same phrase to describe recourse to violence (3.83.3): πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρουν (contrasted to λόγοις in the preceding clause).

26. Sophocles makes this point with care. Athena describes her action in terms of Ajax's vision (cf. especially 51ff.: δυσφόρους ἐπ' ὀμμασι/γνώμας βαλοῦσα) and then reassures Odysseus by a promise of further action of the same kind (69-70: ὀμμάτων ἀποστροφούς / αὐγὰς ἀπείρξω σὴν πρόσοψιν εἰσιδεῖν. 85: ἐγὼ σκοτώσω βλέφαρα). Lattimore (p. 67) speaks of her interference as "bewitchment, affecting not the heart and brain but the testimony of the senses."

27. Cf. 51: ἀπείργω. 53: ἐκτρέπω. 60: ὤτρυνον, εἰσέβαλλον εἰς ἔρκη. 70: ἀπείρξω. See also 115: φείδου μηδὲν ὧν περ ἐννοεῖς — the idea of whipping Odysseus is already in Ajax's mind. (Macbeth says to the vision of the dagger: "Thou marshall'st me the way that I was going.") When later Ajax lays the responsibility for his disgrace on Athena (401ff.), ἀλλὰ μ' ἂ Διὸς ἀλκίμα θεὸς ὀλέθριον αἰκίζεις, he is blaming her not for his murderous attack, but for its failure, as is clear from his later statement (450ff.): ἡ Διὸς . . . θεὰ / ἥδη μ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς χεῖρ' ἐπευθύνοντ' ἐμῇ / ἔσφηλεν ἐμβαλοῦσα λυσσώδη νόσον. That is, the madness consisted of a failure of vision, a delusion, not the intent to murder. These passages make it clear that Athena's earlier statement, φοιτῶντ' ἄνδρα μανιάσι νόσοις (59), is another reference to the distorted vision of the hero. Teucer (953-54) can use loose terms which suggest Athena's responsibility for the whole affair (τοιόνδε . . . Πάλλας φυτεύει πῆμ' Ὀδυσσέως χάριν), but both Athena and Ajax know better.

28. 303: γέλων πολύν. Cf. Kamerbeek *ad loc.*

29. This scene has an important dramatic function: how could the Achaeans learn that Ajax intended to kill kings, not cattle, without Ajax's self-exposure before Odysseus? Athena explains that Odysseus is to act as witness (67): ὥς πᾶσιν Ἀργεῖοισιν εἰσιδὼν θροῆς.

30. S. M. Adams sees a deeper meaning in the use of this word. "When she says she is Ajax's ally she is somehow speaking the literal truth" (p. 28). He states

the "theme of the drama" as: "How Athena ensured that Ajax, though he had offended against her, should have honour after death" (p. 24).

31. Cf. 38: *φίλη δέσποινα*, and 36-37.

32. 124. οὐδὲν τὸ τοῦτου μάλλον ἢ τοῦμόν σκοπῶν.

33. 78: *ἐχθρός . . . καὶ τανῦν ἔτι*.

34. οἶον ἀφορῶν εἰς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τὰ πάντων κοινά, says the scholiast on v. 124.

35. 126: *εἶδωλ' ὅσοι περ ζῶμεν καὶ κούφην σκιάν*.

36. Cf. Allègre, p. 104: "Sans le vouloir, Sophocle arrive au résultat qu'Euripide poursuivait de parti pris." Cf. also Bowra, p. 35.

37. Cf. Σ on 79: *σκληρὸν μὲν τὸ λέγειν ἐπεγγελαῖν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀλλὰ θεός ἐστιν οὐκ εὐλαβουμένη τὸ νεμεσητόν*. Lesky (p. 110) puts it well: "Die Sophrosyne ist bei Sophokles nicht Sache der Götter, die Menschen haben sie zu wahren. . . ."

38. Matt. 5.48.

39. Note *ἄλλοισιν* (774) and *τάλλα* (112). In both cases he gives her permission to operate in spheres other than the one which directly concerns him.

40. 27: *αὐτοῖς ποιμνίων ἐπιστάταις*.

41. Cf. note 29.

42. *Inferno* 19.90ff.

43. *Inferno* 20.28.

44. 79: *γέλως ἡδιστος*. 105: *ἡδιστος . . . δεσμώτης*.

45. 111: *αἰκίση*. 403: *αἰκίζει*.

46. The idea that gods should be better and wiser than men is a Euripidean commonplace. Cf., for example, *Hipp.* 120, *Bacch.* 1348.

47. 777: *οὐ κατ' ἀνθρωπον φρονῶν*. 760-61: *ὅστις ἀνθρώπου φύσιν/βλαστῶν ἔπειτα μὴ κατ' ἀνθρωπον φρονῇ*.

48. Kirkwood (p. 102) claims that "the Ajax of the prologue is mad . . . in the rest of the play there is not the same blind passion." But in 387-91 Ajax wishes he could kill Odysseus, the Atridae, and finally himself, and in his last speech calls for vengeance on the whole Achaean army (843-44) — a vengeance far greater than the one he planned when mad.

49. Cf. the common formula *Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι*, and especially Thuc. 5.47 (the text of the treaty between Athens and Argos): *ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὦν ἄρχουσιν*. . . . In Teucer's argument (1098), *σύμμαχον* clearly means "inferior," "subordinate"; it is contrasted with *αὐτοῦ κρατῶν* (1099).

50. This is a word characteristic of Ajax. Cf. also 991: *ἐφίεθ' ἀνὴρ κείνος*.

51. 117: *τοιάνδ' αἶε μοι σύμμαχον παρεστάναι*.

52. 337-39: *Ζεὺς μοι τῶν τε φίλων δοίη τίσιν οἷ με φιλοῦσιν / τῶν τ' ἐχθρῶν μείζον, Κύρνε, δυνησαμένων / χούτως ἂν δοκέοιμι μετ' ἀνθρώπων θεὸς εἶναι*. . . .

53. 13: *ὥς παρ' εἰδυίας μάθης*.

54. *Rep.* 335a: *δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλέπειν*.

55. 132-33: *τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας / θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακοὺς*. These closing lines of the prologue, so emphatically placed and coming from so authoritative a source, cannot be ignored or passed over lightly. Whitman's subtle and eloquent attempt (pp. 67-70) to limit and reduce their importance for the play is in the last analysis no more acceptable than Kamerbeek's cavalier dismissal (p. 45): "These words are as devoid of import as the ferocious passage at the end of *Electra*."

56. 131: *ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν / ἅπαντα τὰνθρώπεια*.



57. 647: φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται . . .

58. 1052-4: ξύμμαχον τε καὶ φίλον . . . ἐχθίῳ Φρυγῶν. Note ἐλπίσαντες, 1052, and cf. 648: κοῦκ ἔστ' ἄελπτον οὐδέν. . . .

59. 487: ἐλευθέρου . . . πατρός. 489: νῦν δ' εἰμὶ δουλῇ.

60. This duel is mentioned by Teucer (1283ff.). Kitto (*Form and Meaning* 193ff.) attaches great importance to it; he sees Ajax's death on the sword of Hector and Hector's death dragged by the belt of Ajax as the completion of *Dike*: "They fought their duel; neither could prevail. Now each has killed the other; the interrupted pattern is complete."

61. In the *Iliad*, Ajax and Odysseus lead the embassy to Achilles (9), and later (11. 484-86) Ajax covers the wounded Odysseus with his shield.

62. Cf. Lesky (112): "Der Gedanke wurde dann mehrfach variiert, aber im allgemeinen hat man daran festgehalten, dass es sich um eine richtige Trugrede handelt."

63. Bowra is of course conscious of this difficulty and states it frankly: "To our appalled surprise he has decided to kill himself" (43); "Ajax's decision is intelligible only on the supposition that he is not master of himself but the victim of superior forces and powers. Naturally he does not understand this, and cannot say anything about it. We must base our conclusions on the way in which he speaks and acts" (43-44); "We may assume that since Athene's anger is on him as it was when he was mad, it is again the cause of his fury" (p. 44). (Italics mine.)

64. 647: κρύπτεται. 658: κρύψω. 899: κρυφαίω.

65. 1404-5: τοὶ δ' ὑψίβατον / τρίποδ' ἀμφίπυρον λουτρῶν ὁσίων / θέσθ' ἐπικάιρον. In Sophocles this word (with one exception, *Trach.* 634) refers either to libations for the dead (*El.* 84 and 434) or to the washing of the body (*Ant.* 1201, *El.* 445, 1139). In *O.C.* 1599, 1602, it refers to the preparations for death made by Oedipus. Cf. also Eur. *Pho.* 1667, *Hec.* 611, 780.

66. Cf. Ellendt, s.v.: "infra: item deorsum. Illud non dicitur nisi de inferis locis, mortuis, Dis" — a judgment borne out by his lists. In this passage he says of Ajax, "quasi inferis devoturus."

67. ἐκοίμισε (674) reappears in the final speech in a significant context (832): 'Ερμῆν χθόνιον εὖ με κοιμίσαι. Kitto (*Form and Meaning* 190) points out that ἐκχωροῦσιν, ἐξίσταται (671, 672) are "ominous"; he translates them "make room" and "get out of the way."

68. 807-8: ἡπατημένη / καὶ τῆς παλαιᾶς χάριτος ἐκβεβλημένη.

69. This essential point is clarified by Kurt von Fritz, "Zur Interpretation des Aias," *Rheinisches Museum* 83 (1934) 113-28.

70. The best known is Wolfgang Schadewaldt's description of the speech as a λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος in "Sophokles, Aias und Antigone," *Neu Wege zur Antike* 8 (1929) 72-78: "Aias spricht eine figurierte Rede, einen λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος, wie die Rhetorik sagen würde . . . So kommen wir zu dem Schluss: die Aiasrede ist ein λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος in dem der Dichter den Helden seinen Gesinnungswandel, mehr aus sich selbst also zu den anderen redend, darlegen und eben dadurch die Gefährten täuschen lässt." (In a note on page 78, he puts it more simply: "'Täuschung' nicht 'Lüge' ist. . ."). The term is adopted from the late rhetorical treatise, *περὶ ἐσχηματισμένων* (*Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, ed. Usener, Radermacher, 3.295ff.), but Schadewaldt's importation of it into the argument simply substitutes a technical vocabulary for a moral one, and solves nothing. The two examples of such λόγοι ἐσχηματισμένοι cited in support by



Max Pohlenz do not help either: "ein λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος, wie ihn bei Homer der als Bettler verkleidete Odysseus an seine Gattin richtet oder Agamemnon an das kampfes müde Heer, wenn er es auf die Probe stellen will" (*Die Griechische Tragödie* 2 [Göttingen 1954] 174; cf. also Erläuterungen, p. 74). The comparison of Ajax to Odysseus (and the Homeric Odysseus at that, whom Athena congratulates on his sharp practice, cunning, and tricks, 13.291-92) is not felicitous (cf. Kurt von Fritz [above, note 69] 114), and the speech of Agamemnon in *Iliad* 2 is an attempt to gauge the temper of the army, a speech designed deliberately to produce a certain reaction against itself, a provocation, in fact. Even if Ajax's speech is meant to produce an effect on his hearers (but see below), the comparison of the two speeches does not seem as "lehrreich" as Pohlenz (Erläuterungen, p. 74) claims.

71. Bowra, p. 40.

72. Cf. also D. W. Lucas, *The Greek Tragic Poets* (London 1950) 122: "his possible fear that the Chorus might obstruct his suicide scarcely provides an adequate motive." Lattimore (cf. pp. 69, 71, and 66, with notes) maintains that the chorus thinks Ajax mad throughout, and in order to get rid of them ("the shipmates of Ajax, who believe they are attending a madman, cannot plausibly let him go away unattended," 69) he must convince them he is sane. But at 481-82 they certainly do not talk as if they thought him mad, and in the ode which precedes his speech where they *do* talk in terms of madness, they are evidently prepared for his suicide, in fact vv. 635ff. sound almost like approval of the idea. (Cf. Σ on v. 635) It is noticeable, too, that they put up no opposition to his going into his tent at 580ff., where he has made it clear that he is going to kill himself, and may very well do it inside the tent.

73. Impatient, harsh lines like 293, 342-43, 540, 543, 586-95, have built up for us a picture of a man who is not likely to allow interference or even argument.

74. That this approach to the problem has not been explored may be due to the influence of Wolfgang Schadewaldt's authoritative *Monolog und Selbstgespräch* (Berlin 1926), which rules out deliberative monologue for Sophocles ("die erhaltenen Stücke keine Erwägung in der Form der Selbstäußerung aufweisen," p. 91). Schadewaldt claims that *Selbstgespräch*, the earliest example of which is to be found in Aeschylus *Prom.* (88ff.; cf. Schadewaldt, p. 51), was brought to its full development by Euripides (p. 93 and *passim*) but neglected by Sophocles: "Das Problem des inneren Zwiespaltes, welches die Vorbedingung für die erwägende Selbstäußerung ist, hat im Boden der sophokleischen Kunst nicht Wurzeln schlagen und sich zur Gestalt auswachsen können" (p. 91). But Schadewaldt's brilliant and sensitive monograph is not the last word. Many of his defining characteristics of *Monolog* and *Selbstgespräch* are highly subjective, and many of the general statements (like the one above on Sophocles) much too confident, given the nature of the evidence. And in the case of Ajax's speech Schadewaldt neglects a formal characteristic (see below) which appears to me decisive. Interestingly enough, in his later "Sophokles, Aias und Antigone" he says of Ajax's speech, "mehr aus sich selbst als zu den anderen redend" (p. 78).

75. Cf. Linforth (above, note 4) 18: "All that Ajax has said so far [i.e., up to v. 684] he has said in the hearing of his friends, but, whereas he spoke to them directly at the beginning, he has gradually drifted into the expression of his own inner reflections; he has been thinking aloud, mostly oblivious of his friends, heedless perhaps whether they hear and understand." The phrase "whereas he

spoke to them directly at the beginning," for which (as we shall see) there is no evidence in the text, must be based on Linforth's idea that Ajax at the beginning of his speech is replying, as it were, to the final words of the choral ode: "The first words which Ajax speaks reveal that he has heard the closing strains of the choral song. Similarly Oedipus' first words at his second entrance in *King Oedipus* (216) reveal that he has heard some of the prayers of the chorus in the preceding stasimon" (p. 11). But Oedipus begins by addressing the chorus (*αἰτεῖς* & δ' *αἰτεῖς* . . .) and continues to address the chorus in the second person throughout the speech (cf. 218, 223, 233, 252, 256, etc.). The comparison of these two speeches, in fact, makes clear the unique nature of Ajax's opening.

76. Cf. Max Pohlenz (above, note 70) 176: "wenn dann zu der Täuschungsrede Aias mit Tekmessa aus dem Zelte tritt, zunächst jedoch nur in der dritten Person von ihr spricht, auch die Kameraden des Chores erst am Schluss anredet . . . so ist das noch die archaische Technik, die uns bei Aischylos begegnete, die wir aber bei Sophokles später nie finden."

77. The Sophoclean scholia sometimes point out the dramatist's attention to this point; cf. *Σ* on *Ajax* 1, *Electra* 1: *πρὸς τίνα ὁ λόγος*. . .

78. Cf. 372-76, 379-82, 387-91, 393-409, 412-27. He himself says (591), *τοῖς ἀκούουσιν λέγε*, and Menelaus says of him later (1069-70), *οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπου / λόγων ἀκοῦσαι ζῶν ποτ' ἠθέλησ' ἐμῶν*.

79. Cf. Kamerbeek on 688: "The instruction to Teucer falls outside the deceit." On 689: "This means of course that Teucer must see to Ajax's funeral and take over the care of his sailors." Kirkwood, p. 161: "At the end the meaning is so thinly veiled that except to Ajax's followers, who are ready to grasp at any straw, there can be no deception. When he bids his men to ask Teucer to 'take care of me and have good will toward you, for I am going whither I must' he is scarcely practicing deception at all."

80. The difference between this statement of the chorus and Tecmessa's *ἡπατημένη* (807) is often overlooked. Errandonea, for example (p. 23), says: "De fait, tous deux, la femme et le chœur, en appelleront à la tromperie plus tard, devant le mort."

81. *Nem.* 8.24: *ἄγλωσσον μὲν, ἦτορ δ' ἄλκιμον*.

82. 649: *χὼ δεινὸς ὄρκος*. 1113: *ἀλλ' οὐνεχ' ὄρκων οἶσιν ἦν ἐνὸς μοτος*. This last passage must refer to the oath sworn to Tyndareus, the terms of which were (according to the scholium on this line): *συναγωνίζεσθαι τῷ γαμοῦντι αὐτὴν καὶ συστρατεύειν εἴ τις ἀρπαγὴ γένοιτο περὶ τὴν Ἑλένην τῷ γήμαντι*. For a different explanation of 649, cf. Linforth, pp. 13-14.

83. For the suggestions of the word *στόμα*, cf. Jebb's note *ad loc.*

84. Cf. Eur. fr. 360 (*Erechtheus*) 28-29: *τὰ μητέρων δὲ δάκρυ' ὅταν πέμπη τέκνα / πολλοὺς ἐθήλυν' εἰς μάχην ὀρμωμένους*. Xen. *Oec.* 4.2: *σωμάτων . . . θηλυνομένων* as a result of *καθῆσθαι καὶ σκιατραφεῖσθαι . . . καὶ πρὸς πῦρ ἡμερεύειν*.

85. *Σ* on v. 666: *ἐπιφθόνως ἔφρασεν ἐν εἰρωνείᾳ ἀντιστρέψας τὴν τάξιν* ἔδει γὰρ εἰπεῖν θεοὺς μὲν *σέβειν* εἵκειν δὲ *Ἀτρεΐδαις*. For *σέβειν* in Sophocles, cf. Ellendt s.v. In the overwhelming majority of the cases where it is used, the word expresses religious awe for gods, temples, religious objects, and institutions. The only passages parallel to this use of *σέβειν* to express respect for political authority emphasize the violence of its use here. *Ant.* 166: *τὰ Λαῖον σέβοντας . . . θρόνων . . . κράτη*, a phrase of Creon's, whose fault is precisely that he demands "veneration" for the power of the state in preference to "veneration" for a corpse's right to burial; *Ant.* 744 (Creon again): *τὰς ἐμὰς ἀρχὰς σέβων*, a phrase which is rebuked

by Haemon in the following line: οὐ γὰρ σέβεις, τιμάς γε τὰς θεῶν πατῶν; *Ant.* 730 (Creon again): τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν, a hyperbolic, angry phrase — he is accusing his son of “veneration” for lawbreakers.

86. Cf. Kamerbeek on 669.

87. Cf. *Ant.* 779, 998; *O.T.* 613; *O.C.* 852, 1197.

88. On the “theme of the sword,” cf. Kirkwood, pp. 222–23.

89. αἰ can of course mean, as Passow says, *jedesmalig* as well as *beständig*. But even such phrases as ὁ αἰ βασιλεύων, ὁ αἰ ἐπερχόμενος, express, as well as the impermanence of the individual concerned, the permanence or continuity of the office or action. The idea of continuity can also be limited, as in v. 1031 of the *Ajax*: ἐκνάπτειτ' αἰὲν ἔστ' ἀπέψυξεν βίον. But such phrases as θεοὶ αἰὲν ἔχοντες show that the word can express also the idea of eternity, a permanent, infinite state.

90. For οὐποτε used confidently by Ajax about himself, cf. 98: ὥστ' οὐποτ' Αἴανθ' οἶδ' ἀτιμάσουσ' ἔτι (a grimly ironical phrase, for the Atridae, who he thinks are dead, will in fact try to “dishonor” him in the future by refusing burial to his corpse). 775: καθ' ἡμᾶς δ' οὐποτ' ἐκρήξει μάχη — a claim which is belied by the events of the *Iliad*, where Ajax too is driven back to the ships.

91. V.571: μέχρ' οὐ (ἔστ' ἂν Hermann, adopted by Pearson) μυχοὺς κίχῳσι τοῦ κάτω θεοῦ is omitted by Jebb: “The verse is doubtless due to an interpolator who wished to limit εἰσαεί.” This seems likely, for though αἰ . . . ἔστε is common enough, εἰσαεί . . . ἔστε is not; in fact, I have not been able to find a parallel. The line does seem like what would be written in to soften the hyperbole, verging on oxymoron, of γηροβοσκὸς εἰσαεί used of an old woman. L. Radermacher, in *Sophokles, Aias* (Berlin 1913), rejects it also.

92. *Nem.* 6.1–4.

93. Kirkwood (pp. 103–6) has some perceptive remarks on Tecmessa's speech.

94. It seems strange that Kamerbeek in his “Sophocle et Heraclite” (*Studia Volgraff* [Amsterdam 1948], 84–98) where he assembles the evidence for Heraclitean echoes and influence in Sophocles, omits these two emphatic occurrences of the Heraclitean key word.

95. Because of the sense “to freeze.” Cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 496–97: θεὸς . . . πηγύνουσιν . . . πᾶν ῥέεθρον. So ποταμούς (*Ar. Ach.* 139); θάλασσα (*Hdt.* 4.28); πεπάγαισιν δ' ὑδάτων ῥόαι (*Alcaeus* 90 Diehl); ὕδωρ . . . πάγη (*Anaximenes*, Diels, *Vorsokr.* A.7 19.5); cf. Heraclit., *ibid.* A.1 (55.26).

96. Cf. Whitman's balanced discussion of the “peculiarly political mode of treatment” (pp. 64–66). The political tenor of the *Ajax* is discussed at greater length (and with less balance) by Norman O. Brown (“Pindar, Sophocles and the Thirty Years' Peace,” *TPAPA* 82 [1951] 1–28), an article which, though severely censured by Victor Ehrenberg (*Sophocles and Pericles* [Oxford 1954] 178–82), has some valuable suggestions and formulations.

97. Lattimore (p. 68) has a fine phrase for him: “gloomy giant.”

98. Cf. 205, 241, 386, 423, 502, 619, 154, 160, etc. At 169 the chorus calls him μέγαν αἰγυπιόν, possibly a reference to the other etymology of his name, for which cf. Pindar *Isthm.* 6.49ff.

99. 1077: σῶμα . . . μέγα. 1253: μέγας . . . βοῦς.

100. For Ajax and μόνος, cf. 29, 47, 294, 467, 1276, 1283.

101. For Ajax and ἔργα, cf. 39, 439, 616, 116, 355. Cf. also δρᾶν (120, 457, 468, 1280), χεῖρ (10, 40, 43, 50, 57, 97, 115, etc.).

102. Cf. 96, 766, 770.



103. ἄλκιμος (1319), θούριος (1213), αἰθων (147, 222, 1088), εὐκάρδιος (364), δεινός (205, 312, 366, 650, 773).

104. τόλμη (46, 1004), θράσος (46, 364), κλέος (769), εὐκλεία (436, 465), ἀριστεία (464).

105. Cf. 926, 766, 355, 40, 914. For ὠμός, cf. 205, 548, 885, 930.

106. 34-35: σῇ κυβερνώμαι χερσί.

107. 148-51: λόγους ψιθύρους πλάσσων . . . πείθει . . . εὐπειστα λέγει.

108. 445: παντουργῶ.

109. Achilles in *Iliad* 1 would have killed Agamemnon if Athena had not intervened; and she had to promise him a threefold recompense.

110. This atmosphere is maintained by other details through the play, e.g., ὀπτῆρ, 29 (only here in Sophocles; cf. Antiphon 5.27); τοῦπίτριπτον κίναδος, 103 (cf. Andocides 1.99); διωμόςω, 1233 (cf. Antiphon 5.12, Lys. 3.1, Plato *Ap.* 27c, etc.); θόρυβος, 142 (cf. Kamerbeek on 164). The "courtroom" atmosphere of the speeches of the second part of the play has often been remarked.

111. 448-49: δίκην . . . ἐψήφισαν. The phrase shows that in Ajax's mind the Atridae voted, whereas we can see from what Menelaus says later that the kings were not part of the board of judges (1136: ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς, κοῦκ ἐμοί, τόδ' ἐσφάλη).

112. This is a much disputed point. Kirkwood (p. 72) is emphatic to the contrary: "For this assumption [that the award was an injustice to Ajax] there is absolutely no warrant in the play." He is right that v. 1136 is no such warrant, but Odysseus' final admission, it seems to me, is. For whatever the nature of the board of judges, its criterion must have been *arete*.

113. *Nem.* 8.27.

114. Plato *Ap.* 41b: διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον. . . .

115. In 1234, αὐτὸς ἄρχων . . . ἐπλει, the participle is at least partly adjectival in function. The use of ἄρχων as a noun is more frequent in the other tragedians: Aesch. *Sept.* 674, *Pers.* 73; Eur. *H.F.* 38, *I.A.* 374, 375.

116. Cf. *S* 669: τὸ δὲ τιμαῖς ὑπείκει ταῖς ἀλλήλων διανεμήσεσιν. Lattimore (p. 70) translates: "give place in their succession." Cf. Schadewaldt, "Sophokles, Aias und Antigone," 73. n.4.

117. Cf. Thuc. 4.28.3: καὶ ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς (cf. ἐξανεχώρει in the same passage; in 2.63 it is used of abdicating from empire). Cf. also Pericles' phrase (2.61): ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι.

118. Thuc. 3.82.4: τὸ δ' ἐμπλήκτως ὁξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρα προσετέθη.

119. Diog. Laert. 1.5.87: φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας· τοὺς γὰρ πλείστον εἶναι κακοῦς.

120. The nearest parallel is also in the *Ajax* and also suggestive of the atmosphere of Athenian democracy (1243): εἵκειν ἂ τοῖς πολλοῖσιν ἤρεσκεν κριταῖς . . . . In Euripides the phrase is common; cf. *Or.* 772 (δαινὸν οἱ πολλοί), *An.* 336, *El.* 382, *Hec.* 257, etc. The political overtones of this speech are reinforced by the unique occurrence in Sophocles at v. 683 of *ἐταιρείας*, which is the normal Athenian word for political faction or association (cf., e.g., Thuc. 3.82.5).

121. Cf. Thuc. 2.41.1 . . . τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλείστ' ἂν εἶδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ' ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα . . . παρέχεσθαι. Ael. *V.H.* 5.13: ἦσαν δὲ ἅρα Ἀθηναῖοι δεινῶς ἐς τὰς πολιτείας εὐτράπελοι καὶ ἐπιτήδαιοι πρὸς τὰς μεταβολάς. . . . If we read εὐτράπελον with M at Pind. *Pyth.* 4.105 we have a significant context for the word; the heroic education will have none of it (cf. *Pyth.* 1.92-93). For δυστράπελος, cf. Aristotle *E.E.* 1234<sup>a</sup>5.

122. 1359: ἡ κάρτα πολλοὶ νῦν φίλοι καὶ θις πικροί.

123. 1377: ὅσον τότ' ἐχθρὸς ἦ, τοσόνδ' εἶναι φίλος. . . .

124. 1087: ἔρπει παραλλάξ ταῦτα. . . .

125. 1257: ἀλλ' ἦδη σκιᾶς. The irony of this word in the play is complex; earlier Tecmessa spoke (unknowingly) of Athena as a "shadow" (σκιᾶ τινι, 301).

126. Cf. G. Méautis, *Sophocle, Essai sur le Héros Tragique* (Paris 1957) 40: "une âme éprise de l'absolu"; 46: "un pèlerin de l'absolu."

127. Cf. Σ on v. 714: τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Αἴαντος διὰ πολλῶν εἰρημένα διὰ βραχέων διεξῆλθεν.

128. Kamerbeek (on 714) accepts τε καὶ φλέγει as "probably" belonging to the text, and explains the metaphor. Jebb is of course right when he says that the scholium on 714 does not "require" us to read τε καὶ φλέγει, but it certainly (as he admits) encourages us to. Further, if we do, we have a double phrase which corresponds not only with φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται, but also with Athena's κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν (131).

129. On this scene, cf. the brilliant remarks of Lattimore, pp. 75-77.

130. 858: κοῦποτ' αὖθις ὕστερον.

131. 775: καθ' ἡμᾶς οὔποτ' ἐκρήξει μάχη.

132. 833: ξὺν ἀσφαδάστῳ καὶ ταχεῖ πηδήματι.

133. Cf. 254: λιθόλευστον Ἄρη. 408-9: πᾶς δὲ στρατὸς δίπαλτος ἂν με χειρὶ φονεύοι.

134. 1394-95.

135. *Od.* 11.55: οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλες . . . This may be the model for *Ajax* 925. ἔμελλες, τάλας, ἔμελλες. . . .





# THE *ḫESŌN* TABLET OF ENKOMI

BY HENRY D EPHRON

## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

1. Of the three baked clay tablets found at Enkomi in 1952-53,<sup>2</sup> the second, perhaps one quarter of an opisthographic tablet of two columns,<sup>3</sup> had a sufficient amount of easily legible text to enable the late Michael Ventris to prepare a signary<sup>4</sup> and to titillate scholars with the possibility and even hope of decipherment.<sup>5</sup> Unlike the Linear B tablets it was intentionally baked, and the script is described as Cypro-Minoan although it is, in fact, Cypro-Mycenaean. That the writing consists of small jabbing incisions intended for writing on clay is important in explaining the differences between the shapes of its signs and those of Linear B. The reverse of the tablet is of very unequal preservation but contains sufficient legible material in lines 86-99 to be worth studying. The text of the obverse is almost completely legible, and of the twenty-two lines visible, despite the fragmentary nature of the tablet, eleven consecutive lines can be read completely except for one sign. The exact state of the two sides may be seen on Plates I and II, and their legibility may be judged also from my somewhat stylized drawings shown in Figures 1 and 2. The context in which the tablet was found points to the end of the thirteenth century, but since the tablet is a discard used in the foundation for a hearth floor, this date is merely a *terminus ante quem*. How much earlier this tablet should be dated, it is impossible to say.

2. Ventris, even if for the wrong reasons, deduced correctly that the tablet ("perhaps") contained poetry.<sup>6</sup> It has also been noted before, by Piero Meriggi, for example, that line 20 ends with "un cercle qui en minoen serait '100'."<sup>7</sup> I have seen no reference to the obvious fact that every line seems to have five words, giving us, if true, a total of exactly one hundred words at the end of line 20, where the possible Mycenaean symbol for "100" appears.<sup>8</sup> No one seems to have noticed, either, the evidence that this tablet is a copy. For if it is, in the case of a tablet which may have contained two hundred lines and does not use line-dividers, the scribe would have had to coordinate the amount of material, the space given to each line, and the size of the tablet in order to be sure that all his text would fit on the tablet. Apparently he marked the first sign

of certain lines beforehand in order to avoid either crowding or spreading his lines unnecessarily. Presumably he usually erased this faint symbol or wrote over it, but sometimes he failed to do either. The issue is obfuscated by the possibility of accidental markings and abrasions. Perhaps such is the case at lines 87 and 88, and at 89, where the sign for *a* can be made out. At line 96 he seems to have dropped a half line below his mark so that he needs must crowd from then on to gain space. The unmistakable indications are at line 5, where part of the first sign, *a*, can be seen half a line below and slightly to the left, and at line 20, where part of the first symbol, *i*, is visible, quite in alignment with the line but a little to the left of the margin, which has strayed somewhat.

### THE MYCENAEAN ORDER OF THE *A-BA-GA*

3. The signary of this tablet I attacked by various cryptanalytic methods, and, to use the technical language of cryptanalysis, after making the necessary "assumptions" and obtaining a number of "clicks," I finally decided that I had "broken the cipher."<sup>9</sup> Gradually I assigned values in which I had considerable faith to forty of the fifty-six signs.<sup>10</sup> At this point, almost intuitively, I solved a problem which had been bothering me from the start, and for which I had been trying to find a satisfactory assumption which would prove consistent. This was the problem of the pairs of almost identical, yet different, signs, and of the resemblances in general of the signs to each other. I suddenly realized that I had within my grasp the original order of the Mycenaean *a-ba-ga*. The internal resemblances of the signary, the resemblances of the signs to each other, were deliberate; the answer to my problem lay in preparing my reconstruction skeleton or "grid" with the rows and columns in the Mycenaean order. When I found that order I would find that the forty signs to which I had assigned values formed a systematic pattern based on their shapes, insofar, at least, as my assignment of values had been correct. To find the order I sought proved not to be difficult, because the "abagaic" order turned out to be, *mutatis mutandis*, the order of the later Greek alphabet.

4. After I found that my forty assumed values did produce a systematic pattern of shapes when placed into a reconstruction skeleton with the rows and columns arranged on this basis and that I could then fit virtually all the remaining signs into place with the aid of a study of their shapes, I became convinced that I had deciphered the signary.<sup>11</sup> Since, however, I cannot transfer my conviction to others and since it is obvious that anyone can arrange a group of such signs into a neat order according

to shape, I present the grid with its contents, for the moment, as an assumed mass coincidence which must now be proved by further coincidences too many and too great to be attributed to chance. The proofs that I have to offer are chiefly four sets of coincidences: (1) the relationship just mentioned of the signs to each other (only an assumption until proved, but an extremely significant part of the proof after that), (2) the most important proof of all, Mycenaean Greek text *in convincing context* derived by means of a transliteration according to my values and an *explicitly stated* set of orthographic conventions, (3) the meter, and (4) the relationship of the individual signs to those of Linear B and, to a slight extent, classical Cypriote.

5. For a thorough understanding of the first part of the proof, the shapes of the signs and their relation to each other, it is necessary to note that each Enkomi sign is related to a Linear B sign, almost always of identical value.<sup>12</sup> If this is kept in mind, I believe that I can explain how the inventor, or, perhaps more correctly, adapter, of the Enkomi syllabary may have worked and what he may have been trying to accomplish. To speak of him in the singular is not to deny any amount of evolution that may have taken place in the syllabary before his time, nor is it to deny the possibility of earlier adapters. That the inventor was a scribe, however, who knew the Linear B syllabary well and had it in mind while he made his adaptation, I have no doubt. The purpose of the inventor was to create a syllabary easier to teach and learn, easier to memorize and remember. Undoubtedly all scribes had to know Linear B, which seems to have been the *lingua franca*, or better, the *scriptio franca*, of commerce among the Mycenaean. Resemblances to Linear B therefore had to be retained insofar as possible as one factor in making the script easy to memorize and remember. And indeed after the prolonged and painful task of memorizing Linear B and the difficulty of remembering it once learned, I did find the Enkomi signary relatively simple.

6. One obvious reason why the Enkomi signs had to differ from and be simpler than the Linear B signs was the method of writing that the Cypro-Mycenaean had developed. They made their signs by jabbing strokes in the clay and *not* "with a *drawing* motion . . . with the fine point of a stylus" as in Linear B.<sup>13</sup> The inventor limited himself to jabs, long and short jabs, straight, slanting, or slightly curved jabs, horizontal and vertical jabs, and parallel, tandem, or hooked, double jabs (only the hook in *so* appears not to be two strokes). Still it is not possible to understand the changes made in the Enkomi signs until one has made a thorough study of the resemblances of the signs to each other when placed in their original order on a grid comparable to the Mycenaean



1. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
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3. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
4. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
5. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
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12. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
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14. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
15. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
16. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
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18. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
19. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
20. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
21. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢
22. 𐎧𐎺𐎠 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢 𐎶𐎵𐎠𐎢

FIG. 1. Stylization of the text on the obverse of the *Yēsōn* tablet, as read by the editor after decipherment.




PLATE I. The second clay tablet from Enkomi (obverse).

(From *Antiquity* 27 [1953] 233ff.)



PLATE 2. 'The second clay tablet from Enkomi' (reverse).

(From *Antiquity* 27 [1953] 233ff.)





grid. I use columns for the vowels and rows for the consonants as is usually done today, but it may well be that the Mycenaeans used the reverse. Either method will bring out clearly what the inventor was attempting to do, provided that the vowels and consonants are placed exactly in their original order.<sup>14</sup> Without finding this order I could not have learned the relationship of the signs to each other, and, vice versa, having learned the relationship of the signs to each other, I could not have failed to find the original order. In actual practice I used both processes simultaneously.

7. I made what seemed to me the most obvious assumptions. That an order of sounds existed before the invention of the alphabet seemed logical. That this order was fairly standard for the whole area was a good possibility. There was no reason to assume that the invention of the alphabet initiated a new order of sounds except insofar as minor changes might have been forced by the new methods and by the borrowing of the medium from one language by another. I assumed, as I had while working on Linear B at an earlier date without being able to find the evidence to prove it,<sup>15</sup> that the later alphabetic order of the Greeks did not differ substantially from the pre-alphabetic order of the Greek "alphabet," the Mycenaean order of sounds. It seemed logical to me also that any sign used for two or more consonantal sounds would have been put in the first place in that order in which it fitted. A series of signs for *g*-, *k*-, and *kh*-syllables, to take an example, is *correctly* placed in the *g*-row, and the whole series is *correctly* labeled *g* rather than *k*. This would be equally true for Linear B. Thus the Linear B *r*-row, which is used for both *r* and *l*, should, strictly speaking, have been labeled *l*, as is shown by the fact that the Enkomi signary, which has separate rows for *l* and *r*, uses the Linear B *r*-series *not* for its own *r*-series but for its *l*-series.<sup>16</sup>

8. My assumptions concerning resemblances, which I shall attempt to demonstrate, are as follows. The main effort of the inventor was to provide motifs for the rows and columns; he attempted to begin and end the row or column with the same motif. Insofar as he could he tried to lead progressively by slight changes from one sign to another within the column or row or both. Had he been entirely successful, an impossible task since he never deviated from the rule of retaining some resemblance to his original model, each sign would have resembled all its neighbors in the grid. It usually does not do so. In columns *e* and *i* particularly, the flow of the design down the column is frequently interrupted by that of the crossing row. Yet the resemblances of the signs to their neighboring signs and the motifs of the rows and columns represent his main effort.

For these, as may be seen by a comparison with Linear B,<sup>17</sup> he exchanged the places and thus the values of *ja* and *je*; he used *pa*<sub>2</sub> for *ba* and *ra*<sub>3</sub> for *la*. *ra* he fitted perfectly into the spot for *lo*, and the displaced *ro*, which should have been *lo*, remained *ro*. He derived *be* from *pje* (*pte*) and *da/ta* from *ta* instead of *da*, which would normally have been his model.<sup>18</sup>

9. In Figure 3 I have repeated the *a*-column at the right and the open-vowel row at the bottom in order to bring out his attempt to open and close the row or column with the same motif. In the case of the columnar resemblances he achieved his greatest success with the *a*- and *o*-columns, the most important from the point of view of frequency.<sup>19</sup> Let the reader, if he is interested in the detailed proof of the decipherment, please begin with column *a* and trace out some of the resemblances as I indicate them. The bottom half of *a* is given the motif of the *a*-column and becomes *ba*. The center mark is removed to obtain *ga*, which is doubled to form *da*. *wa* has a line between the two outside lines slightly changed; *ja* has the hooked, double jab between them. *la* has an extra mark above the two lines; *ma* adds an additional mark to *la*. Note that these changes are of a progressive nature, one small step at a time. Since the opening and closing of the column should show a resemblance, note the *a* again, this time in the repeated, bottom row. *sa* has an obvious resemblance to it, as *ra* does to *sa*. *na* resembles the center part of *ra* turned upside down, and with its upper, vertical stroke ties in with *ma* and *la*.

10. Since rows should also begin and end with resembling signs, compare the *u*-column with the *a*-column repeated at the right, but note that at the same time the *u*-column has its own motif, that of animals. The resemblance of *bu* to an animal is obvious, and *gu* is the Linear B bird given a quarter turn. *du*, *wu*, and *nu* contain the male and female symbols familiar from Linear B. *lu*'s symbolism is obvious. Yet, while accomplishing this, the inventor kept most of his resemblances to the *a*-column apparent. *bu* has the three marks of *ba* below the upper line; *gu* adds tandem jabs to *ga*; *du* and *da* are each composed of two separated angles. In *wu* the two outer strokes of *wa* have been turned horizontal; in *lu* the top and bottom of *la* have been reversed. *mu* retains the outside lines of *ma*, but the tandem, vertical jabs in the center have become parallel, horizontal jabs. The two horizontal jabs of *na* have become the female symbol in *nu*.

11. In the *o*-column, the hook of *o* is picked up by *bo* in its upper half and then by the hook at the end of the column in *so*. *go* is a square, doubled for *do*, to which a complication is added for *wo*. *zo* concludes this group with a more complicated, double square. *jo* begins a series of



	a	e	i	o	u	a
-						
b						
g						
d						
w						
z						
j						
l						
m						
n						
q						
r						
s						
-						

Fig. 3. The reconstruction skeleton after decipherment, showing the original order of the Mycenaean *a-ba-ga* and the proposed values of the Enkomi signary. See §§3 and 9.

partial squares with one side and the hook which is the motif of both the *j*-row and the *o*-column. This method of using a motif of both the row and the column is fairly frequent. We see it as we progress to *lo*, where the added jab under the hook gives us the motif of the *l*-row, just as the interior part of *mo* picks up the shape of *ma* as the *o*-progression continues. The added jab becomes the third side of the square in the case of *no*, which fits perfectly into the *n*-progression at the same time. Two sides of the square are kept for *go*, but the third becomes the vertical-line motif for the rest of the column and for the *q*-row.

12. Groups with progressive change are exemplified in the rows also. Note *a* and *e*. To the two strokes of *ga* an upside-down T is added to form *ge*. Now note how the four jabs are used in the remainder of the row. The use of doubling as a motif is illustrated in every *d*-sign. Proceed from *wa* to *we* to *wi*. Note that here as in many parts of the grid there is not the slightest question in which direction the progression moves: from left to right and from top to bottom. The *n*-row illustrates the progression and direction more beautifully than any other row. From *na* with one vertical stroke we proceed to *ne* with two, and then the bottom horizontal stroke becomes a third vertical jab for *ni*. A fourth vertical is added to form *no* with the center strokes formed into a hook to fit the symbol into the motif of the *o*-column. Thus *na*, which fits perfectly into place in the *a*-column, is progressively changed until it becomes *no*, which fits perfectly into place in the *o*-column.

13. It is scarcely necessary to point out every resemblance, although they cannot all be so easily detected. There are, however, other classes of resemblances, including some that are disguised or hidden, which do not yield at once to examination and require patient study and the use of the imaginative reason before they become apparent. The most difficult of these are due to the experimentation of the inventor as he tried to improve upon his simplifications of Linear B signs in order to obtain greater success in the internal resemblances which were his chief aim. *ne* is an excellent example. If the reader will take Linear B *ne* and simplify it so that it can be drawn with jabs in the Enkomi manner he will find that he has *me* with an extra vertical jab. The inventor merely changed the bottom vertical stroke of *ne* to a horizontal to obtain the excellent progression in the *n*-row, after he had lined up *me* and *ne*, thus disguising their resemblance. Hidden resemblance to the shape of a neighbor can usually be found by comparing a sign with the Linear B equivalent of its neighboring sign. Thus *bo*, which seems out of place among its neighbors, is easily seen to resemble Linear B *pi* (= *bi*) and *ko* (= *go*), once it is understood what the inventor was doing.

14. The *i*-column as a whole is very fruitful in demonstrating how the inventor destroyed resemblances to Linear B by later changes for the sake of internal resemblances. The Linear B *i*-column has five signs with long, slanting or curved outer lines, not counting the unused *ti*: *i*, *ki*, *pi*, *si*, and *wi*. Each of these outer lines has been changed to tandem jabs as can be seen from Enkomi *ji*, *gi*, *bi*, *si*, and *wi*. Since the Enkomi *i*-column does not show any other example of this pattern, there can be no question that the tandem jabs are the equivalent of the long, slanting outer line in the *i*-column of Linear B. By doing this the inventor was able to harmonize both *bi* and *si* with the jabs in *ai* and *i*, and each of these signs with its row.

15. With an understanding of how the inventor worked and especially of how he tried to lead progressively by slight changes from one sign to another, it is possible to check the abagaic order which I have assumed. Have I found the original, Mycenaean order of the syllabary? The reader will understand that I have tested my results to my own satisfaction by juggling the columns and rows until I became convinced that a better order based on resemblances is not possible. I have already shown<sup>20</sup> that on the basis of the opening and closing of rows and columns with the same motif the open-vowel row leads into both the *b*-row and the *s*-row and that the *a*- and *u*-columns work well together. It is logical then, to place the open-vowel row first, the *b*-row second, and the *s*-row last, as well as the *a*-column first and the *u*-column last. We must still corroborate this placement by tying the other rows and columns to them and to each other. The open-vowel row is tied to the *b*-row by *ba*, *bi*, and *bo*, but is similarly tied to the *s*-row. The first four rows are tied together by the progression, *a*, *ba*, *ga*, *da*, and this order is corroborated by the progression, *go*, *do*, *wo*, *zo*.<sup>21</sup> There are other, less obvious corroborations, such as the fact that *bo* is tied to *go* by its resemblance to Linear B *ko*, one of the hidden resemblances, but I shall limit this discussion to the most obvious resemblances for the most part. We can tie *z* to *j* only by the resemblance of *je* to a logical simplification of Linear B *ze*<sup>22</sup> and by the elimination of all the other rows. *l* and *m* are tied together by *la* and *ma*, and this is verified by the progression, *jo*, *lo*, *mo*, *no*. For the four rows we have further corroboration in that *ja* cannot follow *na* and so must precede *la*, and in the hidden resemblance of *me* to *ne*. *qe* is tied to *re*, and even with \**qa* missing, it is easy to see how *na* leads to *qe* and *ra*. *r* and *s* are tied by *ra* and *sa*. Thus every row has one or more ties, and the fact that a few of them are rather weak is scarcely significant because the rows are strongly tied into the groups, *b* to *z*, *j* to *n*, and *q* to *s*.

16. The placing of the columns is well corroborated. *a* and *e* tie the



first two, and this is strengthened by the progression *wa, we, and wi*, giving us the *i*-column third. *di* and *do* tie together the *i*- and *o*-columns. The progression *na, ne, ni, no* provides strong corroboration of this order. The *u*-column, therefore, is last, just as we placed it. And since the "alphabetical" order of the rows and columns is verified, it seems sensible to place the open-vowel row first, rather than last, so that *a* may become the first sign both of its column and its row. Thus, in accordance with explicitly stated theories, I have succeeded in arranging the signs in their Mycenaean order by means of a study of their shapes.

17. Be it understood, however, that I am not claiming intuition or clairvoyance, for I have admitted that I had broken the cipher before I made this attempt. Moreover, I know that I have not yet proved anything and that this arrangement is a proof of solution of the syllabary only if I can find some way of proving it. The most important proof of solution and of the arrangement is the intelligible language to be obtained from a transliteration. Because I have already broken the syllabary I am in a position to assume that the language we are dealing with is Mycenaean Greek. Obviously if I am in error to any appreciable extent, the transliteration according to my values will yield almost nothing intelligible as far as context is concerned, although the flexibility of such a syllabary may conceivably give us the illusion of a small percentage of Greek.

18. To assume, however, that due to the flexibility of the syllabary it may be possible to extract from chance resemblances a considerable amount of what appears to be Mycenaean Greek fitting in context is, as far as cautious scholarship is concerned, to keep on the safe side, if we are permitted an unlimited juggling of the values of the signs in order to obtain our results. The limitation of the possibility of juggling the values which I placed upon myself through the twofold requirement of obtaining and retaining those I needed, while simultaneously arranging the signs in the grid according to my explicitly stated theories of the abagaic order, effectively reduces the likelihood of chance. Let us, however, see if we can without regard to the added proof offered by this arrangement obtain enough Greek in context to be acceptable as proof by itself. Obtaining by the combinatory method a percentage of Greek too high to be accidental will then prove the correctness of the labeling of the signs forced by the arrangement, and the two sets of coincidences will become mutual proofs of each other. What percentage of Greek in context, then, may we expect? Fortunately we do now have a basis for judgment in the case of such a flexible syllabary and a Mycenaean Greek dialect.

## THE GOAL PROVIDED BY LINEAR B

19. In using the extraction of Greek from a transliteration as a proof of solution, if we claim a Mycenaean (East Greek) dialect comparable to that of Linear B and a similar syllabary, we may turn for purposes of comparison to *Documents*, the publication of which has given us an excellent idea of what to expect from a correct solution. A study of the 630 lexical units in the vocabulary<sup>23</sup> shows that, adhering strictly to an explicitly stated set of spelling rules, we may expect to be able to equate approximately one third of the words with attested Greek words which are at least possible in context. There are some additional words, *corroborated by context*, of which Ventris and Chadwick felt confident, but which show relaxations of their own rules in one way or another, such as slight variations in expected spelling or unattested compounds. These additional words may be considered as secondary proof, but only after a sufficient number of *perfect* equations in possible context has been found. A most important feature of their results is that, counting both perfect and imperfect equations, more than a quarter of the total number of words are equated with *Homeric* words. Because of the flexibility of the syllabary and the resultant possibility of equations suggested by accidental resemblances to Greek words, the importance of this goal provided by the solution of Linear B cannot be overestimated. Any purported "solution," claimed as Greek of Mycenaean times, which does not at least approach this goal must now be considered, and almost automatically becomes, suspect.

20. From my reconstructed text and translation on pages 59-60, along with the notes and discussion included in the Commentary on the Text and Translation, as well as the lists of Greek words involved in my equations and the Lexical Index, it will be easily seen that I have done more than merely approach my goal. I have exceeded it, although I had to accept the handicap of including proper nouns. Since I had somewhat over one hundred dependable, complete, different sign-groups, my goal was twenty-five to thirty *Homeric* words, whether exactly spelled or not, and including these, a minimum of thirty-five *exactly* spelled, attested, Greek words. To be dependable, these had to fit reasonably well into the context and even to offer a considerable amount of good context. Since it was conceivably possible to obtain accidentally a few words fitting well in context, I wanted a number of exceptionally good clicks of two or more words. To enable the reader more easily to make an accurate judgment I shall point out and discuss in the Commentary some less-than-perfect equations, which should not be considered as

primary proof, and some exceptionally perfect contextual clicks, which are convincing proof in themselves.

# ORTHOGRAPHIC CONVENTIONS

21. Before it is possible to produce from the transliteration a reconstructed text and a translation, or to understand fully the process and be able to make a mature judgment concerning its results, an understanding of the orthographic conventions or spelling "rules" adopted by the people who used the syllabary is absolutely essential. For Linear B one can obtain this understanding from the detailed exposition in *Documents*.<sup>24</sup> Although many of the spelling rules for Linear B would serve also for another Mycenaean syllabary, such as that of the Enkomi tablet, to assume identical rules for both would be illogical, especially since the Enkomi syllabary is a probable ancestor of the classical Cypriote syllabary, which differs from Linear B in a number of important points. The reader could use Linear B for his basis and make the changes dictated by the text, but for the decipherer it was safer to begin with the Cypriote and search out the differences.

22. The usual attitude toward the Mycenaean syllabary is derogatory.<sup>25</sup> The writing method is said to be inadequate for Greek, fraught with difficulties, and of a form which "reflects not Greek but another language, which we may for convenience designate 'Minoan.'"<sup>26</sup> The ancestors of the people who remodeled the "syllabary without vowels" of the West Semites into the Greek alphabet were incapable of adapting a syllabary, no matter the provenience, to their own language! But "any script is better than none, and the Mycenaeans cannot be criticized for having failed to adopt the refinements which made syllabic writing a more serviceable instrument for the later Cypriots."<sup>27</sup> Whatever amount of truth there is in the facts of the matter, I cannot disagree more with the attitude.

23. In Linear B, and more particularly in the Enkomi signary with its greater simplification, I find a system of writing that has reached a peak of perfection for the type it represents, used by a people long acquainted with the art of writing. We know that the Greeks were not mere imitators. They took the tools of others and made them their own. I attribute this quality to the Mycenaeans too. Any idea that the Mycenaeans merely tried to make do with a method of writing not intended and not suited for their language, that they lacked distinctions between certain consonants, such as the voiced and unvoiced or *l* and *r*, because



they did not have sense enough to invent the additional symbols they needed, and that they limped along with other inadequacies because their symbols represented sounds not in the Greek language, appears to me to be arrant nonsense. There are many symbols in Linear B not found in A; presumably the Mycenaeans invented or adapted some of these. If they could so invent or adapt one, they could many; if many, then all they needed. And no matter how different the original sounds were for which the symbols stood, just as the alphabet quickly came to stand for Greek sounds, in a short time the symbols would have stood for the Mycenaean sounds as far as the writers of Mycenaean were concerned. Once a symbol is accepted into a language to represent one of its own sounds, it stands for that sound and not for the one it used to represent in another language.

24. But why do I claim that we are dealing with a writing system which has reached a peak of perfection? Because the virtue of a writing system may be expressed by the single word *economy*, economy of time and energy and space. The development of writing systems from earliest days to the alphabet illustrates the growing economy in the number of symbols which have to be learned, in the simplification of the symbols and reduction of writing time, and in the space used for writing. The virtue of an alphabet is to reproduce a word as exactly as possible by analysis, for the invention of the alphabet has achieved economy automatically. But before the invention of the alphabet with its very simple symbols, few in number, and with its economy thus assured, the Enkomi syllabary surely carried the concept of economy as far as it could be carried for Greek. The shapes of the symbols were simplified and reduced in size, the signs were easily made and easily learned, their number seems to have been reduced to a minimum by using the same sign for all sounds similarly *made*, however different they actually sounded, and the number of signs which had to be written was kept to a minimum by the omission of certain sounds like, for example, final *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, and *s*. The Mycenaeans could hardly have gone further in obtaining economy short of the alphabet, which was on its way. It is true that we find the method difficult. But the system of writing is said to be inadequate by a euphemistic inversion of expression. It is *we* who are inadequate! Let us not, because of our own helplessness, magnify whatever difficulty the Mycenaeans may have had in reading the syllabary.<sup>28</sup>

25. The classical Cypriote syllabary represents a hybrid. It represents a corruption and depreciation of an earlier system of writing, highly developed and almost perfect of its kind. When the alphabet came into regular use elsewhere, the Cypriotes, insofar as we can judge them from

this syllabary, were too conservative and too lacking in imagination to discard their syllabary. Instead they kept it and tried to achieve with it the effect of an alphabet; they tried to include all the sounds of a word and virtually to spell it. Thus, by this hybridization, they destroyed the virtue of their earlier system of writing and yet failed to gain what the new system offered.

26. Although we speak of a syllabary, it must be understood that the signs did not stand for syllables. They could not have, for the concept of a syllable had not yet been invented. The Mycenaean were obviously aware that words could be broken up into separate sounds, for the writing system is based upon that principle. Each sign of the syllabary represented what was *to them* a single, blended sound or a single blend of sounds: consonant plus vowel, and any additional sound which blended with and modified the vowel. When a syllable was composed of two separated sounds, such as *-pto*, both sounds were written: *-bo-do* (7).<sup>29</sup>

27. In the absence of evidence to the contrary we may guide ourselves by the rules of the classical Cypriote and the Mycenaean orthography developed for Linear B. The outstanding difference between the Enkomi and classical Cypriote syllabaries is the omission at Enkomi of the final consonants (in agreement with Linear B).

L, M, N, R, and s are usually omitted at the ends of syllables: *helkontai* (20), *omphā* (88), *ḡēsōn* (11), *mētēr* (8), *genos* (16).

s before an initial consonant may be omitted: *spodion* (17).

28. The most important differences between the Enkomi and Linear B syllabaries include (in agreement with classical Cypriote):

D may represent *d*, *t*, or *th*: *desmons* (20), *ainetans* (1), *theios* (89).

L is used for *l* only: *alāioio* (2).

R is used for *r* only: *mustēriōi* (15).

29. A number of agreements with Linear B are substantiated; for example:

B may represent *b*, *p*, or *ph*: *basi[leian]* (5, but Linear B *pa<sub>2</sub>*), *aipās* (6), *ephē* (11).

G may represent *g*, *k*, or *ch* (= *kh*): *agōmen* (11), *kalwēn* (6), *cherronēson* (10).

Doubled consonants are not indicated: *allūsō* (5), *ippon* (91).

In *consonant clusters* a stop before a consonant is usually written as an extra syllable with the following vowel-sound: *anapton* (7), *gnathōn* (92). *mn-* is written *mi-ni-*: *mnike* (96), but note *-wj-*: *o-wa* = *owjas* (13); the *wj* would probably have been written *wi-j* in Linear B.

Five vowels are differentiated without distinction as to length: *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*. Initial vowels may represent a later aspirated vowel or not: *allūsō* (5),

*ephē* (11, 88), and *uphistaeho* (4), *ippon* (91), *imasa* (19). I do not add an *h*, but *s* must sometimes be reconstructed as *h*.

JI and WU are used for *i* and *u* as in Linear B, where they are labeled *i* and *u*: *jī-qo* = *ippon* (91), *e-wu* [= *eu*] (98); but *i* can replace *jī*: *i-qi-o* = *ippioi* (91).

30. I reconstruct *diphthongs* on the basis of later Greek, but whether a *j* between vowels, for example, was always pronounced as a diphthong at this time is problematical.<sup>30</sup> The *u* of a diphthong is regularly indicated: *ma-wu-me-go* (15), *de-wu-no* (16), *e-wu* [= *eu*] (98). In the only occurrence between vowels it is indicated merely by the *w*-slur or -glide: *e-we-ro-jo* = *euerio* (18). The *i* of a diphthong is regularly indicated between vowels by the *j*-glide: *theios* (89), but otherwise it is not indicated: *makairan* (6), except for open *ai*, which appears initially, written with a special sign: *ainetans* (1), *aipās* (6).

31. In the case of any sounds which we know underwent a process of *historical change*, we must accept either pre-change or post-change spelling: labiovelars, *j*, *w*, *s*, *h*, *ā* vs. *ē*. Although the possibility of an occasional equation by accidental resemblance which may seem contextually corroborated cannot be summarily rejected, there are far too many equations which show this shifting and perhaps even careless spelling to attribute to chance. They are too many also for the category of hypothetical linguistic detail which needs revision by the comparativists. The evidence of the tablet itself therefore imposes this spelling "rule" upon us. Note the examples in this and the following sections.

*j* and *w* are used as glides after *i*- and *u*-sounds: *mu-de-ri-jo* (15), *gu-wo* (1). Between vowels they replace the *i* and *u* of diphthongs, as illustrated above. In *alāiōio* (2), the first *i*, which the meter shows to be a separate syllable as in Homer,<sup>31</sup> is indicated merely by the *j*-glide: *a-la-jo-jo*. *j*-consonant is expressed in *je-so* = *ḡēsōn* (11), but not in *o-wa* = *owjas* (13); however, both examples are corroborated by the meter as two-syllable words. Sometimes the *j*-glide is not used: *[.]li-o* = *[po]lios* (6), *i-qi-o* = *ippioi* (91). A slur may appear unnecessarily owing to the accidents of pronunciation: *wu-bi-da-we-so* = *uphistaeho* (4). Of interest is the use of *w* in *warasse* (18) and the lack of it in *elika* (87) and *elikas* (14). Note its omission also in *poiā* (19), *oiā*- (12), and *-ōnātons* (13), and keep in mind that, as shown in section 36, this dialect is related to the ancestor of Attic-Ionic, which lost the *f* at a very early period. Obviously the change in pronunciation was already well begun at this time.

32. The use of the *labiovelar* is, as in Linear B, not entirely dependable. *qo* is used for *bo*: *duīpori*+ (3). *ba* is used for *\*qa*: *omphā* (88). *si* is used



for *qi*: *sīmāka/ke* = *tīmāka/ke* (1, 8, 91), where the *s* rather than *t* may be due to confusion of *s* and *t* before *i* or to the possibility of *qi* > *si* discussed in the Commentary (1). The word for "horse" appears both as *ji-bo* = *ippos* (96), and "correctly" as *ji-qo* = *ippon* (91), with which compare *i-qi-o* = *ippioi* (91). The labiovelar is used as expected frequently: *-qe* = *te* (19, for example), *qo-o* (14, 86), *qo-mo* (87), *o-ja-na-qo* (12). In my reconstruction I arbitrarily use the spelling attested in later Greek.

33. *s* may represent a range from disappearing *s* or *h* to *ss*: *uphistaeho* (4), *helkontai* (20). Note *Argohos* (2, 12), where the *h* surprisingly must be from *j*, and *bu-da-so* = *Pūthahōi* = *Pūthaiōi* (14), instead of the expected \**bu-da-jo*. I have adopted the convention of showing an *h* in my reconstruction only when it has been indicated by an *s*-symbol. See also: *omosse* (2), *allūsō* (5), *cherronēson* (10), *warasse* (18), *imasa* (19), *thūsa* (86).

34. One-sign words do not appear. Mycenaean syllabary writing apparently made a practice of not writing a word with one sign. Since ideograms were still in use at this time, as in Linear B, it seems obvious that although a sign used as part of a word would by convention have designated a syllabic sound, a sign used by itself would have been interpreted as an ideogram. Enclitics are written as part of the preceding word: *me-de-ja-qe* = *Mēdeian te* (5), *e-be-qe* = *ephē de* (11), *ga-na-do-ba* = *gnathōn par* (92). Other one-syllable words are written as two signs: *qo-o* (spelled exactly as in Linear B) = *bōns* (14), *bōn* (86), *e-ne* = *ens* (10).

35. *t* and *s* are perhaps confused before *i* and *u*: *si-ma-ga* = *sīmāka* = *tīmāka* (1, but see also section 32), *ma-si-ro* = *mansirōi* = *mantirōi* (15), *du-wa* = *tuas* = *suas* (13). See Commentary (1, 13, 15).

36. *ē* may represent *ē* < *ā*. In addition to its regular use as in Linear B, *e* may represent the later Attic-Ionic eta. The dialect represented by the Enkomi tablet, then, may be considered to be related to the ancestor of Attic-Ionic, exactly as the dialect of Linear B, to the ancestor of Arcado-Cyprian.<sup>32</sup> Since the vowel *ā* was still in process of change, and since such early occurrence of *ē* < *ā* comes as a surprise, it is necessary to explain the circumstances under which this *ē* does and does not occur and to present the available examples. It is obvious that the pronunciation of *ā* did not suddenly change to that of *ē*, and so, although the evidence of the tablet shows that the change had already made considerable progress, it is not surprising that both *ā*'s and *ē*'s appear. Rather is it surprising that the *ā*'s and *ē*'s are used with remarkable consistency under similar circumstances. The repetition of a word shows not a single inconsistency: four occurrences of forms of *Idaiā*, three of *tīmāka/ke*, two of *āwera*, all with *ā*, and two of *ephē* with *ē*. In the following list the first

two columns contain words keeping the  $\tilde{a}$ ; the third, words showing the change to  $\tilde{e}$ :

Idaiā (11)	alāioio (2)	mētēr (8)
Idaiās (19)	oiānapon (12)	cherronēson (10)
Idaiān (5, 8)	therptōnātons (13)	Jēsōn (11)
Idās (5)	poiā (19)	ephē (11, 88)
aipās (6)	kaliās (88)	attēgon (15)
Mukēnās (16)	omphā (88)	Mukēnās (16)
tīmāka (1, 91)	āwera (17, 92)	kalwēn (6)
tīmāke (8)		

All the words in the above list are not equally well corroborated by context, and they include unattested compounds, but note that the words with  $\tilde{e}$  are among my safest equations, attested Greek words exceptionally well corroborated by context.

37. We may speculate that as  $\tilde{a}$  was pronounced more and more like  $\tilde{e}$ , those  $\tilde{a}$ 's which the scribes were most accustomed to writing held out the longest against the encroachment of  $\tilde{e}$ , especially those influenced by alternations between  $a$  and  $\tilde{a}$ . Analogy, we may assume, played a part in pronunciation and spelling for the Mycenaean as well as for the later Greeks. Although in a syllabary words were spelled as pronounced, habit must have had its influence. The facts of the tablet agree with this. In the first declension endings, the most important place to look for  $\tilde{e} < \tilde{a}$ , but where habit would have been the strongest and where some forms would have continued to use  $a$ , there is no evidence of the change despite the large number of occurrences, with one exception: *kalwēn* (6). This Homeric word is so well corroborated by context that it would be foolish to assume error; we must keep it despite the inconsistency. Perhaps because the vowel in question fell among four short  $a$ 's (*kalwēn makairan* [*makarjan* ?]), the difference in the sound of the  $\tilde{a}$  became more exaggerated to his ear as the writer uttered it aloud while writing, thus influencing him to write *we*. If the equation were in error, it would still be obvious from the passage that the word is accusative, singular, feminine, the same case, number, and gender as *makairan*. The vowel  $a$  is also used consistently in words containing an  $\tilde{a}$  deriving from first declension  $\tilde{a}$ , such as denominatives and compounds, as can be seen from the above list.

38. All other cases of original  $\tilde{a}$  show  $\tilde{e}$  with one apparent exception: *āwera*, which perhaps would be reconstructed more correctly as *auera*, on the basis of Aeolic  $\alpha\tilde{\omega}\eta\rho$ . But this word appears in Homer, at least in

the nominative, with  $\bar{a}$ , on which basis too we may assume that the vowel  $a$  was used with reason and should not be classed as an inconsistency. Such consistency is remarkable at a time when the pronunciation of this sound was still in process of change. To be equally consistent, the place name (16) should have been spelled with an  $\bar{e}$  in the second syllable and a first declension  $\bar{a}$  in the third, as it is: *mu-ge-na* = *Mukēnās*.

39. In a syllabary of this type the spelling of a word is dependent on the actual pronunciation the scribe gave it at the moment of writing. This was the *main writing rule*, and other spelling conventions were secondary to it. For this reason and because of near homophones two different signs may be used for the same syllable, even in the same line: *ji-bo* = *ippos* (96), *ji-qo* = *ippon* (91), *i-qi-o* = *ippioi* (91). Homophones do not occur.

40. The Mycenaean read his syllabary in the light of contextual understanding just as we read a difficult handwritten letter. Understood context remains a prime necessity for resolving difficulties in reading and interpretation and is therefore a necessary factor in the use of the spelling rules. Decisive context, insofar as we can obtain it, may be considered as the *main reading rule*, to which other rules should be subordinated. Therefore we must not blame the syllabary for the trouble caused *us*, not the Mycenaean, by lack of contextual understanding and thus of decisive context, due to missing text, fragmentary words, and words whose meanings are not yet known to us.<sup>33</sup>

#### COMMENTARY ON THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION<sup>34</sup>

41. In the transliteration — the transcription of the Cypro-Mycenaean phonetic signs of the *Jēsōn* tablet of Enkomi according to the values assigned to them in Fig. 3 — I have attempted to show the state of the text to some extent by the conventions listed in *Documents*, pp. 153–54. Dots and numerals duplicate each other, one showing the number of missing syllables, the other of missing words:

- [. .] two *syllables* missing, not necessarily two signs
- [o] nothing missing
- [. o] one syllable missing, but no *complete* words missing
- [. . 1] two syllables missing including one *complete* word

The transliteration shows the number of missing syllables and words for the first twenty-one lines of the obverse and for lines 86–91 of the reverse. These lines are also divided metrically according to the metrical

# TRANSLITERATION

## Obverse

1. || ai-ne-|da gu-||wo si-|ma-ga wa-| |...|. 1]
2. a-|go-so a-||la-|jo-jo o-||mo-se | [...|...|. 2]
3. || du-wi-qo-|ri de-||na-bi-|lu-sa || wo-wu wo-|be[. |... 1]
4. a-|go wu-||bi-da-we-|so ma-ga-||ro-go-no-|...|. 2]
5. a-|lu-so ||ji-da-||ja ji-|da me-||de-ja-|qe ba-ši-||... o]
6. | [...] -li-o | | ai-ba | du-si-no-||go ga-|we ma-||ga-ra [o]
7. | a-na-bo-||do a-me-|go ge-| re-ja-|qe ji-ri-||ra- [...] |...|. 1]
8. we-|qo si-||ma-ge-qe | ji-da-| ja me-|de ge-ra-||do- [...] o]
9. | [...] -i-||ri du-|wa-bi-||so ga-|ra-do-| no ba-|wi-bo[ [...] |...|. 1]
10. a-||go de-|na-bi-||lu-sa | e-ne lu-| |ga-jo | ge-ro-||ne-so | [o]

11. || je-so | ji-da-||ja e-|be-qe a-| |go-me | bu-ra-bo-||do
12. zu-|ge-jo o-||ja-na-|qo wa-na || a-go-|so me-de-|li-so
13. | o-wa || de-o-gi-|lo du-||wa bu-|jo-ri-||jo de-bo-|do-na-| |do
14. me-de-|li-sa || qo-o e-li-|ga a-go-||me bu-|da-so
15. || ma-si-|ro a-| |de-go | a-zo-||wo mu-|de-ri-||jo ma-wu-|me-go
16. mu-||ge-na | ge-no ji-| | [...] de-wu-|no a-ge-||qo
17. so-|zo-da || ji-gu-nu | a-we-||ra bo-di-|jo wo-| |bo-ro-|ni-sa
18. wa-||ra-se | a-go || e-we-|ro-jo || i-go-go | a-qo-| |wi-ro
19. | i-ma-sa-||i-jo-|go-qe || ji-da-|ja-qe || me-ra | bo-ja
20. | | i-qo-|qo de-||mo | ai-||wa-ro || o-|je | |se-|go-||da | ●

21. || [...] | ba-ba-||nu[.]du-qe ga-| |je-ra | qo-wu-i-||jo

## Reverse

86. ] | du-sa || qo-o [o]
87. e-li-|ga [...] -|go i-||wa-do | qo-mo | | i- [...] o]
88. |ga-li-||a-qe | ai-ge-||lu-na | e-be o-||ba du-|so-di [o]
89. a-|na-so | de-jo a-||ra-ge | de-me-||go ba-|mo-da-||bo [o]
90. a-li-|da-bo | |qi-ga | me-go-la || a-qo-|qe bu-bo-||do [o]
91. ji-|qo si-||ma-ga-qe | i-ne | | i-qi-|o a-mu-|| [...] +? o]
92. |ga-bu-|wo ga-na-|do-ba | a-we-||ra [
93. e-me bo-ma-si ma-mi-jo [

94. gu-na ga-ne-lo-jo ai-[
95. ai-wa-qe me-go a-[
96. ji-bo mi-ni-ge [
97. wu-ṇu-ra-we wu-wa [
98. a-so-go-qo e-wu[



# RECONSTRUCTED TEXT

Str. 1

Obverse

- A1. 1 1. ainetans guons tīmāka wa[naktos ...  
A7. 2 2. Argohos alāioio. omosse ...  
B7. 1 3. duīpori+ + Denabilusa+ + wou+ ...  
C5. 3 4. agōi uphistaeho makaro-Knō[so+ ...  
D4. 2 5. "allūsō Idaiān Idās Mēdeian te basi[leian]  
E4. 1 6. [po]lios aipās + dusinochon kalwēn makairan  
F2. 1 7. anapton amegon chēreiān te ..."  
G1. 2 8. wepos tīmāke de Idaiān mētēr ...  
G8. 1 9. . . . . .  
H8. 2 10. agōn + Denabilusa+ ens Lukaion cherronēson.

Str. 2

- A1. 1 11. "Jēsōn," Idaiā ephē de, "agōmen purrapton  
A7. 2 12. zugeion oiānapon, wana Argohos. + methelisō  
B6. 1 13. owjas theochilons, suas puiōrions therptōnātons."  
C5. 2 14. + methelisa bōns elikas. agōmen Pūthaiōi  
D3. 1 15. mantirōi attēgon azowon mustēriōi. + Maumego +  
E2. 3 16. Mukēnās genos i[.] deuno + + ageqo +  
E7. 2 17. sōzonta ignun āwera spodion + woboronisa +  
F6. 3 18. warasse Argos eueroio + Ikokos + aqowiro +  
G6. 1 19. imasa + Iokos te Idaiās te mēra poiā  
H5. 1 20. + Iqoqos desmons aiwārons oies helkontai.

Str. 3

- A1. 1 21. . . . -te . . . bouio +

Str. x

Reverse

86. . . . thūsa bōn  
C7. 2 87. elika . . . bōmōi . . .  
D6. 1 88. kaliās de + Aigeluna+ ephē omphā thūsonti  
E4. 3 89. . . . theios . . .  
F3. 2 90. . . . phīkas megolans . . . + bubdo +  
G1. 2 91. ippon tīmāka de. ines ippioi . . .  
92. kapuōn gnathōn par āwera . . .  
93. . . . . . . . . .

Str. x<sup>2</sup>

94. . . . . . . . . .  
95. Aiwans te megos . . .  
96. ippos mnike . . .

3 + C.F.

## TRANSLATION

### *Obverse (Strophe One)*

1. The renowned travels I sing of the . . . lord
2. of the wandering Argo. He took an oath . . .
3. the wretched maiden + Denabilusa . . .
4. You promised the chieftain-king [at ?] blessed Knossos . . .
5. "I shall set free Idaia [of Ida ?] and Medeia, queen
6. of the lofty city . . . beautiful, wealthy,
7. untouchable, majestic, and the widow . . ."
8. But the mother honored Idaia in speech . . .
10. bringing + Denabilusa to the Peloponnesus.

### *(Strophe Two)*

11. And Idaia said, "Jason, let us move the watch fire
12. to the height overlooking the village glen, O lord of the Argo. [I shall  
move ?]
13. the god-pastured sheep and the suckling, nourishing pigs."
14. [I moved ?] the crumpled-horned oxen. We brought to the Pythian
15. diviner a slaughtered goat for the secret rite. + Maumego +,
16. of Mycenae by race . . . *basileus* . . .
17. preserving . . . ash-colored haze . . .
18. Argos beat the . . . of the passionate + Ikox.
19. I whipped the thighs of both + Iox and Idaia with a *poa*-switch.
20. The sons of + Iqox everlastingly drag their wearisome chains.

### *Reverse (Strophe x)*

- 86-87. . . . I sacrificed a crumpled-horned bull . . . on the altar . . .
- 88-89. But from the shrine . . . the divine voice spoke . . . as he was  
about to sacrifice . . .
90. . . . the large animals . . .
91. And I prized the horse. The sinews of the horse . . .
92. breathing forth a mist from its jaws . . .

### *(Strophe x<sup>2</sup>)*

95. . . . And the mighty Ajax . . .
96. The horse ate . . .

scheme given in Fig. 4. |, ||, | |, || ||, duplicate their use in the scheme for ease of comparison. Numbering at the beginning of a line of text, such as A7. 2, means that it begins at line A, foot 7, syllable 2 of the scheme. + at the beginning of a "reconstructed word" or its "translation" means that the word has not been equated with later Greek and is included merely for convenience. The editor has felt free, however, to indicate possibilities by his choice of consonants, as for example, -ochon (6). + at the end of a word means that no decision has been made in regard to the grammatical ending.

42. Much of the Mycenaean Greek could be written in Greek characters, but as Ventris and Chadwick have pointed out (*Documents*, p. xiv), this would create additional difficulties, and like them I "have reluctantly decided" to use Roman characters (see their conventions, *ibid.*, pp. xiv-xv), while attempting Mycenaean spelling insofar as practical. The conventions in use are obvious, but since we do not know the pronunciation of the labiovelar in Mycenaean times, and confusion of orthography was already taking place, I have adopted the arbitrary method of using later Greek spelling in my equations to some extent. As Ventris and Chadwick say: "This transcription is to be regarded as no more than a conventional approximation; the exact pronunciation of these phonemes may be subject to considerable uncertainty (particularly in the case of *z*, *h*, *q*<sup>u</sup> and *s*)" (*ibid.*, p. xv; for *z* see my note 21). I arbitrarily use the following conventions: I indicate *h* in my equations only when *s* has been used in the tablet, I omit *w*'s and *j*'s which are mere slurs and those replaced with *u* or *i*, and I retain *j* in the reconstruction only when it is corroborated by the meter: *ḡēsōn* (11) and *owjas* (13).

43. I have adopted the morphological conventions of *Documents* in spelling out the endings (pp. 83ff.). A few occurrences of special interest grammatically or otherwise are: the alternating verb-endings -*ka* and -*ke* (1, 8, 91, 96), 1st and 3rd pers. sing. aor. ind. act.; the primary ending of the middle voice in *helkontai* (20), with which cf. Linear B -*to* = -*toi*; the 2-ending -*ios* adjectives (2, 10, 89, 91); the accusatives of specification, *wepos* (8) and *genos* (16); postpositive *par* (92), "from," without an accent, with the genitive; the 1st pers. plur. subj. in an exhortation, *agōmen* (11), with omega corroborated by the meter; the vocative form *wana* (12) of a man; the acc. plur. *owjas* (13), "sheep"; *megos* (95), *megolans* (90), for \**megas*, \**megalans*, with which cf. *amegon* (7); the Mycenaean and Homeric standing epithet with *qo-o*, "bull," *elikas* (14) and *elika* (87), with which cf. *aipās* used of [*po*]*lios* (6); the (1st pers.)



aorist of "approval," *tīmāka* (1), to be translated by the present; *warasse* (18), "beat," with digamma, and *elikas* (14), *elika* (87), "crumpled-horned," without it; the suffix *-ro-* in *mantirōi* (15), "diviner"; Attic *-rr-* rather than *-rs-* in *cherronēson* (10) and *purrapton* (11); and Attic-Ionic eta (see §§36-38 above).

44. Fully reconstructed words not discussed in the following notes are spelled exactly as expected for equation with Homeric or classical words and seem to offer no difficulty. Reconstructed words which offer difficulties and those not acceptable as primary proof are discussed. All words, including unreconstructed sign-groups of two signs or more, will be found in the Lexical Index whether included in the notes or not.

45. Because of the flexibility of the syllabary, especially with regard to case-endings, more than one interpretation is sometimes possible even with the context to guide us. Usually I have made a choice, but I do not intend to imply that necessarily no other choice is possible. A study of the flexibility of the syllabary from a grammatical point of view, however, shows that with many words, once an equation has been made, there is no, or only slightly, greater grammatical flexibility than in alphabetic writing. Cf. such words as *genos* (16), *alāioio* (2), *wana* (12), *ḡēsōn* (11), and *mētēr* (8).

(1) GUONS (acc. plur. fem.), "lands," and so, "travels, voyages." γῶς, masc., i A.D. +, = γῶς, masc., more freq. in the plur., "lands," Aesch. +. The feminine seems plausible enough: γῶς is attested as feminine, Eur. *Hel.* 89, *Ba.* 13 (MSS); and *guons* is equivalent to the feminine ὁδοί here. γῶς ὁδοί, Hsch. —SI-MA-GA: SĪMĀKA = TĪMĀKA (1st pers. sing. aor. ind. act., equivalent to \**tīmāsa*, with κ-aorist as in, e.g., ἐθῆκα). Cf. (91) and the alternating (3rd pers.) ending *-ke* (8) and (96). Lit., "I honored." Note the use of the (1st pers.) aorist of "approval," to be translated by the present, and with *ainetans* . . . *tīmāka*, "I honor the praiseworthy . . .," cf. Soph. *Ajax* 536: ἐπῆνεσ' ἔργον, "I praise your act." Translate, "I honor [in song]," = "I sing"; cf. *wepos tīmāke* (8). This word may be an example of the confusion of *s* and *t* (§35) before *i* (*si*=*ti*) or may indicate that the labiovelar changed to a sound more like *s* than *t* before *i*. Cf. the Arcado-Cyprian change of the labiovelar to a sibilant before a front vowel; e.g., σις=τις. With the failure to use *qi-* cf. *ji-bo* (96) vs. *ji-qo* (91) for "horse." For confusion of *s* and *t* see *mantirōi* (15) and *suas* (13) with Commentary. This word need not count in the primary proof of solution.

(1-2) "The renowned travels I sing of the . . . lord of the wandering

Argo." We are very fortunate in having this contextual click for our proof. The beginning of the first strophe gives us the subject of the poem and fully corroborates the first word of the second strophe, *Jēšōn* (11), "Jason," and *Mēdeian* (5), as well as the name *Idaia* (5, 8, 11, 19); see Commentary (5, 19-20). —WA-[.....] A-GO-SO: WA[NAKTOS ...] ARGOHOS. One word is missing after *wa[naktos*. The restoration is safe since the phrase is repeated in the vocative, *wana Argohos* (12), the context calls for it, and initial *wa* is very infrequent, appearing only once more on the tablet (18). The genitive does not seem debatable. The word *wanax* (in various forms) is found with some frequency in Linear B. The digamma is well attested. *ἄναξ* is found with the meaning "master" from Homer on. Cf. esp. Aesch. *Pers.* 383: *ναῶν ἄνακτες*. —ARGOHOS, "of the Argo," must refer to the ship in which Jason sailed. Here *s* is equated with *h*, not *<s*, but *<j*, which also passed through an aspirate-stage. See §33 and cf. *bu-da-so* (14).

(2) A-LA-JO-JO: ALĀĪOIO (gen. sing. fem., modifying *Argohos*), "of the wandering (Argo)." See §45. For 2-ending adjectives in *-ios* see *Lukaion cherronēson* (10), *omphā . . . theios* (88-89), and *īnes ippiōi* (91). The meter shows that the first *-i-* is a separate syllable as in *Il.* 6. 201: Ἀλγῆϊον. —OMOSSE. See *Il.* 10.328: ὄμοσσειν. For the contextual corroboration note *uphistaeho* (4) and the promise beginning at line 5.

(3) DU-WI-QO-RI: DUĪPORI+ (nom. or acc. sing.), "wretched maiden," with *qo* for *bo*. Since the context is insufficient and \**dui-poris* (cf. *dūios* and *πόρις* [of a girl, Eur.]) is an unattested compound, we cannot use this word as primary proof. —DE-NA-BI-LU-SA may be assumed to be a feminine personal name in apposition with *dui-pori*+. See repetition (10).

(4) WU-BI-DA-WE-SO: UPHISTAEO (2nd pers. sing. imperf. ind. pass.), "you promised, you kept promising." See note on context (2). The *-w-* was a mere slur and is not repeated in the reconstruction. Our equation must be not with *ὑφίστημι* but with the collateral form *ὑφιστάω*. That *ιστάω* was an early collateral form of *ῖστημι* is well attested by Herodotus. —MA-GA-RO-GO-NO-[: MAKARO-KNŌ[so+, "blessed Knossos." As a compound (cf. *μάκαιρ* and *Κνωσός*, as well as KN *ko-no-so*) it is unattested, but cf. Pindar *P.* 10.2: *μάκαιρα Θεσσαλία*. Despite the missing portion, which makes it less possible than ever to decide the case, this particular place name, the very suitable adjective with which it is compounded, and the fact that we are dealing with five legible, consecutive signs offer corroboration of correct solution. Cf. *makairan* (6).

(5) ALLŪSŌ, "I shall set free." Cf. Hom. ἀλλύουσα, etc., Epic for ἀναλ-. The promise to set free Idaia and Medeia provides contextual corroboration after *uphistaeho* (4), "you promised." —IDAIĀN, the most frequently recurring word, is a personal name, "Idaia"; see (8, 11, 19). This name is excellent contextual corroboration, in view of the names, Jason (11), Medeia (5), and (the boat) Argo (2, 12), since Idaia appears as a character in one of the stories of the Argonauts (Diod. Sic. 4.43.4, the story of Phineus). The story changed much in over a millennium and Idaia appears as an unimportant character. We must be careful, however, not to assume the greater importance of her role in the earlier story as a whole on the basis of one fragmentary tablet. See Commentary (19-20). Cf. KN and PY *i-da-i-jo*, masculine version of the name. —JI-DA: IDĀS (gen. sing.), "of Ida?" From a place named Ida or the daughter of Ida? See *Mukēnās* (16), where the genitive of the place name is verified by *genos*, and Commentary. Cf. also KN \*47-*da*-, place name. \*47 could be the original from which Enkomi *i* developed, but this cannot be proved. The name cannot be included in our proof. —ME-DE-JA-QE: MĒDEIAN TE, "and Medeia," Medea, daughter of Aeētes. That the word is a feminine personal name is corroborated by the context: "Medeia, queen of the lofty city, . . . beautiful, wealthy," etc. For the superb proof by context see Commentary (1-2). Although her name is mentioned only once in our fragment, the importance of Medeia is shown by the large number of epithets which follow (5-7).

(6) This line provides additional proof of solution along with (5) and (7). Note the description of the city as *aipās*, a standing epithet, of the woman as beautiful and rich, and of the queen as untouchable and majestic. —[PO]LIOS: *makaro-Knō*[so+ (4)? —DU-SI-NO-GO: probably an unattested, compound adjective, modifying *Mēdeian*. Or a genitive with [po]lios? If the word is \**tursinochōn*, the first part of the compound cannot equal *τύρσις*, "tower," since the -n- would be impossible, but might be an unattested, related word. The context would be excellent for the "queen of the lofty city," but both corroborated cases of -rs- appear as -rr- (10, 11). —GA-WE: KALWĒN, "beautiful"; see §§36-37. —MA-GA-RA: MAKAIRAN, "blessed, wealthy." One might point out *owjas* (13), spelled *o-wa*, and argue for *makarjan*, but where a linguistic change is involved, the exact stage of which cannot be determined, I have usually adopted the later Greek spelling. Cf. *makaro-Knō*[so+ (4).

(7) ANAPTON. Metrical "rule": The initial syllable of the line may be lengthened under the ictus. So in Homer: cf., e.g., *Il.* 22.379, ἐπέι. In addition to *ānāpton* see *kāliās* (88) and *kāpuōn* (92). The three short



first syllables may be defended individually on separate grounds, on the basis of Homer and later authors: e.g., we may compare the lengthening of the  $\alpha$ -privative in ἀθάνατος. But we should note that all three short syllables which need explanation are the initial syllables of their lines under the ictus. Comparatively few lines begin with an ictus and a two-syllable foot. I count 81 first syllables of known length in trochees and spondees, including only 7 line-beginnings, in the 27 lines from 1-20 and 86-92. Placed at random under the ictus among the 81 available positions, one of our three shorts would have 7 chances in 81 of falling into one of the seven line-beginnings, another 6 in 80, the third 5 in 79. Multiplying  $7/81 \times 6/80 \times 5/79$ , I find that the three short syllables have one chance in 2438 of occupying three of these seven line-beginnings by accident. Hence, the metrical "rule" given above. —A-ME-GO: AMEGON (acc. sing. fem.), "mighty, majestic." Many labels are possible for the  $a$ - in *amegon*, such as "prothetic vowel," *a sterētikon*, etc. But the context shows quite clearly that we have here *megos* (95; see Commentary) with strengthened force. I therefore prefer the label ἐπιτατικόν (Eust.),  $\alpha$ -, III, in LSJ. Puhvel suggests *ameg*- < *Hmeg*- rather than  $\alpha$ -privative + *meg*- ("most unlikely, because early Greek simply did not use alpha *sterētikon* with simple adjectives" [letter, Feb. 4, 1960]). Presence of an initial *H*- is shown in Homeric segments of the type, ἐνὶ μεγάροισι, where it makes position. "We know that *H* in Greek seems either to be vocalized *or* to 'make position'; this would to my knowledge be the first instance where both treatments were found in different dialects, and such uniqueness is hardly an asset from the point of view of credibility" (*ibid.*). Possibly  $a$ - < *\*sm*- or *\*ḡ*-, weak grade of *en*- ("as probably in the figura etymologica *ámoton memaúia* 'intensely intent' from *\*ḡ-mḡtom*" [*ibid.*]). —GE-RE-JA-QE: CHĒREIĀN TE (adj.), "and widowed." -*ios* adjectives are usually 2-ending (see Commentary [2]), but that would scarcely be an objection. Possibly *chēreiān* (noun), "widow," analogous to *basi[leian]* (5), "queen," in formation and meaning.

(8) WEPOS: acc. (sing.) of specification; cf. *genos* (16). —SI-MA-GE-: TĪMĀKE. See Commentary (1) and §56 below. —QE: DE; cf. δέ, adversative and copulative particle. The context must determine whether -*qe* is to be equated with τε or δέ. See *de* (11, 88, 91) and Commentary (11), and compare the usage with *te* (5) and *te . . . te* (19), "both . . . and." My study of Mycenaean -*qe* has convinced me that it may represent either of the later words. Unfortunately the derivation of δέ is completely obscure and cannot help us, although *\*g<sup>h</sup>e* has been suggested. Final decision will have to be based on a study of actual occurrences in Mycenaean writing. The subject requires more space than can be given



to it here and will be treated more fully elsewhere. Meanwhile cf. *Documents*, p. 402: "Function of Myc. *ouq<sup>ue</sup>* is closer to that of class. οὐδέ . . . [than οὐτέ]." —IDAIĀN: see Commentary (5). —MĒTĒR: see §§36 and 45.

(10) A-GO: AGŌN (nom. sing. masc. pres. act. part.), "bringing." Due to missing text we cannot be sure of the grammatical form. Cf. *agōmen* (11) and *agōmen* (14). —DE-NA-BI-LU-SA: see Commentary (3). —E-NE: *scriptio plena* (§34) for ENS (prep. with acc.), "into, to." *agōn* justifies the assumption of the lengthened form *ens* (later εἰς) and the accusative. Cf. *e-me* (93) and Commentary. —LUKAION (acc. sing. fem.), "Lycaean, Arcadian." For adjectives in *-ios* see Commentary (2). —CHERRONĒSON: note the Attic-Ionic *ē* (§36) and the Attic *-rr-*. We have here another exciting click: "Lycaean peninsula" = "Arcadian peninsula" = "Peloponnesus." Note too that this very important "place name" is in a strategic position, the very end of strophe 1 (see Commentary on *ῥῆσον* [11]).

(11) JE-SO: JĒSŌN (voc. sing.), "Jason," son of Aeson. This is a quite certain instance of the occurrence of Attic-Ionic *ē* (§36). Both the name and the line are corroborated in such an amazing manner as to remove all possibility of chance coincidence. The name Jason in the vocative case is corroborated by his being addressed further as *wana Argohos* (12), "Jason, master of the Argo," with *wana* a vocative form which the flexibility of the syllabary cannot disguise. *wa-na* can be nothing else (§45). The name is also corroborated by the announcement of the subject of the poem (1-2) and by the names, Medeia (5) and Idaia (see Commentary [5]). The vocative is further corroborated by the presence (11) of a verb of speaking, EPHĒ (recurring [88]; see §36), and both are corroborated by the 1st pers. plur. subj. following *ephē*, AGŌMEN, "let us . . .," with the length of the thematic vowel demonstrable metrically. See *agōn* (10), *agōmen* (14), and §50. Lines 11-12, "And Idaia said, 'Jason, let us move the watch fire to the height overlooking the village glen, O lord of the Argo,'" are fully corroborated by the meter and contain only one difficult equation: *zugeion* (12). In addition, there is evidence that certain words are placed in strategic positions and that the "recurring word" of Pindar is inherited from a device employed by the Mycenaean poet (see §56). We have seen that reference to an important place like the Peloponnesus marks the exact end of strophe 1 (10); it is not surprising that the beginning of strophe 1 gives the subject of the poem, Jason's travels. After the reference to Knossos, the phrase "lofty city" is used, and the genitive, [*po*]lios, is the first word of the second half of strophe 1 (beginning of [6]). The first word of the second

half of strophe 2 (beginning of [16]) is the genitive of the name of the city which gave its name to the whole period, *Mukēnās*. Consider, then, that the first word of strophe 2 picks up the beginning of strophe 1 with the name Jason. This strategic placement again rules out the possibility of coincidence through chance resemblance. The "hero" of the poem, corroborated in very many ways, does not appear as the first word of strophe 2 (and in a sense also as the last word of strophe 1; see §60) by accident. The discussion of the "recurring word" in §56 will give further evidence of the deliberateness with which certain words were placed in either the line or the metrical scheme. —QE: DE. If we had, "*\*Iēsön,*" *ephē \*d' Idaiā* [or *Idaiā \*d' ephē*], we should feel fully at home in the "Greek." See Commentary (8). —BU-RA-BO-DO: PURRAPTON, "watch fire, signal fire." With *pur-*=*\*purs-* cf. *cherronēsōn* (10). The first syllable is long metrically, and so the equation is better with *πυρός* ("torch"; plur., "fires") than with *πῦρ*. The two parts of the word are a click in themselves whether *πῦρ* or *πυρός* is assumed; cf. ἄψαι πυρόν, Pindar *I.* 4.43.

(12) ZUGEION. Here Idaia says, "Let us move the watch fire to the ZU-GE-JO of the village glen." Since a watch or guard would probably have been stationed at the highest point in order to command a view of the whole area, the watch fire also would in all likelihood have been placed there. *zugeion* ought to refer in that case to a high place of some sort. The closest we can come in later Greek to the Mycenaean spelling is *ζύγιος* or *τὸ ζύγιον*, with which we may compare *τὸ ζυγόν*. The uses of *ζυγόν* and the related Latin word *iugum* agree exceptionally well semantically. It may therefore in this instance not be too unreliable a method to study the uses of both words to derive the best meaning for our context. The Latin *iugum* has, as a well attested meaning, exactly what the context calls for, "height, summit of a mountain; ridge." Translate, "height" (overlooking the village glen). —O-JA-NA-QO: OIĀNAPON, unattested compound adjective; cf. *οἶη* and *νάπη*. *qo* is "correctly" used, but see Boisacq on the evidence for interior *\*-w-* in *oiā-*, and cf. §31. —WANA ARGOHOS: see Commentary (1-2). The vocative *ἄνα* (instead of *ἄναξ*) is later limited to the gods and therefore must be the older form (cf. the old plural, *Ἀνάκες, Φάνακες*). —ME-DE-LI-SO: cf. *me-de-li-sa* (14). Since the context demands a verb in both places and includes the idea of *moving*, we may assume, for the endings, *-sō* and *-sa*, 1st pers. sing. fut. ind. act. and aor. ind. act. of a verb compounded with *\*meta-* (change of place). Each occurrence precedes the name of an animal. The standing epithet *elikas* is used with *bōns* after *-sa*, and there may have been an intentional play on sounds here, but if the verb is related to *elikas*, *-sa*

must represent *-ksa* (*-sō* could be present tense). Comparison with *ἐλίσσω*, etc., brings in the added difficulty of the digamma. "I shall move?" and "I moved?"

(13) O-WA: OWJAS=dissyllabic *owias* (acc. plur.), "sheep." For corroboration, note that the word is followed by a compound epithet obviously meaning "pastured by [or "for"] the gods" and that the same verb precedes both *owjas* and *bōns* (14), "bulls." The presence of *j* is corroborated by the probable metrical length of the syllable *o-*. For both the ending and the dissyllabic feature cf. the Homeric acc. plur. of *πόλις*: dissyllabic *πόλιας* (*Od.* 8.560, 574). We have a click in lines 13-15 (despite the "incorrect" spelling of *suas* [13]) in the names of four common animals: "sheep, pigs" (13), "bulls" (14), and "goat" (15). In addition, every animal is corroborated by a modifier. —THEOCHĪLONS: obviously a compound adjective, "god-pastured."="pastured by [or "for"] the gods." —DU-WA: TUAS=SUAS, "pigs." Confusion of *su* and *tu* (§35), attested in various dialects, is infrequent compared with that of *si* and *ti*. The context demands the equation and interpretation. Cf. *si-ma-ga* (1) and *ma-si-ro* (15). —BU-JO-RI-JO: PUIŌRIONS, unattested compound adjective, "milk-season"="suckling." Cf. *πύιον* τὸ γάλα, Hsch., *πυός*, "first milk after birth" (of women or cattle), and *ῶριος*. —DE-BO-DO-NA-DO: THERPTŌNĀTONS, unattested compound adjective = \**thrept-ōnātons*, "nourishing, bought for nourishment," or "bought to be kept and reared." On the choice between *ωνητός* and *ονητός* (*όνινημι*) and the question of an initial \**zw-* in the former, see *Documents*, p. 235, and cf. §31 above. The translation, "nourishing," may be kept in either case.

(14) ME-DE-LI-SA: see *me-de-li-so* (12) and Commentary. —QO-O: BŌNS, "bulls, oxen, kine, cattle." Cf. *bōn* (86). The use of the Homeric standing epithet for oxen (see *elikas* below) as a standing epithet of *qo-o* in Mycenaean poetry (see [86-87]), along with the identical spelling used in Linear B (*qo-o*) for the one-syllable word (§34), is one of our happiest clicks because it quite proves the deductions (*Documents*, pp. 195-96, 207, and 407) leading to the interpretation of Linear B *qo-o* ("ox") and of \*23 used as an ideogram (OX): "the best suggestion being that of E. Risch . . . that [*qo-o*] is a *scriptio plena* for *g<sup>u</sup>ōs* (acc. plur.);" (pp. 195-96). *qo-o* (86) is preceded by *thūsa*, "I sacrificed," which verifies the word as representing a sacrificial animal. We may *strengthen* the conclusion in *Documents* (p. 195) and say that this is "certainly a part of the word corresponding to *βοῦς*." The meter (C7.1) decisively proves that *qo-o* is one syllable. The context of (86-87) is further corroborated by the word *bōmōi*, "on the altar." —ELIKAS, "crumpled-horned"; see



*elika* (87). That this word is a standing epithet of *qo-o* is shown by its use in both passages. Cf. the use of ἑλξ later as a standing epithet of βούς, not well understood, but commonly accepted as describing the horns; or of the movement of the body, "rolling." No digamma! —AGŌMEN: see *agōn* (10) and *agōmen* (11). See §§50 and 56 for the deliberate placement of *agōmen Pūthaiōi* and *agōmen purraption* (11) in identical line-position. —BU-DA-SO: PŪTHAHŌI=PŪTHAIŌI, "Pythian." Despite the *s* (= *h*) for *j*, the added suffix *-ro-* in *mantirōi* (15), and the flexibility of the syllabary, it is difficult to dismiss as chance resemblance the occurrence side by side of the words, *Pūthaiōi mantirōi*, "Pythian diviner," especially since they are immediately followed by the words (spelled according to the rules), *attēgon azowon*, "slaughtered goat," and *mustēriōi*, "for the secret rite," a sure reference to religious ritual. With the possibility of *s* (= *h*) for *j*, cf. *a-go-so* (2, 12), where we have *s=h < j*. Cf. also Bennett's discussion of the opposite possibility in Linear B, namely, *j=h < s* (*The Olive Oil Tablets of Pylos*, Suplementos a *Minos*, Núm. 2 [1958] 20-22).

(15) MA-SI-RO: MANTIRŌI, "diviner, seer." On the addition of *-ro-* see Commentary on *aiwārons* (20), and cf. ἄστυρον=ἄστυ, "city." With *si* for *ti* cf. Buck, *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin* (Chicago 1933) §141.2: "τ becomes σ: in most of the nouns formed with the suffix *-ti-*, . . ." Cf. *si-ma-ga* (1) and *du-wa* (13). —ATTĒGON, "he-goat": Ion. word, ii B.C. —MA-WU-ME-GO: a personal name, or perhaps a title. With the ending *-me-go* cf. *me-go* (95) with Commentary, *me-go-la* (90), and *a-me-go* (7). *ma-wu-*=*Mau-*, one syllable.

(16) MUKĒNĀS, "Mykene, Mycenae." This is the first reference to it found in Mycenaean writing. For the strategic placement see Commentary (11). We may assume that the singular is the older form, for it is more frequent in Homer than the plural. The second syllable shows the Attic-Ionic ē, but as is usual in the tablet the ā of the first declension is left unchanged (see §38). With *genos* following we have a click. —GENOS (acc. [sing.] of specification), of or from Mycenae "by race"; cf. *wepos* (8). For the construction and word cf. ἐξ Ἰθάκης γένος εἰμί (*Od.* 15.267), and for the genitive without ἐκ see Soph. *Philoc.* 239-40. See §45. —DE-WU-NO: DEUNO+. Cf. δεῦνος, Indian for βασιλεύς (*EM apud* LSJ). —A-GE-QO: equation with ἄσκεπος, aside from other difficulties, would be awkward metrically.

(16-17) I have been unable to develop the context from *i[.]* to +*woboronisa*+. By the law of averages, since context is lacking, it is likely that one of my four "good" equations (17) is the result of accidental resemblance.

(17) SO-ZO-DA: SŌZONTA. Lack of construable context makes a decision impossible, but the infrequency of *so* as an initial syllable and of *zo* in all positions diminishes the chance of equation with a Greek word by accidental resemblance. Historically this word has too many possibilities for safe conjecture. —JI-GU-NU: probably IGNUN. Due to lack of context it is hard to choose between the meanings, "ham, the part behind the knees and thighs," and "dust, ashes" (*ignun* or *iknun*). *mēra* (19), "thighs," suggests the former, but *āwera spodion* (17), "ash-colored haze," the latter, which is less well attested. Note that alphabetic spelling (without accent marks) would not help us make a choice. —ĀWERA: cf. (92) and see §38. —ĀWERA SPODION, "ash-colored haze," if the words are to be construed together.

(18) See §57. —E-WE-RO-JO: EUEROIO (gen. sing. of \**eu-eros*), "much-loving, passionate." Cf. the similar compounds with ἔπος, e.g., δύσεπος, Thuc. +; Homer preferred ἔπος to ἔπως. On the omission of the *u* of the diphthong see §30 above and cf. MY *e-we-pe-se-so-me-na*. —I-GO-GO: cf. *i-jo-go-* (19) and *i-go-go* (20). All three are personal names ending in *-os* (gen. sing.). If we assume that they are similar-sounding names, what is true for one should be true for all. That the first syllable is long is shown by the meter in (19) and (20). That the *o*'s and the second syllable are short is shown by the use of *i-go-go* (18) in a three-syllable foot (two syllables must remain short). The context corroborates their interpretation as personal names in the genitive, esp. *eueroio* + *Ikokos* (18), "of the passionate + Ikox," and + *Iokos te Idaiās te* (19), "of both + Iox and Idaia." —A-QO-WI-RO: Argos beat the *a-qo-wi-ro* of + *Ikox*. What the *a-qo-wi-ro* is or are, is impossible to say. Cf. the pun in *Od.* 18.73, Ἴπος ἄϊπος, in which the point of \*-*wīro-* in the second word must depend on a different meaning from that of the name. Cf. also IE \**uīro-s*. The third syllable of *a-qo-wi-ro* is long.

(19) I-JO-GO-: see Commentary (18). —IDAIĀS: see Commentary (5) and (19-20). —ME-RA: MĒRA (acc. plur. neut.), "thighs." Or *mērja*? Cf. *o-wa* = *owjas* (13). —POIĀ (instrumental sing.), "with a *poa*-switch"; a grasslike whip or one made of grasses or other plants; "laurel," Pindar *P.* 8.20. On \*-*w-*? see §31. Or *poiāi* (*Documents*, p. 83: "In the sing. the instr. coalesces with the dat. in all declensions")?

(19-20) In these lines the decipherment of the tablet receives corroboration from the Diodorus Siculus account of an adventure of the Argonauts, the story of Phineus (4.43-44). In spite of the changes in the story in well over a millennium the key words in (19) and (20), *imasa*, "whipped," *Idaiās*, *desmons*, "chains," and *oies* (= *vīes*), "sons", match some of the key words in the later story, where the *sons* of Phineus

are *whipped* through the evil machinations of Idaia (*ibid.* 4.43.3-4). They are also in *chains*, and the same word (δεσμούς) is used (*ibid.* 4.44.2). —In the Enkomi version the *oies* of +Iqox trail their fetters behind them. They are therefore human beings. Without a clue *oies* might be the “sons, daughters, slaves,” etc., of +Iqox. With the clue to “sons” provided by Diodorus, it is easy to see that we have in *oies* the Homeric *vīes*. As one pronounces the two words aloud, keeping the diphthong but emphasizing the *i*, it is possible to observe how little difference there need be in the sound of the two; the spelling *oies* may merely imply careless pronunciation. —These lines along with (18), also provide metrical proof of both the decipherment and the interpretation and leave no doubt that the song was accompanied by mimetic dancing. See §57.

(20) I-QO-QO: see Commentary (18). —DESMONS, “chains” (acc. plur.; never δεσμά in the sense of “bonds, chains”). See Commentary (19-20) and on *helkontai* below. —AI-WA-RO: AIWĀRONS (acc. plur. masc., modifying *desmons*). Perhaps, “eternal,” hence, “wearisome.” On the productivity of the primary and secondary suffix *-ro-*, which began “in IE times,” see Buck and Petersen, *Reverse Index*, pp. 311ff., and note *-apo-*. As a secondary suffix (mainly after formative vowels) the “most common of all types is *-ηπο-* (*-āpo-*),” productive chiefly of adjectives as here (*ibid.*, p. 312). Since this type arose by the addition of *-ro-* to *ā*-stems, the spelling with *ā* rather than *ē* would conform to the rule (§37 above). With *aiwārons* cf. αἰεί, Hom. +, αἰφεί, and Lat. *aevum*; cf. also αἰωνής, etc., Archil. + (see Boisacq, s.v.). With <\*σαιϝ-, Lat. *saevus*, cf. Hor. *Odes* 3.11.45: *saevīs . . . catēnīs*. —O-JE: OIES for \**uies* (nom. plur., Homeric short form; cf. *vīes*); see Commentary (19-20). It seems to me that this word shows too many spelling variants in later Greek for any assumptions on probable Mycenaean spellings, but see Boisacq and cf. §31 above. —SE-GO-DA: SELKONTAI=HELKONTAI (the *s-* still makes position; 3rd pers. plur. pres. ind. middle), “they drag,” with a notion of exertion. With the ending *-da=-tai* cf. Linear B *-to=-toi*. With *desmons . . . helkontai* cf. Hdt. 3.129.3: πένδας . . . ἔλκοντα. Note how the meter illustrates the dragging of the feet by the use of 11 consecutive long syllables and the omission of the *anceps* or short (see §57).

(22) The signs ]-be a-we-qo[ (or šī) are legible.

(86-87) A breath-taking click: “I sacrificed a crumpled-horned bull . . . on the altar,” with all four words spelled as expected and Homeric. —BŌN / ELIKA: see Commentary (14) and §56.

(88) KALIĀS, of or from “the shrine.” For *kā-* see Commentary on



*anapton* (7). — -QE: DE; see Commentary (8). —EPHĒ: see (11). —O-BA: OMPHĀ, with *ba* for \**qa*. In Homer the word is always used of the gods. Cf. Thgn. 808 (oracle delivered from a *shrine*). With *omphā* . . . *theios* (89) cf. *Il.* 2.41: *θείη* . . . *ὀμφή*.

(88–89) This passage is another fine example of contextual corroboration, both internally and by its click with the preceding passage: “But from the shrine . . . the divine voice spoke . . . as he was about to sacrifice . . .,” with spelling according to the rules, all words attested (except proper nouns), and four out of the five Homeric.

(90) QI-GA: PHĪKAS (acc. plur. fem.), the name of an animal? Cf. *Φίλκ*, Hes., and *σφίγγες τε καὶ γρῦπες* as ornaments, Hdt. 4.79.2. —MEGOLANS, “large”; see Commentary (95). *phikas megolans* fits into the metrical scheme and is also corroborated by the gender. —BU-BO-DO: The meter indicates a two-syllable word with consonant cluster *-bd-*.

(91) JI-QO: IPPON. See Commentary on *īnes ippioi* below. —TĪMĀKA: see Commentary (1) and §56. —QE: DE; see Commentary (8). —ĪNES IPPIOI is a fine example of a click. *ippioi* (*i-qi-o*) is also confirmed by *ippon* at the beginning of the line (*qo* and *qi* are both used “correctly,” but cf. the alternate spelling *ji-bo* = *ippos* [96], also fitting in context).

(92) Note the contextual corroboration of solution. It is impossible to place line 92 and the fragmentary material following in the metrical scheme. —KAPUŌN, “breathing forth.” For *kā-* see Commentary on *anapton* (7). —GNATHŌN. Note *ippon* and *ippioi* in the preceding line and cf. Hom. *Epigr.* 14.13: *γνάθος ἱππέη*. —PAR (postpositive enclitic prep. with gen.), “from.” See §34. Both *παρ*’ and *πάρ*’ appear before a vowel, Hom. +, but I do not spell the word *par*’ because there is no evidence in the tablet for elision. —ĀWERA: see (17).

(93) E-ME BO-MA-SI. In PY Ta 641.1, *e-me po-de*, *e-me* is reconstructed as *hemei*, “one” (*Documents*, pp. 336 and 392). However, it is perhaps more likely to be *em* before *p*, as possibly here, *e-me* = *em* (prep. with dat.), “in, on,” assimilated from \**en* before a word beginning with a labial. See §34 and Commentary on *e-ne* = *ens* (10). The partial assimilation of a nasal to a following labial in external combinations (mainly between words standing in close logical relation) is very common in all dialects to a late period (Buck, *Greek Dialects* [rev. ed. 1928] p. 71). The meter makes a long second syllable likely in *bo-ma-si*. If so, perhaps *pōmassi*, dat. plur. of \**pōma*, whether “lid, cover,” or “drink.” Puhvel (if *si* = *ti*): *emei pōmati*, “at one draught?” but the meter is awkward.

(94) GU-NA: probably *kuna*, “dog” (or *kunas*); possibly *gunā*, “woman, wife,” but the text is too fragmentary for a decision. —GA-NE-LO-JO: probably a personal name in the genitive.

(95) MEGOS (nom. sing. masc.), "mighty, great." With *megos* = \**megas* cf. KN and PY *pa-ro* = *παρά*, PY *pe-mo* vs. KN and PY *pe-ma*, and Arc. *δέκο* = *δέκα* (see examples cited in *Documents*, p. 77, and for *o* = *α* see Buck, *Greek Dialects*, §6 and sub§ *a*). An unexpected spelling demands good contextual or other corroboration. We have it in the click, "And the mighty Ajax . . .," and in the occurrence of *megolans* (90): cf. *μέγας*, *μεγάλη*. See also *amegon* (7).

(96) JI-BO: see Commentary (91). —MI-NI-GE: MNIKE (3rd pers. sing. aor. ind. act.), "ate." For *-ke* see Commentary (1). *μνίειν* *ἐσθίειν*, Hsch.

(98) A-SO-GO-QO. If confusion of *s* and *t* should turn out to be possible before any vowel, rather than only before *i* and *u*, this word might be equated with *ἄρτοκόπος*, Hdt. + (cf. *ἄρτοπόπος*, and PY and MY *a-to-po-qo*). However, there is no proof of such additional confusion of *s* and *t*, and no context is available on which to base a decision.

(99) Ventris reads: *be-go-go e-ge-so*? but only *e-ge-* is legible on the plate.

#### THE GREEK WORDS

46. I said in section 20 that I had exceeded my goal of 1) twenty-five to thirty *Homeric* words whether exactly spelled or not, and including these, 2) a minimum of thirty-five *exactly* spelled, attested, Greek words, all at least fitting in context. Actually in preparing lists of the Greek words involved in my equations I found about forty-two Homeric words in which I had confidence (the first category), of which about thirty-five fitted the second category. I have reached my second goal with the Homeric words alone, and if I add to these thirty-five the other exactly spelled, attested, Greek words of which I feel confident, I have about fifty. These include in both categories those proper nouns which I consider to be contextually corroborated. The exactly spelled Homeric words are given in the first list with the numbers of the lines in which the equations occur. That, excepting proper nouns, every repeated word in the text is Homeric seems to me significant for the proof.

ἄγος (4)	Ἄργώ (2, 12)	θεῖος (89)	μήτηρ (8)
ἄγω (10, 11, 14)	βοῦς (14, 86)	θύω (86, 88)	Μυκῆνη (16)
ἄηρ (17, 92)	βωμός (87)	Ἰήσων (11)	ὄμνυμι (2)
Ἀἴας (95)	γένος (16)	ἱμάσσω (19)	ὀμφή (88)
αἰπός (6)	δεσμός (20)	ἵππος (91, 96)	πάρ (92)
Ἀλήϊον (2)	ἔλιξ (14, 87)	ἴς (91)	ποίη (19)
ἄλλύω (5)	ἔλκω (20)	καλός (6)	τε (5, κτλ.)
ἄναξ (12)	ἐνς, εἰς (10)	μάκαρ (6)	φημί (11, 88)
ἄράσσω (18)	ἔπος (8)	μῆρα (19)	

The following attested Greek words should be added for the second category only:

ἄζωος (15)	γνάθος (92)	καλή (88)	μυστήριον (15)
αἰνετός (1)	γύος (1)	καπύω (92)	χερρόνησος (10)
ἄναπτος (7)	Ἰδαία (5, κτλ.)	Λυκαῖος (10)	χηρεία (7)
ἄττηγός (15)	ἵππιος (91)	Μήδεια (5)	ὕφιστάω (4)

To these might be added *μνίειν* (96), attested by Hesychius, *Πυθαῖος* (14), where we find  $s=h$  for  $j$ , and *σπόδιος* (17), less well corroborated contextually. We may also add to the primary proof the surprising number of equations which may be made with the small list of words obtained from Linear B. The following list, which disregards differences in form and gender and includes four proper nouns, is not complete, but contains most of the striking comparisons. The others may be found in the Lexical Index.

<i>Enkomi</i>	<i>Linear B</i>	<i>Enkomi</i>	<i>Linear B</i>
a-go	a-ke	i-qi-o	i-qi-o
ai-wa-	ai-wa	ji-da-ja	i-da-i-o
de-jo	te-i-ja	ji-qo	i-qo
de-mo	de-so-mo	me-de	ma-te
de-o-	te-o-	me-de-ja-	me-de-i-jo
e-be	pa-si	me-go	me-zo
e-me	e-me (?)	-qe	-qe
e-wu[, e-we-	e-u-, e-we-	qo-o	qo-o
-go-no-[(so)	ko-no-so	wa-na	wa-na-ka

47. These lists comprise the words and context upon which our primary, combinatory proof of solution rests, although many of the words in the secondary proof are fully as convincing, and, I believe, equally strong proof of the decipherment if, and only if, the goal set by the solution of Linear B has been attained. To the first category may be added, then, the following Homeric words of which I am confident:

βασιλεια (5)	δῖς (13)	σῦς (13)	νῖός (20)
μέγας (95, 90)	πόλις (6)	τιμάω (1, 8, 91)	

To these might be added *Ἄργος* (18), used in Homer of a dog, and *σώζω* (17), uncorroborated contextually. Almost as convincing equations as the primary proof are several unattested compounds, excellently corroborated by context, one or both of whose component parts can be found in Homer. Such compounds, with only the Homeric component parts added in Greek, are: *cherronēson* (10, attested; *χέρσος* + *νήσος*),



*duīpori*+ (3, context fragmentary; πόρις), *eueroio* (18, εὐ+ἔρος), *makaro-Knō[so*+ (4, μάκαρ+Κνωσός), *oiānapon* (12, νάπη), *puiōrions* (13, ὤριος), *purrapton* (11, πυρρός+ἄπτω), and *theochilons* (13, θεός).

48. In view of the convincing nature of the proof by attested Greek and even Mycenaean, and by striking context, demonstrated in the lists, translation, and notes, it would hardly be worth while to include less convincing equations here. There could be criticism that a word like *μνίειν* (96) is not a *suitable* word to find on a Mycenaean tablet. I concede that frequent words attested only by lexicographers and other late sources would be unsuitable as proof. Perhaps none of them is suitable. Let the reader judge for himself the suitability of the Greek words included in the lists above and not consider as proof of solution any word not acceptable to him as such. Such words are, of course, useful for purposes of interpretation of the text after the solution has been proved, even when they are not acceptable as proof of it.

#### THE METER

49. Finding by the combinatory method a percentage of Greek too high to be accidental proved my arrangement of the signs in the grid according to the original, Mycenaean, abagaic order. How much stronger did the proof become when I found myself able, quite unexpectedly, to derive another set of coincidences impossible to attribute to chance through my attempt to solve the riddle of the meter? I say “unexpectedly” and refer to a “riddle” because just as there had been an unintentional trap<sup>35</sup> in the syllabary for the decipherer, so was there one in the contents of the tablet for any person essaying to extract the meter from the text. It was quite logical for Mr. Ventris to assume on the basis of the available evidence that the tablet might contain a poem; I concurred. The chief evidence lay in the length of the lines, which fluctuated around an average, and yet were sometimes so short that there was more than enough room to have written the next word.<sup>36</sup> That the metrical requirements determined the number of syllables and thus the length of the lines seemed an obvious assumption to make before decipherment.

50. After decipherment it was obvious that the contents did represent Mycenaean poetry. One could hardly miss the playing with sounds, including assonance, alliteration, and repetition of groups of syllables in the same line-position. Note, for example, the three consecutive initial *i*’s with ictus in line 19 and the use of *m*’s in lines 14–16. *agōmen purrapton* (11) and *agōmen Pūthaiōi* (14) occupy identical line-position with the familiar shift of the ictus. In addition there was evidence of the

use of epithets, compounds, and compound epithets, and even of the standing epithet. We do not find merely "Knossos," but *makaro-Knō*[so+ (4), not merely *bōns*, but *bōns elikas* (14, 86-87), not merely a "watch fire," but *purr-aptōn* (11). The sheep are *theo-chīlōns* (13), the pigs are *pui-ōrions* and *therpt-ōnātons* (13). The Argo is described as *alāiōio*(2), + *Iko*x as *eu-eroio* (18), "city" as *aipās* (6). And in describing Medeia the poet became almost prolix: "queen of the lofty city, . . . beautiful, wealthy, untouchable, majestic . . ." (5-7). Most important of all, the interpretable material could be read rhythmically without any difficulty, as, for example, line 1: *ainetans guons timāka wa[naktos*,<sup>37</sup>

| ' ∪ | ' ∪ | ' — | ' ∪ ∪ | ' . |

and line 19: *imasa + Iokos te Idaiās te mēra poiā*,

| ∪ ∪ | ' ∪ | ' ∪ | ' ∪ | ' ∪ | ' ∪ | ' . |

51. However, the lines did not show the similarity to each other of a regular meter such as dactylic hexameter or iambic trimeter. Nor could I find any connection between the meter and the length of the lines. There was none. And even with the most flexible rules no two complete lines could be considered metrically identical. The pre-decipherment evidence for poetry had nothing to do with the meter; it became a mere trap for anyone working on the problem.

52. What did control the line-length? For some perhaps traditional reason not available to us the lines were controlled in length by the number of words. The total for every line in which the number of words could be determined proved to be five, no more, no less. At the end of line 20 there is a circular symbol: could this be the symbol for "100" as in Linear B? Five words a line times twenty equals one hundred: did the symbol represent a word count? The regularity of the five words per line seemed to indicate that the word count held some importance for the Mycenaean composer. However, if a symbol had been needed for any reason, a round symbol would have been logical enough, and in section 55 below I shall show another possible interpretation of it. But whether or not the symbol is a word-count signifying "100," there seems to be no question that each line contains exactly five words.

53. Discarding the earlier erroneous assumption, I began to look for clues. I worked out the metrical feet for each line separately and found that whenever a line ended with an ictus, the next line never began with one, and, of course, whenever a line began with an ictus, the preceding line never ended with one. Since each line had almost an equal chance of beginning, as well as of ending, with an ictus or not, this coincidence

was not likely to be accidental. The meter had to be continuous. Actually the smooth flow of the feet was never interrupted by the end of the line. A partial final foot ended in the next line as necessary, and it was for that reason that apparently trochaic and iambic lines almost alternated with each other. Studying the line-divisions I noted that the poet had five basic choices, which may be represented thus:

|..      .|.      |...      .|..      ..|.

with the vertical bar indicating the end of a line; dots, the syllables of the split or following foot. By the law of averages, in the twenty-five lines available for study, there should have been approximately five cases of two identical line-divisions in a row. There was not a single case. This can happen by accident, of course, but so seldom that it was reasonable to assume not only deliberate avoidance of it on the part of the poet but also meticulous care in the metrical composition of the poem. What we had, I decided, was a highly developed art form, the strophe, meticulously composed, perhaps the result of a long history of development and a wealth of tradition. There had to be some point at which the metrical scheme began a second time, could I but find it. The reason I had failed to find coinciding lines might be that lines indifferent as to length and ending with a studied disregard of the metrical foot ended at different places when the scheme was repeated.

54. There was only one possible place where the meter of the fragmentary first line could be repeated at the beginning of a line, and that was at line 11. When line 1, *ainetans guons timāka wa[naktos*, was compared with line 11, *Jēsōn, Idaiā ephē de, agōmen*, applying the rule that a long vowel or diphthong may be shortened before a following vowel and is in that case to be read as long under the ictus but short elsewhere,<sup>38</sup> I had:

1: |—∪|—∪|—|—∪∪|—·|  
11: |—∪|—∪|—∪|—∪∪|—|

The only variation was a responsion of ∪ for — in what we may call the *anceps* of the third foot.

55. Missing text provided only a slight handicap in the first twenty lines because the approximate number of missing syllables was obvious from a study of the average length of the words and lines on the tablet combined with an exact knowledge of the number of words missing.<sup>39</sup> Because strophe 2 did begin at line 11, I was finally able to establish the metrical congruence of strophe 1 (1-10) and strophe 2 (11-20). The metrical scheme is shown in Figure 4. Since the responsion to a short



in one strophe, however, may be an irrational long in the other, and two strophes are insufficient to determine what limitations may have been placed on this practice, I needed a set of coincidences which could not be mere chance in order to be sure, and to be able to prove, that we have actually the repeated metrical scheme of a strophe and not merely continuation of a similar metrical rhythm which gives an appearance of congruence to the two strophes.<sup>40</sup> I had this proof in the fact that every three-syllable foot of each strophe coincides with a three-syllable foot in the other. This can scarcely be attributed to chance. And is it likely to be chance that an early "Greek" poem turns out to have a strophe containing ten lines of five words each, totaling *exactly fifty* (!) words? Since twice fifty is one hundred, does the circular symbol discussed in section 52 merely indicate the end of the strophe at the end of line 20, the number 100, or both?

56. In line 4, *uphistaeho makaro-*, I found a succession of five short syllables, the only occurrence of more than three consecutive shorts in the first ten lines. In the second ten lines this phenomenon was repeated, again just once, in line 14, *elikas agömen*. Line 14, as it happens, corresponds to line 4 of strophe 1 except that the two lines do not begin and end at identical points in the metrical scheme; *the two sets of five shorts coincide exactly*, as may be seen at a glance in Figure 4. Later I discovered that if I made *qo-o e-li-ga* (86-87) coincide in the scheme with *qo-o e-li-ga* (14) and then estimated the syllables carefully, the beginning of line 91, *ippon timāka de*, coincided with the beginning of line 8, *wepos timāke de*, in the first case a coincidence of strophe  $\alpha$  with strophe 2; in the second case, of strophe  $\alpha$  with strophe 1. We have in four and one-half lines two illustrations of the "recurring word" of Pindar, indicating that it was a frequent device of probably great importance to the Mycenaean poet. This device was the careful placing of repeated words in corresponding parts of the metrical scheme, as Pindar, for example, placed *Τλαπολέμων* at the end of the first line of strophe 2 and *Τλαπολέμω* in identical metrical position at the end of the first line of strophe 5 of the same ode.<sup>41</sup> The repetition discussed in section 50, in the same position within the written line only, is a related device, but not identical, since there is no metrical coincidence.

57. After a comparison and analysis of strophes 1 and 2 and the portion of strophe  $\alpha$ ,<sup>42</sup> I was able to make the following assumptions on the basis of the internal evidence of my equated text and what is known of later Greek meter. We have in the tablet Mycenaean poetry, one element of the Greek trinity, song, music, and dance. The music may be assumed. The song was accompanied by mimetic dancing, and we may have here

a form of *hyporchema* comparable to that to which Homer, it is generally assumed, was referring in the Demodocus episode at the court of Alcinöus.<sup>43</sup> A comparison of the meter and sense of lines 18–20 leaves

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
A.	- ∪ - ∪	- ∪ - ∪	- - - ∪	- ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪	- . - -	- - - -	- - - ∪	∪ ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪
B.	- ∪ - ∪	- ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪	- ∪ - ∪	- ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪	- ∪ - -	- - - -	∪ ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪	- . - ∪
C.	- . - ∪	- . - ∪	- . - -	- - -	- ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪	- ∪ - ∪	- ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪	∪ ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪
D.	- - - -	- - .	- ∪ - .	- - - ∪	- ∪ - ∪	- ∪ - ∪	- - - ∪	- - - .
E.	- - - - - .	∪ ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪ - ∪	- - - - - -	∪ ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪ - ∪	- - - . - .	∪ ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪ - ∪	- - - - - .	- ∪ - ∪ - ∪
F.	- ∪ - ∪ - .	- - - ∪ - .	∪ ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪ - .	- - - . - .	- - - . - -	∪ ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪ - ∪	- - ∪ - .	- ∪ - - - -
G.	- ∪ - ∪ - -	- - - ∪ - -	- ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪ - ∪	- ∪ - . - ∪	- - - . - ∪	- ∪ ∪ - ∪ ∪ - ∪	- - ∪ - -	- . - ∪ - -
H.	- . - ∪ - ∪	- . - ∪ - ∪	- . - ∪ - ∪	- . - ∪ - -	- ∪ - - - -	- . - - - -	- - - -	∪ - - -
I.	- . - -	- . - -	- . - -	- ∪ - -	- - - -	- ∪ - -	- - - -	- - -

FIG. 4. Metrical comparison of strophes 1 (upper line), 2, and x. See §§54–62. Omissions=missing text. . =unknown length. |, ||, |||, and |||| divide the meter into feet, dipodies, dimeters, and lines respectively, but this division is arbitrary. Lengths determined by the rules alone are included.

no room for doubt as to the mimetic dancing. When the beating starts in line 18 (*warasse*), word-ending in caesura, which has been favored almost two to one over diaeresis, is suddenly dropped, and every word ends in diaeresis for two lines (to include the whipping scene);<sup>44</sup> although

the irrational long is used frequently in the *anceps* of the foot elsewhere, there is not one in the beating scene, and indeed, after the word *imasa*, "whipped," there are seven pure trochees. With the aid of the rhythmical effect produced by the pure trochees and regular diaeresis one can easily picture the mimetic movements and gestures of the dancers in these scenes, and especially the rhythmical strokes of the whip. When the scene shifts in line 20 to the boys, who are painfully dragging their wearisome chains (*desmons . . . helkontai*), which are presumably attached to their feet, the rhythm changes, and we have uninterrupted long syllables to the end of the strophe, again illustrating the mimetic dancing. If we assume syncopation beginning with *-mons* of *desmons*, or make each long a triseme and thus a complete metrical foot, the strophe ends where it should, at the end of line 20.<sup>45</sup> Thus, to use the older and more correct terminology, each foot lacks its "arsis" (the raising of the foot). It should be remembered that under the circumstances described, with the chains dragging, there would be virtually no raising of the feet in walking. The mimetic dancing, therefore, is demonstrated not only by the long syllables, indicating the slow shuffling of the feet, but by the constant omission of the arsis, showing conclusively that the foot was not raised during this scene.

58. The basic foot of the metrical scheme is the trochee, which alternates with the tribrach. If the feet were all pure trochees and tribrachs, there would be fifty-six trochees and fifteen tribrachs. Except for the special mimetic effects illustrated in our fragment by the syncopated feet ending the second strophe,<sup>46</sup> comparison of the strophes always shows a responsion of a two-syllable foot for a two-syllable and a three-syllable for a three-syllable foot. However, irrational feet are permitted, and from strophe to strophe we may have a responsion of a spondee for a trochee or vice versa. Out of about thirty two-syllable feet in strophe 1 we have an almost equal number of spondees and trochees, but out of about forty such feet in strophe 2 we have a proportion of two pure feet to one irrational. In the case of the tribrach there can be only one irrational substitution of a long for a short, almost always the first syllable, so that the usual substitution is the so-called cyclic dactyl.<sup>47</sup> Two syllables of the three-syllable foot must remain short. This, combined with the fact that the first syllable of a trochee must be long, places rather a tight curb on accidental and erroneous equations which might be used as "proof" of decipherment and on the interpretation of the text as "Greek." Another interesting point useful as proof, since it can hardly be due to chance, but unsafe to use as a limitation upon interpretation because we have no evidence that it is an unbreakable rule, is that,



although a dactyl is more often than not preceded by a pure trochee, a three-syllable foot beginning with a short syllable, of which we have eleven examples, is always, *without exception*, preceded by a lengthened foot.

59. Although the metrical scheme of the strophe is continuous and cannot be considered as divisible into lines of poetry in the usual sense, I have divided it into nine lines in Figure 4, as if the first eight were trochaic tetrameter acatalectic, but with no intention to imply that they are. The meter may perhaps best be thought of simply as logaoedic. I assumed that the scheme must have been broken up by the poet into smaller units for practical purposes: such "unofficial" lines might show coincidences in the final results because of habits, techniques, or even deliberate intent. The material is too slight to permit of sure results, but I divided the scheme into groups of eight feet, or pairs of four, because I thus obtained numerous coincidences.<sup>48</sup> This division corresponds well with the division into written lines: nine lines of four dipodies each, except for the last, *versus* ten lines of five words each. Column 1 alone of the eight contains no three-syllable feet. If we consider only the distribution of three- and two-syllable feet, line A is composed of two identical parts, lines F and G are identical, as are also the second halves of lines E, F, and G. Certain half lines are composed of two identical dipodies: for example, strophe 2, B, |—∪|—∪∪|, and strophe 1, E, |—|—|∪∪∪|. Of a possible twenty-five lines of text, seventeen end in an odd-numbered column, eight in an even-numbered one. And only the eighth column has *none* of these line-ends, since the poet prevented even the strophe from ending there by his device of the prime number, described in the next section.

60. In studying diaeresis and caesura I used varying amounts of the text, for the most part omitting lines 18–20, since, as indicated above,<sup>49</sup> the poet was striving there for special effects which caused all three lines to deviate from the norm. Caesura for word-ends is favored over diaeresis somewhat less than two to one. There are more diaereses at the end of the first foot of a dipody than the second, and after column 5 there are eleven diaereses, far more than anywhere else. There are more caesurae in the second foot of a dipody than the first. Important sense pauses are likely to be caesurae in, first, column 4, and second, column 8. Perhaps the best evidence that the poet worked with what we may call lines of eight feet is shown by his careful effort to prevent division into such lines. Out of twelve word-ends column 8 shows one diaeresis and eleven caesurae; out of seventeen possibilities the end of column 8 (of the line as well as of the foot) splits a word sixteen times. Caesura, of course,

tends to bind the parts and keep the meter flowing in a way that diaeresis does not.<sup>50</sup> And it may be that it was actually in order to prevent *any* possible division into "lines" of equal length that the poet picked "seventy-one," a prime number, for his total number of feet per strophe, for a prime number automatically made the strophe indivisible into smaller sections of equal size. The resultant missing foot in the last line of the scheme supplies a place in strophe 1 for the first foot of strophe 2, achieving unity of the two strophes and, in effect, making *ḡēsōn* the last word of strophe 1 at the same time that it is the first word of strophe 2. Note how the sound of *-nēsōn* is picked up by *ḡēsōn*, and that *|-kaion | cherro- | nēsōn. | ḡēsōn |* forms two identical dipodies, *|\_\_|\_∪||\_\_|\_∪||*, and ends with the short that is characteristic of column 8. I repeat therefore that we must definitely not consider the meter as trochaic tetrameter acatalectic used *κατὰ στίχον*, even if we may believe that the poet worked with units of eight feet, composed of two dimeters or four dipodies each.

61. Although the written lines of the tablet show no relationship to the meter insofar as their length is concerned, so that the lines of strophe 2 do not match the lines of strophe 1 metrically, yet I believe that they were intended to be treated as lines of poetry, and that they provided the *irregular* metrical units which the poet wanted. There is *στίχος ἀκέφαλος*: the initial syllable of the line may be lengthened under the ictus.<sup>51</sup> The number of thought-groups which begin with a new line is too great to be accidental. We cannot judge accurately in all cases, but note this phenomenon apparently in lines 1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 14, 18, 19, 20, 88, 91, 92, and 95. In lines 18–20 each line depicts a new scene, actually beginning and ending it. Possibly a slight pause was placed on the final syllable of each line (*syllaba anceps*?), but the few line-endings which we can judge show no breaking of the "rules" if the poetry is read without regard to lines.

62. There is no elision.

#### THE RESEMBLANCES TO LINEAR B SIGNS

63. Three sets of coincidences with which to prove my decipherment were one more than I had hoped for, and the third, in addition, reassured me not only of the accuracy of my decipherment, but also of my reconstruction and interpretation. I recognized the possibility of additional verification of individual values offered by obvious resemblances between certain Enkomi and Linear B signs of the same values, exemplified by

*ai*, *ro*, and *se* in Figure 5 (1),<sup>52</sup> but I was drawn into an intensive study of this additional proof rather by a certain haunting, over-all resemblance between the two signaries. I had already discovered that many individual resemblances were disguised by the inventor's aim to lead progressively by slight changes from one sign to another.<sup>53</sup> Now a new realization came to me: *every* Enkomi sign was modeled on a Linear B sign, whether directly or indirectly, whatever amount of evolutionary development there might have been previously in the Cypro-Mycenaean signary. I experimented with the Linear B signs, simplifying them and noting the changes necessary to obtain the Enkomi signs. Thus I came upon my fourth proof, another, virtually complete, set of coincidences. Insofar as the Linear B values were known, I found myself able to derive each Enkomi sign from its model.

64. In almost all cases the "original" of an Enkomi sign was the Linear B sign of the same value, as an inspection of Figure 5 will show. In the few cases in which the inventor did not derive his symbol from the expected source, the substitutions were relatively logical, as shown in section 8, where they have been listed. As a result his reasoning could always be followed. A few apparent substitutions are not that, as may be seen from my discussion of correct labeling for Linear B in section 7. The question here is not one of accuracy of decipherment, but merely of correct placement in the original, Mycenaean grid. I similarly believe that *i* and *u* belong in the spaces for *ji* and *wu*.

65. In Figures 5 and 6 I have attempted, by drawing one or more transitional stages, to show how the Enkomi signs may be derived from their Linear B originals. The signs are arranged alphabetically within each column according to the Enkomi labels at the right. The figures show every known derivation, and the reader has merely to look at each step of a row to recognize even a disguised derivation. There is no need, as there was in the case of the internal resemblances, to describe in detail what the inventor did, but only to point out his methods. Figure 5 (1) illustrates his retention of the original sign with only those changes forced by the different method of writing. Sometimes he obtained the shape he needed in the grid by using only a portion of the Linear B sign, as I have demonstrated in Figure 5 (2) and (4). Frequently, to obtain the shape he wanted, he rotated his original in a clockwise or counterclockwise direction, reversed it, or turned it upside down, as may be seen from Figure 5 (3) and (5). In other cases he did this with only part of the sign, leaving the rest intact, as shown in *bo* (3) and *bi* (5). I find *bi* particularly fascinating because the derivation proved exceptionally difficult to detect, yet became completely obvious, once it was understood.





B * E			B * E			B * E								
a				a	jo				jo	qo				qo
di				di	ru				lu	?				ra
du				du	mu				mu	zu				zu
(1)			(2)			(3)								

B * * E				B * * * E							
pa <sub>2</sub>					ba	e					e
ta					da	ki					gi
de					de	mo					mo
ke					ge	ne					ne
i					ji	ni					ni
ri					li	no					no
me					me	si					si
nu					nu	so					so
sa					sa	wi					wi
we					we	wo					wo
u					wu	zo					zo
(4)				(5)							

FIG. 6. Derivation of Enkomi signs (E) from Linear B signs (B), illustrated by assumed intermediate stages (\*).

66. Very interesting uses of only part of a sign are illustrated by *de* and *ge* in Figure 6 (4). In Linear B, although the T came to be omitted at Pylos, the distinguishing features of the resembling *ke* and *de* may be considered to be the T of *ke* and the X of *de*. In the Enkomi signary, aside from two outside marks, *ge* and *de* retain only these features: the T upside down for *ge* and a lazy X for *de*. Nothing else was needed for recognition purposes by anyone who knew Linear B, as every scribe undoubtedly did. In like manner only a distinguishing feature saved from Linear B makes *wo* recognizable at Enkomi, as illustrated in Figure 6 (5). Note also in (5) how, while *e* was made to resemble *a* (1) almost perfectly, the wedge, the distinguishing feature of the *e*, was retained. See also the similar retention in *mo* (5) and the exaggerated use of this device in *do*, Figure 5 (4). The derivation of *gi*, *so*, and *zo*, Figure 6 (5), proved fascinating, but offered considerable difficulty; these signs are well worth some study. Final judgment on individual derivations such as the last should rest upon a detailed study of all the derivations and the related subject of the resemblances of the signs to each other, for the problem now is not *whether* the Enkomi signs were derived from their earlier models, but *how*.<sup>54</sup>

#### THE MATHEMATICAL ODDS AGAINST CHANCE

67. Some additional corroboration for the values I have given to the Enkomi signs exists in the shapes of the later Cypriote signs, some of which resemble their Enkomi counterparts. These resemblances help to verify individual values rather than the whole decipherment and will be taken into account in "Corroborative Evidence for Individual Signs," sections 77-79 below. The four proofs promised in section 4 have now been presented and, it is hoped, have been sufficiently convincing so that virtually everyone will accept the decipherment and, at least in the main, the reconstruction and interpretation. Presumably it was Ventris who wrote, "It may be difficult to assess the point at which ultimate scientific proof can be conceded, but a relative degree of certainty must be granted to the theory when we try to estimate the odds against its results having been obtained by chance . . ." <sup>55</sup> How close are we to the point at which "ultimate scientific proof can be conceded"? It may be worth while to consider briefly what the mathematical odds are against the "results having been obtained by chance."

68. Actually these odds require the use of numbers so large that we must first make sure that we have an understanding of the astronomical figures involved. According to the United States system a trillion is one



thousand billions and may be expressed as  $10^{12}$ , 10 to the 12th power, or with a one followed by 12 zeros: 1,000,000,000,000. The number of atoms composing our earth has been estimated as  $10^{52}$ , and the number of atoms in the visible world of stars as  $10^{87}$ . A googol is  $10^{100}$  or a one with 100 zeros following; a googolplex is a one followed by a googol of zeros. I can now state with mathematical accuracy what the likelihood is of obtaining my results by accidental coincidence. It is one chance in a number somewhere between a googol and a googolplex.<sup>56</sup> This number was obtained by assigning either unquestionable or conservatively estimated values to the coincidences. In attempting to elucidate I shall express 1 chance in 10 as a fraction:  $1/10$ . I shall usually omit the numerator for convenience, but it must be understood. The values obtained by the different coincidences ( $1/10$ ,  $1/5$ ,  $1/50$ , for example) must then be multiplied ( $10 \times 5 \times 50$ ) to obtain the product, 2500, that is,  $1/2500$  or 1 chance in 2500. Except for the first digit I shall change the final figures to zeros and express a number like 132,576 as if it were 100,000:  $10^5$ . I shall not attempt to prove any exact number; I shall merely indicate how dependable results may be obtained, giving sufficient illustrations to show that astronomical figures result, that my statement of the mathematical odds was accurate, and that the proof by them cannot be nullified even by someone cautiously determined to test it by assigning unreasonably low and even ridiculous values to the coincidences.

69. Let us consider first a few of those obtained metrically. Whenever a short syllable occurs between 2 longs, it must fall in the *anceps* of a trochee. Obviously, if it occurs in a two-syllable foot, it has 1 chance in 2 of falling in the right place. There are at least 40 single shorts, without counting any either shortened or lengthened by special rule. Without exception every one of these is the short of a trochee. I multiplied 2 (that is,  $1/2$ ) by itself 40 times:  $10^{12}$ . In other words there is less than one chance in a trillion that this phenomenon of the single shorts happened by chance. I also tested the apparent shift from trochaic rhythm to iambic and vice versa. At the point of change there had to be a three-syllable foot, and this foot had to coincide with an occurrence of two or three consecutive short syllables. Out of 71 feet in the strophe, 15 are such, or approximately  $1/5$ . At the time I made this test my reconstruction showed 16 such coincidences; therefore I multiplied 5 by itself 16 times:  $10^{11}$ . The product of  $10^{12}$  and  $10^{11}$  is  $10^{23}$ . Any possibility of chance results is, of course, ruled out; I shall merely point out one more very good test of the metrical results: the congruence of the strophes. What is the chance that every time a two-syllable or three-syllable foot

occurs in lines 1-10, a foot of the same length in lines 11-20 will coincide with it by sheer accident?

70. In the case of my successful results in deriving the Enkomi signs from their Linear B equivalents, as demonstrated in Figures 5 and 6, could I have obtained them if the values assigned were wrong, and the resemblances were accidental? It is obvious that some Enkomi signs can be derived from more than one Linear B sign, but the important question is: could each be derived *equally well* from another sign? And the answer is, "On the average, yes." The majority could each be derived equally well from a second Linear B sign, and a few from several others. To obtain the mathematical odds against chance for my results I must make a basic assumption which may seem debatable, but I shall offer a test to prove that the odds are so great that no matter what basic figures one may start with, the results will still be such that "ultimate scientific proof can be conceded." I shall first assume that if we omit certain Enkomi signs there are forty-five, each of which could be derived equally well from two Linear B signs on an average, including the derivation shown in Figures 5-6. This I consider to be the fairest estimate. As an added safeguard and to obtain an easy figure to work with I shall raise the basic number to  $2\frac{1}{4}$  for 45 signs. There is 1 chance in 20, then, for each sign that it may have been derived from the sign of the same value by sheer chance through accidental resemblance. We must now multiply 20 by itself 45 times. I obtain for my result 1 chance in more than  $3 \times 10^{58}$ . Compare this figure with  $10^{52}$ , the estimated number of atoms composing our earth.

71. Now suppose that another scholar were to decide that, since it is better to err on the side of caution, we must assume that each of the 45 Enkomi signs could be just as well derived from  $4\frac{1}{2}$  signs on the average, twice my assumption. We would then have 1 chance in 10 of accidental resemblance for each sign. Multiplying 10 by itself 45 times gives us  $10^{45}$ . Let us carry this to the ridiculous extreme of assuming that it would be possible for 50 signs to derive each equally well by accident from 25 different Linear B signs, an obvious impossibility. There would then be 1 chance in 2 of derivation through accidental resemblance. We must multiply 2 by itself 50 times and the answer is  $10^{15}$ . Even with this impossibly low basic value we find that we should need 1,125,899,906,842,624 different signaries whose signs resemble those of Linear B for each accidental case of the phenomenon we are discussing. No matter what *reasonable* basic values are assumed then, the possibility that the results in Figures 5 and 6 could be due to chance is eliminated.

72. Few people would be likely to ask for mathematical corroboration of my proof by Mycenaean words in convincing context, but it is possible even here, without knowledge of what values to assign reconstructed words or clicks in context, to show that, whatever reasonable assignments are made, the odds against chance results offer added proof of solution. For purposes of this article I wanted a simple test of the context obtained. The simplest would be one in which the same value could be assigned to every reconstructed word. Including repetitions and even emended words, my reconstructions numbered 93. Anyone else may omit from consideration any reconstruction not acceptable to himself; I accepted these words and was now testing the value of each contextual fit rather than of each reconstruction on the basis of spelling. Every word could be considered to be at least possible in context and so could be assigned a value higher than 1 on the basis of its contextual fit; for it is incontestable that *not every word* obtained at random would appear possible in context.

73. I assumed that even if my reconstructed words were the result of accidental resemblances, 1 word in 5 might actually seem to fit in the over-all context or with another word (value 5). I assigned to words in good to excellent context the values 10 to 50; in a superb click, 100. Where two words clicked only with each other I assigned the value 1 to the second. Since space is not available for all the details, I shall merely list a few examples of my assignment of values as a basis for judgment. I gave the value 5 to each of the following italicized words: "*large animals*" (90), "*bringing*" (10), "*nourishing*" (13); 10 to each of the following: "the *renowned* travels I *sing*" (1), "you *promised*" (4); 50 to each of the following: "*beautiful, wealthy*" (6), "Idaia said, 'let us *move*'" (11); 100 to each of the following: "*Medeia, queen of the lofty city*" (5-6), "I sacrificed a *bull*" (86) "on the *altar*" (87). I assigned values of 5 or less to 28 words, 10 or more to 65.

74. The average value of the contextual clicks was well above 10 per word; it was therefore fair to assume on this arbitrary basis that I had obtained 93 reconstructed words each of which had on the average 1 chance in 10 of fitting in context as well as it did by accident. Multiplying 10 by itself 93 times I obtained  $10^{93}$ . Compare this with  $10^{87}$ , the estimated number of atoms in the visible world of stars. On the basis of this test and my own estimates I had one chance in  $10^{93}$  to obtain the context I did if my 93 reconstructions were random words due solely to accidental resemblances. No two persons, however, would assign values identical with mine, and two equally able scholars might end up with a tremendous difference in their final results. I would have a right to



insist on only a few points; for example, 1) since not a single word appears impossible in context and not every word obtained at random would appear possible in context, each word deserves a value higher than 1, even if only fractionally higher; 2) some of my words fit so well in context that a *relatively* high value must be assigned them.

75. Can any reasonable assignment of values nullify my proof? To test that let us assign as the average value per word the minimum that could be assigned on the basis of the two points made above: 2. No one, I feel sure, is going to be so unreasonable as to claim that 93 random words, even in a Mycenaean syllabary, would on the average each have 1 chance in 2 of producing the sort of context I obtained. Multiplying 2 by itself 93 times we obtain approximately  $10^{28}$ . Even on this basis there would be only 1 chance in  $10^{28}$  of obtaining my context by accident.

76. Since I have reduced my estimate *ad absurdum* with this result, it is obvious that no *reasonable* assignment of values can nullify this proof. The figures for all three proofs multiplied together show that my earlier statement of the likelihood of obtaining my results by accidental coincidence was entirely accurate: one chance in a number somewhere between a googol and a googolplex. It must also be remembered that we have by no means exhausted all the coincidences supplied by the solution. May we not therefore use Ventris' phrase and say that we have reached the point "at which ultimate scientific proof can be conceded"?

#### CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE FOR INDIVIDUAL SIGNS

77. Even when scientific proof of decipherment is conceded, there are still two problems to plague us: 1) if it is possible to obtain a certain percentage of "Greek" words through chance resemblances, is this percentage of error present in our contextually proved portions of Linear B and Enkomi interpretations? and 2) is it possible that the decipherment in the main is proved but that the values of one or more signs are not yet proved? The first problem may never be completely resolved, but it is reduced in importance by the first law of Mycenaean reconstruction, a sort of reverse Gresham's law: Good context drives out bad. The second problem we may hope in time to be rid of entirely, when we have sufficient material in Linear B and in the Enkomi syllabary so that the infrequently used signs become relatively frequent. Meanwhile it is not enough to have demonstrated the validity of the decipherment as a whole: it is also necessary to show the relative amount of evidence corroborating the decipherment of the individual signs. Although such an estimate must of necessity be to some extent subjective, I shall attempt



to show as objectively as possible both the total amount and the types of corroboration we have for each of the signs which are less firmly validated.

78. I prepared a table of all the signs, showing my evaluation of the corroborative evidence for each by means of asterisks. In the first column I listed all the signs in alphabetical order according to the values which I had given them (S), and I added in the second column a count of the number of occurrences of each sign (O), made specifically for this estimate. The count is of lines 1-21 and 86-98, including fragmentary groups, but omitting single signs and underdotted readings in unreconstructed material, bracketed signs, and sign-groups repeated without any change whatever. I estimated the value of the corroboration from internal resemblances of the signary as from zero to two asterisks (E), from resemblances to Linear B as from zero to three (B), and to classical Cypriote as from zero to two (C). Resemblance to an alternate sign I showed by enclosing the asterisks within brackets; for another indication of a lesser value I used a plus sign. I did not make a special classification for the meter because all of my Mycenaean text is corroborated metrically so that my combinatory evidence automatically includes it (CM). Here I placed no limitations upon the number of possible asterisks.

79. In the portion of this table which I include here, Table I, since it is obvious that acceptance of solution automatically includes acceptance of the more fully corroborated values, I have omitted all signs which included both types of corroboration and received (1) more than nine asterisks, (2) five or more for context and meter, or (3) the maximum number (seven) for resemblances. These are listed below.

a	bo	ga	ja	ma	ne	qo	so
ai	da	ge	ji	me	no	ra	wa
ba	de	go	jo	mo	o	ro	we
bi	e	i	li	na	qe	se	zo

Of these *a*, *bi*, *bo*, *e*, *li*, *se*, and *zo* received two asterisks in column C; *ge*, *i*, and *na*, one. The signs not listed above are given in Table I with completely detailed information, including references by line number (R) to all occurrences of each sign upon which my estimate in column CM was based. Columns of the table are so ordered that the asterisks may be considered to be of consistently greater value as one moves from left to right.<sup>57</sup>

TABLE I  
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE FOR INDIVIDUAL SIGNS†

S	O	E	B	C	CM	R
be	2	*	[**]		** **	(11) (88)
bu	5	**	***		** +	(11) (92) (13) (14)
di	2	**	***		*	(17) (88)
do	9	**	*		** * +	(7) (11) (92) (13 <i>bis</i> )
du	6	*	***		** * +	(86) (88) (3)
gi	1	**	*		*	(13)
gu	3	**	**		**	(1) (17) (94)
je	3	*	[**]		** *	(11) (20)
la	2	**	[**]		** *	(2) (90)
lo	2	**	[**]		*	(13)
lu	4	**	***	*	** *	(10) (5)
mi	2		***		*	(96)
mu	3	*	**		** **	(15) (16)
ni	2	**	*	*	*	(96)
nu	1	*	**		+	(17)
qi	2	*	**		**	(91) (90)
re	1	**		+	* +	(7)
ri	5	*			** +	(15) (3) (13)
sa	5	**			* **	(19) (86)
si	7	**	*		**	(1) (8) (91) (15) (93)
wi	3	**	***		+	(3)
wo	6	**	*		** **	(15) (1) (92)
wu	7	*	*		** +	(4) (16) (98) (21)
zu	1		**		+	(12)

† See §§78-79 for a complete explanation. Headings of the columns represent initial letters: transliterated values of the Signs (S); number of Occurrences (O); corroboration by resemblances to Each other (E), to Linear B (B), to classical Cypriote (C); Combinatory and Metrical evidence (CM) with References by line number (R).

## LEXICAL INDEX

This lexical index contains both a complete index of sign-groups and a glossary of reconstructed Mycenaean words and proper nouns. As an index it includes every sign-group on the *Jēson* tablet of Enkomi, complete or incomplete, of two signs or more, lines 1–22 and 86–99. Although the normal alphabetical order of the transliterated sign-groups is used for the arrangement, different forms or spellings of the same reconstructed word are included in a single lexical unit. When this may cause difficulty in locating a sign-group a cross reference is given in proper alphabetical sequence. Enclitics are glossed in regular alphabetical sequence with cross references under the words to which they are attached. In the glossary I have for the most part attempted to include the following in as brief form as possible in the order given: 1) the transliterated sign-group, 2) the line number in parentheses, 3) equations with, or references to, Linear B words in brackets, 4) the reconstructed word, 5) grammatical comment within parentheses, 6) translation, 7) an estimate of the relative value of the contextual corroboration for the reconstructed word and the passage in which it occurs in abbreviated form, 8) the Greek word of the equation along with an indication, usually by author, of its first occurrence and a plus sign for continued use, and 9) in any order, additional notes and cross references to the article as necessary.

Abbreviations used are for the most part obvious, and as explained previously, references to Boisacq are a mere convention.<sup>58</sup> "Cf." before a Greek or Linear B word means that no direct equation is intended. The abbreviations used for the estimate of contextual corroboration may be interpreted as follows:

- NoC. Insufficient or no context
- C. Possible in context
- FC. Fair context or fits in context (but no more)
- GC. Good context or good corroboration
- EC. Excellent context or click
- SC. Superior context or click

Linear B references are limited to those available in *Documents*, which contained the most convincing parallels. Conventions explained in the introduction to the Commentary, sections 41–45, and remarks made there, are equally applicable here insofar as the Commentary and Index overlap. As I said in section 45, I am merely giving my own interpretation in most cases without intending to imply that necessarily no other interpretation is possible.



A-DE-GO (15). *attēgon* (acc. sing.), "he-goat." EC. [*ἄττηγός*, Ion. word, ii B.C. Cf. Phryg. *attagus* (LSJ).]

A-GE-QO (16). See Commentary (16).

A-GO (4). *agōi* (dat. sing.), "chieftain-king." GC. [*ἄγός*, Hom. +.]

A-GO (10). [Cf. PY: *a-ke*.] *agōn* (nom. sing. masc. pres. act. part.), "bringing." GC. [*ἄγω*, Hom. +.]

A-GO-ME (11). *agōmen* (1st pers. plur. pres. subj. act.), "let us move." SC.

A-GO-ME (14). *agōmen* (1st pers. plur. imperf. ind. act.), "we brought." GC.

A-GO (18). *Argos* (nom. sing.), "Argos," architect of the Argo. FC. [*Ἀργος*, Hom. +, but in Homer, the name of a dog.]

A-GO-SO (2, 12). *Argohos* (gen. sing.), "of the Argo," the ship in which Jason sailed. SC. See Commentary (1-2). [*Ἀργώ*, Hom. +; gen. sing. (with loss of intervocalic *u*): *Ἀργόος*.]

AI-BA (6). *aipās* (gen. sing. fem., modifying [*po*]lios), "of the lofty (city)." SC. [*αἰπός*, Hom. +.]

AI-GE-LU-NA (88). Probably a proper noun. 3rd syllable long.

AI-NE-DA (1). *ainetans* (acc. plur. fem.), "praiseworthy, renowned." SC. [*αἰνητός*, Pindar +; *αἰνετός*, Aristot. +; cf. *εὐαίνετος*, Bacch. +; *εὐαἰνήτος*, Pindar; cf. also *αἰνέω*, Hom. +.]

AI-WA-QE (95). [KN: *ai-wa*.] *Aiwans* (nom. sing.), "Ajax," + *-qe*, *q.v.* SC: modified by *megos*, "the mighty." [*Ἄας*, Hom. +.]

AI-WA-RO (20). *aiwārons* (acc. plur. masc., modifying *desmons*). Perhaps, "eternal," hence, "wearisome." GC. [Cf. *αἰεί*, Hom. + (Ion. and poet. for *ἀεί*), *αἰφεί*, and Lat. *aevum*. Cf. also *αἰᾶνής*, etc., Archil. +, referred back to *αἰεί* (see Boisacq s.v.). On *-āro-*, etc., see Commentary (20).]

A-LA-JO-JO (2). *alāioio* (gen. sing. fem., modifying *Argohos*), "wandering." See Commentary (2). SC. [*Ἀλγίον*, Hom. +.]

A-LI-DA-BO (90). 3rd syllable long.

A-LU-SO (5). *allūsō* (1st pers. sing. fut. ind. act.), "I shall set free." EC. [*ἄλλύω*, Epic for *ἀναλύω*, Hom. (*ἄλλύουσα*, etc.) +.]

A-ME-GO (7). [Cf. KN: *me-ki-ta*, and KN, PY: *me-zo*, etc.] *amegon* (acc. sing. fem., modifying *basi[leian]*), "mighty, majestic." See Commentary (7) and (95). EC. [Cf. *me-go* (95); Puhvel (but see Commentary for other possibilities): *ameg*- < *Hmeg̃*-; *μέγας*, Hom. +.]

A-MU- (91).

A-NA-BO-DO (7). *anapton* (acc. sing. fem.), "untouchable." See Commentary (7) for *a-*. EC. [*ἀναπτος*, Aristot.; cf. *ἀπτός*, Plato +, and *ᾄπτω*, Hom. +.]

A-NA-SO (89). The reading is not absolutely certain. Probably a proper

noun: personal name, dat. sing. ? 1st syllable short; 2nd long.

A-QO-QE (90). 1st syllable long.

A-QO-WI-RO (18). Noun, direct object of *warasse*. 1st and 3rd syllables long. See Commentary (18).

A-RA-GE (89). 1st syllable short; 2nd long.

A-SO-GO-QO (98). [Cf. PY, MY: *a-to-po-go*?] NoC. See Commentary (98). [Cf. ἀρτοκόπος? Hdt. +.]

A-WE-QO[ (22). Or *a-we-ši*?]

A-WE-RA (17, 92). *āwera* (acc. sing.), “haze, mist.” Or *auera* (§38)? FC (17) and EC (92). [ἀήρ, Hom. +; Aeol. αὐήρ.]

A-ZO-WO (15). *azowon* (acc. sing. masc., modifying *attēgon*), “lifeless.” EC. [ἄζωος, Thphr. +, “without life,” iii A.D.; but cf. ζωή, Hom. +, and ζώος, “alive, living” (also ζώς, Hom. +, and ζοός, Archil. +), Pindar +. Cf. also Cypr. prop. n. Ζωφόθεις, v B.C.]

-BA (92). [Cf. KN, PY: *pa-ro* + dat.] *par* (postpositive enclitic prep. with gen.), “from,” after *gnathōn* (*ga-na-do-*), “jaws.” See Commentary (92). EC. [πάρ, παρά; postpositive πάρα, παρ’, and πάρ’, Hom. +.]

BA-BA-NU[ (21).

BA-MO-DA-BO (89). Cf. following word *a-li-da-bo*. 2nd syllable long.

BA-SI[. .] (5). Or *ba*-. . .]. [KN, PY: *pa<sub>2</sub>-si-re-u*, etc.] *basī*[*leian*] (acc. sing.), “queen, princess.” SC. [βασίλεια, Hom. +.]

BA-WI-BO[ (9). 2nd syllable long.

BE-GO-GO (99). Ventris’ reading. Not available in the *Antiquity* plate.

BO-DI-JO (17). [Not KN: *po-ti-jo*.] *spodion* (acc. sing., modifying *āwera* ?), “ash-colored, grey.” FC. [σπόδιος, Semon. +; cf. σποδιή, Hom. +.]

BO-JA (19). *poiā* (instrumental sing.), “with a *poa*-switch”; “grass, plant.” See Commentary (19). FC. [πόα, Ion. and Epic ποίη, Hom. +. For \*ποιφα, see Boisacq and cf. §31 *supra*.]

[.] -LI-O (6). Or *hə-li-o*. [Not KN: *po-ri-wa* or *po-ri-wo*.] [*po*] *lios* (gen. sing.), “of the city.” SC. [πόλις, Hom. +; gen. πόλιος, Hom. +.]

BO-MA-SI (93). NoC. Perhaps *pōmassi*, dat. plur. of \**pōma*, “lid, cover,” or “drink.” See Commentary (93). [πῶμα, “cover,” Hom. +; “drink,” Aesch. +.]

BU-BO-DO (90). A 2-syllable word with a consonant cluster (-*bd*-) and 2nd syllable long.

BU-DA-SO (14). *Pūthahōi* = *Pūthaiōi* (dat. sing., modifying *mantirōi*), “Pythian.” EC. See Commentary (14). [Πυθαῖος, iii B.C.; cf. Πύθιον, *h. Ap.* 373; Πύθιος, Pindar +; cf. also other “Pythian” words, such as, e.g., Πυθᾶευς.]

- BU-JO-RI-JO (13). *puiōrions* (acc. plur. masc., unattested as a compound, modifying *suas*)=*pui-ōrions*, "milk-season"="suckling (pigs)." EC.[πύιον. τὸ γάλα, Hsch. (cf. πύος, "first milk after birth," Cratin., Aristoph. +), and ὥριος, Hom. +.]
- BU-RA-BO-DO (11). *purrapton*=*purr-aption* (acc. sing.), "watch fire, signal fire." See Commentary (11). GC. [πυρσός ("firebrand," *not* the color, which has a *f*), Hom. +, and ἄπτω, Hom. +, "set on fire," Hdt. +; cf. ἄφαι πυρσόν, Pindar.]
- DE-BO-DO-NA-DO (13). [Cf. KN, PY: *o-na*, and PY: *o-na-to*, etc.] *therptō-nātons* (acc. plur. masc., unattested as a compound, modifying *suas*) = *\*thrept-ōnātons*, "nourishing, bought for nourishment." FC. [Cf. τρέφω, θρέπτρα, Hom. +, and ὠνητός, Hom. + (on the assumed *\*w-*, etc., see Commentary [13]); cf. also ὀνίνημι and ὀνητός.]
- DE-JO (89). [PY: *te-i-ja*.] *theios* (nom. sing. fem. [see Commentary (2)], modifying *omphā*), "of, from the gods; divine (voice)." SC. See Commentary (88). [θεῖος, Hom. +.]
- DE-ME-GO (89). 1st syllable long. Cf. *me-go* (95), *me-go-la* (90), *a-me-go* (7), *ma-wu-me-go* (15).
- DE-MO (20). [KN: *de-so-mo*.] *desmons* (acc. plur., object of *helkontai*, "dragged, trailed"), "chains." See Commentary (20) and (19-20). SC. [δεσμός, Hom. +; "bonds, chains," Aesch. +.]
- DE-NA-BI-LU-SA (3, 10). Probably a fem. pers. name, acc. sing. (10), nom. or acc. (3). 2nd and 4th syllables long. FC (3) and GC (10).
- DE-O-GI-LO (13). [KN, PY: *te-o-*; cf. also *te-o*, etc.] *theochildons* (acc. plur. masc., unattested as a compound, modifying *owjas*, "sheep")=*theo-chilons*, "god-pastured." EC. [θεός and θεο-, Hom. +, and χιλός, Hdt. +.]
- DE-WU-NO (16). *deuno*+. Nom. sing.: *\*deunos*=βασιλεύς. C. [Cf. Δεύνυσος, Anacreon (vi B.C.), Ion. for Διόνυσος. LSJ, s.v. Δεύνυσος: from δεῦνος, Indian for βασιλεύς, acc. to EM.]
- ]DU-QE (21).
- DU-SA (86). [Cf. PY: *tu-we-a* and *tu-wo* ?] *thūsa* (1st pers. sing. aor. ind. act.), "I sacrificed." SC. [θύω, Hom. +.]
- DU-SO-DI (88). *thūsonti* (dat. sing. masc. fut. act. part.), lit., "to [him] about to sacrifice"; "as [he] was about to sacrifice." EC.
- DU-SI-NO-GO (6). Compound adj. (acc. sing. fem.). See Commentary (6).
- DU-WA (13). *tuas*=*suas* (acc. plur.), "pigs." Study context and see Commentary (13). SC. [σὺς and ὕς, Hom. +. Homer prefers σὺς.]
- DU-WA-BI-SO (9). 2nd syllable long.

DU-WI-QO-RI (3). *duīpori*+ (nom. or acc. sing. fem.)=(nom. sing.):  
 \**duī-poris*, "wretched maiden." FC. [δύϊος, Aesch. (lyr.)=δυερός; cf.  
 δύη, Hom. +; and πόρις, Hom. +; of a girl, Eur. (lyr.) +. *qo* for *bo*.]

E-BE (88). [PY: *pa-si*=*phāsi*, "says."] *ephē* (3rd pers. sing. aor. ind. act.),  
 "said, spoke." SC. [φημί, Hom. +.]

E-BE-QE (11). *ephē*+*-qe*<sup>2</sup>, *q.v.* SC.

E-GE-ŠQ (99). Ventris' reading. *e-ge*-[readable in *Antiquity* plate.

E-LI-GA (14); E-LI-GA (87). [Not KN: *e-ri-ka*, if *Documents* correctly  
 equates it with *helikās*, "of willow-wood." No \**w-* is shown in  
*e-ri-ka*, but neither is it in *e-li-ga*. Perhaps *e-ri-ka*, describing  
 wheels, should be reconsidered in the light of *e-li-ga* and ἑλιξ,  
 sometimes explained of the movement of the body, "rolling."] *elikas*  
 (14, acc. plur.) and *elika* (87, acc. sing.), standing epithet of  
*qo-o* ("ox, bull"), "crumpled-horned." See Commentary (14).  
 SC. [ἑλιξ, Hom. +; see § 31.]

E-ME (93). [Cf. PY: *e-me*.] Perhaps *scriptio plena* (see § 34) for *em*  
 assimilated from \**en* before a labial (prep. with dat.: *em pōmassi* ?),  
 "in, on." See Commentary (10) and (93). NoC. [ἐν, Hom. +.]

E-NE (10). [Cf. PY: *e-ne-e-si*, and KN: *e-ne-o*, equated with forms of  
 ἐνεμι.] *Scriptio plena* (see § 34) for *ens* (prep. with acc.), "into, to."  
 See Commentary (10). EC. Cf. *e-me* (93). [εἰς, Hom. +; originally  
 ἐνς.]

E-WE-RO-JO (18). [Cf. MY: *e-we-pe-se-so-me-na*, and frequent *e-u-* in  
 Linear B.] *euerio* (gen. sing. masc., unattested as a compound)  
 =*eu-eroio*, "much-loving, passionate." See Commentary (18).

GC. [εὖ, Hom. +, and ἔπος (poet. form of ἔρως), Hom. +. Homer  
 preferred ἔπος to ἔρως. Obviously *not*=εὐερος, εὐειρος, "fleecy."]

E-WU[ (98). [Cf. frequent *e-u-* in personal names in Linear B.] *eu-*. Cf.  
*e-we-ro-jo* (18). NoC. [εὖ, εὖ-, Hom. +.]

GA-BU-WO (92). *kapuōn* (nom. sing. masc. pres. act. part.), "breathing  
 forth." See Commentary on *anapton* (7) for *kā-*. EC. [καπύω, Q.S.  
 (iv A.D. ?); cf. (cogn.) κεκαφώς, Hom. +; cf. also κέκηφε τέθνηκεν,  
 Hsch.]

GA-JE-RA (21). 2nd syllable long.

GA-LI-A-QE (88). *kaliās* (gen. sing.), "of, from the shrine," +*-qe*<sup>2</sup>, *q.v.*  
*ī* in Hes., but may be short. See Commentary on *anapton* (7) for  
*kā-*. EC. [καλή, "hut," etc., Hes. +; "shrine," containing the  
 image of a god, AP (i B.C./i A.D.).]

GA-NA-DO-BA (92). [Cf. MY: *ka-na-to*, on which *Documents* has the note,



"Not γνάθος in some technical sense?" Cf. KN personal name *ka-na-to-po*.] *gnathōn* (gen. plur.) + *par* (-*ba*, *q.v.*), "from the jaws." See Commentary (92). EC. [γνάθος, Hom. *Epigr.* +, prose form of γναθμός, Hom. +, but also freq. in poets.]

GA-NE-LO-JO (94). Probably a personal name in the genitive.

GA-RA-DO-NO (9). 2nd syllable long. *ge-ra-do*-[.] (8) has short 2nd syllable.

GA-WE (6). *kakwēn* (acc. sing. fem.), "beautiful." For -*ē*- see §§ 36-37.

SC. [καλός, Hom. +; Boeot. καλφός, vi B.C.]

GE-NO (16). *genos* (acc. sing. [of specification], limiting *Mukēnās*), "by race." See Commentary (16). EC. [γένος, Hom. +.]

GE-RA-DO-[.] (8). 1st 2 syllables short and 3rd long. Contrast *ga-ra-do-no* (9).

GE-RE-JA-QE (7). [Not PY: *ke-re-a<sub>2</sub>*.] *chēreiān* + *-qe*, *q.v.* (acc. sing. fem. adj.), "widowed," or *chēreian* (noun), "the widow." See Commentary (7). SC. [Cf. *χηρεία*, "widowhood," Thuc. +; Ion. *χηρήιος*, Antim. (v/iv B.C.); *χήρειος*, AP (i A.D.).]

GE-RO-NE-SO (10). *cherronēson* (acc. sing. with *ens* after *agōn*), "peninsula." See Commentary (10) and note -*ē*- (§ 36) and -*rr*-. SC: "to the Peloponnesus." [*χερσόνησος*, Hdt. +; later *χερρόνησος*; Dor. *χερσόνᾱσος*. Cf. *χέρσος*, Hom. +, and *νῆσος*, Hom. +.]

GU-NA (94). [Cf. PY: *ku-na-ke-ta-i* and *ku-na-ja*?] Probably *kuna*, "dog" (or *kunas*), but possibly *gunā*, "woman, wife." C. [κύων, Hom. +; γυνή, Hom. +.]

GU-WO (1). *guons* (acc. plur. fem., modified by *ainetans*), "lands," and so, "travels, voyages." SC: see Commentary (1-2). [γύος, ὁ (= γύης), i A.D. +; γύης, ὁ, more freq. in plur., "lands," Aesch. +; fem., Eur. See Commentary (1). γύαι' ὁδοί, Hsch.]

I-GO-GO (18). Personal name (gen. sing.); see Commentary (18). EC.

I-JO-GO-QE (19). Personal name (gen. sing.) + *-qe*, *q.v.*; see Commentary (18). EC.

I-MA-SA (19). *imasa* (1st pers. sing. aor. ind. act.), "I whipped, flogged." SC. [ἰμάσσω, Hom. +.]

I-NE (91). *īnes* (nom. plur.), "sinews." EC. [ἴς, ἰνός, usually in plur., "sinews," Hom. +; not ἴς(ῑ-), "strength."]

I-QI-O (91). [KN: *i-qi-jo* and *i-qi-ja*, referring to chariots.] *ippioi* (nom. plur. fem. [see Commentary (2)], modifying *īnes*), "of the horse." EC: see Commentary (91). [ἵππιος, Alcaeus +, poet. form (trag.) of ἵππειος, Hom. +.]

I-QO-QO (20). Personal name (gen. sing.); see Commentary (18). EC. [.] -I-RI (9). Ventris: ]-*ai-ri*.

I-WA-DO (87). 2nd syllable long.

- JE-SO (11). *Jēsōn* (voc. sing.), "Jason," son of Aeson. SC. See Commentary (11). [*Iῆσων*, Hom. +.]
- JI-BO (96). Alternate spelling of *ji-go* (91), "horse," *q.v.* GC.
- JI-DA (5). *Idās* (gen. sing.), "of Ida?" C. See Commentary (5). [Cf. *Iδη*, Hom. +; *fi*-?]
- JI-DA-JA (5, 8, 11); JI-DA-JA-QE (19). [KN, PY: *i-da-i-jo*, masc. version of the name.] (*i*-.) Personal name, "Idaia." See Commentary (5) and (19). *Idaiān* (5) (acc.). EC. *Idaiān* (8) (acc.). FC. *Idaiā* (11) (nom.). SC. *Idaiās* (19) + *-qe*, *q.v.* (gen.). SC. [*Iδαία*, Diod. Sic. 4.43.4; Cf. *Iδαιος*, *Iδαῖος*, Hom. +; *fi*-?]
- JI-GU-NU (17). Probably *ignun*, "ham, part behind knees and thighs?" or "dust, ashes?" See Commentary (17). C. [For 1st possibility cf. *ἰγνύη*, Hom. +, and *ἰγνύς*, -*ύος*, *h. Merc.* +, with *i*- < \**ēγ*-; for 2nd cf. the less well attested *ἰγνύν*, Hippoc., and *ἰκνύν*.]
- JI-QO (91). [KN, PY: *i-go*, etc. With *ji-bo* (96), cf. *Documents*, p. 394, on *i-po-po-go-i* (PY)?] *ippon* (acc. sing.), "horse." GC. Cf. *ji-bo* (96; *bo* for *go*), *ippos* (nom. sing.). [*ἵππος*, Hom. +.]
- JI-RI-RA- [ (7). 3rd syllable long.
- [.] -LI-O (6). See *sub bo*-.
- LU-GA-JO (10). *Lukaion* (acc. sing. fem. [see Commentary (2)]), "Lycaean, Arcadian," referring to the Peloponnesus. SC. [*Λυκαῖος*, Pindar +.]
- MA-GA-RA (6). *makairan* (acc. sing. fem.), "blessed, wealthy." SC. See Commentary (6). [*μάκαρ*, Hom. +; usual fem., *μάκαιρα*, *h. Ap.* +.]
- MA-GA-RO-GO-NO- [ (4). [KN: *ko-no-so*.] *makaro-Knō*[*so* +, "blessed Knossos." GC. See Commentary (4). [*μάκαρ*, Hom. +, and *Κνωσός*, Hom. +.]
- MA-MI-JO (93).
- MA-SI-RO (15). *mansirōi* = *mantirōi* (dat. sing.), "diviner, seer." Cf. *ἄστυρον* = *ἄστυ*. See Commentary (15). EC. [Cf. *μάντις*, Hom. +.]
- MA-WU-ME-GO (15). *Mau*-. Pers. name or title. See Commentary (15).
- ME-DE (8). [PY: *ma-te*.] *mētēr* (nom. sing.), "mother." For 1st -*ē*- see §§ 36-38. FC. [*μήτηρ*, Hom. +.]
- ME-DE-JA-QE (5). [KN: *me-de-i-jo*, masc. version of the name.] *Mēdeian* (acc. sing.), "Medeia, Medea," daughter of Aeëtes, + *-qe*, *q.v.* SC. See Commentary (5). [*Μήδεια*, Hes. +.]
- ME-DE-LI-SA (14); ME-DE-LI-SO (12). [Cf. KN: *me-ta*, and KN, PY: *me-ta*-.] 1st pers. sing. aor. and fut. ind. act. of verb compounded with \**meta*- (change of place)? "I moved?" and "I shall move?" C. See Commentary (12). [Cf. *μετα*-, Hom. +.]

- ME-GO (95). [Cf. KN: *me-ki-ta*, and KN, PY: *me-zo*, etc.] *megos* (nom. sing. masc.), "mighty, great." See Commentary (95). SC. [μέγας, Hom. +.]
- ME-GO-LA (90). *megolans* (acc. plur. fem.), "large, great." FC. [μέγας, μεγάλη, Hom. +.]
- ME-RA (19). *mēra* (neut. acc. plur.), "thighs." Or *mērja*? Cf. *o-wa* = *owjas* (13). GC. [τὰ μῆρα, Hom. +, old plur. of *μηρός*, and = *μηρία*, Hom. +. In Homer, "thigh-bones," but *μηρία* = *μηροί*, "thighs," Archil. (vii B.C.) +.]
- MI-NI-GE (96). *mnike* (3rd pers. sing. aor. ind. act.), "ate." GC. For *-ke* see Commentary on *si-ma-ga* (1). [μνίειν ἐσθίειν, Hsch.; see also LSJ.]
- MU-DE-RI-JO (15). *mustēriōi* (dat. sing.), "mystery, secret rite." SC. [μυστήριον, Heraclit. (vi/v B.C.) +.]
- MU-GE-NA (16). *Mukēnās* (gen. sing.), "Mykene, Mycenae." EC. See Commentary (16) and §§ 36–38 (*-ē*). [Μυκήνη and Μυκηναί, Hom. +. The singular is more frequent in Homer.]
- O-BA (88). [Not KN, PY: *o-pa*.] *omphā* (nom. sing.), "voice." SC. See Commentary (88) and (88–89). [ὀμφή, Hom. +; *ba* for \**qa*.]
- O-JA-NA-QO (12). *oiānāpon* = *oiā-nāpon* (adj., acc. sing., unattested as a compound), "of the village glen." On spelling see Commentary (12). GC. [οἴη (= κώμη), Chios, iv B.C. +; cf. οἰήτης = κωμήτης, Soph.; and νάπη, Hom. +.]
- O-JE (20). *oies* for \**uiēs* (= Homeric short form *υῖες*; nom. plur.), "sons." SC. See Commentary (19–20) and on spelling also (20). [υῖος (and *υῖες*), Hom. +.]
- O-MO-SE (2). *omosse* (3rd pers. sing. aor. act. ind.), "he swore, took an oath." FC. See Commentary (2). [ὄμνυμι, Hom. +; *Il.* 10.328: ὄμοσσευ.]
- O-WA (13). *owjas* = dissyllabic *owias* (acc. plur.; cf. dissyllabic acc. plur. *πόλιας* [Hom.]), "sheep." See Commentary (13). SC. [ὄϊς, Hom. +; ὄφινς, v B.C. (Argos).]
- QE (5, etc.). [KN, etc.: *-qe*.] *te* (enclitic particle), "and." SC. See 2nd *-qe* below. [τε, Hom. +.]
- QE . . . -QE (19). *te . . . te*, "both . . . and." SC. [τε . . . τε, Hom. +.]
- QE (8, 11, 88, 91). [Cf. KN, PY: *-qe* ([*ou*]-*qe*, [*e-ke*]-*qe*?).] *de*, enclitic particle to be equated with *δέ*, adversative and copulative particle, "but, and," etc. See Commentary (8). GC. [δέ, Hom. +.]

QI-GA (90). *phikas* ? (acc. plur. fem. of the name of an animal [modified by *megolans*, "large"] ?). See Commentary (90). C. [Cf.  $\Phi\iota\kappa$ , Hes.; Boeot.  $\Phi\iota\zeta$ , and  $\Sigma\phi\iota\gamma\zeta$ :  $\sigma\phi\iota\gamma\gamma\epsilon\varsigma \tau\epsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \gamma\rho\upsilon\pi\epsilon\varsigma$ , Hdt. 4.79.2.]

QO-MO (87). *bōmōi* (dat. sing.; there would be no distinction in spelling for loc. sing. *bōmōi*), "at, on the altar." SC. [ $\beta\omega\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ , Hom. +.]

QO-O (14, 86). [PY: *qo-o*.] *bōns* (14; acc. plur.), "bulls, oxen, kine, cattle." SC. *bōn* (86; acc. sing.). SC. See Commentary (14). [ $\beta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ , Hom. + (see *Documents*, p. 407).]

QO-WU-I-JO (21). [Cf. PY: *qo-wi-ja*, and KN, PY: *qo-u-*, as, e.g., *qo-u-ko-ro*.] *bouio* + or *bōwio* + (3 syllables), "of oxen, of ox-hide" ? NoC. [ $\beta\acute{o}\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$ ,  $\beta\acute{o}\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ , Hom. +.]

RA-WE (97). Ventris' reading. I read *-ra-we* (*wu-ṛu-ra-we*).

SE-GO-DA (20). *selkontai* = *helkontai* (3rd pers. plur. pres. ind. middle), "they drag," with a notion of exertion. SC. See Commentary (20). [ $\epsilon\lambda\kappa\omega$ , Hom. + ; for *sel-* cf. Lat. *sulcus* and see Boisacq.]

SI-MA-GA (1). *sīmāka* = *tīmāka* (1st pers. sing. aor. ind. act., equivalent to \**tīmāsa*, with  $\kappa$ -aorist as in, e.g.,  $\epsilon\theta\eta\kappa\alpha$ ). See Commentary (1) and (1-2). "I sing" (lit., "I honor [in song]"). EC. [ $\tau\iota\mu\acute{\alpha}\omega$ , Hom. +. *si* for *qi*.]

SI-MA-GA-QE (91). *tīmāka* + *-qe*<sup>2</sup>, *q.v.*, "I honored, prized." FC. Not necessarily used in the same sense as in (1) and (8).

SI-MA-GE-QE (8). *tīmāke* (3rd pers. sing. aor. ind. act.) + *-qe*<sup>2</sup>, *q.v.*, "she honored." GC.

SO-ZO-DA (17). *sōzonta*, "save, keep, preserve." NoC. See Commentary (17) and § 31. [ $\sigma\acute{\omega}\zeta\omega$  ( $\sigma\acute{\omega}\zeta\omega$ ), Hom. +.]

WA-NA (12). [KN, PY: *wa-na-ka*, etc. (frequent).] *wana* (voc. sing.), "lord, master." SC. See Commentary (1-2) and (12). [ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\zeta$  and voc.  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha$ , Hom. +.]

WA-[.] (1). *wa[naktos* (gen. sing.). SC.

WA-RA-SE (18). *warasse* (3rd pers. sing. imperf. ind. act.), "he beat, smote, pounded." FC. [ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\omega$ , Hom. + ; cf.  $\acute{\rho}\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\omega$ ,  $\acute{\rho}\acute{\eta}\sigma\sigma\omega$ , Hom. +. For *wa-* see Boisacq, s.v.  $\acute{\rho}\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\omega$ .]

WE-QO (8). *wepos* (acc. [sing.] of specification), "in word, in speech, in song." EC. [ $\epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma$ , Hom. + ;  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\varsigma$ , vi B.C.]

WO-ḪE[ (3).

WO-BO-RO-NI-SA (17). 5-syllable word: *-bo-ro-* is not a consonant cluster. 2nd syllable long.

WO-WU (3). + *wou* + : 1 syllable.



WO-34-WO[ (3). Ventris' reading. No. 34 = *wu* + word-divider.

WU-BI-DA-WE-SO (4). [Cf. KN, PY: *u-po*.] *uphistaeho* (2nd pers. sing. imperf. ind. pass.), "you promised, you kept promising." See Commentary (4). EC. [*ὑφίστημι*, "promise" (passive), Hom. +. *ὑφιστάω*, Sch. II. 18.600, but *ιστάω* as a collateral form of *ἵστημι* is well attested in Herodotus +.]

WU-ḠA (97). Ventris' reading: *wu-ga*. I read *wu-ḡu-ra-we* preferably.

WU-ḡU-RA-WE (97). Ventris reads: *wu-ga ra-we*.

WU-WA (97).

ZU-GE-JO (12). [Cf. PY: *e-pi*-\*65-*ko* and *pe*-\*65-*ka* (\*65 = *ju*), correctly spelled historically for \**epizug*- and \**perzug*- (carpentry or building context).] *zugeion* (acc. sing.), "height, summit, ridge." See Commentary (12). GC. [Cf. *ζυγόν*, Hom. +; *ζύγιος*, Eur. +; cf. also *ζεγγυ*-, Hom. +; cf. esp. Lat. *iugum*.]

## NOTES

1. Portions of this article were included in papers presented at the annual meeting of the Classical Association of the Pacific States, Northern Section, on May 2, 1959, and at that of the American Philological Association on December 28, 1959. I feel greatly indebted to Cedric Hubbell Whitman and Wendell Vernon Clausen, coeditors of the present *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, whose kind efforts have made it possible for this article to appear in print so soon.

2. Porphyríos Dikaíos, "An Inscribed Tablet from Enkomi, Cyprus," *Antiquity* 27 (1953) 103-5, and "A Second Inscribed Clay Tablet from Enkomi," *ibid.* 233-37 (references to Dikaíos are to the second of these); Claude F. A. Schaeffer, "More Tablets from Syria and Cyprus," *ibid.* 28 (1954) 38-39.

3. Dikaíos includes a complete description of this tablet and the circumstances under which it was found. Included also are Michael Ventris' opinions. Photographs of the two sides are shown on Plates IV and V, facing pp. 234 and 235, which contain (Figs. 1-2) Ventris' "normalized" transcription of the legible portions of the tablet. The photographs have been reproduced for this article as Plates I and II. See also Michael Ventris and John Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (Cambridge 1956) 61-66, and especially group 4 on p. 61. This work will be referred to simply as *Documents*.

4. His first attempt at a sign-list may be found in Dikaíos (above, n. 2) Fig. 3, p. 236. See preferably his corrected, less normalized, and more valuable signary in *Documents*, p. 62. Some signs are perhaps still too normalized; cf., e.g., his No. 27 with my *bi* in Fig. 3. In No. 19 his + -shaped cross misses the distinctive feature provided by the lazy-x shape of the interior part of the sign; cf. my *de*. The standard numbering of the signs in use today is that of Ventris in *Documents*. It is given in n. 11 below (*q.v.* for Nos. 13 and 34).

5. *Documents*, p. 62, on the other hand: "... but the material will hardly be sufficient to offer hope of decipherment. . . ." The most ambitious attempt at decipherment was that of Ernst Sittig ("Hellenische Urkunde des 2. vorchr.

Jahrtausends von Cypern [Dikaïos' minoisch-kyprische Tafel von Enkomi]," *La nouvelle Clío* 6 [1954] 470-90). Although I was aware of his attempt, I refrained from investigating it until my own decipherment was finished, for it would not have been possible despite his failure to avoid being influenced by the same ideas which misled him. My own work was dependent upon the materials to be found in the references to Dikaïos and *Documents* and on these only. When I later did investigate Sittig's attempt, I found it worthless. Opinions of other scholars on Sittig's article may be found in "Relations entre les linéaires A, B et le chyprominoen," *Études mycéniennes* (Paris 1956) 269-71, and in Piero Meriggi (who imposed a rigorous analysis both on the signary and on Sittig's work), "Relations entre le minoen B, le minoen A, et le chyprominoen," *ibid.* 193-98. Another and equally unfruitful attempt at decipherment appeared after this article was completed: Stuart E. Mann, "The Decipherment of Cypro-Mycenaean," *Man* 60 (1960) 40-42.

6. Dikaïos (above, n. 2) note on p. 237.

7. Meriggi (above, n. 5) 195.

8. See the metrical discussion, §§52 and 55 above.

9. *Definitions of technical terms.* It is not surprising that some technical usages in so esoteric a field as cryptanalysis and especially its even more esoteric related field, the solving of unknown writing systems, do not appear in Webster. "Assumption," "break," and "click" are defined here after the fashion of Webster (Subject Label: *Cryptanalysis*):

ASSUMPTION, *n.* A guess or pretended guess for testing enciphered or encoded material, intended for immediate discarding if no clues or clicks are obtained thereby; — usually said of an experimental assignment of a value to an unknown quantity; less often, an educated guess.

BREAK (a code or cipher), *v.t.* To reach a point in decipherment where the number of clicks is sufficient to show a cryptanalyst that dependable results are being obtained and that the solution has been successfully *begun*. (Obviously one may think he has broken a system of writing when he has not.)

CLICK, *n.* [Imitative (the dedicated cryptanalyst "hears" the click).] A coincidence obtained by means of an assumption; usually, an exceptional coincidence, or a convincing word or context thus obtained; a perfect fit. — *v.i.* To produce a click.

10. A discussion of the cryptanalytic processes by which I broke the cipher and of the steps by which I assigned the forty values would be too long and involved to be included here. It is my intention to prepare a separate article on this subject. I must, however, refer to the obvious entry into the Enkomi signary; that is, those signs which appeared in Linear B, the classical Cypriote syllabary, and the Enkomi signary with the same values in both Linear B and Cypriote. Examples are Linear B *da*, *pa*, *na*, and Cypriote *lo*. (See the Cypriote signaries in *Documents*, p. 64; Linear B, p. 23.) The obvious assumption may perhaps have blinded scholars to other methods; I, too, assumed that the Enkomi signs which had the same values in both Linear B and the classical Cypriote syllabary could be immediately and safely labeled. But this use of resemblances, especially of the very ones which seemed surest, contained a trap, however unintentional, bound to defeat the would-be solver. When the Linear B people found their way to Cyprus in great numbers at a later date there would have been confusion between and fusion of the syllabaries. Certain Linear B signs which came down into

classical Cypriote may have entered the syllabary *at this later date*. It may also be that the Enkomi signary represents a Cypro-Mycenaean revision (of Cypro-Minoan writing) which left no extant descendant. The later fusion of syllabaries, of which classical Cypriote is a descendant, may well have been between Linear B and the main stem of Cyprian syllabic writing. If so, there would be no connection at all between the classical Cypriote signary and the deliberate changes of the Enkomi adapter. At any rate, the Enkomi signary could not be solved by anyone who made the obvious assumption.

We make assumptions, however, in cryptanalysis only to test them and *then discard them*. I escaped the trap by not depending upon any single method of entry and by later making the equally logical, opposite assumption, that these signs did *not* have the same values as in Linear B and classical Cypriote. A growing mistrust thereafter prevented me from making any use of resemblances to Linear B signs in the process of decipherment. The later use which I made of them, to be discussed in §§63-66, "The Resemblances to Linear B Signs," was that of corroboration and proof.

11. The completed grid is shown in Fig. 3. Since in earlier work the references have been to Ventris' numbering, the values given in their numerical order may also prove useful (n.b. 13=44 [Ventris], and 34=4 + the word-divider).

1=qi	8=mi	16=du	23=la	30=ra	38=li	45=wa	52=so
2=me	9=mo	17=ba	24=lu	31=mu	39=je	46=zu	53=ji
3=ro	10=lo	18=gu	25=qo	32=go	40=zo	47=ja	54=wi
4=wu	11=se	19=de	26=si	33=ri	41=be	48=ni	55=a
5=qe	12=jo	20=bo	27=bi	35=di	42=gi	49=ge	56=e
6=na	14=ga	21=bu	28=da	36=do	43=ne	50=no	57=ai
7=re	15=nu	22=ma	29=sa	37=wo	44=o	51=we	58=i

On the change from 34 to 4 + the word-divider see O. Masson, "Répertoire des inscriptions chypro-minoennes," *Minos* 5 (1957), Fig. 24, at the end of line 3 of the tablet. A word-divider is needed at approximately this point. If 34 did exist as a separate symbol, it may be assumed from its shape to have designated a *u*-syllable. It could be placed, for example, in the space for *ru*.

12. This will be demonstrated in §§63-66, "The Resemblances to Linear B Signs."

13. *Documents*, p. III.

14. The order of vowels and consonants in the Mycenaean grid must have been extremely important and could not have varied in prealphabetic times when it was not possible to label rows and columns with letters. It is probable that for teaching and learning and as an aid to memory every space in the grid had to be known *without benefit of label*.

15. Consider, for example, the close resemblance between Linear B *de* and *ke*. I have never considered this resemblance an accident. In their Mycenaean order and correctly labeled they would have been next to each other in the same column: *ge*, *de*.

16. Isolated exceptions to the norm are taken up in §8.

17. See §64 and Figs. 5-6.

18. He did *not* derive *mu* from the latter-day *mu* (Linear B \*23), but from the sign which I believe to be the correct *mu*, \*56 (*pa*<sub>3</sub>?). (I use Bennett's signary



numbers for Linear B with an asterisk.) Since the fate of Enkomi *mu* is inevitably tied in with the value of \*56, I must point out that there is some evidence for this value in Linear B. Assume for testing that \*56 = *mu*. The chief evidence lies in the consonant clusters: *smu* in ]*su-mu-ta* (KN As 5932) and in *ku-ru-su-mu* (KN K 740), *dmu* in *o-du-mu-ro* (PY An 261), and *tmu* in *tu-mu-da-ro* (KN X 1488). I found 5 cases of \*56 preceded by a *u*-syllable in 15 possibilities. In view of the infrequency of *u*-syllables this can hardly be due to chance. There is a long list of words (PY) beginning with *ma-ra-*, which must in most cases represent *mra-* before the intrusion of *b* and thus be a possible alternate spelling for *pa-ra-*. Note the probable spelling confusion, *ma-ra-ku* (PY Cn 418) and *pa-ra-ku* (PY Cn 201). Confusion of *mu-ra-* and *ma-ra-* for *mra-* is to be expected: cf. *mu-ra-ku-ja* (KN L 587; see *Documents*, p. 403) and *pa-ra-ku-ja* (Ld 580). *ku-ru-su-mu* (KN K 740; =\*207) perhaps begins *klus-* rather than *khrus-* (a rinser?). In L 1568, in view of the suprascript word *mi-ja-ro*, *mu-po-so* (CLOTH +TE) should probably be equated with *μόψος*, "stain, spot": *κηλὶς ἣ ἐν τοῖς ἱματίοις* (Cypr.), Hsch. I shall try to present the evidence in greater detail at a later date.

19. The use of the hook in *bo* and *so* shows that he placed *o* in the open-column row, but the fact that *o* would fit perfectly if placed immediately after *no* suggests the interesting question: did the sign for *o* originally derive from an 'ayin-syllable?

20. Points in this paragraph already demonstrated may be found in §§9-11 and 13.

21. The fact that the consonantal sound of *zo* takes its proper place after the digamma, the place of *z* in the Semitic alphabet, is additional proof that the sound had already become a true sibilant for the Mycenaeans. See *Documents*, pp. 80-81.

22. See n. 57 below.

23. *Documents*, Appendix I, "Mycenaean Vocabulary," pp. 385-413.

24. "The Spelling Rules," pp. 42-48, and "Phonology," pp. 76-83.

25. See *Documents*, pp. 42-43 and pp. 67ff.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

28. See §40 and n. 33 below.

29. Numbers in parentheses refer to the lines of the text. The standard numbering (Ventris') is used.

30. See n. 38 below.

31. *Il.* 6.201.

32. Cf. also the deterioration in the use of the *w* (§31) and Attic *-rr-* rather than *-rs-* in *cherronēson* (10) and *purrapton* (11). See *Documents* (pp. 74-75) for the probable relationship between Linear B and both Arcado-Cyprian and Aeolic. For a readable summary of the current stage of thought on the question of dialects (and references), see also Cedric H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958) 22-26 and notes.

33. See John Chadwick (in somewhat similar vein), *The Decipherment of Linear B* (Cambridge 1958) 96-97.

34. The transliteration is to be found on p. 58, the reconstructed text on p. 59, and the translation on p. 60. The Lexical Index or vocabulary begins on p. 92. For additional readings see Commentary (22) and (99). All references in the Commentary, as well as in the Lexical Index, are given in abbreviated form



instead of as formal bibliographical entries, although every effort has been made for clarity. Abbreviations used are for the most part obvious and not explained; those of Greek authors follow LSJ except when they have been lengthened to make them more obvious. Linguistic notes have been limited to a minimum as belonging to the province of those who are specialists in the field. References to Boisacq are intended as a mere convention to indicate that additional linguistic information is available which may be of interest to the nonspecialist. "LSJ" refers to the new edition of the *Greek-English Lexicon* and "Boisacq" to the *Dictionnaire étymologique* (of which the "3<sup>e</sup> édition" [1938] was available to me).

35. See n. 10 above.

36. Dikaïos (above, n. 2) note on p. 237.

37. I use a dot (.) to indicate uncertainty as to length.

38. This simplification partially begs the question. Perhaps *i* between vowels (as before a vowel) could be pronounced as *j*. Cf. *owjas* (13), *ŷēsōn* (11). Note that the *-ai-* of *Idaiā* never falls under the ictus while *-ei-* before a vowel always does. The *-oi-* of the ending *-oio* is always long (2, 18, 94), but would perhaps be reconstructed more correctly as *-osjo*.

39. Obtained by subtracting the number of words in a fragmentary line from 5. See §52.

40. At the suggestion of Prof. B. L. Ullman I experimented with various passages of Herodotus to see whether I could force them into a similar rhythm. It is sometimes possible to do so with short passages, I found, despite a rhythm frequently reminiscent of epic. Large numbers of consecutive long syllables or passages of predominantly short syllables interspersed with longs could both be divided off into long strings of irrational feet. The chief limitation of the length of the passage which could be forced into the meter was the necessity, whenever a single short occurred between longs, that it fall in the *anceps* of the trochee or iambus. It has one chance in two of falling in the right place. Ten consecutive such shorts have one chance in 1024 of all falling correctly and may occasionally so fall in Herodotus, as I found once, but twenty have less than one chance in a million. Cf. the odds against my results with the Enkomi text (§69). Of course, it was absolutely impossible to find even relatively short passages interspersed with "three-syllable feet" which could be made to fit the same "metrical scheme."

41. *Ol.* 7.20 and 77.

42. The total extent of strophe  $\alpha$  would be lines 84-93.

43. *Od.* 8.256ff.

44. "... a verse in which verse-foot and word-foot should coincide throughout as in the famous *sparsis | hastis | longis | campus | splendet et | horret* of Ennius would lack unity, and a succession of them would be intolerably monotonous. Hence the office of caesura to effect unity by dividing a word between two feet and so to force a more energetic recitation. Diaeresis serves to distribute the masses, caesura to unite them" (Gildersleeve, *Pindar* [New York 1885] liv).

45. Although the length of the written lines, the units smaller than the strophe, is *not* controlled by the meter, it nevertheless seems a reasonable assumption that since the first strophe is exactly 10 lines and exactly 50 words, all strophes using the same metrical scheme will be 10 lines and 50 words.

46. This shows that the poet may deviate, when he so chooses, from the apparent rule requiring the same number of syllables per foot for responsions from strophe to strophe.

47. "... such aberrations as the invention of the 'cyclic dactyl', wherein — ∪ ∪ was supposed to occupy the time of — ∪ . . ." (A. M. Dale, *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama* [Cambridge 1948] 5 n.2).

48. Since this study I have made some slight alterations in the interpretation. These may have caused minimal changes in the results.

49. See §57 on the subject of mimetic dancing.

50. See n. 44 above: "to effect unity by dividing a word between two feet"; i.e., by letting the foot end in the middle of a word. So, by deliberate intent, the lines of eight feet are disguised, and unity is effected, by letting the metrical *line* end in the middle of a word (16 times out of 17).

51. See Commentary (7) on *anapton*.

52. I made no use of these resemblances in the process of decipherment. See n. 10 above.

53. See "The Mycenaean Order of the *a-ba-ga*," above, §§3-16.

54. See §§70-71 for the odds against chance.

55. *Documents*, p. 23.

56. My remarks on numbers are based in part on Edward Kasner and James Newman, *Mathematics and the Imagination* (New York 1952) 19-25.

57. The process of elimination also becomes important in making a decision at this stage; e.g., *zu* could be placed elsewhere in the grid only as \**ju* or \**za*. Speculation may be entirely futile, but as more material is found one might look for a Y-shaped \**le*, for example, or for a \**ze* to resemble *je* with the vertical stroke at the right missing.

58. See the complete explanation above, n. 34.



# NON INIUSSA CANO

## VIRGIL'S SIXTH ECLOGUE

BY J. P. ELDER

IT is now well agreed, I take it, that any interpretation of this poem, indeed almost any comment upon it, must consider two questions: why did Virgil choose the particular themes or topics which follow one upon another in such an apparently unrelated order, and why did he give the living Gallus such an important position amid these tralatitious themes?

Of the recent interpretations of the Eclogue, two seem to me to have tackled these basic questions in an especially noteworthy fashion, and so I begin with these studies.<sup>1</sup> In 1956 O. Skutsch in a brief but valuable comment, which avoided details and focused attention on first matters, insisted that this is a poem of Alexandrianism — Alexandrian in its very theory of poetry (as in the Callimachean *recusatio* in lines 3-5), in its particular depiction of Silenus, in its themes (and here and there in allusions to genres), and finally in its treatment of the consecration of the poet. The themes, according to Skutsch, were chosen because they were Alexandrian ones, and, I add, presumably then popular in at least some circles in Rome. As for Gallus, his presence in such a collection symbolizes, Skutsch pointed out, the Alexandrian concept of the *Dichterweihe*.

In 1959 my colleague Z. Stewart, in a careful and well documented article, not only again called attention to, and clearly illustrated, Virgil's "tendency to combine features from more than one source into a single figure or unity"<sup>2</sup> — we need to be reminded of this again and again — but also proposed a solution to our two fundamental questions. His solution sought to show that every part or section of Silenus' song fits into a balanced system and within one frame, and without giving Gallus an undue importance in a poem dedicated to someone else.

Stewart divided the poem into sections. His points of division are the usual and surely the right ones,<sup>3</sup> although in a poem of this sort, where much of the appeal lies in the dazzlingly quick procession of names and references, more connotative than denotative, critics must not break the kaleidoscopic spell of the song as a whole by too much insistence on sectioning.<sup>4</sup> He then argued that within each division a single type or genre of poetry is represented. These genres he recognized partly by



their subject matter and partly by the treatment given the material. Like Skutsch, he emphasized the Alexandrian *color* of the entire poem, and therefore identified these literary genres as those "for which Rome had inherited a taste from Alexandria." Gallus "appeared only because he was associated with the poetic form which permitted a poet actually to be named," that is, with elegy.<sup>5</sup>

It is not my intention to quarrel over themes versus genres; my purposes are quite different, and others may fish in those waters. So it will be enough to say that I find my colleague's evidence for clear references to six or seven literary *genera* not fully persuasive<sup>6</sup> (to a smaller number — didactic or "scientific," the epyllion, and elegy<sup>7</sup> — yes). Accordingly, in the matter of themes and especially in regard to the presence of Gallus and the concept of the poet's inspiration, I shall in what follows lean heavily and gratefully upon Skutsch.

I am fully persuaded by Skutsch, and should like in addition to propose that in this Eclogue Virgil is also subtly presenting a brief for bucolic poetry and, more specifically, for his writing in Latin his own variety of this Alexandrian form. In this case, then, Virgil may have deliberately intended that the wide range of themes in Silenus' song — some with possible generic associations — should *inter alia* demonstrate his own poetic virtuosity *per se*;<sup>8</sup> this range would redefine, so to speak, the implications in the *recusatio* of lines 3–5 in a sense consonant with Virgil's actual poetic genius, and make it quite clear that in writing pastoral he is doing so entirely by choice and not *faute de mieux*. Further, I propose that with typical indirection Virgil is suggesting that something of "inspiration," as the Alexandrians had conceived of it, had also come to him, Virgil, even as it had come more formally or elaborately to his friend Gallus (which may partially explain what Gallus is doing in the poem). In lines 1–12 Virgil sets forth, as it were, his credo of poetics (Alexandrian), and not the least important of his words here are *non iniussa cano* (line 9): "I do not sing unbidden things," i.e., "Apollo commands me."<sup>9</sup>

Others have called attention to the poem's accent on the power of poetry and Apollo,<sup>10</sup> but until Skutsch clearly marked the Eclogue as Alexandrian and explained the significant symbolism of Gallus here, the motives of poetry and of Apollo seemed, while apparent enough, rather unrelated to the poem's actual themes and to Gallus' appearance — dangling motives, in fact. But now may we not ask: is Virgil here indirectly talking about his own Latin essays — the first Latin ones, too — in an Alexandrian type of poetry, and about his own poetic inspiration?

When a poet of a self-conscious and urban age speaks of or refers to

his own inspiration, he means, I suppose, that he cannot quite explain how it has all come about, how it has happened that he *has* written poetry. Just to have literary models, just to have technical ability, is not enough. And so the poet feels as though "some outside helper whom he naturally objectifies as the Muse herself" has guided him.<sup>11</sup> This outside force or power he can only express figuratively. But most poets feel that, if their poetic form permits it, they must somehow express it, and only symbols and images can come to their rescue.

To go back for a minute in this matter of the relation of poet and Muse:<sup>12</sup> in the Homeric world (when, unless they were heroes, men knew their limitations) the Muses gave the gift of song, taught, and were appealed to for the supernormal power of *true* speech. The bards were not "possessed" (and would still be spared that questionable privilege, apparently, until the time of Democritus). With Hesiod it was almost as simple and ingenuous; the Muses taught him and, as we should expect, while he was at work.<sup>13</sup> No business yet of being asleep, of dreaming, or of holy fountains, let alone of rivers and lakes.<sup>14</sup> But it was Hesiod who established what were to be the two essentials in the Alexandrian *Dichterweihe*: that a divinity or group of them, or a great figure from out of the past (Homer to Ennius), teach or direct the poet; and that the poet acknowledge this inspiration in his writings.

The Alexandrians stylized the idea of the poet's hallowing or inspiration. It is inevitable, I am sure, that any self-conscious poet living in a sophisticated age and pondering with a bit of awe the business of poetic creation, whether he be a Callimachus or a Mallarmé, must feel that some force outside of his normal self has assisted him (poets, and not just romantic ones, themselves abundantly testify to this feeling). The declaration of inspiration may become fairly conventionalized in its imagery and symbols — indeed, often so becomes — but for all that, it need not necessarily be taken as mere form.<sup>15</sup> A sincere and able poet will so manage his symbols that you will know whether he is groping to express a genuine feeling or is simply being emptily traditional.

Then, too, often poets seem eager to make a declaration of their inspiration for another reason. In a large (and possibly vulgar) metropolis — doubtless truer of Augustus' Rome than of Alexandria — a poet is likely to feel the necessity of publicly establishing, amid the welter of shifting values, the dignity of his own art and calling. How better than by telling of his own mystical "outside force," whether he calls it divine aid or magic (as in France in the last half of the last century) or what not? Plainly Horace felt this problem of the public's evaluation of the standing of a poet — *quod monstror digito praetereuntium*.

Be these conjectures as they may, though the concept of the poet's inspiration became formalized, just how ornate the ritualistic trappings should be depended, I suppose, upon that elusive element which we might call the poet's "temperament." A Propertius might have it one way — at the least his rites are generally aqueous<sup>16</sup> — and a Virgil another. In either case it is not inane décor but meaningful and serious statement.

Callimachus, who must have given the formal notion of poetic consecration its station amongst the Alexandrians, declared that in a dream he had been transplanted to Helicon and there had been enlightened by the Muses — an experience more complicated than that of his model, Hesiod. Ennius, to turn to the Roman world, stands in a way between Hesiod and Callimachus, indebted to each, for on the one hand Ennius literally went to the Mountain of the Muses, but on the other hand it was in a dream there that he saw the shade of Homer.<sup>17</sup> Lucretius, struck with the hope of fame and so smitten with sweet love of the Muses and inspired now by this love (*quo nunc instinctus*: 1.925), delights to approach untasted springs (like Hesiod's Hippocrene) and his subject hitherto untried in Latin. No sleep or dream here, but the fountains, which are to become standard stock with Propertius. It is Lucretius, of course, whom Virgil follows in this matter in the *Georgics*,<sup>18</sup> save that Virgil, in the epic tradition, asks for knowledge, while Lucretius, naturally, has it. Once at least Horace too, in a poem based on his own poetic inspiration (*Musis amicus*: C.1.26), follows the Lucretian tradition and language of springs,<sup>19</sup> and once, just as he followed Callimachus in poetic theory,<sup>20</sup> so he followed the master in the "sleep-motive" when he "confessed" his inspiration, which he carefully put back into the fabled world of his infancy.<sup>21</sup> On the whole, the *Musarum sacerdos* does not have the indirection of a Virgil: after all, Horace boasted (rightly) that he could make a humble spring famous; he also called himself elsewhere only a "dumb fish," as if he had "somehow entered the Muse's temple by the back door"<sup>22</sup> — but he knew he was in.

For the really "High Church" treatment we can turn to Persius' astringent parody:

Nec fonte labra prolui caballino  
nec in bicipiti somniasse Parnaso  
memini, ut repente sic poeta prodirem.

And we would turn if we could to Gallus' description of his own consecration, which I assume — with very little reason, I admit — that he described in his poem on the Grynian Grove. Our best example is



Propertius (3.3) who even makes his grotto of the Muses on Helicon an artificial one. Yet, I quickly add, underneath all of Propertius' rococo adornments we feel that he was struggling, and through them, to tell of a genuine and to him rather holy feeling.

The remarkable thing in this struggle is that Propertius turns for help to Virgil among others, and to the sixth Eclogue, and not to the section in that poem that describes Gallus' consecration but to the part that deals with Virgil and Apollo. So Propertius' *reges* of line 3 comes from Virgil's *reges* of line 3; Phoebus rebukes Propertius as Cynthius Virgil, and the *recusatio* is the same, and from the same source, to be sure; Propertius' *praescriptos pagina* of line 21 is a twisted echo of Virgil's *praescripsit pagina* of line 12; and a likeness of Virgil's Silenus graced the green cave in which Propertius underwent his hallowing. To anticipate my point, surely Propertius saw amongst other themes in Virgil's poem that of the *Dichterweihe*, and as applied to Virgil as well as to Gallus. That Propertius preferred a much more ritualistic affair with a dream and Hippocrene and a fully stocked grotto is unimportant here.<sup>23</sup>

My purpose in all this has been to show that the concept of poetic inspiration, while a formalized one from Callimachus on, might be expressed with different elaboration by different authors. I assume that variation within the tradition is owing to individual temperament. In the sixth Eclogue, as I read it and as I infer Propertius did, the motive is present, expressed simply and without frills. Apollo had told him in what mode to sing, and so the result:

te nemus omne canet; nec Phoebus gratior ulla est  
quam sibi quae Vari praescripsit pagina nomen (11-12)

Years later, looking proudly back on his bucolic production, he may have thought of himself as *audax* then, but all the same he knew that he had had divine direction in these essays.

If there is anything to the suggestion that the theme of Virgil's own poetic inspiration is present in the Eclogue, this proposal may be of significance when we ask how Virgil viewed his own pastorals: how did he feel about his own abilities, how did he feel about past and contemporary poets working in other forms, why did he write these ten poems, what was he trying to do in them, and what literary principles did he strive to adhere to in their composition?<sup>24</sup>

Before arguing this matter of "inspiration," I should say that underneath my contentions will lie three arbitrary, though hardly novel, assumptions. The first is that Virgil is generally a poet of the suggestive



rather than of the definite. Items — people, events, symbols, and such — cannot often be finally stamped with a precise denotation.<sup>25</sup> His is usually a connotative world, in which things are not “spelled out”; that is the business of prose. This elusive quality accounts, of course, for much of his always continuing appeal — *semper florentis* — to all kinds of readers in all kinds of societies. But it also means, which is relatively unimportant, that frequently the critic cannot definitely prove some one thesis in interpreting Virgil (e.g., *E.4*). Like the poet himself, the critic in many instances can but suggest, and then wait for the vision or myopia of the next critic. Because of this elusive bent, Virgil, I assume, would be the last poet to write pure allegory — Servius on this point is sensible<sup>26</sup> — or to hide away some occult key to a passage or poem which will suddenly unlock all its secrets. Instinctively, therefore, I should hesitate before accepting Stewart’s theory of *genera* as a solution even if the evidence seemed to me more compelling. Equally, I expect Virgil only indirectly to associate himself with the company of other inspired poets in the great tradition — with Apollo, Linus, Orpheus, Hesiod, Silenus, and Gallus — though there is nothing indirect, it should be added, about his statement in lines 1–12 about his own inspiration.

Second, I believe that we should attach much importance to repeated words, names, or topics in Virgil,<sup>27</sup> that they are consciously repeated (he is no Lucretius),<sup>28</sup> and that therefore they can tell us a good deal about his intentions if we heed them. I have in mind, for example, the six references to Apollo in the sixth Eclogue, the *oves* of lines 5 and 85, Virgil’s *meditabor* of line 8 and Apollo’s *meditante* of line 82, *rigidas quercus* and *rigidas ornos*, or the four forms of *errare* within a span of twenty-five lines.

My third assumption, based in turn upon the assumption that poetry works simultaneously on several levels, is this: that an item may have a primary, obvious, surface meaning, and yet may also be intended to suggest other notions. The *cum canerem*, for instance, says one thing directly enough to Varus, and gives him a reason. But on another plane it proclaims allegiance to a poetic theory. Or take lines 31–40. On the face of it they have to do with “scientific poetry,” with the *Lehrgedicht*. Yet in their vocabulary they deliberately remind us of course of Lucretius, and that recollection calls to mind Lucretius’ great pastoral passage — Virgil’s only model in Latin — toward the close of the very book, the fifth, which Virgil has in mind for other purposes in this passage. But then, Virgil also means the reference to didactic poetry to bring to our minds Hesiod. Hesiod in turn calls up all manner of memories — of Alexandrianism and its regard for Hesiod, of Callimachus’ debt to

Hesiod and then of Callimachus' theories on poetry, and then, lines 3ff., of Hesiod in connection with the elegy at Alexandria (and this looks forward to the Gallus passage),<sup>29</sup> of Hesiod in connection with the pastoral (via elegy and his accent on the countryside), and finally of Hesiod's innocent contribution to the notion of the *Dichterweihe* (and thus back we go to Gallus, and perhaps to Virgil), and so on.

Now to my first proposal. In this poem Virgil associates himself with Silenus and with Gallus. Both of these two in turn are associated with Apollo. Through them, indirectly, Virgil is connected with Apollo. He is also directly associated with this god (lines 3 and 11). Further, there stand in the background as remote links between Apollo, or the Muses, and Virgil the figures of Orpheus and of Hesiod. And we should add the less remote figure of Callimachus. In short, Virgil with varying accent suggests a relationship between himself as poet and these other singers, touches upon their relationship to Apollo,<sup>30</sup> mentions unequivocally his own relationship with Apollo, and thus indirectly and directly establishes his own poetic inspiration. But let me set down the chief points of interconnection:

1. Virgil sings Silenus' song — indeed it ought to be called "Virgil's song of Silenus" — and the song was originally Apollo's song.

2. The "whole chorus of Phoebus" arose to greet Gallus (who had sung of Apollo's grove at Grynia). Moreover, it is Linus who presents Gallus with Hesiod's pipes (Muses — Mount Helicon — Hesiod), and Linus is Apollo's son, and Orpheus' teacher. Further, the phrase *Linus divino carmine pastor* (line 67) brings divinity and the bucolic together (cf. *E.10.17*, where Gallus is hailed as *divine poeta*).

3. The appearance of Apollo in line 3 might be explained purely in terms of the *recusatio*. But not so in line 11, where Virgil in forthright fashion tells Varus that pastoral poetry too has its honor and status, and is warmly welcomed by Apollo. Then we note that, in fact, Virgil's poem begins and ends with Apollo (and outside of Silenus' song: lines 3 and 11, and 82).

4. The song of the inspired Hesiod could move trees (*rigidas ornos*, line 71). So could Silenus' song (*rigidas quercus*, line 28), and this song descended to Virgil from Apollo. So, too, will Virgil's version move trees (*myricae* — *nemus omne*, lines 10–11). In the case of both Virgil and Silenus, after mention of this power comes mention of Apollo in connection with song (lines 11 and 29).

5. Virgil, speaking of his own bucolic poetry, says, "*agrestem tenui meditabor harundine Musam*" (line 8), and then one remembers the

ending of the poem — that the Eurotas heard the song long ago, heard “omnia, quae Phoebō quondam *meditante* beatus / audiit Eurotas” (lines 82–83). The succession, via Silenus, is from Apollo to Virgil, and both “meditate” it; *now* at least it is a pastoral song (*agrestem Musam*) and in the Alexandrian style (*tenui harundine*).

6. To bring himself close to Silenus (who, as Skutsch remarked, has been transformed “vom Verkünder der Weisheit zum Vertreter der wahren Poesie”), Virgil in his own person actually enters the song on two occasions: when he interjects the Gallus passage (which Apollo could hardly have included in the original lay),<sup>31</sup> and by the *quid loquar* of line 74 (“now, what shall I, Virgil, recount next from Silenus’ song?”). This personal question, and the fact that the original song lasted from morning to night, means in effect that Virgil in his eighty-six lines is excerpting from Apollo’s lengthy song (and what could be more Alexandrian?).

7. Finally, to look at the matter of interconnections from a stylistic point of view, Silenus uses, as we should expect, forms of *canere* (as a connective to begin new topics, like *his adiungit* of line 43): *namque canebat* (line 31) and *tum canit* (lines 61 and 64). *Cantando* is used of Hesiod (moving trees; line 71). Virgil himself uses the verb no less than three times in the first twelve lines (3, 9 and 11); he ends the poem with *ille canit* (line 84). Here we have the obvious verb employed as a kind of formalizing link between Silenus, Hesiod, and Virgil, with Apollo in the background.

Such are the ways by which Virgil has managed obliquely to join himself with Silenus, Hesiod, and Gallus (and we may include Callimachus, too) within the community of poetry and poetic inspiration, Apollo and the Muses presiding over the entire company. No one of these associations seems especially striking in itself, but their cumulative force is strong. Indeed, it is just this vaguely felt effect of the omnipresent power of Apollo and of hallowed poets that sends us back to examine more closely the individual references, to discover how the total impression had been created. Then we begin to see how subtly Virgil has used these associations, one by one, to build up throughout the poem his House of Inspiration, and delicately to include himself within the edifice.

If he does include himself, it is as an inspired *pastoral* poet. This brings me to my second proposal: that this poem contains *inter alia* a brief for the writing of pastoral poetry in Latin. More specifically, I look upon it as containing a brief for Virgil’s writing *his* kind of pastoral, which, to say the least, was different enough from Theocritus’ so that some ancient critics were misled into considering the fourth, sixth, and



tenth as not "properly" pastoral<sup>32</sup> (they are pastoral, in Virgil's terms, as we know from his deliberate bow to tradition in the *paulo maiora* of the fourth). And Virgil is very much aware that his will be the first in Latin (such, I take it, is the meaning of the initial *prima* and *nostra* of the first two lines of the sixth).

Verses 1-12 are directly concerned, in personal terms, with the theory and practice of pastoral — out and out programmatic!<sup>33</sup> In fact they constitute Virgil's fullest pronouncement on the matter, and this perhaps explains why some early authorities thought that the sixth was the earliest, or meant to stand first, of all ten.<sup>34</sup>

The first two lines immediately sound the pastoral note (*Syracosio, ludere, silvas, Thalia*). Nothing could be clearer, not even the opening of the fourth (where likewise because of the non-Theocritean nature of the work Virgil must both show that he knows the tradition and admit freely that he is somewhat departing from it). The first two lines of the sixth also sound the personal note, Virgil and pastoral. Then the third line announces the Callimachean *recusatio* (fuller than the one to Pollio in 8.6ff.), and there follows, straight from Apollo himself, the Alexandrian prescription: *deductum carmen*. This is how it is to be handled! And Virgil is the shepherd (*pastorem*). Next comes the frank outburst of pride in his work in this genre (lines 10-12); he too is an inspired poet of no little accomplishment (I am assuming that this was not amongst his earliest Eclogues). So, *non iniussa cano*.

After such a start in theory, it would be odd if Virgil in practice in the rest of the poem were to forget his pastoral "program." He does not, for *his* bucolic world is a very large one, timeless and everywhere, and may effortlessly include a marvelous host of people and lands.

The closing of the poem looks back to its opening, not just in the matter of Apollo and inspiration but in the bucolic motives: for example, *oves* (cf. *oves* of line 5), *valles*, *stabulis*, and *Vesper*. Bucolic elements form a clear, overarching frame. Now what of the bucolic within this frame?

It is my contention that never for long throughout the poem does Virgil let the reader forget that, heterogeneous as the catalogue of themes may be, this is a pastoral poem (as should be the case, if it also be about the theory of pastoral). Bucolic touches suddenly and unexpectedly appear in the midst of science, mythology, and genealogy. I need not, I assume, be detailed about the stock pastoral equipment. A reader knows it well from the other nine Eclogues — wandering animals (domestic and even wild), trees and shrubs and flowers, brooks and streams, mountains, shepherds, and so forth — and he can verify their frequency from Wetmore's *Index*. These are the inevitable items (in



all the Eclogues) which make up the background for whatever particular subject or subjects Virgil wishes to treat in any one poem, and they will appear as faithfully in the fourth as in, say, the third or the eighth. It is these pastoral items, these motives or touches, which set the tone and the color for the poems. But they do more. They form a steady and unchanging scene against which the poet is free to bring in all manner of topics — Germany, Medea, Silenus, the wonderful *puer* and matters of state, Daphnis, Circe, the veterans, Pollio's tragedies, or Scylla. They permit, they support, so to speak, the *haec incondita* ("disordered matter") of *E.2.4*.

In this countryside, against this background, Virgil's shepherds wander; he as a shepherd-poet wanders in subjects and topics (more so, and intentionally, in the sixth than in any other Eclogue). Rose put it this way: he has "a power of passing easily from theme to theme and from mood to mood."<sup>35</sup> So he does, and so the repeated forms of *errare* signify. But he can only do so because the pastoral background remains constant — the streams and trees and mountains — giving to each poem an ultimate emotional stability, the harmony against which a particular incident may be set and proportionately evaluated. It is this superficially shifting but finally fixed bucolic background which accounts, I suppose, for much of the feeling of peace with which the reader (especially the harassed urban reader) leaves an Eclogue. Evening shadows and the evening star close more than just the day.<sup>36</sup>

Let me briefly list some of these pastoral motives which keep reappearing in the poem:

1. Trees. These are essential, along with mountains:<sup>37</sup> "*si canimus silvas, silvae sint consule dignae.*" In the sixth it is the laurels who learned Apollo's song and thus made the succession possible. Indeed even in the "scientific" passage this motive occurs (*incipiant silvae cum primum surgere*, line 39). The specific instances (I quote them to show the variety) are: *myricae* (10), *quercus* (28), *ilice* (54), *musco amarae corticis* (62), *alnos* (63), *ornos* (71), and *lauros* (83); *silvas* (2), *nemus* (11), *silvae* (39), *nemorum* (56), *nemoris* (72), and *lucus* (73).

2. Animals. Obviously flocks and herds (hence of course *Bucolica*) are standard equipment in the animate background. I note eleven references (lines 5, 27, 40, 45, 46, 49, 55, 58, 59, 60, and 85).

3. Plants, shrubs, and flowers. All are indispensable for the décor (cf. *E.2.45-50* or *4.18-20*). I note eight references (lines 8, 16, 19, 53, 59, 68 *bis*, and 69).

4. Mountains. The sensible herdsman of Italy presumably took his animals up the hills in summer for grass; for a Mantuan, that would mean

the Brescian Alps, if it makes any difference (which it doesn't).<sup>38</sup> "Pastoralis fuit in montibus vita," says Servius. There is surely present, too, the unreal, romanticized Arcady in these references: "ibi haec incondita solus / *montibus et silvis* studio iactabat inani" (*E.2.4-5*), which must have appealed to Propertius. I note four references (lines 40, 52, 65, and 71); *Parnasia rupes*, *Rhodope*, and *Ismarus* should also be included (29-30).

5. Streams and fountains. Apollo sang by the Eurotas (83); Gallus sang by the Permessus (64) — we wonder about Virgil by the Mincio; Aegle is a Naiad (20); and Hylas (43) is intimately connected with a fountain — in fact, too well (*G.3.6*).

6. Wandering. I stressed this theme above (p. 118) as an essential one in the bucolic; it also becomes a symbol for a characteristic practice in Virgil's handling of the form: "ille meas *errare* boves, ut cernis, et ipsum / *ludere* quae vellem *calamo* permisit *agresti*" (*E.1.9-10*). There are four instances of "wandering" within the remarkably small compass of twenty-five lines. In the "scientific" passage the animals wander through the mountains (40); cf. *Siculis errant in montibus agnae* of *E.2.21*. Then come two "romantic" instances; Pasiphae wanders and *in montibus* (52), and her devious steer wanders (58); and finally Gallus wanders by the Permessus (64).

7. Other standard items. Here I include the *pastor* (Virgil and Linus; 4 and 67, and the two lads); the shepherd-poet's reeds (Virgil and Hesiod and Gallus; 8 and 69); the *stabula* (60 and 85); the grotto (13); the pastoral or idyllic theme of the *Saturnia regna* (41); the pastoral tag of *quae te dementia cepit* of the lovelorn (47; cf. *E.2.69*); such rustic divinities as Fauns and Nymphs (27, 55, and 56); and *Vesper* (86) who brings the pastoral curtain down (cf. *maiores umbrae* of the first and *Hesperus* of the tenth).

8. Pastoral humor. When Virgil speaks of *ludere* and of *Thalia* in the first two lines, he is saying that the pastoral is a form for light verse. So pastoral poetry must have humor (or irony), but a delicate (and often learned) kind of humor of its own which, as Rose says, will give the poem a sense of proportions. Otherwise, the shepherds and what they say would be impossibly foolish or sentimental or grotesque. (Whoever can get over the notion that Virgil had no sense of humor would do a good service to us all by studying the nature of his "pastoral humor." Beethoven, at least, seems to have understood pastoral humor.) Let me illustrate very briefly. Consider Corydon the wonderful!<sup>39</sup> Virgil expects you to assume that within the Theocritean tradition he, Virgil, is intentionally indulging in a pleasant absurdity. For the time being, Corydon is no poor Italian herdsman—no indeed!—but a great giant and rich and toler-

ably handsome and in love with Galatea. If we do not see that Virgil sees the absurdity, if we do not enjoy it with him, the whole scene becomes unintelligible and, more to the point, unbearable (as apparently some commentators have found it). Only humor can level it all out and restore balance. Take the marvelously melodramatic ending of Damon's song. Only a great soul — certainly no one stared at by a heifer — could close with: "vivite, silvae: / praeceps aërii specula de montis in undas / deferar; extremum hoc munus morientis habeto" (E.8.59–61). Surely the enjambment is worthy of this man! And how are we to look at the daughters of Proetus who, at best, could muster up only a false moo? Or at the talented ram of the fourth Eclogue (lines 43ff.)? Consider, too, the delicate humor in the close of that same poem: "nec deus hunc mensa, dea nec dignata cubili est." Or, to turn to another type, recall the rustic thrust in E.3.8–9, or Silenus' meaningful remark to that forward Aegle: *huic aliud mercedis erit*. In a way, then, Virgil's *ludere* of line 1 is picked up by the *luserat* of line 19 and by the *ludere* of line 28.

These, in fine, are at least some of the bucolic motives and touches — trees, animals, and the rest — which constantly peep through the learned and mythological and poetic themes.<sup>40</sup> Through them we are always reminded that, after all, this *is* a pastoral poem. They carry us, so to speak, in a pastoral frame of mind from the programmatic first twelve lines to the definitely bucolic close. Perhaps, too, they support the suggestion made above, that in this poem Virgil comes as close as he ever could or would to composing a brief for his trying his hand at what, after all, was the only major literary genre which had not yet been tried in Latin.

In conclusion — *sat prata biberunt* — I return to Skutsch. Surely he was correct in calling this poem a catalogue of Alexandrian themes and in interpreting the presence of Gallus as a symbol of the Alexandrian concept of the consecration of the poet. In the present study I have tried to propose two additional ideas or notions also perhaps to be found in the poem. The first is that it may contain Virgil's declaration of his own poetic inspiration. If so, then Gallus would be introduced not only as an illustration of the *Dichterweihe*, as Skutsch says, and as a compliment to a friend, but also as a contemporary poet who had already written of his inspiration,<sup>41</sup> as Virgil here may be alluding to his own. The variety of themes with their possible generic suggestions, accordingly, would also enable Virgil to display his own poetic virtuosity and, redefining and amplifying the *recusatio* of lines 3–5, would show that he wrote in the pastoral mode out of a deliberate choice from amongst a number of



poetic genres. My second proposal is that the poem may contain a brief, or the nearest thing to that of which the unpoetical Virgil was capable, for his own kind of Latin pastoral.

If there is any likelihood in these suggestions, then we have in this Eclogue a possibly not unimportant document of Virgilian literary autobiography. This document we may wish to consult when we study the other Eclogues and probe into the host of questions that inevitably arise about any great poet's views on his own medium, purposes, art, and craft.

## NOTES

1. O. Skutsch, "Zu Vergils Eklogen," *RhM* 99 (1956) 193-95; Z. Stewart, "The Song of Silenus," *HSCP* 64 (1959) 179-205 (who not only refers to the chief previous studies on the poem but summarizes the principal lines of interpretation which have been proposed). These two articles (or either one of them) might perhaps persuade T. J. Haarhoff, "Vergil and Cornelius Gallus," *CP* 55 (1960) 101-8, to reconsider some of his suggestions, e.g., p. 103, "The Muses give him [Gallus] the reeds that they once bestowed on the old man of Ascræ, Hesiod. Gallus must therefore have written on the farmer's life." Hesiod is simply looked upon here as the father of mythological poetry and, by translating or paraphrasing Euphorion, Gallus qualifies as a successor of Hesiod. Hence we do not need to assume, p. 103, that Gallus wrote "on some aspect of the life of bees." Nor need we agree with the revival of F. Skutsch's thesis: "But the suddenness [of Gallus' appearance] would be modified if the themes referred to were to be found in Gallus' poetry" (p. 106), nor with the proposal that Gallus had perhaps been "a member of the Garden circle at Naples and Sorrento."

2. Stewart (see note 1) 184-86, gives, as an example, a most careful and instructive analysis of the sources behind lines 31-40.

3. Stewart, 196, is right, too, in viewing the last five lines as the conclusion.

4. I am not referring to a poem with a refrain and a careful balancing of stanzas, such as *E.8*, but to just such a one as *E.6*, on which Stewart, speaking of lines 74-81 and the "interjection of the poet in his own person," p. 195, comments that this "may also be a kind of link with the preceding section" (lines 64-73). In general, my feeling is that too much insistence on "sectioning" may obscure the effect of the informative emotional links that unite the passages. For example, take Stewart's first section (31-40: *περὶ φύσεως*) and his second (41-42: mythology and genealogy). From the point of view of methodology of approach, of course they are separated from each other. But emotionally they are not. The first progresses up through *rara animalia*, but the next item, the one that we know must be coming, is omitted. That is Man. But the second section in its allusions (Pyrrha, the Golden Age, and Prometheus) is entirely about Man. The method, however, has sharply shifted; now it is mythological, albeit the mythological references seem balder — more Hesiodic? — than those that follow. Still, I say, the two sections are emotionally bound together, and what has happened here — it is much more than mere chronology — is the kind of oscillation, the "pull-back," which we observe elsewhere in Virgil. At a point, the would-be natural philosopher reins himself in, and mythology takes over. So in *G.1.60-63* we have



Lucretius and then Deucalion. In *G.2* the natural scientist of lines 477ff. — we see him again for an instant in the song of Iopas — suddenly loses his glowing zeal, and out comes *Fortunatus et ille* and Pan, Silvanus, and the Nymphs. So, too, he cannot long sustain the philosophical doctrine of the World Soul (*A.6.724-51*) but quickly passes on to early legends of Rome. We need not doubt the deep and sincere regard he had for natural science, nor his own feeling of inadequacy in this field. But, as W. F. Jackson Knight, "Virgil's Latin," *Acta Classica* (Cl. Assoc. S. Africa) 1 (1958) 31 remarked, Virgil was "afraid of being over-confident," and hence the frequent oscillations here and there in his works between science and mythology. We should, therefore, believe Donatus in his *Life* (Brummer 125-26) that, after he had polished the *Aeneid*, he intended to spend the rest of his life on philosophy. Propertius (3.5.23ff.) tells us, I think quite sincerely, that he would like to spend the years of his old age, too, on natural science — a large program he sets himself! — but we do not find in Propertius as we do in Virgil the tentative sallies into the field that could bespeak a lasting interest in the subject.

5. Stewart (see note 1) 194. This says why he *could* appear but not why he *did* appear here. Stewart's statement is plainly not meant to be taken independently, since poets do name themselves in other poetic forms (e.g., in the didactic, Hesiod or Nicander), but should be interpreted in the context of what Stewart has already said on pp. 193-94.

6. Definite identification of literary *genera* in such a poem is, as I am sure Stewart would agree, ticklish business. Thus one might argue — wrongly, of course — that the *quid loquar* of line 74 is meant to suggest the hymnic form.

7. Propertius (2.10.26) saw in Virgil's Gallus passage a reference to elegy; whoever wanders along the Permessus is certainly a writer of love-elegies. Cf. Stewart (see note 1) 203 n.65, and Georg Luck's excellent *The Latin Love Elegy* (London 1959) 45 and 131-32.

8. Parallel would be epic flights in Horace (e.g., *S.2.1.13-15* or *C.1.6*) or his elegiac strains (e.g., *Epod. 15.1-10*).

9. Serv. *ad loc.*: "vel ab Apolline vel ab Augusto." The Verona scholia quote Cornutus as referring the command to the Muses.

10. See esp. C. Becker, "Virgils Eklogenbuch," *Hermes* 83 (1955) 317-18, and K. Büchner, *RE* 8A.1 (1955) 1219-24.

11. As put by L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and His Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge 1946) 94, commenting on *C.4.3*. Ovid puts it: "Sunt etiam qui nos numen habere putent" (*Am.3.9.18*).

12. On the inspiration of poets, see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951) 80-82 and notes thereto. On the consecration of poets, see E. Reitzenstein, *Festschrift Richard Reitzenstein* (Leipzig and Berlin 1931) 52-69, and R. Pfeiffer, *Callimachus* (Oxford 1949) 1.11, note to *schol. ad frag. 2*.

13. *Theog. 22-25*; cf. *Op. 658-62*.

14. The motives of sleep and of fountains took their start from the opening of the *Theogony* (ἐννύχαι, line 10; Ἰππου κρήνης, line 6), just as the Permessus goes back to line 5.

15. Though it certainly can degenerate into silly affectation, so that we today know what Horace meant by "bona pars non unguis ponere curat, / non barbam" (*A.P.297f.*). See also Persius' *prologus*.

16. For Propertius' views on the nature and principles of his art — he alone

of the elegiac poets earnestly tries to treat this matter — and for the symbolism which he uses in attempting to depict his inspiration, cf. Luck (see note 7) 124-40.

17. See O. Skutsch, *The Annals of Quintus Ennius* (London 1953) 9-11.

18. Lucr. 1.922ff. is the model. In G.2.175 the *sanctos fontis* come from Lucretius' *integros fontis*, but note that Lucretius' direct *haurire* is replaced by Virgil with *recludere*. In G.2.475ff. Virgil's *quarum ingenti percussus amore* echoes Lucretius' *quo nunc instinctus*, but Virgil uses the optative (*accipiant* and *monstrent*). More confident is the statement in G.3.10-11, again modeled on Lucretius (this time, 1.117ff.; Virgil's *victor* of lines 9 and 17 comes from Lucr. 1.75). With the *deducam* of G.3.11 editors generally compare Hor., C.1.37.31: *privata deduci superbo*; I should sooner suppose that Virgil's *deducam* might have induced Horace's *deduxisse modos* of C.3.30.14. If so, that would seem to support the view that Virgil here in G.3.10-11 is not, as is usually said, looking forward to a yet unwritten work (as he is a bit later in lines 46-48) but is actually talking about his *Georgics*; otherwise, how explain *Aonio* with its clear reference to Hesiod?

To return to the influence of Lucr. 1.922ff., in G.3.291-3 *Parnasi dulcis amor* recalls Lucretius' *amorem musarum*, the *iuvat* and reference to Castalia recall Lucretius' *iuvat* and *fontis*, and the *Parnasi deserta* Lucretius' *avia Pieridum*. In general, the tone in G.3 is much more poetically assured than that of the preceding book. Finally, in G.4.7 he openly calls on Apollo to "hear" him.

19. Wilkinson (see note 11) 11f. gives an excellent solution of this ode.

20. For example, *spiritum tenuem* of C.2.16.38 (cf. Virgil's *temui harundine* of E.6.8) or *Phoebus volentem proelia me loqui* | *victas et urbis increpuit lyra* of C.4.15.1-2 (cf. Virgil's *cum canerem reges et proelia*, *Cynthia aurem* | *vellit et admonuit* of E.6.3-4).

21. Why Horace indulges in this bit of autobiography is magisterially explained by Eduard Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 274ff.

22. Wilkinson (see note 11) 94.

23. So ornate has the consecration become with Propertius that he even — so far as I know, without any traditional authority — makes Ennius drink of the Hippocrene.

24. In facing these questions, we could do worse than start with Donatus' *Life* (Brunner 280-325).

25. At least four reasons for this come to mind. First, *Totus quidem Vergilius scientia plenus est* (Serv., *praef.* A.6; Thilo 2.1.1). Second, we have lost some of the works from which he drew. Third, in one single passage he blends materials drawn from several sources, as Stewart (see note 1) 180 emphasizes. Fourth, he often indulges in deliberate ambiguity (which may be worth keeping in mind whenever we ponder the fourth Eclogue).

26. His principle: "Sed melius simpliciter accipimus: refutandae enim sunt allegoriae in bucolico carmine, nisi cum...ex aliqua agrorum perditorum necessitate descendunt" (*ad. E.* 3.20; Thilo 3.33.12-15). See the wise comments of H. J. Rose, *The Eclogues of Vergil* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1942) 117-38.

27. I do not refer to repetitions within the same or the following lines (on which see Jackson Knight, cited in note 4, pp. 36f.) but to those which are separated from each other by a fair number of lines.

28. On whose unconscious repetitions I have commented in "Lucretius 1.1-49," *TAPA* 85 (1954) 93f.

29. In elegy as much as in epic — we should say today "mythological" or "non-epic" poetry — the Hellenistic world looked to Hesiod in his role of 5 + C.P.

didactic poet and writer of informal verse; cf. Stewart (see note 1) 203 n.67 (for an important correction of E. Reitzenstein).

30. I do not know — indeed, it may even be idle to raise the query — why Apollo is called *Cynthius* in line 3, *Apollo* in line 73, but on the other four occasions *Phoebus*. It might merely be the repeated *c*-sound of “cum canerem . . . Cynthius.” Or it might be that in the poem’s opening, for the sake of breadth, the geographical *Syracosis* induced another geographical item, *Cynthius* — could this be said of *Sicelides* . . . *Cumaei* of *E.4.1-4*? — but that later on enough geography was enough, and there was no desire for expansion, and hence *Parnasia rupes* (29), *Permessi ad flumina* and *Aonas in montes* (64f.), and *Eurotas* (83) forbade the geographical epithet? I have no trust in this guess. Callimachus, in his famous opening of the *Aetia*, uses *Λύκιος*.

31. As Skutsch (see note 1) 194 pointed out.

32. Donatus, *Life* (Brummer 302-4) excludes 4, 6, and 10; Serv., *buc. prooem.* (Thilo 3.3.20-24) says three are not *meras rusticas* (and names two of them, 4 and 6); the *scholia Bern.*, *ad loc.* (Hagen 792) says of the sixth: “Haec ecloga non proprie bucolicon dicitur.” Why Donatus’ three? He gives no reasons. True, the fourth and sixth are not modelled on Theocritus, but what of the tenth? But Servius explains that Virgil departed from the tradition (*a bucolico carmine*), i.e., from Theocritus, *cum excusatione*. The reasons are: “vel ut ex insertis altioribus rebus posset placere, vel quia tot varietates implere non poterat.” The second reason is a silly one, but the first must give the clue. The figure of the *puer* with the grave pronouncement on Italy’s future, the learned song of Silenus, and the dominating picture of Gallus throughout the tenth, must have set them apart from the other seven (at least for fourth-century critics). Apparently it did not occur to them to ask themselves why Virgil would be “unorthodox” in nearly a third of his “bucolic” output. Surely an answer is that he was deliberately “unorthodox” within the tradition.

33. Becker (see note 10) 317: “fast programmatisch spricht der Dichter gleich am Anfang über seine Berufung durch Apollo und hebt das Neue und Besondere seiner Bukolik hervor (6, 1-12). Dieses Proömium hängt eng mit dem Folgener zusammen.”

34. Donatus, *Life* (Brummer 323-25); Serv., *buc. prooem.* (Thilo 3.3.19f.).

35. Rose (see note 26) 42f.

36. Consider the first Eclogue. Here Vergil probes, as he will in the *Aeneid*, the absorbing contemporary problem of the individual and social upheaval. The Eclogue offers no pragmatic answer; Tityrus is safe but Meliboeus is ruined. Yet the poem finally breathes out a peace and a harmony, not economic but emotional, and that is owing to the bucolic closing. The shadows of the oncoming evening and the mountains are regular and constant, and against them transitory man and his ephemeral problems are dwarfed.

37. Cf., e.g., *E.10.9-15*.

38. From my own amateurish explorations in the Mantuan territory, I agree entirely with Rose (see note 26) 61-62 on this subject which has devoured so much ink and paper.

39. Rose (see note 26) 31ff. has an illuminating section on Corydon.

40. In 1953 my friend and former student, G. P. Fitzgerald, wrote under my nominal direction a senior thesis “Elements of Unity in the Sixth Eclogue: Some Notes on Vergil’s Literary Method” (unpublished; in Harv. Coll. Library). From our discussions and his conclusions I learned much. I also happily here

express my gratitude for comments on the present paper to Professors Wendell Clausen and Philip Levine.

41. But not introduced because he had written bucolics (unproved) nor because he was going to write them (unprovable) nor because his love-elegies had any special bucolic *color*. Servius' well-known comment on *E.*10.46 supports no such conclusions, and *E.*10.50f. looks to the future (and may never have come to pass).





## THE ANONYMUS IAMBLICHI AND HIS PLACE IN GREEK POLITICAL THEORY

BY ANDREW THOMAS COLE, JR.

IT is generally agreed that the sections of the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus isolated by Blass and ascribed by him to Antiphon the Sophist come from a work of the late fifth or early fourth century B.C. Almost as general is the conviction that this work cannot have been written by Antiphon.<sup>1</sup> Various alternatives have been suggested<sup>2</sup> — Theramenes, Protagoras, Critias, Hippias, Antisthenes, Antiphon the Orator — without advancing the problem any nearer to solution; and many scholars<sup>3</sup> would now assume, perhaps rightly, that the Anonymus is a minor writer, one whose name may not have been preserved to us at all. But if the Anonymus has thus been accorded a separate identity and a place among the *Vorsokratiker*, the importance of his treatise is still not generally understood. He has been too often dismissed summarily as a “geringer Geist”,<sup>4</sup> a shallow and second-rate popularizer of the doctrines of Protagoras,<sup>5</sup> or viewed as something of a philosophical anachronism — an isolated and despondent voice from another age addressing a world which was already ripe for the message of Platonism.<sup>6</sup> Even scholars who place a higher estimate on his work have tended to treat him as a sort of half-way house between the Sophistic and the idealist political philosophies of the fourth century — of interest chiefly in so far as he throws light on the transition from the one to the other.<sup>7</sup>

Evidence of a salutary reaction against these tendencies is to be found in a recent series of articles by Quintino Cataudella.<sup>8</sup> Cataudella has pointed out some fairly extended echoes of the Anonymus in subsequent literature — echoes which suggest that the ancient estimate of his importance was rather different from the modern one; and he has advanced a number of reasons for believing that the Anonymus was no less a figure than Democritus.<sup>9</sup> Not all the arguments presented are of equal value; taken as a whole, however, they deserve more attention than they have hitherto received — at least from non-Italian scholars.<sup>10</sup> Cataudella's thesis needs modification at points, but it is, I believe, correct in essentials. And though his study of the echoes of the Anonymus in later literature is incomplete, it represents a line of investigation which can lead to a more accurate understanding than has hitherto been possible,

both of the character of the work itself and of its place in the development of Greek political thought.<sup>11</sup>

## I

The most striking of the parallel passages adduced by Cataudella are two which appear in Book 2 of Cicero's *De Officiis*. Their immediate source, like that of the rest of the book,<sup>12</sup> was doubtless the *Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* of Panaetius. The first of the passages occurs in the course of a discussion of *gloria*. Panaetius' remarks on the *liberalitas* which is one of its prerequisites should be compared with the very similar statements which the Anonymus makes about the necessary prerequisites of *ἀρετή*:

*De Officiis* 2.15.52-20.71

Sed expositis . . . officiis quae valeant ad gloriam adipiscendam deinceps de beneficentia ac de liberalitate dicendum est (52).

Multi enim patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte largiendo. Quid autem est stultius quam, quod libenter facias, curare ut id diutius facere non possis? Atque etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinae; cum enim dando egere coeperunt, alienis bonis manus adferre coguntur. Ita cum benevolentiae comparandae causa benefici esse velint, non tanta studia adsequuntur eorum quibus dederunt quanta odia eorum quibus ademerunt (54-55).

. . . aut opera benigne fit indigentibus aut pecunia. Facilior est haec posterior . . . sed illa lautior ac splendidior et viro forti clarioque dignior. . . altera ex arca altera ex virtute depromitur, largitioque quae fit ex re familiari fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit (52).

Anonymus 3.3-6

τόν τε αὖ ἀρετῆς ὀρεγόμενον τῆς συμπάσης σκεπτέον ἐκ τίνος ἂν λόγου ἢ ἔργου ἄριστος εἴη· τοιοῦτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ πλείστοις ὠφέλιμος ὢν.<sup>13</sup>

εἰ μὲν τις χρήματα διδοὺς εὐεργετήσῃ τοὺς πλησίον ἀναγκασθήσεται κακὸς εἶναι πάλιν αὖ συλλέγων τὰ χρήματα· ἐπειτα οὐκ ἂν οὕτω ἄφθονα συναγάγοι ὥστε μὴ ἐπιλείπειν διδόντα καὶ δωρούμενον· εἰτα αὕτη αὖθις δευτέρα κακία προσγίγνεται μετὰ τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἔαν ἐκ πλουσίου πένης γένηται καὶ ἐκ κεκτημένου μὴδὲν ἔχων.

πῶς ἂν οὖν δῆ τις μὴ χρήματα νέμων ἀλλὰ ἄλλω δὴ τινι τρόπῳ εὐποητικὸς ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπων καὶ ταῦτα μὴ σὺν κακίᾳ ἀλλὰ σὺν ἀρετῇ; καὶ προσέτι δωρούμενος πῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὴν δόσιν ἀνέκλειπτον;

Quae autem opera non largitione beneficia dantur haec tum in universam rem publicam tum in singulos cives conferuntur. Nam in iure cavere consilio iuvare atque hoc scientiae genere prodesse quam plurimis vehementer . . . pertinet . . . ad gratiam (65). . . . Extremum autem praeceptum in beneficiis operaque danda ne quid contra aequitatem contendas ne quid pro iniuria; fundamentum enim est perpetuae commendationis et famae iustitia sine qua nihil potest esse laudabile (71).

ὥδε οὖν ἔσται τοῦτο εἰ τοῖς νόμοις

τε καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ ἐπικουροίη· τοῦτο γὰρ τὰς τε πόλεις καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὸ συνοικίζον καὶ τὸ συνέχον.

The pictures which Cicero and the Anonymus give of the immoderate giver forced to make up his losses from other sources and finally reduced to poverty are identical; both writers associate the proper sort of liberality with justice; and it is reasonable to see<sup>14</sup> in Cicero's mention of the activities of the lawyer a translation into Roman terms<sup>15</sup> of the Greek notion of ἐπικουρία τῷ δικαίῳ.

In the other main parallel passage noted by Cataudella the subject is once more *gloria*, but *gloria* discussed from a somewhat different point of view. Socrates, it is said (2.12.43), claimed that the shortest path to glory was *si quis id ageret, ut qualis haberi vellet, talis esset*.<sup>16</sup> Lasting fame cannot rest on pretence and fraud. The point is briefly stated and illustrated with examples. Cicero then passes to a different, though related, subject, one which receives a very similar treatment in the Anonymus:

*De Officiis* 2.13.44-46.

Sed ut facillime, quales simus, tales esse videamur, etsi in eo ipso vis maxima est, ut simus ii qui haberi velimus, tamen quaedam praecepta danda sint.

Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam . . . aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium coniciuntur atque in eum quid agat quem ad modum vivat

Anonymus 2.1-5.

ἐξ οὗ ἂν τις βούληται δόξαν παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαβεῖν καὶ τοιοῦτος φαίνεσθαι οἷος ἂν ᾖ,

αὐτίκα δεῖ νέον τε ἄρξασθαι καὶ ἐπιχρῆσθαι αὐτῷ ὁμαλῶς αἰεὶ καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. συγχρονησθὲν μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον τούτων λαμβάνει βέβαιον τὴν δόξαν . . . διὰ τὰδε ὅτι πιστεύεται ἤδη . . . καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῶν ἀνθρώπων



inquiritur et tamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita nullum obscurum potest nec dictum eius esse nec factum.

οὐ προσγίγνεται . . . ἅμα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλουσιν εἰ . . . ἄρα τοιοῦτος . . . ἐστὶν οἷος φαίνεται.

Quorum autem prima aetas in hominum ignoratione versatur, ii simul ac iuvenes esse coeperunt magna spectare et ad ea rectis studiis debent contendere;<sup>17</sup> quod eo firmiore animo facient quia non modo non invidetur illi aetati verum etiam favetur. Prima est igitur adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest. . . . Facillime autem et in optimam partem cognoscuntur adulescentes qui se ad claros et sapientes bene consulentes rei publicae contulerunt . . .

ἐαλωκότες γὰρ ἤδη κατὰ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὔτε τῷ φθόνῳ ἐτι δύνανται χρῆσθαι οὔτε ἀπατᾶσθαι ἐτι οἴονται.

One should distinguish more clearly than Cicero does between the two problems: how to be as one would like to appear and how to appear as one is. Cicero is doubtless correct in suggesting that the former is Socratic: it fits in well with the Socratic preoccupation with the perfection of the individual personality. The latter problem is social rather than individual; and the intellectual milieu to which it belongs is, not Socraticism, but the Sophistic analysis of communication and persuasion. The process of acquiring *δόξα* is a repetition, on a larger scale and over a much longer period of time, of the process by which the successful orator gains approval in the assembly for a political policy.<sup>18</sup> This theme, announced at the outset of both passages, is developed consistently and coherently in the Anonymus; Cicero quickly loses the thread of the argument and digresses to other matters which, strictly speaking, have nothing to do with the announced subject. The seeking of military renown and the imitation of the example of famous men are pursuits which, in general, may be expected to be a *commendatio ad gloriam* for a young man, but not specific means of inspiring confidence in his sincerity and abilities. Cicero uses the ideas of the Anonymus as a springboard from which to pass to other matters, but the parallels between the initial portions of the two passages are close enough to make his dependence on the earlier writer fairly obvious.

The passages quoted contain the most significant of the resemblances

between *De Officiis* 2 and the Anonymus noted by Cataudella. But the more general similarities linking the two works extend much further, suggesting that, not merely certain passages, but the whole concept and structure of Book 2 derive either from the Anonymus or from a work closely resembling his.

Near the beginning of the book the benefits which man derives from the society of his fellows are the subject of a passage which, in spite of certain Hellenistic features, contains much that is characteristically fifth century in spirit:

Quae ergo ad vitam hominum tuendam pertinent partim sunt inanima . . . partim animalia. . . Eorum autem alia rationis expertia sunt, alia ratione utentia. Expertes rationis . . . equi . . . pecudes quarum opere efficitur aliquid ad usum hominum atque vitam. Ratione utentium duo genera ponunt deorum unum . . . alterum hominum. . . Earumque item rerum quae nocent et obsint, eadem divisio est. . . Ea enim ipsa quae inanima diximus pleraque sunt hominum operis affecta quae nec haberemus nisi manus et ars accessisset nec iis sine hominum administratione uteremur . . . Tecta vero . . . unde aut initio generi humano dari potuissent aut postea subveniri . . . nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxilia petere didicisset? Adde ductus aquarum derivationes fluminum . . . quae unde sine hominum opere habere possemus? Ex quibus perspicuum est qui fructus quaeque utilitates ex rebus ipsis quae sunt inanimae percipiuntur, eas nos nullo modo sine hominum manu atque opera capere potuisse. Qui denique ex bestiis fructus aut commoditas nisi homines adiuvarent percipi posset? . . . Quid enumerem artium multitudinem sine quibus vita omnino nulla esse potuisset? . . . quibus rebus exulta hominum vita tantum destitit a victu cultuque bestiarum (2.3.11-4.15).

The uncompromising glorification of technology which this passage contains is of a sort which hardly appears in Greek literature outside the speeches of Aeschylus' Prometheus, the first stasimon of the *Antigone*, and several later texts which seem to derive from fifth-century sources: Plato's Protagoras myth, the prehistory in Diodorus 1.8, and the concluding portion of Lucretius 5. The form of the passage may well be Hellenistic. The division of the resources at man's disposal into animate and inanimate, with the former subdivided in turn into rational and irrational, suggests the influence of a Peripatetic system of categories and, in particular, of those which appear in the *Bíos 'Elláδος* of Dicaearchus;<sup>19</sup> one might expect a fifth-century account to be, like those preserved in Lucretius and Diodorus, historical rather than analytic in character, showing how one discovery led to another until the whole fabric of civilized life was built up.<sup>20</sup> But the differences between Panaetius and

Dicaearchus are more important than the similarities. The latter's account of the development of culture, assuming as it does the existence of a Golden Age before the beginnings of technology, is diametrically opposed to Panaetius'. Equally dissimilar is the account given by the Stoic Posidonius, with its apparatus of *sapientes*<sup>21</sup> who act as man's mentors during the whole process. And the implication contained in the final lines of the passage quoted — that it is only technology which separates man from beast — is one which no idealist philosopher, Academic, Peripatetic, or Stoic, would be likely to make.

The affinities between Panaetius and the fifth century are even clearer in what immediately follows in Cicero's text (2.4.15):

Urbes vero sine hominum coetu non potuissent nec aedificari nec frequentari, ex quo leges moresque constituti, tum iuris aequa descriptio certaque vivendi disciplina; quas res et mansuetudo animorum consecuta et verecundia est effectumque ut esset vita munitior atque ut dando et accipiendo mutuandisque facultatibus et commodis nulla re egeremus.

The passage clearly implies that the existence of *urbes* and *hominum coetu* is a prerequisite for what follows. Evidently, then, Panaetius sees the social virtues, not as an inseparable part of man's nature, but as the result of his living in close association with a number of his fellows. Altogether absent here is any suggestion of that *naturalis quaedam congregatio* which, in the orthodox Stoic view,<sup>22</sup> characterized man from the start and hence predated even the earliest of societies. Panaetius' perspective is that of the fifth century — of Sophocles, who characterizes the dispositions of civilized man as *ἀστυνόμους ὀργάς*,<sup>23</sup> and of Plato's Protagoras, who proclaims that the worst of city dwellers is a more moral man than any solitary-dwelling savage.<sup>24</sup>

The general similarity of the Panaetian and Protagorean viewpoints here is all the more significant in view of the parallels of detail which link the passage to similar ones in the Protagoras myth and in the Anonymus:

*Protagoras* 322b-c.

ἐζήτουν [primitive men] δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σφύζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις· ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν ἡδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην ὥστε πάλιν σκεδανύμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς οὖν . . . Ἑρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους

Anonymus 6.1.

εἰ γὰρ ἔφυσαν . . . οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀδύνατοι καθ' ἑνα ζῆν, συνῆλθον δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῇ ἀνάγκῃ εἰκόντες, πᾶσα δὲ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῖς εὖρηται καὶ τὰ τεχνήματα πρὸς ταύτην σὺν ἀλλήλοις δὲ εἶναι αὐτοὺς κἂν ἀνομία διαιτᾶσθαι οὐχ οἶόν τε (μειζω



αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην ἔν' εἶεν πόλεων  
κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συνα-  
γωγοί.

γὰρ αὐτοῖς ζημίαν ἂν οὕτω γίνεσθαι  
ἐκείνης τῆς κατὰ ἓνα διαίτης), διὰ  
ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς ἀνάγκας τὸν  
τε νόμον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐμβασιλεύειν  
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Cicero's *urbes* and *certa vivendi disciplina* are the κόσμοι πόλεων of the myth, and his *verecundia* is the Protagorean αἰδώς. *Leges moresque* are the νόμος of the Anonymus. And the δίκη (right return) of both passages finds a partial parallel in the notion of proper recompense for services involved in the phrase *mutuandis facultatibus*.

Both Protagoras and the Anonymus see the formation of society as the result of two causes. Man's physical weakness, according to Protagoras, makes it necessary for him to form aggregations with his fellows for protection; he is, in the words of the Anonymus, unable to live a solitary existence. However, once men are gathered into groups, there must be something to prevent them from harming one another. Hence Zeus must send Right and Reverence to constitute the "ordered existences of cities and the uniting bonds of friendship"; hence it is that "lawful usage and right hold kingship among men." Both causes of the social order are present in Cicero, although in a somewhat different form. His enumeration of the conveniences which men secure from one another is simply the other side of the coin to the statements in the *Protagoras* and the Anonymus to the effect that society is a response to the discomfort or impossibility of a solitary existence. And the mutual injustice and "worse fate" (μείζω ζημίαν) which would occur if men lived together without lawful usage and right are present in a passage which appears slightly later in Cicero's account: *atque ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum atque consensu, sic nulla tam detestabilis pestis quae non homini ab homine nascatur* (2.5.16). Cicero's approach is analytical, considering first the benefits, then the potential disutility, involved in man's social existence; that of Protagoras and the Anonymus is historical, seeing in the advantages of a group, as against a solitary, existence the initial impulse for the formation of societies, which would subsequently develop means of preventing the harm which arises from internal dissension. Cicero's account of society stands in exactly the same relationship to those of Protagoras and the Anonymus as does his account of the benefits of technology to the sort of historical presentation of the subject which seems to have been characteristic of fifth-century anthropological speculation. It would be natural, then, to assume that Panaetius is following a single, fifth-century source for both parts of his discussion;



and that source may well have been a more complete version of the text preserved in Iamblichus.

This suggestion can be supported by further parallels between the portions of Cicero and the Anonymus under consideration. The contexts in which their descriptions of the development of society appear are quite similar: the two accounts are introduced for an identical reason and from them identical conclusions are drawn:

*De Officiis* 2.3.9-5.17.

Lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via sensimque eo deducta est ut, honestatem ab utilitate secernens, constitueret esse honestum aliquid, quod utile non esset, et utile quod non honestum, qua nulla pernicies maior hominum vitae potuit adferri . . . Quod qui parum perspiciunt ii saepe versutos homines et calidos admirantes, malitiam sapientiam iudicant. Quorum error eripiendus est opinioque omnis ad eam spem traducenda, ut honestis consiliis iustisque factis, non fraude et malitia, se intellegant ea quae velint consequi posse.

[There follow the passages on technology and society just discussed].

Quis est enim cui non perspicua sint illa quae . . . a Panaetio commemorantur neminem neque ducem bello nec principem domi magnas et salutare res sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse? . . . Atque ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum atque con-

Anonymus 6.1-5.

ἔτι τοίνυν οὐκ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν ὁρμᾶν δεῖ οὐδὲ τὸ κράτος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ πλεονεξίᾳ ἡγείσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὸ δὲ τῶν νόμων ὑπακούειν δειλίαν· πονηροτάτη γὰρ αὕτη ἢ διάνοιά ἐστι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς πάντα τὰναντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γίννεται κακία τε καὶ βλάβη.

[There follows the Anonymus' attempt to show that man is ἀδύνατος καθ' ἑνὰ ζῆν. It is further asserted that even a completely self-sufficient "superman" would be unable to do as he liked against the wishes of the majority: he would be overcome by the πλῆθος and the power of its εὐνομία].

sensu ita nulla tam detestabilis pestis quae non homini ab homine nascatur . . . Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint proprium hoc statuo esse virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere.

οὕτω φαίνεται καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κράτος ὅπερ δὴ κράτος ἐστί, διὰ τε τοῦ νόμου καὶ διὰ τὴν δίκην σωζόμενον.

The Anonymus does not distinguish the two categories *utile* and *honestum*. He belongs to a time when the *lapsa consuetudo* of which Cicero speaks had not yet come into play. Yet he foresees the problem which the later antithesis *utile-honestum* was to formulate more explicitly. Power, prestige, material well-being, and moral excellence are all involved in *ἀρετή*. The Anonymus would not analyze the concept in this fashion, but he does recognize that the pursuit of *ἀρετή* can, in certain circumstances, be self-defeating; or, as we should say, that *ἀρετή* can be lost through excessive preoccupation with one aspect of it. *Κράτος* must always be accompanied by *νόμος* and *δίκη*. Similarly, Cicero maintains that to pursue the *utile* without giving proper attention to the *honestum* (i.e., *fraude et malitia*) is a policy likely to prove neither honorable nor useful. And both writers appeal to the history of man's social development to support their contentions.

It should be noted that the accounts which are given of that development support the contention of the Anonymus much better than they do Cicero's. The *conspiratio hominum atque consensus* which Cicero sees as the precondition for any individual's attainment of what is *utile* for himself is a fair equivalent of the Sophistic idea of *νόμος*, but it is certainly somewhat inadequate as a definition of the *honestum* of the philosophical idealist. The *De Officiis* passage merely shows that an individual's *κράτος* is dependent on his not outraging the feelings and moral sentiments of his fellows — the *νόμος* and *δίκη* of the society in which he lives; it does not take into account those situations in which the latter are themselves in conflict with what is *honestum*. This suggests that the concept of the *honestum* is being imposed on a context not originally designed for it. A similar conclusion with regard to the *utile* is suggested by further difficulties in Cicero's discussion.

The useful and the honorable are two aspects of a single ideal, τὸ καθῆκον, which lies at the basis of all ethical judgment. Book 1 of the *De Officiis* deals with the *honestum* as it operates over the whole range of human activity, and one would expect a comparable treatment of the

*utile* in Book 2. Cicero's actual discussion, however, somewhat belies his announced plan. The crucial passage is that which immediately follows the one just quoted:

Itaque quae in rebus inanimis quaeque in usu et tractatione beluarum fiunt utiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea tribuuntur operosis, hominum autem studia ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute excitantur. Etenim virtus omnis tribus in rebus fere vertitur quarum una est in perspicendo quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit . . . alterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, tertium iis, quibuscum congregemur uti moderate et scienter, quorum studiis ea quae natura desiderat expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque si quid importetur nobis incommodi propulsemus ulciscamurque eos qui nocere nobis conati sunt, tantaque poena adficiamus quantam aequitas humanitasque patitur (2.5.17-18).

It is fairly clear that the *virtus* and *sapientia* which enable men to make use of one another's services are not a general attribute of the human race, but, rather, the property of *praestantium virorum*. Panaetius at first includes cities, laws and justice in the list of those conveniences which men have achieved by cooperative effort, but when he comes to analyze the social process in greater detail, he makes a distinction between the exploitation of inanimate and animal resources — those involving *artes operosae* — and the successful exploitation of man, a task which involves talents of a much higher order. He doubtless could not conceive how the efforts of a group of ordinary men, each of them seeking to obtain from his fellows what was useful for himself, could result in anything but anarchy.

It is clear that, in spite of his professions to the contrary, Panaetius distrusts the *utile*. He promises, in effect, a general system of ethics based on it comparable to the one centered around the *honestum* which appeared in Book 1. In fact, however, the useful, in so far as it is a principle worthy of being admitted into his philosophy alongside the honorable, must be the useful as conceived by a superior intelligence. Hence the treatise deals only occasionally with τὸ συμφέρον as it enters into ordinary men's dealings with one another; it is devoted chiefly to a consideration of how the prominent man, and in particular the statesman, can use others to his own advantage.

This divergence between Panaetius' actual theme and what he states to be his theme is, I suggest, another indication of the split between the views of his source and the adaptations and modifications which he has introduced himself. How the theme may have been treated in that source and how the modifications came to be introduced will be sug-



gested by a further comparison with the Anonymus. The latter's principal subject — announced and unambiguous — is the same as that of Panaetius: how the man who seeks ἀρετή may acquire personal power and prestige without losing the good will and respect of the rest of society. But the Anonymus does not hedge in his utilitarianism with restrictions. The exceptional individual fades into the background in the paragraphs on the origin of society and in those which immediately follow. The latter (7.1-11), to which there is no exact parallel in Cicero, consider the mutual benefits which accrue when δίκη and νόμος prevail in the actions of all members of society; and they contrast this εὐνομία with the ἀνομία which results when δίκη and νόμος do not so prevail. The Anonymus evidently believes that the pursuit of personal ἀρετή is only part of a larger process by which all individuals attain to maximum satisfaction of their wants by helping others attain the same satisfaction. Hence the inclusion of a treatment of the entire social process, of which the prominent individual is a part, and apart from which he cannot survive, is natural enough. Equally natural is the absence of any exact parallel to this in Cicero: Panaetius is, as we have seen, uninterested in the workings of society as a whole.

By keeping this basic difference in mind it is possible to see how Panaetius, starting from a source like the Anonymus, might have been led to bring changes and inconsistencies into its doctrines. He has retained the latter's analysis of man's social history and the general conclusion which is drawn from it: that a harmony between the interests of the exceptional individual and his fellows is possible. They give to his ideal of the *utile* an air of universality which it would not have otherwise and which it does not, in fact, deserve. But he cannot, like the Anonymus, follow his account of the forces which bring society into being by a description of the effective functioning of those forces under εὐνομία and of their breakdown in ἀνομία. If he did, he would have to show all men continuing to pursue the common συμφέρον which first brought their primitive ancestors together. Hence he departs from his model and substitutes for his original definition of the *utile* a narrower, more aristocratic one.<sup>25</sup> Harmony between the individual and society must come, not through pursuit of a common συμφέρον, but through manipulation (benevolent, presumably) of the latter by the former.

In the subsequent portion of his treatise Panaetius gives advice to this individual and reproduces much of what the Anonymus has to say about the process of gaining ἀρετή. But the perspective is a radically changed one. The exceptional man is not, as in the Anonymus, seen against the background of the social process of which he is a part; rather, he is the



only part of the process which matters. The fate of society is identical with that of its aristocrats. In this portion of the work there is a section which corresponds to the *εὐνομία-ἀνομία* passage in the Anonymus, but it appears in a characteristically altered context.

The parallels between the views of Cicero and the Anonymus on *εὐεργεσία* have already been noted (above, pp. 128-29). Cicero's discussion is the first half of a larger treatment of the problem and deals with *liberalitas* directed toward private individuals. The second section (2.21.72-24.85) deals with *liberalitas* as practiced toward the citizenry in general. It is, for the most part, a defense of the sanctity of private property and an attack on proponents of an *aequatio bonorum*. The strongly partisan tone is not characteristic of the Anonymus, and probably reflects the attitude of Cicero and Panaetius toward the social issues of their own day. Yet the program favored, if not the spirit in which it is presented, recalls that recommended by the Anonymus in his discussion of *εὐνομία* and *ἀνομία*. The latter, like Cicero, believes property should be protected; the prevailing mood in his well-run state, as in Cicero's,<sup>26</sup> is to be one of *πίστις* (7.1). When this exists, the rich are safe in the possession of their wealth,<sup>27</sup> hence more eager to help the poor when in need and to cooperate in enterprises directed toward the common good (7.2). Cicero's whole discussion is, in effect, a translation of the argument of the Anonymus into individualist terms. He sees society, not as a mechanism which functions on its own, but as one which is manipulated from above. Thus *ἀνομία* is condemned, but viewed less as a general eclipse of *νόμος* than as the result of the wrong kind of *liberalitas*: an ambitious individual's effort to further his own *utile* through a policy popular with the poor. And, since Cicero is interested in such men not merely as individuals but also as members of a governing class, his translation of the Anonymus is oligarchic in tone as well as individualistic. He favors private property, but as an end in itself — not as an institution which promotes the general good; and he sees *πίστις*, not as a positive force which operates on all levels of society, but simply as that thing which secures the wealthy man continued enjoyment of his holdings.

The difference between the viewpoints of Panaetius and the Anonymus is at times very great, and yet it is possible in every instance to see how the former have served as a point of departure for the latter. What the two writers share is a utilitarian liberalism (diluted, in Panaetius' case, by the necessity of paying at least lip service to a philosophical idealism which is neither utilitarian nor liberal). And, just as modern liberalism has alternately favored and opposed the progressive democratization

of society, so its ancient counterpart seems to have been open to varying interpretations: aristocratic and individualist in Panaetius, social and democratic in the Anonymus. The evidence, however, strongly suggests that the latter version is the original one. The ideas of the Anonymus develop in a natural and straightforward manner. Panaetius often shows the awkwardness and inconsistency which is characteristic of translations.

Such awkwardness, however, is chiefly evident in those portions of the treatise which are focused, or were focused in Panaetius' source, on society rather than the individual. Where the discussion centers around the prominent man — as it does in the bulk of the work — it offers few difficulties and closely parallels the corresponding consideration of ἀρετή in the Anonymus. Two of these parallels have already been discussed (above, pp. 127–30); two further ones, while less extensive, are worth examining.

The final paragraphs of the Anonymus (7.13–16) deal with the insecurity which attends the would-be tyrant. A similar discussion occurs at the beginning of the main portion of Cicero's work, the one which follows his redefinition of the *utile* and is devoted to an enumeration and discussion of the things which tend to secure the statesman a popular following. These are, on the part of the people, *benevolentia*, *fides*, *admiratio*, and *metus*; and, on the part of the individual, *largitiones* and *pretium et merces*. The first of these to be considered (2.7.23–8.29) is *metus*. Cicero concludes that what usefulness it has is very limited, and proves his point by noting that fear has never been enough to secure the life of a tyrant. Thus both Cicero and the Anonymus contain discussions of tyranny, and both view the tyrant in a similar light. What they say is a commonplace, but the resemblance is perhaps significant in the context of the much larger ones found in other portions of the two works.

More important in themselves are the parallels between the rest of Cicero's list and the Anonymus. *Pretium et merces* is characterized at the outset (2.6.21) as *sordidissima . . . ratio et inquinatissima*, and nothing more is heard of it. This leaves *benevolentia*, *admiratio*, *fides*, and *largitiones* still to be considered. The first three are linked together by Cicero as the principal components of the *gloria* which should surround the statesman.<sup>28</sup> There is no exact parallel in the Anonymus to the treatment of *benevolentia* (2.9.32) and *fides* (2.9.33–34), although the concepts are identical with the freedom from φθόνος and the πίστις which the seeker after ἀρετή is ordered to strive for (2.1–8).<sup>29</sup> Cicero's discussion of *admiratio*, on the other hand, resembles quite closely a portion of the Anonymus:

## De Officiis 2.10.36-11.38

Ergo et haec animi despicientia admirabilitatem magnam facit et maxime iustitia . . . Nemo enim iustus esse potest qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exilium timet aut qui ea quae sunt his contraria aequitati anteponit. Maximeque admirantur eum qui pecunia non movetur (38). Admiratione autem adficiuntur ii qui anteire ceteris virtute putantur et cum omni carere dedecore tum vero iis vitiis quibus alii non facile possunt obsistere (37).

Nam et voluptates, blandissimae dominae, maioris partis animos a virtute detorquent; et dolorum cum admoventur faces, praeter modum plerique exterrantur; vita mors divitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovet (37).

## Anonymus 4.1-6.

καὶ μὴν ἐγκρατέστατόν γε δεῖ εἶναι πάντα ἄνδρα<sup>30</sup> διαφερόντως τοιοῦτος δ' ἂν μάλιστα εἴη εἰ τῶν χρημάτων κρείσσων εἴη πρὸς ᾧ πάντες διαφθίρονται καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφειδῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς δίκαιοις ἐσπουδακῶς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν μεταδιώκων. πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ δύο οἱ πλείστοι ἀκρατεῖς εἰσι.

διὰ τοιοῦτον δέ τι ταῦτα πάσχουσιν φιλοψυχούσι μὲν . . . φιλοχρηματοῦσι δὲ τῶνδε εἵνεκα ἅπερ φοβεῖ αὐτούς. τί δ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα; αἱ νόσοι τὸ γῆρας αἱ ἐξαπινᾶλοι ζημίαι, οὐ τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων λέγω . . . ἀλλὰ τὰς τοιαύτας πυρκαϊάς, θανάτους οἰκετῶν τετραπόδων ἄλλας αὖ συμφοράς, αἱ περικέινται αἱ μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν αἱ δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς αἱ δὲ τοῖς χρήμασι.

Both passages draw an identical contrast between the man who seeks ἀρετή and the πλείστοι in their attitudes toward dangers to life, limb, or property. The Anonymus does not state explicitly, as Cicero does, that it is this difference in attitude which secures *admiration* to the former. But the idea seems to be implied by what follows in his text. If man were immortal, he argues, there would be some excuse for φιλοψυχία. But since the prospect of death and old age worse than death attend upon a lengthening life, it is ἀμαθία μεγάλη to prefer disgrace to death. The passage is a clear echo of the concluding lines of Sarpedon's famous exhortation to Glaucus (*Iliad* 12.322-28), and earlier in the same speech (310-21) Sarpedon says quite plainly that he and his companion enjoy preeminence and honor because the Lycians admire their ἵς ἐσθλή and know that their rulers are no ordinary men. The Anonymus' seeker after ἀρετή thus enjoys the same social position as the Homeric πρόμαχος and, presumably, for the same reason.<sup>31</sup>

Having analyzed the components of *gloria*, Cicero considers two further aspects of the subject: its connection with *iustitia* (11.39-12.42)



and the necessity of appearing as one is and of being as one would like to appear. The former passage has no exact parallel in the Anonymus (see below, pp. 142-43); the latter has already been discussed (above, pp. 129-30). After a short digression — perhaps his own addition to Panaetius — on oratory as an aid to the statesman, Cicero passes to *liberalitas*, concluding his work with the two accounts which have already been analyzed (above, pp. 128-29 and 138).

There is thus hardly a portion of Cicero's treatise which is not linked in some way with the Anonymus.<sup>32</sup> Such similarities can hardly be coincidental. Panaetius must have been following closely throughout his work either the Anonymus or a treatise closely resembling it — perhaps its immediate source. Of the two possibilities the latter seems to me the more probable. For there is evidence to suggest that Cicero has drawn upon a discussion somewhat more detailed than that of the Anonymus. The latter gives a much briefer account of the development of society than does Cicero, and at one point he seems to compress into a single sentence a set of ideas which are developed at much greater length by Cicero. It is only by "allying himself with the laws," the Anonymus says (6.3), and "strengthening them, and using his power on their behalf" that the would-be "superman" may survive. Otherwise he cannot last (*οὐκ ἂν διαμένει*). All men, relying on their *εὐνομία*, would become his enemies and, acting as a body, overcome him, either through craft or force (6.4). The Anonymus seems to be saying that the "superman" might, for a time, be able to establish his *κράτος* over his fellows, but only for a time — eventually he would succumb to the combined opposition of the *πλήθος*. It is not clear from the passage whether the Anonymus has any special situations in mind when he refers to the behavior of the successful and unsuccessful "supermen." The *De Officiis*, however, suggests a solution to the problem.

In discussing the futility of tyranny Cicero remarks (2.7.24) that *quamvis . . . sint demersae leges alicuius opibus quamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando*. Here he seems to see in the rule of a tyrant the same sort of temporary eclipse of *νόμος* which the Anonymus has in mind. And the passage recalls a later one in the Anonymus (7.15) which speaks of the "nature of steel" which any man must possess who "one against many," would "undo the bonds of justice and right and take away the lawful usage which is shared in and profitable to all." Both Cicero and the Anonymus seem to view *νόμος* as something inherent in the social structure, and the tyrant is the man who must conduct a constant and, eventually, at any rate, fruitless struggle against it.

If the tyrant is the unsuccessful superman mentioned by the Anonymus,



the identity of the successful superman is suggested by another passage in Cicero. It occurs in the discussion of the interrelation of *gloria* and *iustitia* (see above, p. 140):

Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam apud nostros maiores iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati reges constituti. Nam cum premeretur inops multitudo ab iis qui maiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem; qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores aequitate constituenda summos cum infimis pari iure retinebat. Eademque constituendarum legum fuit causa quae regum. Ius enim semper est quaesitum aequabile; neque enim aliter esset ius. Id si ab uno iusto et bono viro consequerentur erant eo contenti; cum id minus contingeret leges sunt inventae quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur (2.12.41).

The contrast of *inops multitudo* with *qui maiores opes habebant* suggests that this passage gives an example of the sort of situation where *leges* and *libertas* are *demersae . . . alicuius opibus*. Oppression is avoided for a time through the rule of one *iusto et bono viro*, but this device eventually proves ineffectual, and *leges* are devised to replace him. The whole passage reads like a commentary on the unclear statements of the Anonymus. The superman can survive by "allying himself with lawful usage and strengthening it and using his power on its behalf" — by behaving, in other words like the *vir praestans virtute* who in Cicero's account is the first king. Otherwise he cannot last: like the unjust kings whose rule gives way to that of *leges* he is overcome by a concerted action on the part of the people.

The two accounts fit together so well that one naturally wonders whether Cicero may not be presenting a more detailed version of the source from which Iamblichus derives. He does not seem to be drawing exclusively on Herodotus. There is no equivalent in the Deioeces story to the eventual substitution of law for kings, and Deioeces is more an arbitrator of disputes than a protector of the weak. Both these aspects of Cicero's account, however, seem to have fifth-century prototypes. The supporter of monarchy in the constitutions debate of Herodotus 3 tries to show that democracy is unworkable by pointing out that the *πλήθος* will always fear the plots of unscrupulous men and hence resort to the protection of a *προστάτης*, i.e., monarch. And the sequence kingship—unjust kingship—rule of law appears both in Lucretius 5 and in Posidonius' account of man's early history — an account which, like Lucretius 5, shows the influence of fifth-century anthropological speculation.<sup>33</sup> This suggests that the similarities between Cicero, the Anonymus, and

Herodotus are owing, at least in part, to a common derivation from fifth-century political theory — a theory which, as might be expected in the Athens and Ionia of the time, saw law and right as primarily democratic and egalitarian in character (*ius semper est quaesitum aequabile*) and explained monarchy as a possible, and perhaps historically antecedent, alternative to democracy.<sup>34</sup> The greater detail with which this theory is presented in Cicero is most plausibly explained by assuming that he is reproducing more completely the work from which both he and Iamblichus ultimately draw.

Whether the more summary character of Iamblichus' account indicates that the Anonymus is not simply an abridged version of the text used by Panaetius but the work of an intermediate source, it is impossible to say on the basis of the evidence advanced thus far. But whatever Iamblichus' relation to his ultimate source, the parallels with the *De Officiis* are sufficient to show that this source was a single work, the contents of which are fairly accurately, if incompletely, represented in our text — not, as some have suggested, a single work or group of works from which Iamblichus has reproduced random excerpts.<sup>35</sup>

The theme of this work is ἀρετή and how to achieve it in its entirety. That the growth of society should be treated in a context devoted to individual ἀρετή rather than vice versa might seem to support the contention of those who believe that the Sophistic milieu from which the Anonymus springs is already beginning to share some of the preoccupations of the Socratics or the Early Academy. But if there has been any such influence on the Anonymus, it is completely superficial. We have already seen that the Socratic injunction to "strive to be as one would like to appear" is conspicuously absent in a passage which might well have included it; and there is nothing inward about the Anonymus' conception of ἀρετή. Its "components" are eloquence, bravery, strength, and cleverness (1.1). This is the excellence of the statesman, not the autonomous individual, and for a comparable conception one must go, not to Plato or the Socratics, but to Thucydides, who praises in Antiphon and Themistocles (8.68.1; 1.138.3) the same sort of ἀρετή. The man who possesses such ability must use it in the service of νόμος and not against it; and in turn, the πλῆθος must not reject his services through envy or distrust. These are the principal concerns of the Anonymus, and they were probably fairly common ones in the late fifth century and early fourth century — the inevitable consequence, one might imagine, of the experience of Periclean democracy and its aftermath.<sup>36</sup> There is no trace in the treatise of an effort to treat the conflict of the individual and society in the more general context of Platonic idealism.<sup>37</sup>

But if the Anonymus does not seem to have been influenced by the philosophical movements which were to culminate in Platonism, there are undeniable points of contact between his work and Plato's. Particularly impressive are similarities linking the *Republic* to those portions of the Anonymus which show traces of a Protagorean origin. These parallels are second only to the Ciceronian ones in importance and must be given separate treatment.<sup>38</sup>

## II

The Protagorean character of certain passages in the Anonymus has already been pointed out. Their presence is not enough to suggest that the Anonymus should be identified with Protagoras himself.<sup>39</sup> The doctrines attributed to the latter seem to be characterized by the optimism of the age of Pericles; the darker mood of the Anonymus suggests that he is writing in the last years of the fifth century. He speaks of *εὐνομία* and *ἀνομία* with evident feeling, as if he had experienced both. Moreover, the reference to war "leading to destruction and enslavement" (7.6) as more likely where there is *ἀνομία* looks like a reference to the situation which existed toward the end of the Peloponnesian war, when *στάσις* in any city was likely to bring intervention from one or both of the great powers.

But if the Protagorean elements in the Anonymus appear in a context which seems to date from at least a generation later, they form an extensive insertion whose boundaries can be marked off fairly clearly. The account of the beginnings of society which the Anonymus gives is closely connected with what immediately follows on the superman. Taken together with the parallel passages in Cicero and Herodotus, it is evidence for the existence of a "democratic" interpretation of history, one which viewed monarchy either as a response to social disorder or as a passing stage in the process by which men gradually secure for themselves the benefits of mutual cooperation and a common way of life.

In view of the similarities between the Anonymus' account of the origin of society and the Protagoras myth, it would be reasonable to assume that this whole section of his work, together with the interpretation of history it implies, is Protagorean; and here the form as well as the content of a Protagorean discussion may well be preserved. The final paragraphs of the Anonymus (7.12-16) show why an ordinary man (in contrast to the hypothetical superman) can become a tyrant only when lawful usage and right have "abandoned" the mass of mankind and must be supplied by a single individual. The connection with the earlier passage on the superman is close. Taken together, the two discussions



give a set of contrasting pictures: on the one hand, the *πλῆθος* defeating the would-be tyrant through its *εὐνομία*; on the other, succumbing to him through *ἀνομία*. And, somewhat similarly, the text which intervenes between these two passages describes first the well-being of the society which enjoys *εὐνομία*, then the misfortunes of *ἀνομία*. The whole second half of the treatise is thus constructed in the manner of Protagoras as a set of contrasted *λόγοι* and may derive from a single work of his, perhaps the *Ἀντιλογίαι*.

Support for this suggestion comes from another and somewhat unexpected quarter. Heinrich Ryffel, in his study of the development of the Greek concept of a cycle of political constitutions,<sup>40</sup> has noted that the contrasted *λόγοι* of the Anonymus represent, to a certain extent, a "Weg hinauf" and "Weg hinab" in the life of the *πόλις*. For the tyrant discussed at the end of the treatise is one who owes his power to the disintegration of that right and lawful usage whose development accompanied the formation of society described earlier.

Proceeding partially from this observation, Ryffel has made an important suggestion.<sup>41</sup> He proposes to explain Aristoxenus' well-known charge (Fr. 67 Wehrli) of plagiarism in the *Republic* as a reference to the whole architecture of the work. The formation of the state described in Books 2-4 recalls the Protagorean title *Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως* and is the "Weg hinauf" of the Anonymus. The decline of the state depicted in 8-9 corresponds to the "Weg hinab" of the Anonymus and to the argument offered by the spokesman for monarchy in Herodotus 3: that lawlessness in a democracy inevitably leads to one-man rule. Ryffel suggests that the idea for this portion of Plato's work comes from the *Περὶ πολιτείας* of Protagoras, which would thus have been a counterpart to the *Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως* and have composed, along with it, a set of books in the *Ἀντιλογίαι*.

Ryffel's identification of the contents of the *Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως* and the *Περὶ πολιτείας* is, of course, highly conjectural. The treatises could just as easily have been more general in scope, and the discussion which served as Plato's source a separate, though related, part of the *Ἀντιλογίαι*. But this possibility does not affect the general validity of Ryffel's argument, which is much the most probable explanation yet offered of Aristoxenus' accusation.<sup>42</sup> The argument can, moreover, be supported by further similarities between Plato and the Anonymus which Ryffel has overlooked.

Books 2-4 of the *Republic* read very much like an effort to show the inadequacy of the Anonymus' discussion of the superman, the result being a restatement of the whole argument in Platonic terms. Glaucon



begins Book 2 by positing, in effect, the existence of a superman who is not subject to the limitations imagined by the Anonymus: granted that, given man's weakness, justice is profitable, what of the possessor of the ring of Gyges? Is there any reason why he should prefer justice to injustice? Socrates answers by transferring the social analysis given by the Anonymus to the individual soul. The latter had pointed out that, without justice, social prosperity and concord (hence, happiness for the individual) are impossible. Socrates says that, without justice, internal concord and well-being are impossible<sup>43</sup> (Sophistic *δμόνοια* being re-defined as general acquiescence in the rule of the superior). Moreover, he begins his whole discussion by an analysis of the origin of society which seems to be Sophistic,<sup>44</sup> and pursues it long enough to derive the principle of division of labor from it. This he applies, first to justify the special role of the guardians, then as an analogy to the three-fold division of functions which he sees in the soul. The details in the sections which follow on the community of wives and the education of the philosopher doubtless have few, if any, Protagorean elements in them; structurally, however, they correspond to 7.1-7 of the Anonymus, on the blessings of *εὐνομία*. And, just as the Anonymus concludes with an account of *ἀνομία* and the tyranny which arises out of it, so Plato in Books 8-9 traces the results of the absence of justice, not only in the state, but in the soul. The Anonymus recognizes only two stages of decline: *ἀνομία* and tyranny. This progression is present, along with much Platonic modification, in the succession democracy-tyranny of Book 8. The rest of the cycle of *Republic* 8-9 is largely Platonic in character,<sup>45</sup> but with one important exception.

The stages in the degeneration of the state correspond quite closely to the situations existing in the soul of its ruler: aristocracy, timocracy, and oligarchy represent the dominance, respectively, of the soul's rational, spirited, and appetitive elements. Democracy is the anarchy of all desires, and tyranny the hegemony of the worst among them. Plato combines his account of each political change with a parallel account of the character change which causes and accompanies it. The description of how democratic man develops out of oligarchic man follows the expected pattern. The young oligarch begins to tire of his father's single-minded devotion to gain. He then seeks pleasures of a more varied character, which eventually lead him to a life of dissipation. For a while the influence of his father's friends and his own better nature cause him to waver, and the oligarchic and democratic in him contend for mastery. Eventually the latter wins out, and the oligarch's greed is replaced by the democrat's utter subservience to the whim of the moment.

To this analysis the account of the transition from oligarchy to democracy forms, in the main, a natural complement. The greed of the ruling class leads to a swelling of the ranks of the poor with spendthrift and impoverished oligarchs; and these men, in turn, corrupt the sons of those who are still wealthy. The *στάσις* in the soul of the young oligarch is thus likened to the *στάσις* between rich and poor in the city. Eventually revolution occurs, and the poor win out, just as the democratic desires won out in the internal struggle. Here, however, there is a serious difficulty in Plato's account. The analogy between soul and state is valid only so long as the poor who depose the rich are degenerate members of ruling families who have been impoverished through the greed of their companions. But Plato pictures the revolution as coming from a completely different section of the population: it is a lean and sunburnt poor man observing some fat and dissipated member of the ruling classes who first conceives the idea of a revolution and tells his friends, in effect, that when a revolution comes they will have nothing to lose but their chains. There is nothing in this passage to suggest that the poor man involved is an oligarch whom dissipation and usury have reduced to poverty. Such a man would not be likely to be lean and sunburnt himself, nor would he have to learn from a chance observation what sort of people composed the ruling class. And there is a further difficulty in the account. Since Plato's poor man is not an impoverished noble, one would expect him to have escaped the corruption which ruined the oligarchs; hence the regime which he and his companions set up should be an improvement over the preceding one; instead, it turns out to be another phase in the downward progress of the state.

The passage is brief, and, sandwiched in between the account of the effects of oligarchic usury and the transformation of oligarchic man, it has not been noticed by commentators.<sup>46</sup> The inconsistency is perhaps of Plato's own making. He may have realized that, however much young oligarchs prefer flute girls and drinking parties to the counting house, they are unlikely, in general, to be so extravagant as to deprive themselves of the financial source of these pleasures; and he probably saw that the ranks of demagogues are not always made up of impoverished oligarchs. On the other hand, the briefness of the passage involved and the fact that the notion it contains appears nowhere else in Plato's account suggests another explanation. Plato forgets for a moment that he is dealing with *στάσις* within the ruling class and thinks of the contest in more general terms, as *στάσις* between rulers and subjects. And this lapse may indicate the influence of a source which, like the Anonymus, did not base its view of political developments on the aristocratic maxim (see *Republic*

8.545c-d) that, so long as the better citizens maintain class solidarity, no one will be able to challenge their supremacy in the state.

The fact that the character of the democratic revolution leads one to expect an improvement, not a further degeneration, links Plato even more closely to the Anonymus. For in the Anonymus the mention of the overthrow of the tyrant by the *πλῆθος* precedes the description of the well-ordered society. The democratic revolution is part of the "Weg hinauf," the overcoming of that tyrannical rule which might occur at times but which would be no more than a passing phase so long as the force of *νόμος* generated by the growth of society remained strong. Plato has transferred the motif from its natural place — hence its incompatibility with its immediate surroundings in the "Weg hinab" traced by Book 8.

On the assumption, then, that the last half of the Anonymus is Protagorean, there is good reason for accepting Ryffel's hypothesis as to Plato's source. I would only suggest that the terms "Weg hinauf" and "Weg hinab" show too great a tendency to conceive the whole process as a rigid historical scheme. It is conceivable, and perhaps more likely, that Protagoras would simply have presented, in antithetical fashion, accounts of those forces which, at any time, may create and preserve a society, and of those which can disrupt and, in some instances, destroy it.

The whole perspective, moreover, of those *λόγοι* may have been slightly different from that which appears in Plato and the Anonymus. The parallels with Herodotus suggest that Protagoras' work is at least as early as the 440's. It is a little difficult to believe that, at this date, it would have been necessary to make a reply to the doctrine of the natural "right of the stronger."<sup>47</sup> Literary evidence for the existence of such a doctrine first appears around 420.<sup>48</sup> The first of the Protagorean *λόγοι* could, however, have formed part of what would amount to very much the same thing, a defense of democracy against autocracy. Such a defense might involve a similar effort to show that reliance on individual strength or ability was against the whole tendency of man's social development, and that one-man rule could only be a temporary phenomenon. A hint of such a concept is already present in Solon's remarks on *αὐτάρκεια* in Herodotus 1.32.8, and the *Antigone* and *Ajax*, both plays of the 440's, conclude with *νόμος* triumphant over the would-be tyranny of Creon and the Atreidae. It would be natural at a later date to reinterpret the argument as a counter to the doctrine of the natural right of the stronger, and it would need scarcely any modification to be fitted into the new context.

The second *λόγος* might have been either a continuation of this defense



— an effort to show that one-man rule can arise only out of social disorder — or a presentation of the other side of the question: an attempt to show that a free society, through internal dissensions, must inevitably evolve into monarchy. The latter argument, though a defense of monarchy, could be easily modified to suit the Anonymus' purpose. It would only be necessary to emphasize that one-man rule, while a natural outgrowth of ἀνομία, was still a remedy worse than the disease: κακὸν τοσοῦτόν τε καὶ τοιοῦτον (7.12).

The parallels between Plato and the Anonymus are not nearly so close as those between the Anonymus and Panaetius; they do not compel one to assume that Plato was familiar with both the Anonymus and its Protagorean original. A more likely explanation, perhaps, is that the Protagoreanism represented by the Anonymus was popular at the time (otherwise Plato would not have bothered to write what is an implicit refutation of it),<sup>49</sup> and that it may have been no single work in particular that made Plato turn to the Ἀντιλογία and present his thoroughgoing revision of the doctrine they contained. Seen from one point of view, then, the Anonymus, or works like it, may be said to have prepared the way for Plato. But this point of view is that of Platonism itself, for which the philosophy of Protagoras and his followers would represent a well-meaning but superficial attempt to reconcile the conflict between φύσις and νόμος, one which failed to see that justice is best for man, not because of any social utility it has, but because it creates a proper harmony within the soul. Seen more impartially, Plato and the Anonymus represent, rather, parallel and conflicting attempts to unite the ἀρετή of the man and the citizen. If the solution offered by the Anonymus would appear superficial to Plato, Plato's own formulation, addressed as it is to a completely imaginary superman, would be dismissed by the Anonymus as irrelevant.

If the latter has a real successor, it is Isocrates and the statesmen of the fourth and subsequent centuries. The πάτριος δημοκρατία praised in the *Areopagiticus* embodies a more authoritarian version of the εὐνομία envisioned by the Anonymus;<sup>50</sup> and the Anonymus' insistence on the importance of law and justice, of liberality in moderation on the part of the rich, and of ὁμόνοια between social classes finds its echo in the program of many Hellenistic city-states.<sup>51</sup> Democracy became the order of the day in this period, and so long as it worked successfully men were doubtless not inclined to seek a resolution of the conflict between individual and society on any level other than that of the immediate συμφέρον envisioned by the Anonymus. It is thus not surprising that doctrines like his were popular. That they continued to be popular down into the



second century and beyond is shown by the evidence of Cicero. By this time, however, Greek democracy, going through just the reverse of the development predicted for it by Plato, had evolved into an oligarchy of the well-to-do.<sup>52</sup> When Panaetius identified the defence of law and right urged by the Anonymus with the defence of property he may have been doing nothing more than interpret a well-known document of democratic theory in the light of the political practice of his own day.

In the context of this development it is Plato, not the Anonymus, who must be considered the solitary and lonely voice of protest. The fact that this protest ultimately prevailed, and that its unfavorable verdict on democracy and the Sophistic became the verdict of antiquity as a whole, should not blind us to the fact that, in the history of the city-state, the roles of Plato and the Anonymus are exactly the reverse of those usually assigned to them.

### III

The identity of the Anonymus is more difficult to establish than his historical significance, and a final solution to the problem is perhaps impossible. But the numerous parallels between the Anonymus and Democritus, many of them pointed out by Cataudella, are worth examining. Close connection between the theories of Protagoras and Democritus can be inferred with some certainty — both from ancient testimony and from similarities in the surviving fragments. Moreover, if one accepts the traditional *floruit* of 420 for Democritus, a plausible case can be made for seeing in him and his school those continuers and adapters of the doctrines of Protagoras whose presence in the Anonymus has already been inferred.

A consideration of the characteristically Democritean elements in the work is perhaps best introduced by examining those places where the argument seems to disengage itself from the Protagorean material which it incorporates. In a passage already quoted (above, p. 129) the Anonymus announces that he who seeks ἀρετή in any pursuit must νέον τε ἄρξασθαι καὶ ἐπιχρηῆσθαι αὐτῷ ὁμαλῶς αἰεὶ καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως (2.1). The phraseology recalls a fragment of Protagoras (B3) which contains the statement ἀπὸ νεότητος ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μαθάνειν. The rest of the fragment reads: φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δέϊται, and this is quite in harmony with the Anonymus' insistence on a combination of φύσις and a long period of training for the seeker of ἀρετή. It might be natural, then, to see in the passage a continuation of those borrowings from Protagoras which are evident elsewhere in the treatise. But the notion that φύσις

requires *μελέτη* is a commonplace, which appears in Democritus (B56, 59, 242) as well as Protagoras, along with a statement (B183) to the effect that time alone is not sufficient to produce wisdom: *ώραίη τροφή καὶ φύσις* are needed. Moreover, the injunction of the Anonymus to be *φιλόπονος* in pursuit of *ἀρετή* (1.2) definitely suggests Democritus rather than Protagoras.<sup>53</sup>

Quite apart from parallels of detail, the whole tone and tendency of this portion of the Anonymus seems Democritean. It is as if the author had started from a Protagorean position only to subject it to a considerable amount of modification — in somewhat the same way, perhaps, as Democritus took over some aspects of the Protagorean skepticism about the possibility of knowledge but rejected others.<sup>54</sup> Thus *εὐγλωσσία* is one of the components of *ἀρετή* (1.1), but the ability which stems from long training is later contrasted (2.7) with the *τέχνην τὴν κατὰ λόγους* which a man can learn in a short time and be no worse than his teacher. The statement would certainly be unusual coming from a man who was a professor of rhetoric and who placed a very high emphasis on the importance of effective discourse.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, it falls into line with a number of fragments in which Democritus seems to be questioning the value of training which relies exclusively on *λόγοι*.<sup>56</sup>

Closely related to the rejection of this excessive reliance on *λόγοι* is the emphasis placed on habit (*συνήθεια*). Achievement of *ἀρετή* takes a long time because the people must become accustomed to expect nothing but good things from the statesman (2.2–3); cowards who fear death are said to do so *διὰ φιλίαν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ συνήθειαν ἣ συντρέφονται* (4.2); prolonging life at the price of disgrace is said to be evidence of *ἀμαθία μεγάλη καὶ σὺνήθεια πονηρῶν λόγων καὶ ἐπιθυμημάτων* (5.2); and of the *ἀρετή* which arises from deeds it is said (2.7): *συντραφῆναι τε αὐτῇ δεῖ καὶ συναυξηθῆναι τῶν μὲν εἰργόμενον κακῶν καὶ λόγων καὶ ἡθῶν τὰ δ' ἐπιτηδεύοντα καὶ κατεργαζόμενον*. With the last two passages one may compare Democritus B184; *φαύλων ὁμιλίη συνεχῆς ἔξιν κακίης συναύξει*, and B146, which speaks of the *λόγος* in man as *ἐντὸς ἤδη τρεφόμενον καὶ ριζούμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ . . . αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὰς τέρας ἐθιζόμενον λαμβάνειν*. The latter fragment, though its subject is the inner contentment rising from limitation of desire, describes a process very similar to the one envisioned by the Anonymus. *Ῥιζούμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ* suggests the biological metaphor involved in *συντραφῆναι τε καὶ συναυξηθῆναι*. Both contentment and *ἀρετή* grow through a natural process of *αὔξησης* and habituation to *τέρας* and good words and habits. Both Democritus and the Anonymus seem to see education as something more than the assimilation of a body of doctrines or methods. It is a slow and fundamental transformation or

modification of a man's whole nature: ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ (B33).<sup>57</sup>

A somewhat similar superposition of Democritean on Protagorean elements characterizes the Anonymus' description of εὐνομία. It has been suggested that the εὐνομία-ἀνομία contrast goes back to a set of Protagorean λόγοι. But the tone and emphasis of the passage, if not its structure, is Democritean. When εὐνομία prevails it is possible φροντίδος . . . τῆς μὲν ἀηδεστάτης ἀπηλλάχθαι τῇ δὲ ἡδίστῃ συνεῖναι· πραγμάτων γὰρ φροντίδα ἀηδεστάτην ἔργων δὲ ἡδίστην (7.4). This and the description which follows of the pleasures of sleep and rest untroubled by fear of unexpected misfortune, and of πόνοι made lighter by τῇ ἀντιλήψει ἀγαθῶν, strongly recall the moderate eudaemonism of Democritus, which has room in it for πόνοι as well as ἡδονή,<sup>58</sup> and the Democritean picture of the εὐθυμος who εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ ἀνακηδὴς ἐστίν (B174). Protagoras, so far as the surviving fragments allow us to judge, would have been more likely to discuss the political and social aspects of εὐνομία; typically Democritean is the Anonymus' concern to include a treatment of εὐνομία as it is reflected in the experiences and emotions of the individual.<sup>59</sup>

To the general similarities in mood, various parallels of detail may be added. They are most striking in the discussion of the relationship between rich and poor which should obtain in the well-run society. The fragments of Democritus (B255, 287) which see in the willingness of the more powerful members of society to help their weaker fellows both the foundation of social concord and a means of relieving the misfortunes which befall men individually are quite in the spirit of the Anonymus. The latter remarks (7.2) that when εὐνομία reigns the τύχαι which attack life and property are less serious: it is possible for the unfortunate to receive succor from the fortunate διὰ τὴν ἐπιμειξίαν τε καὶ πίστιν. In a state of ἀνομία, on the other hand, τά τε χρήματα δι' ἀπιστίαν καὶ ἀμειξίαν ἀποθησαυρίζουσι ἀλλ' οὐ κοινοῦνται καὶ οὕτως σπάνια γίνεσθαι ἐάν καὶ πολλὰ ᾖ (7.8). With the latter statement one may compare Democritus B251, which calls poverty in a democracy superior to the so-called εὐδαιμονίῃ παρὰ τοῖς δυνάστησι. Conceivably, Democritus is saying no more than that freedom is preferable to wealth; but he may be referring to the hoarding of resources which, in a δυναστεία, would nullify their usefulness.

On the problems involved in succoring the poor one may compare B282: χρημάτων χρῆσις ξὺν νόῳ μὲν χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ἐλευθέριον εἶναι καὶ δημωφέλεα ξὺν ἀνοίῃ δὲ χορηγίῃ † ξυνή, and B78: χρήματα πορίζειν μὲν οὐκ ἀχρεῖον ἐξ ἀδικίης δὲ πάντων κάκιον. In spite of the probable corrup-



tion in the last word of B282, it is clear that Democritus is dealing with the same problem of due measure in *liberalitas* which is treated in Panaetius and the Anonymus; the robbing of one portion of the population in order to give to the other which both authors condemn is, conceivably, the ἀδικίη mentioned in B78;<sup>60</sup> and perhaps the best commentary on the Anonymus' command to the would-be benefactor to τοῖς νόμοις τε καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ ἐπικουρεῖν is found in the fragment (B248) which begins ὁ νόμος βούλεται . . . εὐεργετεῖν βίον ἀνθρώπων: the man who seeks to be πλείστοις ὠφέλιμος is ordered to abandon an activity which is ineffectual and self-defeating when carried on by a single individual, and to merge his resources with the much greater ones of νόμος.

Chapters 4–5 of the Anonymus have not figured in the discussion thus far, but they, too, contain parallels to Democritus. The rejection (5.1–2) of φιλοψυχία by a reference to the prospect of mortality and old age “worse than death” finds an echo in the fragments (B205–6) which mention the fools who fear death more than old age or, by their fear of death, show that they wish to grow old. Less of a commonplace and hence more important is the notion (4.3–4) that men seek wealth because of fear of death and the disasters attendant on life. The idea, a somewhat unusual one, appears in Lucretius (3.59–77) and, given the similarities between the ethics of Epicurus and Democritus,<sup>61</sup> may eventually derive from the latter.

Finally, one may note a passage in Iamblichus which occurs just before those selected by Blass as belonging to Antiphon (pp. 94.29–95.4 Pistelli): . . . καὶ τοὺς θηριώδεις ἀνθρώπους καταγωνίζεσθαι ὁ τῆς ἀνδρείας παραγγέλλει νόμος καὶ τὰ βλαβερώτατα τῶν θηρίων χειροῦσθαι, χωρεῖν τε ἐπὶ τοὺς κινδύνους δεῖ προθύμως καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι αὐτοὺς ὑπομένειν. Cataudella, who first called attention to the passage, observes<sup>62</sup> that the reference to τοὺς θηριώδεις ἀνθρώπους suggests fifth-century *Kulturentstehungslehre*, of which a sample appeared in one of the works of Democritus. Even more significant, perhaps, is a fact not mentioned by Cataudella. Three fragments of Democritus (B257–59) are preserved which speak of penalties to be enforced against wrongdoers — whether animal or human. This bracketing together of men and beasts as possible malefactors has been plausibly explained<sup>63</sup> by assuming that Democritus saw the origin of society's attitude toward the criminal in man's early struggle for survival against other species. The wrongdoer is someone who, by his violation of society's laws, has, in effect, put himself outside society and must be destroyed like the animals which threaten man's survival. If this interpretation is correct, the passage quoted from Iamblichus could stem from an analogous line of thought. Primitive



man's bravery against τὰ βλαβερώτατα τῶν θηρίων is, or should be, a model for the zeal his descendant shows in enduring dangers for the sake of that δίκη and νόμος which, at a more complicated stage in the development of society, takes the place of the simple νόμος τῆς ἀνδρείας as τὰς τε πόλεις καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὸ συνοικίζον καὶ τὸ συνέχον (3.6). The passage would thus form a natural introduction to what follows, and it is quite conceivable that it did so in the source from which Iamblichus ultimately derives.

The parallels between Democritus and the Anonymus are quite as numerous as those which connect the latter with the *De Officiis*;<sup>64</sup> they give strong grounds for believing that the single work from which Iamblichus and Panaetius derive is a work of Democritus — perhaps the *Περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας* (cf. B2a). Such titles were often first assigned in the Alexandrian period and hence need not tell us much about the contents of a fifth-century work; but the word is an early Ionic one, and it would be natural for it to figure prominently in a treatise whose central figure is the ἀνὴρ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθός (4.6). In an introduction to a work so entitled the reference to τοὺς θηριώδεις ἀνθρώπους would be especially appropriate: the discussion of the ἀρετή of man begins with an effort to consider that ἀρετή in its most basic aspect: the primitive νόμος τῆς ἀνδρείας without which it would have been impossible for man to survive as a species at all.

If the ultimate source for Iamblichus and Panaetius is a work of Democritus, it was written in Ionic. Cataudella suggests<sup>65</sup> that Iamblichus had the text of Democritus before him, and that it is he who is responsible for the Attic version of the excerpts which appear in the *Protrepticus*. It is argued that, had the Anonymus been an obscure writer — an Attic follower of Democritus — Iamblichus would have mentioned his name in quoting him, just as, in similar circumstances, he mentions that of Archytas. As it is, he cites him anonymously, just as he cites Plato and Aristotle; and it follows that he considered him to be a figure of comparable importance. The argument does not seem to me to be a cogent one. One cannot decide on the basis of three examples what Iamblichus' general practice was in naming sources; we cannot be sure that Iamblichus would have classified Democritus as an "important" author;<sup>66</sup> and he may have refrained from giving the name of his source for the simple reason that he did not know it. Moreover, the theory of a translation by Iamblichus from Ionic to Attic does not explain the presence of occasional Ionicisms (e.g., εὐγλωσσία, μικρός) — natural enough for an Attic writer in 400 B.C. but not in 300 A.D.

To these objections may be added a more general, stylistic one.


Cataudella rightly notes<sup>67</sup> the poetic coloring which the vocabulary and expression of the Anonymus share with the fragments of Democritus; equally significant, however, are the differences between the two styles. The Anonymus, with his diffuseness, his artificial word echoes, his fondness for pairing phrases and clauses of similar meaning,<sup>68</sup> bears little resemblance to Democritus, whose style is more simple and paratactic<sup>69</sup> and shows, even in the longer fragments, a marked propensity for the short epigrammatic phrase. The evidence thus points to the work of an Athenian follower of Democritus,<sup>70</sup> much more influenced than his master by late fifth-century rhetoric — perhaps one of the second generation of Sophists.<sup>71</sup>

The treatise is, however, a faithful reproduction of the contents, if not the style, of its model. At one point only is it possible to detect what may be an original contribution of its author. The mention of "war leading to destruction and slavery" occurs in a passage which, because of its gloomy tone, is not likely to be Protagorean; and it contrasts rather strikingly with the fragment of Democritus (B250) which speaks of the *δμόνοια* which enables men to carry out mighty wars. The latter statement is closely paralleled in *De Officiis* 2;<sup>72</sup> hence one is inclined to suppose that the Anonymus found something like it in his source but decided to replace it with an observation which fitted better with his own experience.

I would thus suggest that the relationship between the works and authors considered in the preceding pages is as shown in the accompanying diagram. As to how Democritus and the Anonymus came to be known to Panaetius and Iamblichus one can only conjecture. It should be noted that the name of Democritus was, throughout antiquity, associated with that of the Pythagoreans.<sup>73</sup> Either the name (if the treatise was known to be the work of one of his followers) or similarities of doctrine<sup>74</sup> (if it was preserved anonymously) could have led to its inclusion in the Pythagorean corpus, where Iamblichus would have become acquainted with it.

As regards Panaetius, there are two possibilities. If, as has been suggested (above, p. 150), the treatise was known in second-century political circles as a sort of classic exposition of certain aspects of the statesman's art, it would have been natural for Panaetius to come across it.<sup>75</sup> If the treatise was not well known, it would have been equally natural for Panaetius, given the nature of his subject, to turn for guidance to the political speculation of an age when the problem of harmonizing *honestum* and *utile* had not yet been hopelessly complicated by the advent of

philosophical idealism; and Democritus, in particular, would have been a natural model. His doctrines could not but strike Panaetius as embodying in unusual degree that balance between the claims of man's public and private existence — of politics and philosophy — to recreate which was one of the principal aims of the Middle Stoa.<sup>76</sup>



## NOTES

1. Blass' attribution was shown to be impossible, on stylistic grounds, by K. Töpfer's study, *Die sogenannten Fragmente des Sophisten Antiphon bei Iamblichos* (Progr. Arnau 1902), and, on the grounds of content, by the subsequent discovery of the Antiphon papyrus fragments.

2. For the most complete bibliography of modern works on the subject, see M. Untersteiner, *Sofisti, Testimonianze e Frammenti* 3 (Florence 1954) 110-12. Studies frequently referred to will be abbreviated as follows: Cataudella<sup>1</sup>=

Quintino Cataudella, "L'Anonymus Iamblichi e Democrito," *StItal* N.S. 10 (1932) 5-22; Cataudella<sup>2</sup>="Nuove ricerche sull' Anonimo di Giamblico e sulla composizione del Protrepitico," *RendLinc* ser. 6, vol. 13 (1937) 182-210; Cataudella<sup>3</sup>="Chi è l'Anonimo di Giamblico?" *REG* 63 (1950) 74-106; Roller=R. Roller, *Untersuchungen zum Anonymus Iamblichi* (Diss. Tübingen 1931).

3. E.g., Diels-Kranz in *FVS* 27.400: "Doch kann keiner der bekannten Schriftsteller als Verfasser in Anspruch genommen werden."

4. Wilamowitz in "Lese Früchte," *Hermes* 64 (1929) 478. Cf. the similar opinion of K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford 1946) 414.

5. See Fritz Taeger, *Thukydides* (Stuttgart 1925) 98.

6. This is, in general, the view of W. Schmid, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*, 1<sup>3</sup> (1940) 203.

7. See W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*<sup>2</sup> (Stuttgart 1942) 433, and Roller, 60-72, 80-81, and 84-87.

8. See above, n. 2. Equally a reaction, but perhaps less salutary, is M. Untersteiner's attempt to identify the Anonymus with Hippias (see "Un nuovo frammento dell'Anonymus Iamblichi," *RendIstLomb* 77 (1943-44) 442-58 and *The Sophists* (Eng. transl. London 1954) 274 and 280-94). Untersteiner's arguments, based on tenuous parallels between the Anonymus, Thucydides 3.84, and the fragments of Hippias are well refuted in Cataudella<sup>3</sup>, 88-94.

9. Parallels between Democritus and the Anonymus had been noted by earlier commentators (see the references in Untersteiner, above, n. 2, 112), but not treated exhaustively.

10. Except for brief references in *L'Année philologique*, Schmid (above, n. 6), and *FVS* 27.428 (Nachtrag), Cataudella's articles seem to have gone unnoticed. The highly significant parallels with Cicero and Panaetius to which he has called attention are ignored in van Straaten's *Panaetius* (Amsterdam 1946) and in Atzert's edition of the *De Officiis* (Leipzig 1949), although the latter work (p. xxxvii) notes the much less extensive resemblances which link Cicero to Isocrates. In Italy, Cataudella's thesis has been accepted by V. E. Alfieri, *Atomisti, Testimonianze e Frammenti* (Bari 1936) xvi and 265, and I. Lana, "Tracce di dottrine cosmopolitiche in Grecia," *RFIC* (1951) 328-32. It is rejected by C. del Grande, *Hybris* (Naples 1947) 524 (who accepts Untersteiner's attribution to Hippias), D. Viale (A. Levi), "L'Anonimo di Giamblico," *Sophia* 9 (1941) 245 n.20, and F. Mesiano, *La Morale materialistica di Democrito di Abdera* (Florence 1951) 35-36. For their criticisms of Cataudella see below, n. 64.

11. My own views, both as to the connections between Panaetius and the Anonymus and the identity of the latter, were formed before reading Cataudella's articles. The independent character of our two investigations provides additional support for the validity of their conclusion.

12. See Cicero's own testimony in *De Officiis* 3.2.7 and *Ad Atticum* 16.11.4.

13. With this phrase and the injunction to ἐπικουρεῖν τοῖς νόμοις found at the end of the passage quoted compare *De Officiis* 2.11.38: . . . *omnia iustitia conficit et benevolentiam quod prodesse vult plurimis*.

14. As is suggested in Cataudella<sup>3</sup>, 98 n.1.

15. Probably a mistranslation. Phrases like νόμῳ βοηθεῖν occur in Plato's *Laws* and certain Pythagorean texts, where they are euphemisms for "be a conscientious informer." (See the discussions in A. Delatte, *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne* (Liège 1922) 49-50, and E. L. Minar, *Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory* (Baltimore 1942) 103-4.) An even closer parallel is one pointed out by



Cataudella ("Due note ad Aristofane," *Athenaeum* 23 (1935) 199-202) in the *Plutus* of Aristophanes (829-33 and 907-15). Two of the characters in that play are a "Just Man," who has reduced himself to poverty by his liberality, and a Sycophant, who claims to be a benefactor of the city through his efforts to βοηθεῖν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις/καὶ μὴ 'πιτρέπειν ἕαν τις ἐξαμαρτάνῃ. It is reasonable to assume that Aristophanes had the Anonymus in mind when he wrote this passage. His text is a cynical parody of the latter's doctrine but probably not a complete misrepresentation. The Anonymus would have the would-be benefactor do all in his power to see that justice is done and, in particular, refrain from putting individual, family, or class loyalties above the public good. The unpopularity of the professional informer did not prevent the Greeks from realizing that the practice itself was essential in a democracy: Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 9.1) lists among τὰ δημοτικώτατα of Solon's laws the one which made it possible τῷ βουλομένῳ τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων.

16. The reference is evidently to *Memorabilia* 2.6.39. Cf. also *Cyropaedia* 1.6.22 and *Gorgias* 527b.

17. With this compare Anonymus 1.2: ἐπιθυμητὴν γενέσθαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν (noted in Cataudella<sup>3</sup>, 96).

18. Cf. *Theaetetus* 167c, where Protagoras is made to define the function of the orator as ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. The Anonymus gives a non-relativistic version of this doctrine: the opinion of himself which the statesman should foster would, in his view, be ἀληθής as well as χρηστός.

19. Dicaearchus, like Panaetius, envisions man as exploiting his environment: first, the inanimate world (by becoming a gatherer of fruit), then the animate (by domesticating animals). Hence the succession of the "wild" and "pastoral" stages in early man's history. See the summaries of his doctrine preserved in Varro, *De Re Rustica* 2.1.4-5, and Porphyry, *De Abstinencia* 4.2 (pp. 228.22-231.2 Nauck).

20. For evidence of the existence of such an account in the fragments of Democritus himself see *FVS*<sup>7</sup> 68A151 and B 144, 154, and 198, with the commentary in E. A. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (New Haven 1957) 118-20.

21. Posidonius' theories are preserved in Seneca's critique of them, *Epistulae* 90.4-25.

22. See the passages cited in P. M. Valente, *L'Ethique stoïcienne chez Cicéron* (Diss. Paris 1956) 359-60.

23. *Antigone* 355.

24. *Protagoras* 327b-e.

25. Cf., on Panaetius' attitude in general, M. Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum, Cicero de Officiis und das Lebensideal des Panaitios* (Berlin and Leipzig 1934) 143: "Panaitios ist der Vertreter einer bürgerlichen Gesellschaft . . . Die Masse des Volkes kam trotz aller Anerkennung des demokratischen Gleichheitsprinzips im Grunde doch nur als Objekt der Politik in Betracht."

26. Cf. 2.24.84: nec ulla res vehementius rem publicam continet quam fides.

27. Cf. 2.24.85: ab hoc . . . genere largitionis ut aliis detur aliis auferatur aberunt ii qui rem publicam tuebuntur in primisque operam dabunt ut iuris et iudiciorum aequitate suum quisque teneat et neque tenuiores propter humilitatem circumveniantur neque locupletibus ad sua vel tenenda vel recuperanda obsit invidia.

28. Cf. 2.9.31: summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his si diligit multitudo si fidem habet si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat.

29. *Fides* is said to rest on a combination of *prudentia* and *iustitia*. The subdivision into categories suggests, once again, Peripatetic influence, and it is not surprising that there is no parallel in the Anonymus.

30. Roller, 33, asserts that at this point the Anonymus' discussion passes from the ἀρετή of the exceptional individual to that ἀρετή "die jeder besitzen kann und muss, das sittliche Bewusstsein und das sociale Verantwortungsgefühl." The words πάντα ἄνδρα might seem to support this view, but if they are so interpreted the subsequent contrast with οἱ πλείστοι makes no sense. Πάντα ἄνδρα must mean "every man who seeks ἀρετή." Perhaps, however, one should read πάντων ἀνδρῶν διαφερόντως for πάντα ἄνδρα διαφερόντως.

31. Cf. the similar account given by Protagoras (*FVS*<sup>7</sup> 80B9) of how Pericles' calm behavior on the occasion of his sons' death won him τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖσι δόξαν: πᾶς γάρ τις μιν ὄρων τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πένθεα ἐρρωμένως φέροντα μεγαλόφρονά τε καὶ ἀνδρείον ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ κρείσσω κάρτα εἰδὼς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τοιοῖσδε πράγμασιν ἀμηχανίην.

32. The parallels may be summarized as follows:

	<i>De Officiis</i> 2		Anonymus
1.1-2.8	Introduction	—	
3.9-6.20	Necessity of <i>hominum consensus</i> for individual success.	6.1-5	Folly of πλεονεξία
6.21-22	Catalogue of prerequisites for statesman.	—	
7.23-8.31	Uselessness of <i>metus</i>	7.15-16	Insecurity of tyrant.
9.31 9.32-34	Components of <i>gloria</i> : <i>fides benevolentia</i>	2.2	Necessity of gaining δόξα and πίστις; avoiding φθόνος.
10.36-11.38	<i>admiratio</i> .	4.1-5.2	Why ἐγκρατέστατον δεῖ εἶναι.
11.39-12.42	<i>Gloria</i> and <i>iustitia</i> .	—	
12.42-13.47	Necessity of "appearing to be as one is."	2.1-8	Means of inspiring confidence of others.
14.48-51	Oratory as aid to statesman.	—	
15.52-20.71	<i>Liberalitas</i> toward individuals.	3.1-5	Warning against immoderate εὐεργεσία.
21.72-24.85	<i>Liberalitas</i> toward the whole city.	7.1-2 and 8-9	Relations between rich and poor in εὐνομία and ἀνομία.
24.85-25.89	Conclusion: aspects of the subject not treated by Panaetius.	—	

33. On the relationship between Posidonius and Democritus see W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa* (Berlin 1914) 123-24, and K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* (Munich 1921) 398-401.

34. Similarities between Herodotus and the Anonymus were pointed out soon after the latter work was published (see W. Nestle, *Herodots Verhältnis zur Philosophie und Sophistik* (Progr. Schöntal 1908) 27-28). The parallels between Cicero's account and both works, together with Cicero's explicit mention of the Deioeces story, certainly strengthen the arguments of those who wish to see a definite literary work as Herodotus' source. One further parallel between the Anonymus and Herodotus should be noticed. When the Medes assemble to decide what to do about the prevalence of *ἀνομία* in their land, the supporters of Deioeces say that, if a king is chosen, *αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἔργα πρεσβόμεθα οὐδὲ ὑπ' ἀνομίης ἀνάστατοι ἐσόμεθα* (1.97.3). Quite similarly, the Anonymus views *ἐννομία* as a state of affairs where *ἔργα*, not *πράγματα* are the individual's principal concern (7.3 and 8).

35. This is the view of Cataudella<sup>2</sup>, 207, and Schmid (above, n. 6) 202. At the other extreme is Roller, who asserts (59 n.1) that "auch der Wortlaut des Traktats von Anfang bis Ende so gut wie ganz erhalten ist." This may be true, so far as the Anonymus himself is concerned; but if so, his work is itself an abridgement of a longer one used by Panaetius.

36. Cf. the prominence of the same problems in the *Hiero* and *Cyropaedia* of Xenophon, in the *Nicocles*, *To Nicocles*, and *Evagoras* of Isocrates, and in portions of Greek tragedy — notably the *Philoctetes*.

37. Though the Anonymus has not been influenced by the idealist philosophical systems which were developing in his day, there is in his work an individualism which suggests the fourth rather than the fifth century. But this does not affect his picture of the exceptional man, the measure of whose *ἀρετή* is still his position in society; it appears, rather, in the vividness with which the life of *ἔργα* enjoyed by each citizen in the well-run city is described (see p. 152).

38. The other parallels with later authors adduced by Cataudella (summarized in Cataudella<sup>3</sup>, 100-102) seem to me too general to be significant.

39. The possibility should not be excluded simply on the grounds of dialect. It is conceivable, though not perhaps likely, that Protagoras, closely associated as he was with Athens, composed one or more of his works in Attic. See Töpfer, *Zu der Frage über die Autorschaft des 20. Kapitels im Iamblicheischen Protreptikos* (Progr. Gmunden 1906-7) 12-13.

40. *METABOLH ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΩΝ: Der Wandel der Staatsverfassungen* (Bern 1945) 82.

41. Pages 104-6.

42. The suggestions of other scholars, that Plato took over from Protagoras the defense of injustice in Book 1, the description of the origin of the state in 2, or the passage in 4 on community of wives (see the works cited by Ryffel, 106 n.256), do not fit the phraseology of Aristoxenus, who speaks of an over-all indebtedness.

43. The transformation of a Sophistic analysis of society into a Platonic analysis of the individual soul which is here inferred from the parallels with the Anonymus appears explicitly in *Republic* 1.351c-52a. There Socrates points out that even a band of robbers must observe justice among its own members if it is to be a harmonious and effectively functioning body; similarly, it is suggested, an individual must be just if he is to enjoy inner harmony. Significantly, the same argument, minus the application to the inner man, appears in *De Officiis*



2.11.40. Panaetius may well have found it in the source from which the rest of the book is drawn.

44. On the character of this passage see Havelock (above, n. 20) 94-101.

45. Ryffel's attempt (89-96) to show extensive Sophistic borrowings in this portion of the *Republic* does not seem to me to have been successful. See the remarks of H. Strohm in his review of Ryffel's work, *Gnomon* 23 (1951) 147-48.

46. Aristotle among them. Cf. *Politics* 5.10.5-6, 1316b14-27, where he criticizes Plato for giving only one cause for the fall of oligarchies (poverty arising from extravagance) and gives as an alternate reason the very one which appears in the passage under discussion: that the subject population, if it suffers injustice and insult, is likely to revolt, even if it has not first squandered its property. The inconsistency in Plato's account was called to my attention by Professor Havelock.

47. The Anonymus does not explicitly attack those who justify rule of the stronger by an appeal to φύσις, but his phrase φύσει ισχυρὰ ἐνδεδέσθαι, where the subjects are νόμος and τὸ δίκαιον, is almost certainly an effort to overcome the φύσις-νόμος dichotomy.

48. In the speeches of the Ἀδίκος Λόγος of the *Clouds*. See F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel 1945) 131. Much older, of course, was the recognition that might often counts for more in the world than right (cf. Hesiod's fable of the hawk and the nightingale, *Works and Days* 202-12). But it is only in the late fifth century that the rule of might receives a philosophical justification, and obedience to νόμος is called cowardly or unnatural.

49. The importance of the argument is shown not only by Plato's refutation, but by his own use of very similar ones in *Republic* 1 (see above, n. 43) and Gorgias 488c-89b, where Socrates points out that the many are more powerful than the individual strong man — hence, contrary to what Callicles had said, the rule of law and justice which they favor is κατὰ φύσιν. If, as is sometimes supposed, *Republic* 1 is earlier than the rest of the work, it would seem that Plato grappled with the problem of the strong man vs. society for a long time, accepting the Sophistic solution, along with others, at first, before finally rejecting it in *Republic* 2.

50. Compare, especially, *Areopagiticus* 32-35 with Anonymus 7.1-2 and 8-9. General similarities between Isocrates and the Anonymus, while undeniably present, do not seem to me to justify the suggestion of R. Cadiou, "A travers le protreptique de Iamblique," *REG* 63 (1950) 58-73, that the Anonymus was a pupil of Isocrates. The parallels of detail adduced by Cadiou (67-70) are not convincing.

51. Suggestions for achieving ὁμόνοια similar to those made by the Anonymus were commonplace enough in the late fourth century to find their way into handbooks of rhetoric (cf. *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 2.1424a12-39); for Hellenistic practice in general see W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*<sup>3</sup> (London 1952) 90-91 (law and ὁμόνοια) and 108-10 (liberality).

52. See A. H. M. Jones, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford 1940) 157-69.

53. See Cataudella<sup>3</sup>, 80. Prodicus' myth of Heracles at the cross-roads shows, however, that the praise of πόνος was not the monopoly of any one thinker.

54. For Democritus' skepticism, cf. *FVS*<sup>7</sup> 68B7-11 and, for his disagreement with Protagoras, B156.

55. Cf. the position attributed to him in the *Protagoras* 339a (= *FVS*<sup>7</sup> 80A25): ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπὶ δεινὸν εἶναι.



56. The phraseology of the Anonymus is most closely recalled in B55: ἔργα καὶ πρήξιας ἀρετῆς οὐ λόγους ζηλοῦν χρειών. Cf. also B53a, 82, and 177. That the fragments have to do with education and not merely the simple dichotomy λόγος-ἔργον is shown by B53: πολλοὶ λόγον μὴ μαθόντες ζῶσι κατὰ λόγον.

57. On the significance of the concepts φυσιοποιεῖν and μεταρυσμοῦν for Democritean ethics in general see G. Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in Democritus, Pt. 2," *PhilRev* 55 (1946) 55-56.

58. With the mention (7.5) of the ἀντιλήψει ἀγαθῶν and the ἐλπίσιν εὐπίστοις καὶ εὐπροσδοκῆτοις which make πόνοι lighter compare B243: πάντες οἱ πόνοι ἡδιόνες ὅταν ὦν εἵνεκεν πονέουσι τυγχάνωσιν ἢ εἰδέωσι κύρσοντες.

59. Cf. in this connection Cataudella<sup>2</sup>, 206-7.

60. If χορηγίη ξυνή is the correct reading in B282 Democritus' meaning would be exactly that of the Anonymus: the improvident giver's efforts to make up his losses from other sources transform an individual χορηγίη into one whose burden is felt by the whole population.

61. On which see C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (Oxford 1928) 212-13. On the notion, found in the same passage of Lucretius (79-82), that men commit suicide through fear of death, compare B203: ἀνθρωποι τὸν θάνατον φεύγοντες διώκουσιν.

62. Cataudella<sup>2</sup>, 209-10.

63. By Havelock (above, n.20) 129-30. Cf. the similar line of reasoning in the Epicurean account of the origin of the prohibition against homicide preserved in Porphyry, *De Abstinencia* 1.10-11.

64. While not denying the existence of these parallels, opponents of Cataudella's thesis (see above, n. 10) have singled out two fragments as indicating the incompatibility of Democritean doctrine with the Anonymus' glorification of νόμος. The first of these is A166: οὐ χρὴ νόμοις πειθαρχεῖν τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλὰ ἐλευθερίως ζῆν. This fragment, if genuine, is no more inconsistent with the Anonymus than it is with other statements of Democritus himself on νόμος (B245, 248, and 264); hence it can hardly be said to tell against Cataudella's thesis. This thesis is supported, not weakened, by the other fragment cited by its opponents. B181 states that [an admonisher] κρείσσων ἐπ' ἀρετὴν φανέται προτροπῇ χρώμενος καὶ λόγου πειθοὶ ἢ περ νόμῳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ — νόμος and ἀνάγκη can only secure overt obedience. This, however, simply means that λόγου πειθώ is more effective than ἀνάγκη and νόμος — not that νόμος is bad or ineffectual. Of what use is λόγου πειθώ to those who δρῶντες τὰ αἰσχιστα λόγους ἀρίστους ἀσκέουσιν (B53a) and λόγον μὴ μαθόντες ζῶσι κατὰ λόγον (B53)? Democritus doubtless believed that law, force and reason were all useful in turning men toward ἀρετή (cf. B47: νόμῳ καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ σοφωτέρῳ εἵκειν κόσμῳ). And the Anonymus' treatise is, in effect, an effort to act upon the view expressed in B181: an attempt, through λόγου πειθώ (cf. 5.1: περὶ φιλοψυχίας . . . ὥδε ἂν τις πεισθῇ) to strengthen men's allegiance to δίκη and νόμος, an exercise in προτροπή which may already have found its way into a body of protreptic literature when Iamblichus came across it.

65. Cataudella<sup>1</sup>, 6-7.

66. The passages adduced in Cataudella<sup>1</sup>, 20-22, and Cataudella<sup>3</sup>, 95-96, to show that the name of Democritus was associated with those of Plato and Pythagoras in the circle of Iamblichus are interesting, but certainly not conclusive.

67. Cataudella<sup>1</sup>, 19-20.

68. On which see Roller, 88-94.

69. Contrast, for example, B174: ὁ μὲν εὐθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια

καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ ἀνακηδής ἐστι with 7.3-5: τόν τε αὖ χρόνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . εἰς μὲν τὰ πράγματα ἄργον γίνεσθαι εἰς δὲ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ζωῆς ἐργάσιμον. φροντίδος δὲ τῆς μὲν ἀηδεστάτης ἀπηλλάχθαι . . . τῇ δὲ ἡδίστῃ συνεῖναι· πραγμάτων μὲν γὰρ φροντίδα ἀηδεστάτην εἶναι ἔργων δὲ ἡδίστην.

70. One may also note that the echoes of the Anonymus in the *Plutus* (see above, n. 15) are against the theory of a Democritean authorship. The play was produced in 388, at which time an Attic work of the period 410-390 rather than an Ionic one of the 420's would be the more likely target for satire. The point is made by Untersteiner (above, n. 8) 452.

71. That Democritus was known to them is shown by the echoes of him found in Antiphon. See S. Luria, "Wann hat Demokrit gelebt?" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 38 (1928) 209-32.

72. 2.5.16: *neminem neque ducem bello nec principem domi magnas res et salutare sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse*. Two other passages which have parallels in Democritus, though not in the Anonymus, are 2.3.11: *quarum opere efficitur aliquid ad usum hominum atque vitam . . . duo genera ponunt, deorum unum, alterum hominum . . . Earumque item rerum quae noceant et obsint eadem divisio est. Sed quia deos nocere non putant . . . homines hominibus obesse plurimum arbitrantur* (compare B175: οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι διδοῦσι τὰ γαθὰ πάντα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν· πλὴν ὁκόσα κακὰ καὶ βλαβερά . . . τάδε δ' οὔτε πάλαι οὔτε νῦν θεοὶ ἀνθρώποισι δωροῦνται ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τοῖσδεσιν ἐμπελάζουσι), and 2.11.38: *nemo . . . iustus esse potest . . . qui egestatem timet* (compare B50: ὁ χρημάτων παντελῶς ἥσσω οὐκ ἂν ποτε εἴη δίκαιος).

73. See Cataudella<sup>1</sup>, 22, and Cataudella<sup>3</sup>, 95-96.

74. With the Anonymus' discussion of altruism and free circulation of wealth in the well-run city compare *FVS* 47B3 (Archytas) and Aristotle, *Politics* 6.3.5, 1320b9-12 (on the economic policies of the Tarentines).

75. Perhaps in his native Rhodes. Cf. Strabo 14.2.5 on the Rhodian system whereby *σιταρχεῖται* . . . ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ εὐποροὶ τοὺς ἐνδεεῖς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔθει τινὶ πατρίῳ.

76. It should be noted that Democritean influence on Panaetius has been suggested on other grounds: the prominence in the latter's ethical system of the ideal of *εὐθυμία*. See G. Siefert, *Plutarch's Schrift Περὶ εὐθυμίας* (Progr. Pforta 1908) 46-49, and R. Philippon, "Panaetiana", *RhM* 78 (1929) 337-60.



## THE ART OF CATULLUS 64

BY MICHAEL C. J. PUTNAM

FAVORABLE criticism devoted to the longer poems of Catullus is still comparatively rare. Recent signs manifest a worthy trend away from the hitherto frequent attempt to divide Catullus into two parts, one supposedly *doctus* and consequently an admirer of Alexandrian models and disciplines, the other by contrast witty and clever, the recipient of *μαρία*, in fact the spirit whose lyric fancies offer such endless delight. Yet this heresy persists in a different guise, more damaging to an appreciation of Catullus, in the tendency to disown the long poems as obscurely motivated, foreign to the more successful aspects of his genius. We are allowed to admire Catullus, author of the short, brilliant essays in individualism, while his longer works (though sometimes, especially in the case of 63, interesting in themselves) seemingly impersonal and built on the shaky foundations of tradition and imitation, are relegated to a secondary position and scorned as abnormal or at least exceptional.

Yet to ignore almost half his production can scarcely result in a unified picture either of a poet's mind at work or of his personality. If an examination of Catullus' long poems were only to result in shedding light on the imagination which poured forth the lyrics, it would serve not only a useful but an instructive purpose. But such a goal remains here only a corollary to a search for the unique beauties which one of these, poem 64, possesses in its own right. In other words, we offer here, for one work of Catullus, an analysis comparable to that recently accomplished for the poetry of William Blake, showing, in fact, that his longer works, far from being dull asides or at best lengthy footnotes mirroring the taste of the time, are the offspring of a poet whose special powers can be traced throughout everything he produced.<sup>1</sup>

The result is a twofold plea for unity, unity first of 64 within itself, and unity between it and the shorter poems.<sup>2</sup> If 64 is, as has been maintained, a series of narrative sections strung loosely together by means of the most tenuous and superficial bonds, then we should certainly without further ado dismiss the poem as a piece of made-to-order Alexandrian work, a demonstration, as it were, on the part of Catullus that he too could write in a genre popular with his fellow *neoterói*. Poem 64, we are often told, is written in a form (though even this fact is subject to doubt)



which may have been prevalent during the so-called "Alexandrian" period, and therefore it goes without saying that it exhibits the worst side of the poetry we associate with Callimachus' contemporaries, wherein subject is molded to fit genre and imagination corrupted to the uses of virtuosity. The opposite is in fact the case. There is no meaningless artificiality here. Rather the whole is consciously calculated and specifically pointed, with Catullus' own directness, toward a grand design.

The long poems, and especially 64, contain in the elaborate design which epic allows the same situations and emotions from which the lyrics grew. Catullus' genius is personality.<sup>3</sup> Inspiration for him is always drawn immediately out of confrontation with the events of life. Unlike Milton, Catullus was a poet who could never divorce himself from his themes. The end of 63 offers a case in point when the poet prays:

dea magna, dea Cybele, dea domina Dindymeï,  
procul a mea tuus sit furor omnis, era, domo:  
alios age incitatos, alios age rabidos.

In spite of his seeming protest to the contrary, the strength of imagery here repeated from the body of the poem proves beyond a doubt Catullus' own deep participation in this work. The writing of both 63 and 64 appears detached because the stories center upon remote mythology. But in fact they are the heightened imaginative efforts of a poet who left his mark on every line and who, though deliberately disavowing actual participation in the story, tells his reader by no less obvious means than in the lyrics that these are writings of the most personal sort. The longer poems change names, places, and dates; they do not alter either poetic or personal intensity. Catullus speaks through characters, but very much for himself. As John Livingstone Lowes found of Coleridge, we seek to discover Catullus' mind at work even in his longer poems and at the same time find Catullus as a person around every corner. Briefly, these poems are a very important part of Catullus' production, and no general interpretation which omits an examination of them can be completely successful.

Unity of emotion finds its twin, of course, in unity of imaginative expression. Thus we will have frequent recourse to other poems to observe the imagination which created 64 at work elsewhere on similar topics and in a similar manner.

We assume also at the start that 64 is no Hellenistic poem in the deprecatory sense of the word, meaning a superficial exercise containing little or no meaning beyond its form. It manifests only a few structural techniques in common with the poets of Alexandria, such as use of the

ὀμφαλός pattern for digressions (and even this is as old as Homer).<sup>4</sup> Rather the language of 64 is simple, straightforward, and intense, only rarely redundant or overelaborate. In a sense 64 gives an even truer portrait of Catullus than do some of the polymetric and elegiac poems, especially those which attempt to falsify and reverse the true situation (a common Catullan habit).<sup>5</sup> In 64, because the poet is writing epic, he can give his thoughts a freer rein than usual just because he is writing under the mask of symbolic poetry.

During the course of 64 certain almost prose-like statements about love which the elegiacs offer are elaborated into long descriptive parallels which embody in epic story the skeleton of their tortured utterances. Though 72 is a poem to which further references will be made below, it deserves quotation in full here since, in brief compass, it displays many of the tensions which form the core of the subsequent discussion of 64:

Dicebas quondam solum te nosse Catullum,  
 Lesbia, nec prae me velle tenere Iovem.  
 dilexi tum te non tantum ut vulgus amicam,  
 sed pater ut gnatos diligit et generos.  
 nunc te cognovi: quare etsi impensius uror,  
 multo mi tamen es vilior et levior.  
 qui potis est? inquis. quod amantem iniuria talis  
 cogit amare magis, sed bene velle minus.

Like 72, 64 exhibits, par excellence, the opposition of past and present, ideal and real, ever at hand in Catullus and here spread out in narrative detail. This leads to the belief that Lesbia and the poet's brother are also very much involved in the story as it unfolds. In a word, poem 64 shows Catullus writing of himself in the figures of Ariadne and Aegeus, and of the way he had hoped his relationship with Lesbia would evolve in the story of Peleus and Thetis.<sup>6</sup> With the present disguised under symbolic forms, it is true autobiography and consequently it says more than any other of his poems because it can do so with impunity.

# I. DIVISIONS; SCENE ON THE SHORE AND FIRST FLASHBACK

The poem divides essentially into two parts. It opens with the first meeting of Peleus and Thetis, leading the reader to believe that the tale of their love and marriage forms the bulk of the poem. Yet in the midst of the opening description, only fifty lines after the poem begins, Catullus digresses, by describing the coverlet on the marriage bed, into the tale of Ariadne's desertion by Theseus. This, with its various ramifications, takes up more than half the poem. Thereafter the happy wedding descrip-

tion returns, to balance the sadness of the previous episode. Even now all does not remain serene, for the song of the Fates follows, singing bliss to the happy pair, bliss enhanced and yet impaired by their son, the warlike death-dealing Achilles. Once more happy allusions to the *concordia* of the newly founded home surround the bitter lines, but the poet's point is clear. The ideal is never reached, even in the union between Peleus and Thetis, which to ancient authors was above all others the most perfect.<sup>7</sup> The story and the song now over, the work concludes with a few lines of moralizing wherein the virtues of the past are contrasted with present vices, lines which stand as commentary to the two diverse episodes which preceded.

Leaving the opening verses to be discussed along with those which follow the digression, we shall begin with the tale of Ariadne. We find her first in line 52 as she looks out from the sounding shore and beholds Theseus sailing away, unloving and oblivious. She, on the other hand, is in the grip of love for Theseus which even then she cannot suppress.<sup>8</sup> So sudden is her disillusionment that her mind refuses to acknowledge what her eyes admit as fact. She is aroused from a sleep which is *fallax*, because it lulled her into a confidence as false as her lover:

immemor at iuvenis fugiens pellit vada remis  
irrita ventosae linquens promissa procellae.

The sound of *iuvenis* seems to be reiterated in *ventosae*, just as *linquens* picks up the sense of *fugiens*.

The picture of departure haunted Catullus, meaning to him on most occasions little short of desertion, and in the opening lines Catullus finds the opportunity to enhance this theme. He exploits the situation of Ariadne to the fullest. The winds which bear the youth away are the very ones which waft his promises into the air. As she repeats later in her speech, Theseus gave her *promissa* with *blanda voce*, in alluring and seductive tones but signifying nothing more than mere words. They were (according to lines 59 and 142, both of which utilize the metaphor of winds) *irrita*, a deadly accusation in Catullus' mind.<sup>9</sup> Like his oaths, Theseus' promises were only meant to gain the sensual satisfaction of the moment, remaining invalid for the future (line 148). To adapt the words of Catullus to Lesbia, he was indeed *nullam amans vere*.

Likewise the shore, which finds her deserted on its lonely waste, is a reflection in nature of the situation of her pitiful heart. She has cut herself off from love and home and family only to be surrounded by the girdling sea. The island is *sola* as she is and deserted.

It is not difficult to find other instances of Catullus' commenting on a

similar fate. Attis, the victim of the madness of Cybele, is foreign to anything in 64, but the Attis who awakens to find his madness fled, and with it all that was true and human, is a figure who has much in common with Ariadne. The mere parallels in the way the poet represents their external situations are interesting. We would expect the descriptions of each to begin coinciding at the moment of Attis' awakening, and so they do. In 63.42 Catullus relates that

ibi *Somnus excitam* Attin fugiens citus abiit; . . .

much as he pictures Ariadne (64.56):

utpote fallaci quae tum primum *excita somno* . . .

The lines which follow find Attis gradually becoming aware of the full implications of his recent deeds (63.45-47):

simul ipsa pectore Attis sua facta recoluit,  
liquidaque mente vidit sine quis ubique foret,  
animo aestuante rusum reditum ad vada tetulit . . . ,

yet in much the same manner Ariadne yearns for Theseus. *Vidit* of 63.46 (with *visens* of 48) recalls 64.55. The verses which precede Attis' speech (63.48-49):

ibi maria vasta visens lacrimantibus oculis,  
patriam allocuta maestast ita voce miseriter . . . ,

offer a situation not far different from 64.60:

quem procul ex alga maestis Minois ocellis,

or from the recurrence of this very same description shortly before Ariadne begins to speak. Each is *miser* and each gives vent to suffering in words which reveal its full extent.

But verbal reminiscences alone — and many more could be adduced — do not tell us why the poet offers so much common ground between Attis and Ariadne, why two such supposedly disparate figures should be depicted in such a similar way. The answer can lie nowhere but in the realization that the circumstances and thoughts of each are very much a part of Catullus himself, and therefore are to be conveyed in like fashion. Each wakes from sleep to bitter truth. Each betakes himself to the shore, which becomes not a symbol for arrival (in the opening lines of 63 the shore is not even mentioned), but of separation from true love. Attis laments the loss of home and family through the excessive *furor* of devotion; Ariadne, while manifestly blaming Theseus, bewails almost exactly the same



fate, since she herself has been the victim of mad passion to the detriment of all that remains true and steadfast.

Moreover the phraseology in these lines devoted to Ariadne bears a marked resemblance to the totality of poem 30. Alfenus, after promising much to the poet, had betrayed and deserted him. He stands to Catullus as Theseus to Ariadne. The numerous parallels between the two poems,<sup>10</sup> many of which may be no more than clichés of situation, come suddenly to life with the reflection of 30.5,

quae tu neglegis ac me miserum deseris in malis . . . ,

in 64.57, where Ariadne

desertam in sola miseram se cernat harena.

*In malis* becomes *in sola harena* because of the epic setting. Otherwise the situations are noticeably similar. Only the emotions aroused in the reader by the pitiful case of Ariadne are heightened by the beauty of the shore scene, as the horror of her desertion is magnified by her loneliness.

It is not, however, to any stray example, such as 30, that we turn in search of a completely parallel episode in Catullus' life which might have aroused in him the feelings of Ariadne. We look not to the Alfenuses, numerous as they may have been, but to Lesbia, to whom, alone of those mentioned in his poetry, he could ascribe the actions and feelings of a Theseus. This was the great emotion of his life. He describes in 64 Lesbia's desertion of him in epic terms. Lesbia is the one who has fled his embraces only to leave him *miser* with lovesickness.<sup>11</sup> The similarity between this event and the situation described in 64.58ff. is too close to be mere coincidence. Catullus is very much a part of Ariadne.

The irony of circumstance in these lines is thoroughly apparent. When Theseus sails away *celeri cum classe*, we think on Attis' arrival in Phrygia *celeri rate* and ponder the fact that Theseus' desertion is like the madness which drove Attis away from home. Likewise, Ariadne should arise happy on her wedding day. Instead she awakens to find no love at all.<sup>12</sup> These verses contrast in particularly effective fashion with the very opening section of the poem. Line 35 tells how

deseritur Cieros, linquunt Pthiotica Tempe . . .

The same words used here to describe the home at Pharsalus, crowded with a throng joyously assembled for the marriage rites, recur in the picture of the abandoned Ariadne.<sup>13</sup> The result is direct and deliberate verbal irony to emphasize the distinction between true and false.

We meet another theme from the contrasts within the lines themselves,

namely the difference between external and internal value. We had previously read of the waves of care on which Ariadne was tossed. Her sensations are depicted more explicitly in lines 68–70:

sed neque tum mitrae neque tum fluitantis amictus  
illa vicem curans toto ex te pectore, Theseu,  
toto animo, tota pendebat perdita mente . . . ,

and the imagery is expanded in the lines which follow. She is passionately in love with Theseus with a desire which stems from her whole being, *toto ex pectore*.<sup>14</sup> By contrast, the heart of Theseus is labeled in the course of the poem both *immemor* (line 123) and *immitte* (line 138).<sup>15</sup> He is bent on reaping the sexual rewards of the moment while she suffers the true feelings of love. The result is that lines 63 to 67, where her disheveled appearance is described, because they are framed by the similarity of thought in lines 62 and 68–70, bring out the contrast created by the juxtaposition. Ariadne cares nothing for her physical state. Externally all is disorder. Yet she seems what she is, as her heart yearns truly for Theseus.

This contrast between exterior and interior, a familiar one appearing in many guises throughout the poetry of Catullus, makes no more vivid appearances than in 64. Ariadne cries in lines 175–76 (and the words pick up her previous thoughts at lines 136–37):

nec malus hic celans dulci crudelia forma  
consilia in nostris requiescet sedibus hospes !

The cruel counsels lurk beneath an exterior which tempts toward love. She was carried away by outward charm to hope for inner spiritual values where in fact there were none. The revelation about Lesbia came gradually to Catullus as the elegiacs show, and the tone of 8 clearly suggests that he wanted to postpone acceptance of it until denial was impossible. But Ariadne is the Catullus to whom all is clear. Recognition to her is instant on all levels. It takes place in the seconds which separate sleep from waking. The speech which Ariadne then delivers is the epitome of Catullus' own disillusionment.

In the first twenty lines devoted to the story of Ariadne, then, Catullus prepares the reader for much that is to follow and reveals at the same time his own personal feelings.<sup>16</sup> The very first adjective applied to any aspect of her plight, *fluentisomo*, is an apparent coinage of the poet's. But he soon associates both the floods and the sounds with Ariadne in a way which makes the word a precursor of the description which follows. The ebb and flow, as part of the wave imagery, also become internal

(line 62); yet we have seen how the turmoil of the sea affects her externally as well (lines 67–68). Again a few lines later the metaphorical usage reappears when the poet in his own person adds the aside (lines 97–98):

qualibus incensam iactastis mente puellam  
fluctibus, in flavo saepe hospite suspirantem!

The roar of the beating waves resounds for one last time in the shrill cries of Ariadne bewailing her fate and telling how she began (line 125)

clarisonas imo fudisse e pectore voces.<sup>17</sup>

With line 73 Catullus commences to tell the story from the start. From here to line 121, where we return to Ariadne on the shore, we are treated to a long flashback, beginning with Theseus' departure from Athens to kill the Minotaur and ending with Ariadne's relinquishment of family and home to take flight with Theseus. As always in Catullus, the voyage means more than geographical wandering. It symbolizes change through departure, the leaving of one kind of life for another. Here it gives scope to what may have been to Catullus merely the agony caused by Lesbia's infidelity. Perhaps we may find the source of the poet's continual return to this picture in his brother's death-journey to Troy. Whatever the case may be, 64 rises and falls on the theme of the journey, which is itself a reflection of the happiness and pain of love.

Here the focus of events upon the earlier stages of Ariadne's love adds to the poignancy of her plight while at the same time preparing the way for the speech in which she concentrates all her bitterness. The figure of Theseus is sketched with a few strokes.<sup>18</sup> His arrival in Crete found him only the *flavus hospes* (line 98), the hero whose boldness, coupled with her brave assistance, overcame the Minotaur. It is rather to her love for Theseus that Catullus primarily devotes himself, showing her as the lover capable of supreme devotion. The imagery of lines 86–90, when compared to like passages in 61, proves her ripeness for marriage. But in 61 both the husband and wife are at some point called *cupidus*.<sup>19</sup> In 64 not a word is uttered of such a desire on the part of Theseus. It is Ariadne who views her lover *cupido lumine* (line 86), and who later implies that any eagerness Theseus may have had was but the moment's fancy.

Once again Ariadne is the mouthpiece of the poet himself, for rarely does Catullus speak of a desire on Lesbia's part for him.<sup>20</sup> Mention of his for her forms part of 70 and is the core of 107, where Catullus applies the word *cupidus* to himself three times in the course of five lines. Any such yearning, first suggested in poems like 107, finds its complete expression in the speech of Ariadne in 64. In 107 Lesbia returned to the

poet, who was beginning to despair of her devotion. In 64, Theseus has departed for good.

From the word *cupidus* we may turn to other means by which the poet pictures Ariadne's love. As usual for Catullus, the senses play a role of great importance, especially the eyes. Through her eyes Ariadne first conceives (line 92) the flame of love which burns her to the very marrow. After this brief description couched in highly erotic imagery (especially lines 91-93), the poet has so fallen under the spell of, nay, become part of Ariadne's situation, that he suddenly turns and speaks to Cupid and Venus, addressing them in the second person as he had Theseus in line 69, where he was also thinking quite personally of Ariadne's suffering (lines 94-96):

heu misere exagitans immitti corde furores  
sancte puer, curis hominum qui gaudia misces,  
quaeque regis Golgos quaeque Idalium frondosum. . .

Line 95 reflects the sentiment of 68.17-18, where Catullus, looking wistfully at his own past, boasts:

multa satis lusi: non est dea nescia nostri,  
quae dulcem curis miscet amaritiem.

In fact the whole surrounding passage in 68 is a variation on this situation in 64. When Catullus was, like Ariadne, in the spring of life, 68.16 says, he was much under the power of Venus; yet now, he goes on, all joys are taken from him. The superficial source of the waves of fortune, on which he complains to Manlius he is tossed, is soon revealed as the death of his brother. Yet we know from the second part of 68 that he has also been meditating on Lesbia's infidelity, since he tries desperately to make light of it. Even though he makes no mention at all of Lesbia in 68*a*, the *fluctus fortunae* may find a secondary application to Lesbia's faithlessness. So young Ariadne also experienced the *gaudia* of love with Theseus, only to find herself betrayed.

Epic description returns once more in line 105, this time devoted to the battle with the Minotaur. Little more need be said, Catullus hints in line 116, to fill the gap between this heroic achievement and the desertion on Dia. Yet he adds four interesting lines (117-120) narrating

. . . ut linquens genitoris filia vultum  
ut consanguineae complexum, ut denique matris,  
quae misera in gnata deperdita laeta (batur),  
omnibus his Thesei dulcem praeoptarit amorem. . .



This is a familiar Catullan situation, but it deserves mention here. Ariadne left father, sister, mother, in fact home and family love on account of her passion for Theseus. Such also is the situation in which Attis finds himself when he says

patria o mei creatrix, patria o mea genetrix  
ego quam miser relinquens. . . .

Each has given way to the violence of a passion which in its joy is fleeting while lasting with pain. Each has renounced the steadfast, lasting *pietas* of home, the love which exists between parents and children, between brother and brother. This is the spiritual side of the love which Catullus bore Lesbia, as he defines it in 72. It is also the way he felt, as we shall later see, toward his own brother. The perfect love would have been ideally a union between this spiritual *pietas* and sexual passion. As it was, he learned that the combination could never be achieved, since the love he felt toward his brother could not be found in Lesbia, lacking as she did the *fides* and *pietas* which formed its very foundation.

Line 121 returns to where line 72 had left off. The description now leads directly into the beginning of Ariadne's lament,<sup>21</sup> and the imagery of these ten lines merely recapitulates and enhances the description at the beginning of her story. She rages. She is *tristis* and *maesta*, words applicable to love as well as grief. And the imagery utilized to depict her sorrow before she speaks recurs at her speech's end (line 202), thereby framing the whole. Once more the sad voice and the suffering of violent revelation recall Attis. Ariadne's words are, or at least so she thinks, her last complaints, *extremae querellae* (line 130).<sup>22</sup> She assumes she is in the very throes of death — and for purposes of this particular moment in the action she is indeed dying. When Bacchus arrives the mood changes completely, to be sure, but it is the story of Theseus' desertion which is the real subject of this section of the poem, not the arrival of the new lover. It is no coincidence that she later describes her complaints as those (lines 196–97)

quas ego, vae misera, extremis proferre medullis  
cogor inops, ardens, amentì caeca furore.

Catullus is able to make the external situation justify and fit the internal feelings. What might even be called her *Liebestod* from love for Theseus is one with the tragic end she thinks she will have, left alone on a deserted island, a prey to birds and beasts. Her lips are already beginning to grow numb with cold as she begins.

## II. ARIADNE'S LAMENT

sicine me patriis avectam, perfide, ab aris,  
 perfide, deserto liquisti in litore, Theseu ?  
 sicine discedens neglecto numine divum,  
 immemor a! devota domum periuria portas ?

From these initial questions, the reader learns of her seduction from home and why it is now quite clear to Ariadne that Theseus is carrying *devota domum periuria*, harbingers of the curse which she puts on him at the end. The repetition of *perfide*, with which the indictment opens, is, by standards Catullus sets elsewhere, overwhelming.<sup>23</sup> Theseus has no *fides*, cares not a whit for his promises (as line 144 reaffirms). The *deserto litore* of the first question seems to lead to the *neglecto numine* of the second. Theseus has lost all respect for the *numen divum*, the very accusation Catullus hurls against Lesbia in 76.3-4 when he asserts that he

nec sanctam violasse fidem, nec foedere nullo  
 divum ad fallendos numine abusum homines, . . .

Ariadne's curse is, however, to be fulfilled (line 204):

annuit invicto caelestum numine rector; . . .

What was *neglecto* is in reality *invicto*, and any failure to worship the divinity of the gods will be punished by an all-too-vivid presentation of their power. Ariadne's accusation takes the reader from Crete to Dia and from Dia to Athens. As Theseus carried Ariadne from home and proved perfidious,<sup>24</sup> so now the results of the crime will be visited on his own father.

Ariadne's tone changes in the next two questions (lines 136-38). They are in the nature of pleas, no longer threatening. Will nothing bend his cruel purpose, she asks (as she does later in 175-76)? Will he offer her no clemency from his pitiless heart? The difference between what might have been and what actually is, a difference inherent in her questions, becomes now explicit as she sets off the *quondam* of the past (line 139) against the *nunc* of the present (line 143).<sup>25</sup> We recall the same distinction in 72. Even in 70 the thrice repeated *dicit* emphasizes the fact that Lesbia *said* she preferred to marry Catullus more than anyone else. But her *dicta* were likewise of little import.

This contrast of time present with time past leads the poet, as Ariadne, into six lines (143-48) of meditation on the infidelity of man:

nunc iam nulla viro iuranti femina credat,  
 nulla viri speret sermones esse fideles;

quis dum aliquid cupiens animus praegestit apisci,  
 nil metuunt iurare, nihil promittere parcunt:  
 sed simul ac cupidae mentis satiata libido est,  
 dicta nihil metuere, nihil periuria curant.

We will later draw in more detail comparisons between the Ariadne-Theseus episode and the description of the present ill times with which the poem concludes. Suffice to quote here lines 398 and 405-6, where Catullus inveighs against the lack of justice in the modern world, saying that men

iustitiamque omnes cupida de mente fugarunt, . .  
 omnia fanda nefanda malo permixta furore  
 iustificam nobis mentem avertere deorum . . .

The phrase *cupidae mentis* of line 147 is echoed in *cupida de mente* of 398. The reader cannot but recall the situation of Ariadne in the later line. She is the image which corresponds to the generalizations with which the poem ends.

The next nine lines divide into two sections, 149-53 and 154-57. The first group returns to narration and to a direct address of Theseus. Ariadne's love for him triumphed over all other forms of affection. In order to save him, she even killed her own brother, and in return she is offered to beasts of prey and will lie unburied. Ariadne digresses at line 154 to speculate upon the origin of Theseus, who, she thinks, must be the offspring of a lioness or a Scylla to perform such actions against her.

The chief commentary on these thoughts is poem 60, where the poet also addresses some unknown person (it may or may not be Lesbia) who has failed him in his hour of need. I quote the entire poem:

Num te leaena montibus Libystinis  
 aut Scylla latrans infima inguinum parte  
 tam mente dura procreavit ac taetra,  
 ut supplicis vocem in novissimo casu  
 contemptam haberes, a nimis fero corde ?

The parallels between the first three lines of this poem and 60.154-56 are both numerous and vivid. There is a close connection between Catullus' thoughts on his own *novissimo casu* and Ariadne's meditation on her supposedly imminent death (*extremo tempore*, line 169, contrasts with *tempore primo* two lines later). Ariadne considers herself about to be *dilaceranda feris*, with the result that her mind (or the poet's) immediately turns to the image of Theseus and the *leaena*. Reality has become metaphor. She is to be torn apart by wild animals, but Theseus is the

spiritual beast who in leaving her caused her death. The lioness gives him birth, but it is of the deserter's mind (*mente*, 60.3) and heart (*corde*, 60.5) that the poet is speaking. It is his soul which is animal-like while his form is fair. The adjectives attached to the two nouns are also important. The mind is called *dura*. Its hard and unbending quality is reflected in the phrase *sola sub rupe* (64.154). The heart, in its turn, remains *fero*, an epithet which serves as commentary on the ambiguity latent in the whole section.<sup>26</sup>

Though there may be some connection between the *novissimo casu* of Catullus in 60 and the *casu acerbo* from which Manlius suffers in 68.1, the Laudamia-Protesilaus episode later in 68, to which we shall return in greater detail, offers an even closer parallel. In 68.105-7, for example, Catullus, very much involved in the feelings of Laudamia, mentions the Trojan war which drew Protesilaus away from her:

quo tibi tum casu, pulcerrima Laudamia,  
ereptum est vita dulcius atque anima  
coniugium: . . .

This situation is not at all unlike that proposed by 64.157 when Ariadne asks Theseus if he is the kind of person

taliam qui reddis pro dulci praemia vita?

Ariadne gave sweet life (*dulci vita*) to Theseus and he leaves her. Protesilaus leaves Laudamia even though he is *vita dulcius* to her. The *casus* is the same. Moreover the reversal pattern we have seen above is illustrated by the verb *eripui* in 64.150. She snatched Theseus from the jaws of death only to have him desert her in the same manner as Protesilaus departed from Laudamia (*ereptum est*, 68.106).<sup>27</sup>

Ariadne in her pain now cries out that even if it had not been in Theseus' heart to marry her because he feared the hard commands of a stern father (lines 160-63),

attamen in vestras potuisti ducere sedes,  
quae tibi iucundo famularer serva labore,  
candida permulcens liquidis vestigia lymphis,  
purpureave tuum consternens veste cubile.

Ariadne would have come home to Theseus at least as servant if not as wife. The phraseology is quite unusual, displaying in Ariadne incredible devotion and the utmost submission to a stronger force, the weakest feminine impulse yielding to the adamant masculine. The thought here briefly expressed forms one of the basic ideas of 63, which seems to



represent certain salient aspects of the temperament of Catullus. The servitude demanded of Attis in 63 is even greater than that which Ariadne offers here, since it involves renouncing masculinity for abject slavery, whereas Ariadne need only be reduced to the lowest position for one of her own sex. Nevertheless the Catullus who, disguised in the form of Ariadne, proposes herself as servant for Theseus, is the same Catullus who, transformed imaginatively into Attis, will be the perpetual devotee of the Magna Mater. In other words the mistress/servant feeling, here experienced by Ariadne, finds its heightened and extreme expression in the emasculation of Attis.<sup>28</sup>

A complete change of thought occurs as Ariadne says (lines 164–66):

sed quid ego ignaris nequiquam conquerar auris  
externata malo, quae nullis sensibus auctae  
nec missas audire queunt nec reddere voces ?

This passage is important, and typically Catullan, in two ways: first, it shows the dependence of his intense feelings on the senses, especially seeing and hearing; and second, it specifically draws attention to the need, in such a situation as Ariadne's, of the consolation of speaking and replying. There is no hope, she later cries (lines 186–87):

nulla fugae ratio, nulla spes: omnia muta,  
omnia sunt deserta, ostendant omnia letum.

Desertion is a motif naturally present, but the key Catullan phrase is *omnia muta*. This imagery is particularly linked with death, as we may see for example in 96.1 and 101.4, especially the latter, where, thinking on his brother, Catullus cries,

et mutam nequiquam alloquerer cinerem.

Likewise the world around Ariadne is dead. The pointedly repeated *nequiquam* in 101.4 and in 64.164 adds further poignancy to the vain uselessness of her cries, just as *mutam* coupled with *alloquerer* in 101 tells the reader that the poet for his part will speak, but will hear no reply from his beloved brother, for whom sympathy is now fruitless.

Merely the fact that his brother cannot reply to him in 101 and 65 makes it all the more important that he answer the *dicta* of Ortalus in the latter poem. Whatever they were, they deserve reply. Just as Ariadne must complain in vain to the unknowing breezes, so Catullus insists to Ortalus that (65.17):

. . . tua dicta vagis nequiquam credita ventis.

Very similar imagery, but this time the crucial *nequiquam* will not be true. The poet can and must make answer. When, however, at the end of her speech Ariadne cries to the Eumenides, *meas audite querellas* (line 195), we realize that literally no one can hear and give help and sympathy, except the unseen furies whose help is vengeance for the dead, not life for the suffering.<sup>29</sup>

She is, in fact, *externata* with evil (the same word associated with the ardor of love in line 71). There is no person present to convey the active and manifest sympathy necessary in such a time of trial. In one poem of great suffering, 38, Catullus had asked Cornificius for a brief *allocutio*. No matter how sad, anything would be comforting. Even such solace was denied Ariadne.<sup>30</sup>

The feelings which overcome Ariadne at this point form the heart of the remainder of her speech. In lines 171-76 she prays to Jupiter, wondering why all this has come upon her. Lines 177-81 return to the interrogative technique used earlier:

nam quo me referam ? quali spe perdita nitor ?  
Idaeosne petam montes ? at gurgite lato  
discernens ponti truculentum dividit aequor.  
an patris auxilium sperem ? quemne ipsa reliqui  
respersum iuvenem fraterna caede secuta ?

This time she addresses herself instead of Theseus and asks whither she can turn now for help and consolation since the island offers none. She might return to Crete (though in truth she knows that the crime of her brother's death irrevocably bars such a recourse). In fact, as also for Attis, the sea is the great dividing line between true home and false, between lasting happiness and happiness for the moment leading to greater sorrow. The shore is the closest both characters can come to renewing what each now realizes is the only steadfast type of love.

The only thing she can do now is to call on the invisible furies to avenge her wrongs. The curse which comprises the final lines of her speech is important for the episode which follows.<sup>31</sup> In no other version of the legend is the curse of Ariadne connected with the death of Aegeus. Superficially this is the poet's way of linking two seemingly disparate events. More important, however, it helps to show the reactions of two people to one figure who betrays them both, of lover to lover separated by infidelity, and of father and son separated (as Aegeus thinks) by death. Catullus is no little part of both characters.

It will be seen that, taken as a whole, Ariadne's lament centers

primarily around her own reactions to the departure of Theseus. But the beauty of the piece lies not in any over-reaching concepts which unify the whole, even though we retain the picture of the deserted Ariadne forever before our mind. Rather it is the series of approaches which she takes to her position which interests us. Around the idea of desertion (in which the loss of *fides* and *iustitia* was of equal importance with the loss of *amor*) the poet has written short elegiac and lyric comments, some four lines, some ten, none of them exactly like any other, but all looking back to the same initial situation and viewing it from various emotional angles. And the descriptions, which interweave among these thoughts, he has taken away from any prosaic setting in Rome or Verona or anywhere else, and placed where they will have the most imaginative effect upon the reader.

In brief, the portrayal of Ariadne, beautifully as it is crafted, is distinctive because of her special relationship with Catullus. Let others find in her speech the latent influence of writers from Homer to Lucretius. Every poet is born to tradition and conversant with his predecessors and contemporaries. Yet the source hunter should go no further. Ariadne expresses in the veiled terms which epic invites the struggles and aspirations which were Catullus' own.

### III. THESEUS AND AEGEUS

The curse of Ariadne ends at line 201, as she calls down punishment upon Theseus. And Jupiter, by making the universe tremble, acknowledges that the prayer will be fulfilled. To accomplish this and have the lover's forgetfulness redound to his own suffering, the poet once more turns back the clock to the time when Aegeus gave his final speech of farewell to his son departing for Crete. As the curse of Ariadne depended on the mind of Theseus (the word *mens* appears twice in lines 200-1), so also does its accomplishment (lines 207-9):

ipse autem caeca mentem caligine Theseus  
consitus oblito dimisit pectore cuncta,  
quae mandata prius constanti mente tenebat, . .

The last line is all but repeated in line 238 at the end of Aegeus' speech. Yet the emphatic stress on Theseus' remembering and then forgetful mind in lines 210 and 238 serves to return the reader's thoughts to Theseus' treatment of Ariadne and to help forge a connecting link between the two episodes.

After a brief mention of the crucial *dulcia signa*, which Theseus forgets

to raise upon return as he had been ordered, the digression begins. It presents at the outset the familiar Catullan picture of departure:

namque ferunt olim, classi cum moenia divae  
linquentem gnatum ventis concrederet Aegeus,  
talìa complexum iuveni mandata dedisse: . . .

Here the relationship is between father and son, the son leaving to go off on an adventure (this part of the story parallels the departure of Prote-silaus in 68, and of Ptolemy in 66). We should recall here that in Catullus' own life there were two departures of paramount importance, different in outward detail, yet on the spiritual side, judging from the poet's reaction to them, interwoven and complicated. The first was the departure (such it must have been) of the brother and his subsequent death in the East. The second was the unfaithfulness of Lesbia. The Protesilaus-Laudamia episode in 68 combines these so intimately that it is sometimes hard to distinguish to whom the poet is applying his feelings, to the dead brother or the deserting Lesbia. Both themes are one in 68. In 64 they are dealt with in separate sections. In the Ariadne episode it was Catullus' relationship with Lesbia which we saw was of paramount importance. The next event, shorter though it is, remains no less crucial. This time death is the outcome. I suggest that in it the poet is reflecting on his lost brother and, with himself as Aegeus, is speaking words not of hope for return, but of sadness looking to eternal separation.

Even before the speech begins these feelings are conveyed. If we turn to the imagery of the lines quoted above, *linquo* is a verb around which the thoughts of Catullus are much centered. It appears in line 117 when Ariadne is also leaving her parents. And since the word *complexum* (though a noun in one case, a participle in the other) appears in the lines subsequent to each, the poet was probably thinking back to the first passage. It could even be said that the whole emotional cast of the Theseus-Aegeus episode results from an enlargement of the thoughts contained in those lines devoted to Ariadne. Nor, when we think on Theseus' previous conduct and the imagery the poet attaches to it, does the phrase *ventis concrederet* leave much doubt as to the ultimate outcome of the story.

Let us take Aegeus' speech essentially line by line. The opening apostrophe —

gnate mihi longa iucundior unice vita —

maintains a clear likeness to Catullus' frequent claim that he considered Lesbia dearer than life. Yet such an equation utilizes a comparative



adjective only twice elsewhere. The first instance occurs in 68.106 where Laudamia realizes that the *coniugium* torn from her was *vita dulcius*.<sup>32</sup> The other passage is 65.10-11, where the poet is talking of his brother:

numquam ego te, vita frater amabilior,  
aspiciam posthac ? . . .

This is the first of a series of comparisons we will make with 65 in elucidating the Aegeus passage, and the first where the brother is specifically mentioned.

With line 216,

gnate, ego quem in dubios cogor dimittere casus,

the imagery begins to border on the sensual. Nor should we forget the simile of 68.119-24 when discussing line 217:

reddite in extrema nuper mihi fine senectae, . . .

In 68, Catullus is attempting to describe the extreme passion of love in terms of a relationship which has nothing at all to do with sex. And, even though in the first instance an aged sire has been reunited with his son while in the second a newborn grandson relieves his grandsire of the "vulture," the feeling which the grandfather experiences through contemplation of his daughter's late-born child is exactly that which Aegeus undergoes when he beholds his son returned to him in his late old age.<sup>33</sup>

Aegeus continues in line 218:

quandoquidem fortuna mea ac tua fervida virtus  
eripit invito mihi te, cui languida nondum  
lumina sunt gnati cara saturata figura, . . .

Though *fortuna* is one of the key words in 68,<sup>34</sup> it also appears in one other crucial spot, 101.5-6:

quandoquidem fortuna mihi tete abstulit ipsum,  
heu miser indigne frater adempte mihi, . . .

The word *abstulit* (and also perhaps *adempte*) may find its parallel with the lines from 64 in the word *eripit*, but the surrounding words are more than chance occurrences, i.e., the phrase *quandoquidem fortuna* is repeated in the same metrical position in each passage, and the personal pronouns *mihi tete* of 101, though linked with *mea ac tua*, are even closer to *mihi te* of 64.219.

The lines which follow are highly ambiguous, and without doubt consciously so. Especially words like *languida*,<sup>35</sup> *cara*, and *saturasset*, in

terms of Catullan usage, can be applied to either mad passion or old age and death. *Luctus* is capable of a kindred double meaning. When, in line 226, Aegeus mentions *nostros . . . luctus nostraeque incendia mentis*, he is not only describing grief at parting but also the very pangs of love.<sup>36</sup> To define further the depth and quality of Aegeus' emotions, Catullus emphasizes, as he does in every other similar situation, the yearning eyes of the lover. Even here, then, in a basically spiritual relationship, the depth of the love the father bears his son is denoted in sensual as well as spiritual terms. The repetitions we have adduced from 101 and 65 show that the poet probably had his brother in mind. It remains only to say that Catullus considered himself almost in the place of father toward his brother. The death of his brother, as several passages in 68 reveal, marks the end of their *domus*.<sup>37</sup> Just as his brother's death for Catullus, so also now the death of Theseus would mean that Aegeus' family no longer exists: *domus* symbolizes continuity of tradition as well as personal affection.

Omitting lines 221-22 for the moment, let us continue with lines 223-24, where Aegeus cries in sorrow:

sed primum multas *expromam* mente querellas  
canitiem terra atque infuso pulvere foedans, . . .

Though the objects involved are different — one refers to Aegeus' cries of woe, the other to poetic production cut off in sorrow and then continued by it — the situation is extraordinarily close to that of 65, in the opening lines of which Catullus states that, because of his brother's death

nec potis est dulcis Musarum *expromere* fetus  
*mens* animi, . . .

He can no longer produce the *dulcis fetus* of the Muses, verses of love and happiness,<sup>38</sup> but rather he must sing *maesta carmina* (65.12) while he mourns in the midst of his great sadness (*maeroribus*, 65.15). These complaints for the dead brother are surely akin, as the repeated imagery suggests, to the lament which Aegeus utters in his grief (*maesto*, line 210).

The community between the two poems would stop there were it not for the simile which follows. The songs Catullus sings in mourning are (65.13-14)

qualia sub densis ramorum concinit umbris  
Daulias, absumpti fata gemens Ityli . . . ,

like those which Philomela sang for her son Itylus, torn from her. By thus depicting in 65 the relationship with his brother in parental terms,

Catullus reveals clearly the psychological impetus behind the whole Aegeus-Theseus episode. The poet is experiencing over again the death of his brother. Aegeus utters the cries of woe and performs the acts of a funeral even before anyone has died. Instead of giving Theseus a joyous sendoff, wishing him the best of fortune, he clothes him with the blackness of death, for he, as poet, knows beforehand what the real outcome of the journey will be.

Hence it is not unexpected that throughout this episode Catullus exhibits his habitual intensity about going and returning. Its most vivid manifestation occurs in lines 236-37 as Aegeus bids his son, upon safe return, to raise a white sail

quam primum cernens ut laeta gaudia mente  
agnoscam cum te reducem aetas prospera sistet.

The poet means that upon his son's return the life of the old man will again become prosperous and livable.<sup>39</sup> For this reason when, in the lines which follow, Aegeus thinks that Theseus no longer lives, he takes his own life.

Catullus' feelings for his brother, as exhibited in 68, are all but the same. He realizes that true *gaudia* have gone out of his life since his brother's death. And, along with all *commoda*, he has lost his ability to create poetry. And in each case, as we have said, Catullus focuses his strongest emotions upon a journey. To describe the departure (and at least hoped-for return) of Theseus, Catullus uses imagery which recurs frequently in such lyrics as 9 and 31 to express the pleasure of arrival and the joy of seeing someone else come back after an absence.<sup>40</sup> Aegeus offers the first hint of this theme in line 221 as he cries,

non ego gaudens laetanti pectore mittam, . . .<sup>41</sup>

The emotions which Catullus centers on words such as *laetus*, *gaudium*, and their cognates can also be illustrated elsewhere within 64 itself by appealing to lines 33-34, where the poet describes the royal home and its guests as follows:

. . . oppletur laetanti regia coetu:  
dona ferunt prae se, declarant gaudia vultu.

There happiness is the order of the day. And the context is not only that of marriage, but specifically the arrival of the invited to throng the house. And though the wedding guests are not returning home, as is Theseus, the emotions caused by arrival are in each case evoked in similar fashion.

Through such vocabulary, the poet describes his own sensations

aroused by the phrase *te reducem*. Catullus feels strongly about the return of Veranius in 9 and of himself in 31. Where return could never be achieved, the loss was irretrievable, as in the case of his brother, whom he now subconsciously (or even consciously) involves in the figure of the forgetful Theseus.

The lines which follow Aegeus' speech are most crucial because they unify the two sections of the digression.<sup>42</sup> It is the similarity between the actual situations of Aegeus and Ariadne which first strikes the reader. Aegeus stands at the topmost bastion of his citadel looking out over the sea (lines 241-42):

at pater, ut summa prospectum ex arce petebat,  
anxia in assiduos absumens lumina fletus, . . .

This very kind of prospect confronted Ariadne, as she gazed seaward in longing for her beloved.<sup>43</sup> To show Aegeus catching sight of the ship, the poet employs the very same word he had utilized when describing Ariadne's first glimpse of Theseus (*conspexit*, lines 86 and 243), and many other words, such as *anxius*, *luctus*, and *assiduus*, recur in both passages.<sup>44</sup> But there is no need to elaborate connections of this sort, for the similarity of situation is undeniable: two people are both standing on eminences looking out to sea and losing, or about to lose, someone beloved.

The most obvious connecting link between the two episodes is the curse of Ariadne and its effects. The words which Theseus had once uttered to Ariadne and the *mandata* of Aegeus to Theseus are essentially parallel. Both depend on memory. In the first part emphasis lies on the *promissa* (line 59) of the *immemor iuvenis* (line 58). Line 123 renews this same stress on the *immemor pectus* of Theseus, and of course Ariadne picks up the idea again in her speech (lines 134-35).<sup>45</sup> But the hero's fallibility is exhibited most pointedly in lines 207-9:

ipse autem caeca mentem caligine Theseus  
consitus oblito dimisit pectore cuncta,  
quae mandata prius constanti mente tenebat,

while his father repeats like words, urging (lines 231-32):

tum vero facito ut memori tibi condita corde  
haec vigeant mandata, nec ulla oblitteret aetas; . . .

Catullus makes the forgetful mind the explicit link between the two passages when he says of Theseus in lines 247-48:



. . . qualem Minoidi luctum  
obtulerat mente immemori, talem ipse recepit.

It is surely now clear that in the figure of Theseus, whose *mens immemor* caused both Ariadne's trials and Aegeus' death, Catullus manifests the double suffering caused him by Lesbia and by his brother. The very words of Ariadne, in her final appeal to the Furies, reflect concisely this twofold result of Theseus' actions:

vos nolite pati nostrum vanescere luctum,  
sed quali solam Theseus me mente reliquit,  
tali mente, deae, funestet seque suosque.

It takes the same kind of character, she observes, to kill one's parent as it does to depart from her. *Reliquit* and *funestet* are to her nearly one and the same. Likewise the same grief as she receives from his departure he will suffer from his father's death. In other words, Ariadne knows that the quality which Theseus most lacks is *pietas*, which he has shown neither in his love for her nor in his devotion to his father.

The phrase *seque suosque* has a pronounced Catullan ring (the contexts of 58.3 and 79.2 show varying uses of it). The genuine, more enduring relationship is that of father to son. Theseus' feelings for Ariadne were merely passing, even though Ariadne's passion was intense and strong. As we have seen from 68, Catullus hoped ideally to combine the physical with the spiritual in love. It was not only by forgetfulness but also by his unusual impiety that Theseus could, at one and the same time, destroy both Ariadne and his own father, both lover and parent.

The much discussed lines in 72:

dilexi tum te non tantum ut vulgus amicam,  
sed pater ut gnatos diligit et generos . . . ,

find their archetype in epic form in the affection shown for Theseus by Aegeus. It is the same as that which the poet felt for his brother, and accounts for the superficially odd comparison in 72. It was possible that Lesbia might be able to realize for him the combination which formed his ideal love, and apparently she did so, but only for a time. It is certainly true that in his happiness the poet could not, or rather did not need to, formulate the twofold aspect of what he sought in love. Only the suffering brought about by Lesbia's infidelity could make this clear, even to him.<sup>46</sup>

To those who urge that 64 contains nothing of the true Catullus because he was not one to veil his feelings in such a manner, we could reply with many arguments. The most interesting for our present

purposes is to appeal to the Laudamia-Protesilaus simile in 68 (lines 73-130), to which occasional references have already been made. This simile is a little epic like 64, though a good deal shorter. Yet we know that there the poet is telling his own story, and it is easy to trace his mind at work during its progress. Suffice to say that Protesilaus is the connecting link in 68 as Theseus is in 64, for he not only leaves (deserts, Catullus would say) Laudamia as Lesbia did the poet, but he also dies in Troy like Catullus' brother. 68 therefore offers Protesilaus as an example of the same combination of double suffering which Theseus caused, and fuses in the character of Laudamia Catullus' own intense and individual love for Lesbia and for his brother. It thus merges in one episode that to which in 64 Catullus devotes two separate sections, unified in the end by similarity of conception and exposition.

The numerous connections, then, between the two sections of the digression are both external and internal. The poet deliberately emphasizes the external by means of plot and crucial imagistic repetition. We may find the true bond, however, only within the mind of the poet, in his ideas about love and in the aspects of his own feelings which he elaborates through his characters. Ariadne, disappointed of her ideal lover, looks back as Attis looked back, to the true home of the past. Also, in Aegeus' love for Theseus, we find epitomized Catullus' quest for *pietas*, for the true love between human beings, the deeply felt devotion which is only remotely connected with the sensual. But this quest fails. Aegeus' love for his son and Theseus' subsequent forgetfulness, her mother's love for Ariadne and the daughter's flight, are similar disasters. As Catullus says often of Lesbia, it was she

. . . quam Catullus unam  
plus quam se atque suos amavit omnes, . .

The phrase gains all the more meaning when compared with Ariadne's and Aegeus' plight.

Lines 249-50 return to the opening picture of Ariadne. The digression has gone full circle and, with outward picture and inner metaphor, the poet returns to the initial emotion. Then the spell is broken. A mood bordering almost on death is replaced by life. Bacchus comes with his rowdy throng, seeking the love of Ariadne. Once more all is young, vigorous, full of joy. Perhaps this is the scene which the poet meant originally to have depicted on the coverlet. He does, after all, compare Ariadne to a Bacchant in line 60, and there is not much difference in sound from her *heu* to the *euhoë* shouted by Bacchus' followers. We have

shown why it would not be difficult for Catullus to be carried away by the picture of the deserted heroine to the point of telling a tale which he had not otherwise planned to include in his narrative. But this is mere speculation. The arrival of Bacchus changes our mood entirely and prepares us for a return to the initial picture of the poem, the happy circumstances attending the wedding of Peleus and Thetis.

#### IV. PELEUS AND THETIS

The sections of the poem which surround the Ariadne digression deal with Peleus and Thetis. The song of the Fates begins with line 303, and everything up to that point, save the long interlude, consists of a description of the marriage, the circumstances under which Peleus and Thetis first met, when and how the ceremony took place. The narrative divides into two almost equal sections, lines 1-49 and 265-302. The mood of each is the same, and forms such a complete contrast with that of the digression that we cannot but seek the reason for it. For Ariadne all is empty, dark, and above everything else *muta*, yet for the happy pair throngs of people, including the gods themselves, mob the house, filling it with sounds of joy. The black silence of utter despair which surrounds the deserted Ariadne is juxtaposed with the bright shining happiness of the ideal wedding.<sup>47</sup>

Ostensibly, then, the common bond between the two tales is marriage, the one happy in its consummation, the other ill-fated in its sad conclusion. But there is more than this. Let us first examine the atmosphere in which the poet evolves the tale of Peleus and Thetis.

It begins, characteristically enough, on a mountain top. Like the *phaselus* of 4, whose voyage covers both Catullus' own special journey and the universal course of human life, the Argo was born once long ago on the crest of Mt. Pelion. Thence the Argonauts set out on their journey to capture the Golden Fleece. The ship is fleet and Athena lends her aid with a favorable breeze. It ploughs the sea, which grows hoary (*incanuit*, line 13) with the churning, and out of the whitening deep the Nereids peep to look at the strange sight.<sup>48</sup> It was on this occasion that Peleus saw Thetis (lines 16-18):

illa, atque (haud) alia, viderunt luce marinas  
mortales oculis nudato corpore Nymphas  
nutricum tenus exstantes e gurgite cano.

Images of whiteness and shimmer are connected by Catullus above all others with happiness, and these of the sea are the first of many instances



in 64.<sup>49</sup> A setting similar to this recurs during the epilogue of the poem. In the opening lines Catullus depicts the specific occasion when men saw the nymphs of the sea rising nude from the water, resulting in the union between mortal and divine which this section of the poem stresses as a prime consideration of the heroic age. At the poem's conclusion, he generalizes from the particular to describe the times in broader terms (lines 384-86):

praesentes namque ante domos invisere castas  
heroum, et sese mortali ostendere coetu,  
caelicolae nondum spreta pietate solebant.

There is no doubt that Catullus has here in mind the opening part of the poem, the joyous meeting of Peleus and Thetis in that ideal age when men were righteous and the gods consequently did not hesitate to show themselves to the sight of mortals.

The atmosphere of the voyage, carried on as far as need be, is dropped after line 18. The desired result has been achieved. Peleus is *incensus amore* for Thetis (like Bacchus for Ariadne in line 253, a brief inroad of the gods in an otherwise quite mortal story). Thetis does not disdain *humanos hymenaeos*, and above all the *pater ipse*, Jupiter himself, blesses the match. The idea is important for Catullus, and he reiterates it in lines 26-27. There is no hint of jealousy on the part of Jupiter as the legend usually has it. Rather he sanctions the union, thereby throwing into greater relief the love between the happy couple.

For this reason it is important to compare lines 21 and 26-27 with the sentiments of 70.2 (Lesbia had said that she would prefer to marry the poet even more than Jupiter) and 72.2, where Lesbia protests that she would love Catullus even if Jupiter himself sought her.<sup>50</sup> When Catullus addresses the hero in lines 26-27 as

Thessaliae columen Peleu, cui Iuppiter ipse,  
ipse suos divum genitor concessit amores . . . ,

he surely means to portray Peleus as surpassing, even if just for an instant, Jupiter in his happiness. It was Jupiter who, in giving up his love for Thetis, allowed Peleus to fulfill his desire. This is the ideal, just as the opening lines of 70 and 72 express in personal terms what Catullus' view of perfect love was. Momentarily he is greater than Jupiter because Lesbia loves him, just as Peleus, in the bliss of his marriage with Thetis, seems almost equal to the chief of the gods.<sup>51</sup> The second halves of both 70 and 72 take up the real, what actually comes of the dreams (on Catullus' part) and expression (on Lesbia's) of perfection, dreams which are



shattered by the reality of her vulgarity. The reference to Jupiter, as an aspect of the perfect marriage defined by the short poems, offers a further hint that the contrasting section of 64, devoted to Ariadne, is indeed the reenactment of the second halves of both 70 and 72, the truth of reality after the fleeting hope of gaining the ideal goal. This hope finds a strikingly vivid, truthful, and Roman portrayal in 61. The episode of Peleus and Thetis is its epic counterpart.

The poet is so taken with the picture he has drawn that he bursts in with an aside of his own (lines 22-23):

o nimis optato saeculorum tempore nati  
heroes, salvet, deum genus!

When Catullus does this in epic statement, as at the end of 63, it means much as a disclosure of his personal involvement. Here once more the thought reflects that of the closing lines of the poem. This was the great age of mankind, this the *optatum saeculorum tempus* in which men married happily and the gods blessed the union. Peleus will be happy (lines 25-26):

teque adeo eximie taedis felicibus aucte,  
Thessaliae columen, Peleu, . . .

In much the same words the Fates begin their song to Peleus.<sup>52</sup> It would seem that Catullus can, like the Parcae, detach himself and admire the beauty and happiness of Peleus' love. The question with which he concludes the opening section (lines 28-30) almost implies amazement at the good fortune of the lovers. Could such a thing really happen to a mortal? the poet asks, repeating the *te* of direct address in lines 25, 28, and 29. He can separate himself from this love and admire. He can only partake in Ariadne's sadness.

The scene changes in line 31, and the generalized statement of line 22 becomes the particular. The poet's universal feelings about the age become centered on the special event about to take place. The six lines which follow (lines 32-37) paint a portrait which could without exaggeration be called Catullus' ideal setting, uniting the beauty of home with the pleasure of arrival, which in this case is doubly gratifying because of the future wedding. All Thessaly crowds the house (lines 32-34):

advenere, domum conventu tota frequentat  
Thessalia, oppletur laetanti regia coetu:  
dona ferunt prae se, declarant gaudia vultu:

Much of the imagery recurs shortly. It was even of his *ianuae frequentes*

that Attis thought, as symbolizing his lost home. The throngs of people mean as much to the poet as the joy which they display.

Catullus places the reader as an onlooker upon the threshold who is to behold the palace receding (line 43) in its brightness.<sup>53</sup> It gleams with gold and silver. The ivory glistens, the goblets flash. Indeed (line 46),

tota domus gaudet regali splendida gaza.

The house has become for the moment a person, capable of displaying the same emotion as the guests. Exactly such an emotion Catullus imputes to a personified and rejoicing Sirmio at the end of 31. Nor are the events dissimilar, for he is also arriving home, back to his beloved peninsula. He has left the fields of Bithynia to return, and his home displays obvious pleasure at the advent of its master, just as the house of Peleus glories in the arrival of the wedding visitors.<sup>54</sup>

So begins the poem. From the top of Pelion to the meeting of the lovers to the bright colors on the wedding couch, all the scenes are delightful. The poet conveys thus his own happiness, and makes the outer situation mirror the ideal beauty of such a perfect union among lovers. When the poet returns to this picture, after the digression on Ariadne, the mortal guests are departing and the gods beginning to arrive. The poet is true to his initial statement that the event shows the unity of gods and men. After a beautiful simile comparing the departing mortals to the sea at dawn ruffled by the rising winds which, in turn, make the waves glimmer as they recede into the distance (sight and sound could scarcely be unified imaginatively to greater effect), the poet turns to the gods. Chiron is the first to arrive (like the Argo, *e vertice Pelei*) bringing *silvestria dona* (lines 280-83). The imagery lends much to the atmosphere already established, but also adds a new note of youth and bloom, preparing the reader for the wedded joys to be described in the song of the Fates. Once again it is upon the house that Catullus, resorting to words of sound to convey the excitement of a lovely odor, centers his feelings (line 284):

. . . permulsa domus iucundo risit odore.

Catullus maintains this mood up to line 302, as the home of Peleus gradually grows green with the gifts of nature brought by the divine guests.

Even here, however, the bliss of the wedding does not remain unbroken, for the appearance of Prometheus, which has never been adequately explained, somehow breaks the enchanting spell, as the description of Achilles does again later. Critics seize rather lamely upon

two minor versions of the Peleus and Thetis myth which make Prometheus the person who warns Jupiter that whoever marries Thetis will beget a son stronger than himself. The lines devoted to him run as follows (294-97):

post hunc consequitur sollerti corde Prometheus,  
extenuata gerens veteris vestigia poenae,  
quam quondam *silici* restrictus *membra* catena  
persolvit pendens e verticibus praeruptis.

The description seems needlessly verbose unless one compares the lines where Catullus describes Attis' act of emasculation (63.5-6):

devolsit ili acuto sibi pondera *silice*,  
itaque ut relictas sensit sibi *membra* sine viro, . . .

Not only are the italicized words repeated, but there are parallels between *persolvit* and *devolsit*, *restrictus* and *relictas*, *pendens* and *pondera*. It is as if the poet himself wanted to appear at the wedding, a bit of the present in the happiness of the past, to show just what the evil power of woman is.<sup>55</sup>

Thus far it is basically atmosphere and mood which the poet has sought to convey. He has been building up a setting for the song of the Fates, who make their appearance in line 303.

## V. THE SONG OF THE FATES

The song of the Fates is of course the wedding hymn itself, and should be designed to elaborate the future happiness of Peleus and Thetis and magnify their glories. Yet, at the same time, it takes one of their proudest boasts, their future son Achilles, and identifies him (despite the heroic attributes attached to him) with the bloody brutality of war. Moreover, the song stands apart from the symmetry of the whole.

The song itself, however, is finely symmetrical, and close analysis shows that it is constructed in the characteristic form of a digression. It starts off in lines 328-37 with a further allusion to the ideal love. The personal frame of reference gives way to abstract statement in lines 334-37, where the *domus* is said to roof over the two lovers and yet is conjoined symbolically with *amor* of the next line — the house symbolizes the structure of love. Just as the house *contexit*, the love *coniunxit*.<sup>56</sup> The result is a compact noteworthy for its concord.<sup>57</sup> These same thoughts are resumed at the end of the song (lines 372-81). The lovers are urged: *optatos . . . coniungite amores* in a *felici foedere*. There is no worry that Thetis will be *discors* (line 379).



Just as the Peleus-Thetis episode surrounds the Ariadne digression, a happy event framing a sad, so these groups of ten lines each, which begin and end the song, form a distinct contrast with the intervening section. This deals with Achilles, the tragic offspring of the happy pair. The reader at first wonders why Catullus adds this episode. (He warns of its violently contrasting nature by the mere outward technique of the digression, which resumes the feelings of joy at the end without allowing any excessively bitter taste to remain.)

However, there is no doubt that the poet is carried away by the picture he is creating. Our sympathy never lies with the hero Achilles. He is fearless, brave, and fleet of foot (how finely the poet gives metaphorical expression to the Homeric epithet in lines 340-41!).<sup>58</sup> No hero can compare with him, when the Phrygian fields are steeped with gore.<sup>59</sup> The poet seems almost sarcastic in the next stanza (lines 348-51) when he says that the mothers recognized his *virtutes* as they beat their breasts during their sons' funerals. The situation reminds us of Aegeus in line 224. Just as the reader's mind is scarcely centred on the *fervida virtus* of Theseus there, so also our sympathy rests with the aged women in their grief, and not with the ruthless hero.

Catullus gives symbolic form to this characteristic in the effective simile which follows (lines 353-55):

namque velut densas praecerpens messor aristas  
sole sub ardenti flaventia demetit arva,  
Troigenum infesto prosternet corpora ferro.

Similar imagery was used in 48.5 to depict an overwhelming number. The *aristae* are the bodies of the Trojans whom Achilles mows down indiscriminately.<sup>60</sup> The hot sun places the warriors in the prime of life, while the violence of the scene is enhanced by the verb *prosternet*.<sup>61</sup>

The imagery in the next stanza changes from land to water, but the same ironic tone still remains. It is now the wave of the Scamander which bears witness to his *magnis virtutibus* (line 357). The river bears the bodies. But the poet does not allow us to forget the reaping imagery of the previous stanza, because the carnage is pictured as rife with *caesis* . . . *corporum acervis* — slaughtered piles of bodies which, like heaps of grain, block the passage of the river and warm it with gore.

And the final witness to Achilles' prowess, the one particularly gruesome achievement singled out from the nameless heap, is the death of Polyxena, a murder especially "heroic," the poet ironically implies, because accomplished after the hero's death (lines 362-64):



denique testis erit morti quoque reddita praeda,  
cum teres excelso coacervatum aggere bustum  
excipiet niveos percussae virginis artus.

The tomb is as lofty as the river is deep,<sup>62</sup> and the previous imagistic strand is again carried on as the *acervi* of the slaughtered foemen become the tomb *coacervatum*. The image is so skillfully wrought by the poet that the reader's eye climbs the tomb — which instead of being polished or round becomes a heap of blood-red carnage — only to find the white-limbed virgin on the top, sacrificed to the ideal of heroism which lives in spirit though dead in the flesh. The poet elaborates further on the picture (lines 368–70):

alta Polyxenia madefient caede sepulcra  
quae, velut ancipiti succumbens victima ferro,  
proiciet truncum summisso poplite corpus.

The lofty tomb is soaked in her blood. She is both an offering sacrificed on an altar and a victim of war. The word *ferro* recalls the *infestum ferrum* which Achilles himself had used (line 355), and the fact that it is *anceps* but adds to the ambiguity, for the war ax of the Romans was also usually double-bladed. She is just one more body among the other dead, only more pathetic than the rest. So ends the Achilles digression, and with it we return to the happy bridal couple.

One can only guess why the Achilles passage was written at all. The triumph of brutality over gentleness is another way of expressing the contrast between vulgarity and chastity which is nothing new to Catullus. The purity of the virgin is only further emphasized when put in contrast with the overwhelming masculine rage of Achilles. The plough always defeats the flower. Perhaps there is another reason. Troy means one event of special importance to Catullus — the death of his brother. When he thinks of the Trojan war in 68 the result is a repetition of the lines earlier in the poem on the sad loss of the brother. The atmosphere is much the same in each case. The men are summoned away from home to battle around the walls. The Parcae knew of the results beforehand (68.85) as they sing of them in 64. And in the end only *sepulcra* remain. Out of all the virtues (*omnium virtutum*: 68.90) the only thing left is *acerba cinis*, and the bitterest is that of Catullus' brother. This is what Troy and the Trojan war meant to him. 64 touches upon the prowess of Achilles in epic terms, but the personal events of his own life may well be at the root of Catullus' elaboration.

At any rate, the song of the Fates is bitter and sorrowful. It is a lament for the loss of purity and the former contact men had with the gods.

Though Achilles is associated with the glorious marriage of Peleus and Thetis, nevertheless the brutality of his actions somehow helps bridge the gap between the ideal/past section of the poem and the real/present. He is part of the heroic age, yet the brilliance of his deeds is tainted by a certain unheroic quality. Unnecessary blood was shed in his honor. Though by no means specifically referring to civil war, the poet seems almost to create the same aura in picturing the murderous deeds of Achilles as he does through the description of the shedding of fraternal blood in the poem's conclusion. Certainly Polyxena becomes an almost symbolic Ariadne, sacrificed to the brutality of the heroic/masculine soul. And in this respect she is a figure of Catullus himself, the feminine flower of *II* sheared by the violence of the plough which, caring nothing for its beauty, cuts it heedlessly down.

Whatever the connection, Achilles' delight in the shedding of blood and the horrors of war leads directly into the lines which commence the description of the present in the poem's epilogue (lines 397-99):

sed postquam tellus scelere est imbuta nefando  
iustitiamque omnes cupida de mente fugarunt,  
perfudere manus fraterno sanguine fratres, . . .

The word *imbuta* implies the drinking up of gore, a fact the poet specifies a few lines later with the phrase *sanguine fratrum* (and *perfudere* has an ironic connection with *perfundat* in line 330). Hence the sadness which the reader feels in the song of the Fates is deliberately made explicit, for it also, like the lament of Ariadne, is a commentary on the evils of the times.

## VI. EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION

The two sections into which the epilogue divides, lines 382-96, detailing the attendance of the gods in the ceremonies of mankind during the heroic age, and lines 397-408, picturing the present ways of the world, which through evil have driven the gods far hence, seem strangely un-Catullan in theme at first and much more akin to certain passages in the *Georgics* where Virgil inveighs against the civil wars. But so strong and clear is the stamp of Catullus upon these verses that we cannot help finding therein an epic statement of his own thoughts. The heroic age contrasts with the present decay, and it is in terms of sexual purity or foulness that the poet interprets the division. The gods were accustomed to visit the houses of men when they were *castae*, and to show themselves willingly before *pietas* was spurned. Nemesis and Minerva, Mars and

Bacchus, all joined in religious worship and daily life. Afterwards the earth was imbued with *scelus*, and *iustitia* was put to flight. This seems to be the only deliberate reference to civil war.<sup>63</sup> The lines which follow detail in abundance the manifold sexual aberrations in which Catullus found the key to the degradation of the times. A father desires the death of his son in order to marry the son's bride. A mother loves her son, to the defilement of the household gods. *Pietas* has become *impietas* (lines 403-4), *fanda* are confused with *nefanda*, justice is no longer at hand (line 406).

The relationships are all perverse, all involving parents and their children, as if to Catullus this were the worst type of offense against moral purity. When the intense spiritual affection between parents and children is violated for mere sensual ends, the worst of evils has occurred.<sup>64</sup> The mother bears the burden of a double impiety — she is first called *impia* (line 403) because of her relations with her son and then (line 404) because she had no hesitation to *divos scelerare parentes*. The total picture has much in common with the father's accomplishments in 67.23-24:

sed pater illius gnati violasse cubile  
dicitur et miseram conscelerasse domum.

Again it is noteworthy that the *domus* possesses a twofold nature: it is the *cubile* of 67.23, a symbol of sensual pleasure, yet it also stands for the *divos parentes* of 64.404. This spiritual quality of reverence and awe is also concentrated on the *penates* of 9.3 and *lar* of 31.9. The father hence performs a double breach of piety by his unnatural act in 67, for he is said not only to *violasse cubile* of his son but also to *conscelerasse domum*, to have violated the symbol of true relations between parents and children. To make the idea even clearer, Catullus calls the house *miseram*, as if it were a person in actual pain at the act of force. He adds that it was only an *impia mens* (line 25) which could have perpetrated such a deed, and cries later in sarcasm (line 29):

egregium narras mira pietate parentem.

The *mira pietas* of the father could not be better scorned than by the explicit description of his crime that follows.

And all this, though lacking deliberate application, suggests Theseus' treatment of Ariadne, not in regard to the seduction (hardly a crime in the Roman calendar), but to his subsequent lack of *pietas* and *iustitia*. The ideal past can in no way be found in the all-too-real present. Like the bronze age, as delineated in Hesiod's pessimistic progress, the gods no longer deign nor desire to partake in the ways of men (lines 407-8,



reflecting 384-85). When *pietas* is spurned, the result is not limited to a new lack of worship for the gods. Piety no longer exists on the human level, because men fail to be chaste in their dealings with each other.

The body of the poem, leading up to the lines of the epilogue, reveals exactly the same distinction that divides the final verses, and only when the analogy is pressed does the poem fall into a unified whole. The steadfast happiness of Peleus and Thetis, which contrasts with the infidelity of Theseus, is the product of that ideal age pictured in the first part of the epilogue. In the story of Ariadne we find the poet describing himself, but in so doing he becomes an example of the spirit of his own times. The very point which Ariadne makes in lines 143-48, with specific reference to Theseus, is here generalized into the lack of justice which pervades the modern world.

Indeed, Catullus found himself constantly surrounded by, and fighting against, that degeneracy of which the vulgarity of Lesbia was but a small part. Perhaps a brief word of further explanation is in order for such a claim. There is no denying that Catullus was very much a part of the press of life which swirled around him, but this in no way categorizes him as a cleverly gifted *debauché*. That he enjoyed life and described some of its more sordid aspects does not necessarily mean that he ordered his own existence in the manner he imputes to others. Indeed he protests against this very accusation when he says, in his oft imitated statement,

nam castum esse decet pium poetam  
ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est.

He also gives abundant evidence that his age was marked, amid its countless expressions of individuality, by the longing and search for some *modus vivendi* which transcended day-to-day life. The ideal, which was ever before his eyes but only briefly seemed attainable, takes its shape in this poem in the relationship between Peleus and Thetis.

The final lines are thus another unifying factor for the whole poem. They are of a rare sort for Catullus. To moralize was not his usual bent, even though here was one of the few occasions in his poetry where he could suitably do so. We have seen Catullus' deep involvement in the characters of Ariadne and Aegeus and traced his violent reaction to the figures of Theseus and Achilles. The organic links between the various episodes of the digression are found in the experience of the poet. Yet it is the final lines which make clear the design of the poem as a whole, and show exactly what goal the poet had in mind by the abrupt juxtaposition of two such seemingly diverse stories. The moralizing is for a purpose



and is in order. The particular structure of 64 almost demands it for completion.

The fact that the Theseus-Ariadne episode adorns the marriage couch is scarcely an argument against the time differentiation which we have proposed. It is not the actual chronological sequence of events which is important, for this is gradually lost sight of in the vivid contrast which arises between the two episodes. The mere fact that the poet breaks into the happy story of Peleus and Thetis with a tale of profound sadness is proof enough that his thoughts were centred not on external temporal regularity, but rather upon the internal emotional effect which the juxtaposition caused. It is only by visualizing the resulting contrast as the tension between ideal and real that the full effect of the poem's balance is achieved.

Moreover, it is just because Catullus never states his direct involvement that he can write the final lines at all. If he were telling the tale of his own woes without the facade of epic to hide the personal intensity, he could never sit back and moralize. Yet unless we realize Catullus' own participation in the character of Ariadne and grasp the fact that it is indeed his own present story he is unfolding, the ending makes sense only as a prosaic moralistic appendage. As it is, this is the only place in the whole of Catullus where he could point a moral of such a sort, and its appropriateness is not only undoubted but demanded, because it unifies the poem and makes clear the design of the whole.

The ending is like a coda which draws together the many themes of a gigantic musical exposition. Catullus may seem here to sacrifice some of his usual Mozartian combination of tenderness, delicacy, and innate passion (the veil of suffering is hard to penetrate) for a Wagner-like quality of movement which depends not on lyric themes, but rather on the effect of a large and sweeping design. Since time is of little import, this poem seems mere rhetoric to those bent on interpreting it as part of a past tradition. E. A. Poe, in words limited because their direction was toward his own age, found the long poem an impossibility and documented his argument by casting a somewhat prejudiced eye on the *Iliad*, a poem which seemed to him only a series of lyrical efforts loosely joined together. Yet the admitted goal of many among the greatest of the Romantic poets (and Catullus is a "romantic," both through his own personality and through the temper of his age) was to write a long poem. The composition of short poems, beautiful in their fleeting selves, was often considered only an apprenticeship for things more grand in conception and outlook. 64 is, in a certain sense, to Catullus what *Hyperion* and *Prometheus Unbound* are to Keats and Shelley. It contains within it

somewhere reflections of almost every major subject which interested him. Yet, great as are the long poems of the Romantics, Catullus here surpasses them with a sustained level of achievement which they did not maintain outside their lyric efforts.

The restless spirit of Catullus is revealed here as nowhere in his shorter poems, a spirit always yearning for a perfection which could never be achieved and at the same time partaking to a heightened degree in human emotions. Catullus could only rarely accept things as he found them, but rather propelled himself into an unceasing inquiry for what was better. In the manner of Baudelaire, he was a poet very much involved in both the sapphires and the mire of life, who yet demanded exterior exactness in everything from personal charm to the appearance of a manuscript, as a token of inner beauty. These are the two sides of the coin for Catullus. Such dichotomies also exist for Lucretius, whose self-imposed pattern ever fell victim to his personality and creative powers. In a very different and much more worldly manner, Cicero's idealism was likewise constantly shattered by the buffets of reality. 64 is the final expression of this tension in Catullus. In fact nothing less than the complete scope of the poet's own imagination is the central unifying core for the poem. To read it thus is to treat the work not as an obscure byproduct but as the keystone of Catullus' genius.

Nor are we justified in assuming that the epyllion could never be a vehicle for personal statement (an argument which seems to imply that Catullus could only be himself when writing in shorter verse forms).<sup>65</sup> Indeed, the trend of recent scholarship seems to suggest that the epyllion was not a stereotyped genre, incapable of flexibility to suit circumstances, if indeed it was a fixed genre at all. Yet, assuming that it was, it is often taken for granted that the epyllion, being perhaps a Hellenistic form, could never be used, however subtly, to express personal feelings, and that a poem such as 64 must be the result only of Alexandrian trends in a poet.

We have attempted to prove the opposite. This is not to say that there are no Alexandrian elements in 64. Catullus could not and surely did not want to ignore tradition blindly. Nor, however, was he a poet to be bound by it when its appeal to him was not of a personal nature. Even those who seek to find the influence of Alexandria upon 64 are forced to admit how uncharacteristic the poem most often is. It is neither excessively learned nor obscure. It does not tell a story for the sake of knowledge displayed, but, on the contrary, turns two mythological tales into moving personal documents where personal intensity triumphs over any

inherited stylistic devices inimical to the creation of fine poetry. If with 64 Catullus is making further acknowledgement of his debt to Alexandria, it is a very strange manner of expression indeed. Far from choosing the epic genre because it offered opportunity for mere literary exercise, he found that only here could he state his own situation as he now lived it, and as he hoped he might have but did not, in terms first veiled and then painfully clear.

This raises another point: if the poem is such a personal document, why did not the poet write in autobiographical fashion and tell his own tale in the first person? It would be easy to answer this by saying that Catullus was carried away by the situation of Ariadne and, merging his own feelings with hers, used her as a mask for himself. But I think that another issue could also be raised in response, the origin of the subjective love-elegy.

If the genres of Latin literature are viewed in terms of what we still possess, it is only by means of the love-elegy that Catullus in his own person could have given a lengthy description of exactly what his situation was toward Lesbia. But this genre was probably not yet developed. Catullus himself may have been in the process of evolving it.<sup>66</sup> We find the germs of the subjectivism in all his epigrammatical poems, and it reaches a new peak of development in 76. The union of autobiography with myth, one of the trademarks of Propertius, appears in 68. But much of the interest of the myth in 68, as opposed to the subjective description, is that it tells the truth about the poet's present situation whereas the surrounding frame of reference is happy and past, false in relation to the present. He was not ready to, or perhaps could not, reinterpret the present by myth as Propertius does.

The only way Catullus could describe his situation in detail, and not in the bitter brevity of epigram, was through the long epic tale. Such a recourse as 64 would have been needless to the Augustan poets. To Catullus it was absolutely necessary, because it was only by the disguise of symbols that he could be autobiographical at such length. Epic statement remained the only means open to him, as he was still in the process of pioneering the genre which later Latin authors would find ideal as a mode in which to express personal feelings.

## NOTES

1. The most recent work of any length on 64 is F. Klingner, "Catullus Peleus-Epos," *SBAW* 1956, No. 6, 1-92. Klingner's basic theme, to defend the long poems of Catullus, is akin to that presented here, but his argument looks pri-



marily to the changes Catullus has rung on traditional themes, not to the *ingenium* of the poet himself.

For a survey of other recent treatments see J. P. Boucher, "A propos du Carmen 64 de Catulle," *RevEtLat* 34 (1956) 190-202, to which add C. Murley, "The Structure and Proportion of Catullus LXIV," *TAPA* 68 (1937) 305-17. Murley quotes (p. 305) the criticism of Kroll on the Hellenistic appearance of the poem as based on four factors: the use of inserts, emphasis on the emotions of the characters, pedanticism, and metrical tendencies such as the frequent use of spondaic lines. That the poem is a translation of a Hellenistic original is an opinion proposed as early as 1866 by A. Riese, "Catullus 64 Gedicht aus Kallimachos übersetzt," *RhM* 21 (1866) 498-509.

On William Blake see Northrop Frye, *Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake* (Princeton 1947).

2. Its supposed lack of unity is perhaps the main stumbling block to an appreciation of the poem. See A. L. Wheeler, *Catullus and the Traditions of Ancient Poetry* (Berkeley 1934) who, p. 132, abandons "the effort to find some internal connection between the tales." Also cf. Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung* (Berlin 1924) 2.301; E. A. Havelock, *The Lyric Genius of Catullus* (Oxford 1939) 77-78 and 187 n.32.

3. For a penetrating study of the unified artistic presence behind the short poems see J. P. Elder, "Notes on some Conscious and Subconscious Elements in Catullus' Poetry," *HSCP* 60 (1951) 101-36. A treatment which concentrates particularly on unity of style is H. Bardon, *L'Art de la Composition chez Catulle* (Paris 1943).

4. See O. Friess, *Beobachtungen über die Darstellungskunst Catulls* (Diss. Würzburg 1929) 12-13.

5. Poem 8 is the clearest example.

6. D. L. Slater, in his lecture on *The Poetry of Catullus* (Manchester 1912) makes the equation between Lesbia and Theseus, and the idea was elaborated in parts of the dissertation of L. L. Sell (*De Catulli carmine LXIV quaestiones*: New York 1918). Though Sell's initial idea is in the spirit of this exposition, the cargo of dubious additions it carries with it obscures its basic worth (see the review by B. L. Ullman in *CP* 16 (1921) 404-6, and Wheeler (above, n. 2) 267 n.28).

7. A history of various treatments of this marriage is given by R. Reitzenstein, "Die Hochzeit des Peleus und der Thetis," *Hermes* 35 (1900) 73-105. John Finley in *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1955) reveals the essence of Pindar's treatment of the myth (see esp. p. 48), which seems to offer much common ground with that of Catullus.

8. Her feelings are *indomitos*, the very word Catullus uses to describe himself in relation to Calvus in 50.11.

9. Cf. 65.17-18. On Theseus' meaningless *dicta*, cf. 76.7-8 and 70.4, where once again the metaphor of winds is utilized.

10. *Immemor*: 30.1 and 64.58; *prodere*: 30.3 and 64.190. The theme of perfidy goes through both poems: 30.3, 6, 11; 64.132-133, 182, 191, etc. *Fallax* and *fallere* appear in 30.3-4, 64.56, 151; *iubebas*, 30.7 and 64.140; *obliscor*, 30.11 and 64 *passim* (e.g., 208). For the figure of the winds, see, along with the note immediately preceding, 30.10, and for the *facta* of Theseus and Alfenus cf. 30.6, 9 with 64.192, 203.

11. The word *fugit*, for example, appears in 8.10 and 37.11.

12. Cf. 61.11-12 (where Hymen almost symbolizes the bride) with 64.56-57.



13. E.g., *liquerit*, l. 123 (and cf. ll. 59 and 133).

14. With which cf. 76.22.

15. And cf. ll. 94 and 245.

16. The lines are not without their own beauties of craftsmanship. Consider, for example, the sounds of lines 59–60. The *pro* of *promissa* links with the opening syllable of *procellae*. The promises are equivalent to the breezes. But the breezes, like the wave imagery, are real as well as metaphorical. The *procul* of line 60, repeating the sound of *procellae*, tells the reader that the breezes of Theseus' fraudulent promises are indeed those which are wafting him far from her sight. And, as if to complete the circle, the final syllables of *procellae* are repeated in *ocellis* which ends the next line. The result of Theseus' perfidy is now literally apparent to her.

17. With the imagery cf. ll. 320–21.

18. The one adjective applied twice to Theseus, *ferox* (lines 73 and 247) is scarcely more than an epic epithet.

19. Cf. 61.32 and, by transference, 61.54. With the imagery of 64.86–90, cf. especially 61.58 and 62.21–22.

20. He may, of course, be reading it into a passage such as 2.7.

21. There are clear references to lines 121–23 in 133–35, e.g., the word *litus* occurs in 121 and 133; *liquerit* (line 123) becomes *liquisti* (line 133), *immemori* (line 123) *immemor* (line 135), and *discedens* appears in 123 and 134.

22. With which cf. *extremo tempore* (l. 169).

23. Cf. l. 174. For Theseus' perjury see also ll. 143, 146, and 148.

24. In her anger Ariadne surely means the word *avectam* (line 132) to have the connotations of forceful abduction, even though the previous description said nothing to that effect.

25. The same time scheme is used in poem 8, among others. Though *quondam* warns the reader that Ariadne is looking at a happiness which is past, the theme of hope goes through the whole passage (e.g., ll. 144, 177, 180, 186, etc.).

26. One might compare, for its similarity of context, the imagery used by Dido in *Aeneid* 4. 366–67. This is picked up again and reversed in *Aeneid* 6.471, where it is she who is now like a *Marpesia cautes* toward Aeneas.

27. For similar uses of the verb *eripio* see 64.219, 65.8, etc. A comparison with the opening verses of 68 sheds further light on these lines from 64. In line 149 Ariadne used the familiar water imagery to describe the trials of Theseus, caught in the very whirlpool of death. In such a way the poet describes Manlius' sea of troubles in 68.3–4. We would seek no further for comparisons — the image is indeed a common one — did not the phrase *spumantibus undis* of 68.3 appear also in 64.155 (and the lines show more resemblances than this). Though in 68 the poet is describing a survivor cast up on the shore while the comparison in 64 refers to a man sinking, nevertheless the metaphorical trials of the sea, in which Theseus earlier found himself, have now become Ariadne's.

28. This change from masculine to feminine, which I hope to examine more fully in a separate study, is most apparent in the long poems but occurs, under various guises, also in the shorter works (e.g., 11).

29. In line 170, combining the breezes once more with her sense of hearing, she cries that fortune grudges ears to her wails: "fors etiam nostris invidit questibus auris." Words entrusted to the winds are useless (the similarity of sound between *aurae* and *ures* abets the ironic contrast between ll. 164 and 170).

30. Virgil offers a close commentary on these lines in the passage where

Anchises first greets Aeneas upon their meeting in the Underworld (*Aeneid* 6.687–94). Aside from many minor repetitions, l. 689 is repeated almost word for word from 64.166, with the appropriate change from *missas* to *notas*. Lines 692–93 also contain Catullan reminiscences, this time reflecting the opening line of 101. Just as Aeneas comes to Anchises, so Catullus arrives to offer the last *munus* of love (and death) to his brother.

31. Without going into a detailed analysis here, we may observe that it is a comparison with Ariadne's situation and curse which demonstrates the unity behind the lyric *schema* of 50. Cf. 64.54 with 50.11; 64.57 and 50.9, and especially 64.190–97 with 50.18–21.

32. The similarities between this passage in 68 and the opening lines of the speech of Aegeus are manifold. *Iucundior vita* parallels *vita dulcius*, *casus* is repeated in 64.216 and 68.105, and the verb *eripio* appears in 64.219 and 68.106.

33. It is noteworthy that the only appearances of the word *nuper* in Catullus are here (64.217) and 65.5, where Catullus is thinking on his brother recently dead.

34. Cf. 68.1, 13.

35. For the sensual connotations attached to *languidus*, see its use in 25.3 and 67.21 and the appearance of *languor* in 58b.9. For *saturasset*, cf. 68.83.

36. Both these images had been used previously to describe Ariadne's love. Line 71 tells that she suffered from *assiduus luctibus* when Theseus arrived in Crete, and line 97 shows her *incensam mente*.

37. The poet makes the connection explicit by using images of burial for each — the one literal, the other metaphorical (cf. 68.22, 94, 97, 99).

38. There is a similar use of *dulcis* in 64.210.

39. E. T. Merrill, *Catullus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1951) *ad loc.* claims for the word *aetas* only the meaning *tempus*.

40. The "journey" poems of Catullus show how frequently these words are associated with the joy of return, e.g., *laetus* (9.11, 31.4, 46.8, etc.) and *gaudeo* (31.12–13, etc.).

41. The phrase *laeta gaudia mente* is also employed of similar circumstances shortly after in line 236.

42. Lines 238–45 also offer an interesting example of the poet's mind at work. As Aegeus looks out from the citadel, the poet tells how he was (line 242): "anxia in *assiduos* absumens *lumina fletus*, . . ." In much the same words he portrays his own love-sick state in 68.55–56: "*maesta neque assiduo tabescere lumina fletu* / *cessarent* . . ." The lines which follow in 68 are a simile which has the twofold effect of describing both the poet's tears and the assuaging help which Manlius gave him. Yet the words of the opening lines of the simile are not unlike those which describe Aegeus' suicide (*praeceps* appears in 64.244 and 68.59; *vertice* in 64.244 and 68.57; *iecit* is parallel to *prosilit* in 64.244 and 68.58, and *scopulorum* to *lapide* in the same lines). What makes a subconscious (or even conscious) connection between these two sets of lines more plausible is the simile which preceded this description in 64 by a few lines, where the commands of Aegeus, at first remembered faithfully by Theseus, are said to leave him in the end (ll. 239–40): ". . . *ceu pulsae ventorum flamine nubes / aereum nivei montis liquere cacumen*." This is an elaboration of one of Catullus' favorite comparisons dealing with the lack of constancy in love. Yet in line 240 we have two crucial words repeated from 68.57: "*qualis in aerii perlucens vertice montis* . . ." The close juxtaposition in the repetitions in actual description and in simile must surely be

more than fortuitous. The feelings of love experienced by Catullus and Aegeus are once more described in terms of the same imagery, and here we have a chance to show the poet's mind at work upon the same imagistic pattern in two quite different poems.

43. The connection is most explicit in line 127, where Catullus tells how Ariadne climbed the sheer mountains "unde aciem (in) pelagi vastos protenderet aestus, . . ." So also Attis, while standing on the edge of the sea, begs in pitiful prayer to be told whither he should direct his eyes to find his fatherland (63.55-56).

44. *Anxius*, ll. 203, 242; *luctus*, ll. 71, 226; *assiduus*, ll. 71, 242. The word *anxius* appears often elsewhere in descriptions of love, e.g. 68.8.

45. And we recall that the same images of fleeting feeling and forgetfulness, which she uses in ll. 142-43, recur when applied to Theseus' obedience to the commands of Aegeus.

46. See F. O. Copley, "Emotional Conflict and its Significance in the Lesbian Poems of Catullus," *AJP* 70 (1949) 22-40.

47. Poem 61 comes close to picturing in fact what must have been to Catullus the perfect marriage. But even throughout it are scattered occasional remonstrances to the happy couple concerning the preservation of marital bliss, as if the poet knew the pitfalls and was worried that the picture he was sketching could scarcely endure.

48. The same image suggested by *incanuit* is continued in *candenti e gurgite* (l. 14) and *e gurgite cano* (l. 18).

49. For other examples of imagery of whiteness in a happy setting cf. 68.148, 107.6.

50. In both 72.2 and 64.28 the verb *teneo* is used with the same sexual ambiguity.

51. A similar profession, this time made by the poet himself, is found in the opening lines of 51.

52. Cf. ll. 25-26 with 323-24.

53. A very similar effect is achieved again in l. 273.

54. This event is similar to that Catullus expects when, in 35.3-4, he summons Caecilius to leave Novum Comum and come to Verona (cf. the sound of 35.4: "Comi *moenia* Lariumque litus" with that of 64.36: "Crannonisque domos ac *moenia* Larissaea").

55. One might compare with this the appearance of Shelley in stanzas 31ff. of *Adonais*.

56. Cf. also ll. 329, 331, 372-73.

57. Line 335 (and cf. 76.3 and 87.3-4).

58. Ellis (on l. 341, p. 335) quite rightly compares also Pindar *Nem.* 3.51.

59. *Campi*, a reading suggested by Statius to fill the gap in line 344, is especially apt in the light of 46.4.

60. For further instances of *carpo* see 62.36, 37, 43.

61. And we also recall the use of *substernens* in ll. 332 and 403.

62. With *alta madefient* of l. 368 cf. *alta tepefaciet* of l. 360.

63. L. Herrmann, "Le poème 64 de Catulle et Virgile," *RevEtLat* 8 (1930) 211-21, maintains that the last lines of 64 do indeed refer to contemporary events, a valuable corrective to former opinion.

64. Catullus emphasizes his point by repeating line endings such as *parentes* (ll. 400, 404), *nati* or *nato* (ll. 401, 403).

65. As does, e.g., C. J. Fordyce in a review of E. V. Marmorale, *L'Ultimo Catullo*, in *Class. Rev.* N.S. 4 (1954) 132.

On the epyllion see Walter Allen, Jr., "The Epyllion," *TAPA* 71 (1940) 1-26, and the salutary criticism of it by C. W. Mendell, "Epyllion and *Aeneid*," *Yale Cl. St.* 12 (1951) 205-26. For a more detailed history of the whole problem see L. Richardson, Jr., *Poetical Theory in Republican Rome* (New Haven 1944), and J. F. Reilly, "Origins of the Word 'Epyllion'," *CJ* 49 (1953) 111-14, with full bibliography.

66. On this much-debated problem, see A. A. Day, *The Origins of Latin Love-Elegy* (Oxford 1938), esp. 107-11, and E. Paludan, "The Development of Latin Elegy," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 4 (1941) 204-29, who agrees with those who find the origin in Catullus. One should, however, approach this judgment with caution, as G. Luck, *The Latin Love Elegy* (London 1959) 58 warns. Wheeler (above, n. 2) ch. 6, argues, quite rightly, that if Catullus had had the developed genre before him he would have made use of it.





# THE CHARACTER AND CULTS OF DIONYSUS AND THE UNITY OF THE *FROGS*

BY CHARLES PAUL SEGAL

## I

IT has often been remarked that the works of a long-established art-form are the most complex towards the end of its evolution when the form itself is on the verge of disappearing or undergoing a radical transformation. The *Frogs* of Aristophanes provides an excellent illustration of this observation.<sup>1</sup> The last extant example of the true old-comic style and the last of the comedies of Aristophanes performed in the fifth century before the collapse of Athens, the *Frogs* contains a plot of singular complexity, for the poet has combined two types of comic motifs, the journey and the *agon*, each occupying one half of the play.<sup>2</sup> He has radically altered the traditional structure of Old Comedy, moreover, by transforming the *agon* that usually takes place before the parabasis into a minor scene of little intellectual content (the whipping of Dionysus and Xanthias), whereas the true *agon* occupies the entire second half of the play.<sup>3</sup> This innovation is of some significance for the mood of the play, for in the earlier comedies, notably the *Acharnians* and the *Birds*, the protagonist, victorious in the *agon*, carries out his reforms and remodels the world according to his wishes in the part of the play following the parabasis. The *Frogs* lacks this transformation almost entirely; and the parabasis is succeeded only by a longer, albeit highly amusing, *agon*. This lack of a transformation gives the *Frogs* a note of seriousness, as befits its subject, but also raises a problem of a sort, that of the unity of the play and the coherence of such apparently disparate elements as Heracles, the Frog chorus, the Eleusinian Mysteries, and Aeschylus and Euripides.<sup>4</sup> Whereas in the earlier plays the magical transformations which succeed the parabasis are the logical (or illogical) extensions of the wish of the protagonist and thus provide a strong unifying theme, the two parts of the *Frogs* are somewhat loosely joined. Dionysus' initial *pothos* or longing for Euripides is not ultimately satisfied, and is only indirectly connected with the *agon* between the two tragedians. He is chosen to preside only because he happens to be present at this moment of *stasis* in Hades (760); and Pluto, aware of the "shortage of clever men" in his realm (806), names Dionysus judge because he is "experienced in

the art" (811). The presence of Dionysus alone, therefore, unites the two parts of the play. The forms in which Dionysus himself appears, however, are manifold, and seem at first to enhance even further the impression of incoherence. And yet his disguise as Heracles, his appearance as Iacchus in the Mystic procession, and his role as the god of comedy and tragedy are all ultimately connected and provide a clue to the unity of the play and one of its meanings.

The comedy itself is, of course, part of a festival in honor of the god and thus also an expression of the close relation between the poet and the state which Aristophanes, through Aeschylus, so strongly emphasizes (1053ff.); and it is noteworthy that a number of cult-forms of Dionysus occur in the play, each an expression of a slightly different aspect of the community. These multiple cult-forms, however, are all finally referred to a unified image of the god; and there is perhaps a development within Dionysus himself toward this image, a development expressed, as so often in Greek literature, through the form of a journey,<sup>5</sup> and perhaps analogous after all to the transformations of the earlier plays. It is, then, in an analysis of the different aspects of Dionysus' character and functions, their development in the play, and their relation to his cults that an interpretation of the *Frogs* can be sought.

The central problem in the character of Dionysus is how the rather timorous and almost despicable figure of the first part of the play can serve as arbiter in a contest of the gravest consequences at its end.<sup>6</sup> Yet by the end of the parabasis, Dionysus has attained a certain dignity, and there is no question of his fitness. His development can be followed in some detail, and, in fact, permits a glimpse of Aristophanes' remolding of a traditional old-comic motif.

The earliest legends connected with Dionysus have already an element of the potentially ridiculous or incongruous about them that made them suitable for comic treatment. The description of the frightened god fleeing to Thetis in the *Iliad* is perhaps not without a touch of humor (6.135-37).

Διώνυσος δὲ φοβηθεὶς  
 δύσεθ' ἀλὸς κατὰ κῦμα, Θέτις δ' ὑπεδέξατο κόλπῳ  
 δειδιότα· κρατερὸς γὰρ ἔχε τρόμος ἀνδρὸς ὁμοκλήῃ.

The incongruity between the effeminacy of the god and his dangerous power has a potentially comic side which appears also in the Homeric Hymn (7) and, though more grimly, even in Euripides' *Bacchae*. Aristophanes too perceived the comic possibilities of the incongruous in Dionysus when he quoted the line from the *Edoni* of Aeschylus to

describe Agathon in the *Thesmophoriazousae* (136):<sup>7</sup> ποδαπὸς ὁ γύννις ; τίς πάτρα; τίς ἡ στολή; Aristophanes, moreover, uses this identical type of parody in the *Frogs* in the interview between Heracles and Dionysus (47): τί κόθορνος καὶ ῥόπαλον ξυνηλθέτην; The satyr-plays, of course, such as the *Lycurgus* of Aeschylus, would have presented Dionysus in a still more comic light; and the god so appears in Euripides' *Cyclops*. In the course of the discussion of Odysseus and the Cyclops on the nature of Dionysus, the Cyclops asks, θεὸς δ' ἐν ἄσκῳ πῶς γέγηθ' οἴκους ἔχων; (525) and remarks, οὐ τοὺς θεοὺς χρὴ σῶμ' ἔχειν ἐν δέρμασιν (527), referring to the supposed profligate and bibulous nature of such a god, to which allusion is also made in the *Frogs*. Comedy has thus only to combine some of these motifs and shift their emphasis in order to produce the desired ludicrous effect.<sup>8</sup>

Old Comedy seems, in fact, to have exploited just this ridiculous aspect of the god. He appears as a gluttonous, licentious braggart, whose real cowardliness is quickly shown up at the first test, a typical ancient *miles gloriosus*.<sup>9</sup> Eupolis in his *Taxiarchoi* doubtless exploited this aspect of Dionysus in depicting him learning the art of war from Phormio in Hades, but unwilling to renounce certain pleasures,<sup>10</sup> while Platon in the *Adonis* played upon the sensuality of Dionysus by making him a rival with Aphrodite for her famous favorite, whose approaching birth is announced in oracles, a possible parody of the rivalry of Poseidon and Zeus for Thetis.<sup>11</sup> The most important evidence for the treatment of Dionysus in Old Comedy, however, derives from the hypothesis of the *Dionysalexandros* of Cratinus discovered in a papyrus fragment at the beginning of this century.<sup>12</sup> Here Dionysus' amorous propensities appear in his replacing Paris as judge of the three goddesses and choosing Aphrodite for the sake of gaining Helen; and his braggadocio and timorousness would be displayed in the arrival of the Greeks, when the frightened god tries to hide Helen and disguise himself as a ram. It is possible, however, that he defied the Greeks heroically before their arrival, his desire momentarily conquering his fear,<sup>13</sup> not unlike the reaction of the Aristophanic Dionysus at the promise of the dancing girls (516) who await the "true" Heracles. There would have been supplications and prayers to the rescuers and to Paris, making the god appear even more ridiculous and perhaps similar to Dionysus' entreaties to his "Xanthidion" in the *Frogs* to re-exchange costumes when the inn-keeping woman and Plathane threaten (579ff.).<sup>14</sup> There is a further similarity between the Dionysus of Cratinus and Aristophanes in the effeminate *κροκωτός* at which Heracles is so amused,<sup>15</sup> for it appears that the Dionysus of Cratinus entered wearing a *krokotos* (fr. 38 K). It is not



impossible that the *krokotos* was standard equipment to indicate the effeminacy of the comic Dionysus. It has even been suggested that the reference to the "Bacchic rites of bull-eating Cratinus" (357) is Aristophanes' recognition of his debt to his predecessor's *Dionysalexandros*.<sup>16</sup>

The first part of the *Frogs* contains many traces of this comic treatment of Dionysus. He appears, in fact, as an ordinary mortal, the son of Stamnios, complaining of *hybris* (21-22). The tradition of his dissolute living and gluttony is reflected in the epithet γάστρων (200), a probable allusion to the typical padded costume of the comic Dionysus, prominently equipped with a προγαστρίδιον.<sup>17</sup> The ridiculousness of his effeminacy and braggadocio appears in the uncontrollable laughter of Heracles (38ff.) and in Dionysus' boasting before he meets Empousa (280ff.). The blisters and pain in his ὄρπον of which he complains when rowing Charon's skiff (221ff., 236) are perhaps other indications of softness.

From the beginning, however, another quality makes itself evident which shows that Aristophanes is not merely reproducing the stock comic Dionysus, for his is a god with a *pothos* for Euripides, an intellectual seeking a ποιητὴν δεξιόν (71) who cannot be dissuaded from his otherworldly quest. In the opening lines, moreover, he strictly forbids Xanthias to use the worn-out comic jokes of the stage-slave; he is not content with mere buffoonery any more than he is with the empty chattering of Euripides' successors (89ff.). It is primarily in his relation to Heracles, however, that his differentiation from the comic Dionysus of Cratinus appears. He has, on the one hand, a certain affinity with Heracles. They are, of course, brothers, and address one another in intimate terms (60); Dionysus plans to imitate Heracles and does so not only in the descent itself, but also in the matter of servitude.<sup>18</sup> They are, furthermore, traditionally associated with one another as the two gods most ridiculed and degraded by the writers of Old Comedy.<sup>19</sup> Yet it would be expected that these two gods of strong sensual appetites would understand one another better than they in fact do. Dionysus adopts a rather scornful attitude to Heracles' gluttony when Heracles reveals his complete insensitivity to the superiority of Euripides over the remaining tragedians (89ff., esp. δειπνέειν με δίδασκε, 107). He finds his *pothos* entirely misunderstood by Heracles, who immediately refers it to a woman or boy or, finally, to Cleisthenes (56f.); and he has to resort to an *ainigmos*, the analogy of soup, to make his point clear (60ff.). He has difficulty in expressing the ethereal nature of his longing to his somewhat coarser brother (60, 64). Aristophanes has detached the intellectual element in Dionysus and set it in contrast to Heracles, to whom he also

transfers most of the gluttony usually associated with Dionysus. Hence the incongruity of Dionysus' disguise as Heracles is all the greater because Dionysus not only lacks Heracles' military prowess, but is being divested also of his model's devotion to mere physical appetite. This differentiation of Heracles and Dionysus, of course, is only partial; and the comedy would lose much of its vitality if it proceeded any further; but a higher note in Dionysus' character, an almost Euripidean "otherness" — to use Dodds' term — is suggested from the very beginning and is important for the conception of Dionysus in the second half of the play.

The object of Dionysus' journey to Hades appears, in fact, as the testing of the Heracleian side of his nature, mere comic buffoonery and nonintellectual braggadocio. It soon becomes apparent that the results of this test are negative; and the unfortunate experiences of Dionysus' disguise as Heracles are analogous to his prohibition of Xanthias' indulgence in the common slave-tricks which appear in the works of Phrynichus, Lykis, and Ameipsias: both imply the inadequacy of a conception of the comic limited to mere buffoonery.

Dionysus appears as the embodiment of the comic spirit seeking a stable definition of itself and its aims; and his search is presented primarily through the motifs of disguise and changeability. With the assumption of a new garment comes the testing of a new identity and the beginning of a transformation of character.<sup>20</sup> Here again, of course, Aristophanes is working within the bounds of a traditional theme. To disguise the protagonist as his apparent opposite is a regular *modus operandi* of Old Comedy, familiar from the remodeling of Mnesilochus as a woman in the *Thesmophoriazousae*; and there is an even more immediate tradition in the *Dionysalexandros* of Cratinus, where the god seems to have been disguised as Paris and even as a ram.<sup>21</sup> But the Aristophanic Dionysus feels singularly out of place in his new garb. Not only does he provoke the laughter of Heracles himself (42ff.), but he fails to adapt to his new surroundings, in marked contrast to his slave, Xanthias, the forerunner of the facile slave or parasite of New Comedy. Thus Dionysus is uncertain about how the natives of Hades knock on doors (460ff.), while Xanthias simply tells him, καθ' Ἡρακλέα τὸ σῆμα καὶ τὸ λῆμ' ἔχων (463). It is, however, precisely this lack of correspondence between *schema* and *lema* which is the cause of Dionysus' failure, whereas it is Xanthias who appears as ληματίας (494), having the *lema* not of his master (500), but rather ἀνδρεῖον τὸ λῆμα (603). This lack of correspondence between appearance and reality, external posture and inner disposition, is also the source of the instability of Dionysus.

He exchanges roles with Xanthias four times in two hundred lines; and after the first set of exchanges the chorus sings an ode on the cleverness of changeability, "to turn about to the softer way" (*πρὸς τὸ μαλθακώτερον*) in preference to assuming one *schema* (533ff.). When Xanthias reassumes the Heracleian costume, however, the chorus too reverses itself completely and warns him not to commit anything *malthakon* (588ff.). Xanthias similarly ridicules the changeability of his master by remarking ironically to the Hostess and Plathane on the gluttonous and ruffian ways of the pseudo-Heracles, "It's his work all right; that's his manner *everywhere*" (563). All these motifs perhaps reflect the weakness of the comic spirit itself at the time, the failure of the external boisterousness of comedy such as practised by Phrynichus, Lykis, and Ameipsias (13ff.) when its bases in a firm and stable communal life and a clear conception of its own end are lacking. Dionysus as the comic spirit has the vestiges of a Heracleian vitality, and the reputation of his predecessor follows him — to his discomfort — all along his journey; and yet the lion-skin is betrayed by the effeminate *kothornoi* (557), and it is perhaps more than just the exigencies of the comic situation that cause him to be accepted as Heracles only when he is to suffer for his model's misdeeds. The low comic buffoonery with which Xanthias is associated from the very beginning adapts easily enough to the role of Heracles; but for Dionysus a more stabilizing, unifying principle is sought, one that will enable him to maintain some of the comic vitality which Heracles possesses without stooping to the low tricks which he apparently detests and to which he is, in fact, proved unsuited. Comedy as entertainment has apparently become separated from comedy as a potentially didactic medium, as it was in Aristophanes' earlier plays.<sup>22</sup> The reunification of these two aspects of comedy is, in part, the quest of Dionysus and takes the form of a reintegration of his own personality. His problem, on the literary level, is to be able both to amuse and instruct, to appear in the age of the degenerate Phrynichus, Lykis, and Ameipsias as he did in the days of the "bull-eating" Cratinus. Hence there is a real kinship between Dionysus' development in the first part of the play and the issues of the *agon* in the second part: the faults of Euripides as analyzed by Aeschylus and the assertion of the communal function and dignity of the tragic poet are thematically related to the weakness of the purely "Heracleio-xanthian" conception of comedy and to Dionysus' *pothos* and search in Hades for something that has passed out of the world of the living and is to be found only in the land of the dead.

In the descent to Hades Dionysus loses something of his traditional identity: he is, in a sense, purged of the mere buffoonery which belongs



to Xanthias and Heracles and to the treatment of Dionysus in Old Comedy. The breakdown of the communal solidarity which the battle of Arginusae and its aftermath exposed requires drastic measures, and the god of Comedy must strip himself of his previous identity in order to arrive at a positive conception of himself which will meet the new demands put upon him. Hence when he first descends as Heracles, he fails to recognize "himself" when the Frogs sing of "Nyseian Dionysus the son of Zeus in Limnae" (215ff.) or when the Mystae sing of Iacchus. This failure to acknowledge himself as Nyseian Dionysus or Iacchus does not necessarily mean, as some commentators have felt, that the different aspects of the god were kept separate and simply not thought of together<sup>23</sup> (in fact, as will appear below, the opposite is true), but merely that Dionysus-Heracles has not yet attained the unified conception of himself which he is seeking and thus *cannot* yet acknowledge his identity as Iacchus. He must, in fact, relinquish his traditional divinity in order to regain a sounder dignity.<sup>24</sup> Hence he forbids Xanthias to call him "Dionysus," although he extends the injunction to the name "Heracles" as well (298ff.), thus temporarily losing all identity. Not only does he exchange roles with his slave, moreover, but he endures the basest of the necessities of slavery, physical punishment and an accuser's right of *βασανίζειν* (616, 625, 629). The pain which he unsuccessfully tries to conceal, furthermore, is an indication of his loss of divinity, "for if he's a god," says Xanthias (634), "he won't feel it."<sup>25</sup> In another sense too Dionysus' reduction to the role of slave is the fullest possible execution of the *mimesis* of Heracles, whose slavery to Omphale was regarded as the most debasing of his toils.<sup>26</sup> Under the duress of this final episode, however, Dionysus does begin to reaccept his divinity and the dignity it entails. He challenges the claim of Xanthias to torture him, proclaiming, "I forbid any one to torture me, as I am immortal" (628-29), and, *ἀθάνατος εἶναι φημι Διόνυσος Διός* (631). It is perhaps significant that in this last line he uses the same formula as the Frogs in singing of Dionysus in Limnae (*Διὸς Διόνυσος*, 216), thus associating himself with the established communal and cult implications of his divinity; he is beginning to become aware of what comedy should be, a reflection of the solidarity and secure firmness of the community, and this is preparing him for his acceptance of the Aeschylean conception of tragedy in the second part of the play. The recognition of his divinity at this point is not, as Cornford felt, a sign of a certain ineptitude in Aristophanes, unnecessarily straining the situation of a god's presence on the stage, but part of a carefully worked out development within Dionysus himself.<sup>27</sup> There may even be some resemblance intended to the actual Mystae, who,



after seeing a vision of the underworld and the punishment of the wicked, arise to a new, semi-divine condition as ἐπόπται.<sup>28</sup> Dionysus' progress in Hades is in part negative, for he casts off finally the disguise which he initially adopted; and the oath of Aeacus in confessing that he cannot determine which is the god (οὐ τοι μὰ τὴν Δῆμητρα δύναμαί πω μαθεῖν / ὁπότερος ὑμῶν ἐστι θεός, 668–69), the lines which mark the terminal point of Dionysus' loss of identity, recalls the words of Héracles when he first saw Dionysus in line 42, οὐ τοι μὰ τὴν Δῆμητρα δύναμαι μὴ γελᾶν. This moment of indecision on the part of Aeacus, moreover, perhaps points ahead to the next crucial moment of indecision, when Dionysus cannot decide between Euripides and Aeschylus (1410ff.) and is on the verge of the choice which is to mark the completion of his development toward a communally centered conception of the poet, applicable to comedy as well as tragedy. By the end of the first *agon*, therefore, Dionysus has returned to his starting point; but he has in the process succeeded in stripping off a partially false and inadequate conception of himself when, at the command of Aeacus (641), he and Xanthias strip off their false garments and stand, presumably naked, before one of the judges of the underworld.<sup>29</sup>

After the parabasis, with its exhortation to the sacred chorus to advise and teach what is χρηστὰ τῇ πόλει (686f.), Dionysus has, in fact, attained a sense of dignity and an awareness of his proper role. His recognition by Pluto and Persephone soon entails his serving as judge on what is essentially the problem of the relation of art and literature to the state; and this very appointment is indicative of his now recognized position as the god of the communal dramatic festivals. He executes his task admirably, though of course with some buffoonery. He is not, nevertheless, merely the stock figure of the *agon*, a ridiculous third party, as Cornford sees him, present only to exploit the comic possibilities of the scene,<sup>30</sup> but does perform a very valuable function; despite his initial *pothos* for Euripides, he manages to remain a fair and impartial judge. Thus he tries to induce Aeschylus to speak in his own defence against Euripides' attack (832), he restrains Euripides' loquacity (835) and Aeschylus' wrath (844ff.), and is delighted in turn by each of the accusations and rebuttals (1150ff.), even though he admits that he cannot follow all of Euripides' reasoning (1169). Though a supposed Euripides-lover, he defends Aeschylus spontaneously, before the poet can even defend himself (1175ff.). When the two tragedians begin to quarrel, he interjects his own newly gained conception of the dignity of poetry: λουδορεῖσθαι δ' οὐ πρόπει | ἄνδρας ποιητὰς ὥσπερ ἄρτοπώλιδας (857–58). The last two words are especially interesting, for they reflect his rejection of such

scenes as he himself experienced in the first part of the play with the Hostess and Plathane (or such as occur at the end of the *Wasps*). He even succeeds in remaining clever and dignified in the face of Euripides' insults after his decision (1472ff.); far from playing the buffoon in this scene, as one commentator has claimed,<sup>31</sup> he refers the accusations of Euripides to the audience (τί δ' αἰσχρόν, ἦν μὴ τοῖς θεωμένοις δοκῇ; 1475), thus asserting the more strongly his own identity as the representative of the communal spirit at the tragic and comic festivals.

In the light of the development of Dionysus, his ultimate choice of Aeschylus is not so surprising after all. Dionysus, in fact, confesses that he enjoyed the old Aeschylean dramas οὐχ ἥττον ἢ νῦν οἱ λαλοῦντες (916f.) and that he cannot follow all Euripides' subtle quibblings (1169). He sympathizes with Euripides' troubles with the *lekythion* (1220ff.), but clearly indicates that Aeschylus has fairly won the Battle of the Prologues (1245ff.). Yet Dionysus, doubtless like Aristophanes himself, obviously admires the *dexiotes* and *sophia* of Euripides: τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι σοφόν, τῷ δὲ ἥδομαι (1412); and Dionysus' rejection of Heracles and the low comic tricks of Xanthias is perhaps an attempt to take *sophia* and *dexiotes* into account. These two words are not always pejorative, for Aristophanes even uses them of his own achievement in the *Clouds* and *Wasps*.<sup>32</sup> Cratinus even coined the word *Εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζων* (fr.307).<sup>33</sup> Hence in rejecting the pure buffoonery of Heracles and the earlier conception of himself, Dionysus at least leaves room for *sophia* in his attitude toward the poet, although he is not willing to sacrifice to it the sense of the communal mission of the poet which Aeschylus represents.

The proper recognition of Dionysus as the god of the stable and secure community results almost immediately in the reestablishment of order in Hades, the situation of which is of course analogous to that ἐν τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσιν. Hades is disturbed by a great *stasis* (760), just like the world above (359), caused primarily by the agitation of the coarser element for Euripides: ὀλίγον τὸ χρηστόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε (783). The arrival of Dionysus puts an end to this confusion and bolsters the better element in the state (τὸ χρηστόν) by the choice of Aeschylus, who represents the more conservative, traditional outlook of the unified community and in fact did not get along well with the more developed Athenian democracy (807ff.).

Dionysus' reestablishment of communal order is largely expressed through the theme of slave-master relations, a natural image to use after Arginusae (cf. 190, 694). In the parabasis the chorus complains that it is disgraceful for those who fought in but one sea-battle to be honored like

the staunch Plataeans and become "lords instead of slaves" (693-94). This reversal of the traditional situation is, of course, analogous to the charge that Athens raises its lower element to positions of leadership and power, while οἱ χρηστοί are merely set aside (718ff., 1443ff.). The reversal of the position of the slaves, however, bears a closer relation to Dionysus' own experiences, for he and Xanthias do exchange roles as master and slave; and the little *agon* which precedes the parabasis centers about the discovery of the actual slave. Even earlier, Dionysus points out that Xanthias cannot retain the disguise of Heracles, ὥς δοῦλος ὦν καὶ θνητός (531), a statement which Xanthias ironically turns against his master a little later (582-83). In the early part of the *agon*, the slave has the upper hand. His ostensible generosity in letting Aeacus torture the pseudo-Xanthias is called a γενναῖον πρᾶγμα (615), and he himself γεννάδας ἀνὴρ (640), words which recur throughout the play to identify the superior element in the state. When the final identification is made, however, Aeacus recognizes that Dionysus is the *despotes* and the *gennadas aner* (738). The recognition between Pluto and Dionysus has its counterpart in that of Xanthias and Aeacus, who swear friendship πρὸς Διός, ὃς ἡμῶν ἐστιν ὁμομαστιγίας (756); and their joining of right hands (754) points ahead to the similar token of kinship between Sophocles and Aeschylus (789). Through Dionysus' rediscovery of his identity, in other words, the proper separation is made between τὸ χρηστόν and τὸ δουλικόν, and each element is to go its own way: the slave element disappears after Dionysus' proper attainment of his true divinity and his appointment as judge, though it predominated in the first part of the play. This disappearance is not merely an economy of actors (for presumably the same two men would impersonate Aeschylus and Euripides in the second half of the comedy), but a reflection of the careful structuring of the play about the developing character of Dionysus.

The final defeat of Euripides marks the full restoration of communal order, for Euripides is charged with having confused and upset domestic relations in the same way as occurred at Arginusae and in Dionysus' cortège. Aristophanes alludes to his exploitation of his slave Cephisophon in writing his tragedies *Κηφισοφῶντα μιγνύς* (944) and, indeed, to the gossip about Cephisophon's seduction of Euripides' wife (1048, 1408).<sup>34</sup> Euripides too has made the slave as loquacious as his master (948ff.) and has introduced an atmosphere of suspicion into the Athenian household (980ff.). The discrepancy between language and sentiment (διάνοιαι) in Euripides which Aeschylus opposes (1053ff.), a divorcement between style and content perhaps reflected in the application of the *lekkythion*, is also related to the disorder and lack of harmony between the parts of the



state, for which the Euripidean outlook is (according to Aristophanes) in part responsible.

The structure of the *Frogs* is thus somewhat analogous after all to that of the earlier plays where the victory of the Agonist resulted in a transformation of his environment. Dionysus' victory in the small *agon* before the parabasis does result in a kind of transformation of Hades, at least in the reestablishment of the order which Aristophanes would like to see transferred to the upper world. As in the earlier plays too, where the protagonist enjoys the fruits of his victory after the *agon*, so in the *Frogs* the increased dignity of Dionysus, his appointment as judge, and the full recognition of his divinity are all the happy results of his victory, even though no large-scale imaginative transformation of the external world occurs.

## II

The development of Dionysus into a god of communal solidarity appears only partially in his exchange of roles with Xanthias and his rediscovery of his true divinity. It appears perhaps more explicitly in the treatment of the various cults of Dionysus, to which the play, especially the first part, alludes and in the whole religious aura surrounding the descent to Hades. The stabilizing definition of the figure of Dionysus occurs not only through his reidentification of himself, but also through his unification of the separate cult-figures of the early part of the play into a single divinity whose communal significance is strong enough to absorb coherently his separate ritual manifestations.

As already noted, Dionysus disguised as Heracles, that is, still in search of his true identity, cannot recognize his other self, the mystic Iacchus, in the underworld.<sup>35</sup> Yet there are suggestions throughout the play that there is some relationship between them, a potential kinship which can appear more explicitly when Dionysus has asserted his true divine identity as the god of the dramatic festivals. Thus at the beginning of the play Dionysus jokes with Xanthias about their *ὄνος* (25ff.), and one of the destinations mentioned by Charon is "Ὀνου πόκας; but Xanthias connects this *onos* directly with the Mysteries: ἐγὼ γοῦν ὄνος ἄγω τὰ μυστήρια (159). A more apparent connection between Dionysus as the god of Comedy and the mystic Iacchus appears in the proclamation of the Mystae, where everyone is excluded who "neither saw nor danced the rites of the noble Muses nor was initiated (ἐτελέσθη) into the Bacchic rites (Βακχείαι) of bull-eating Cratinus."<sup>36</sup> Here reference is made to the τελεταί of the Bacchic Dionysus, one of whose epithets, "bull-eating,"



is applied to the comic poet, Cratinus. The Mystae go on to exclude any dishonest politician *κωμωδηθεὶς ἐν ταῖς πατρίοις τελεταῖς ταῖς τοῦ Διονύσου* (368), thus apparently applying the Mystic term *teletai* to the comic festivals under Dionysus, although *telete* is used also of the orgiastic rites of the Bacchic Dionysus.<sup>37</sup> The tripartite ode of the Mystae, however (372ff.), is especially interesting as connecting Iacchus and the Mysteries themselves with some of the communal themes that are to become more important in the second half of the play. They sing first to the *Soteira* of the state, who is probably to be identified with Demeter,<sup>38</sup> then to Demeter herself, and finally to Iacchus. The element which unites all three sections, however, is the emphasis on *παίζειν, χλευάζειν, σκώπτειν, χορεύειν*, etc. (376, 390, 394, 409, etc.), culminating in the joyful description of the Eleusinian procession in 411ff.<sup>39</sup> Here Aristophanes seems to be feeling his old vigor, and the tone of this last passage especially recalls Dicaeopolis' celebration of the Dionysia in the *Acharnians* with its song to Phales and Dionysus (263ff.). There is here a spirit of jovial ribaldry based upon the civic solidarity and harmony between state and individual which the gods and the performance of their rituals symbolize and express. This last passage approximates to the spirit not only of the Dionysiac phallic song of the *Acharnians*, but also to the comic performances under Dionysus himself and the various *κῶμοι* from which these performances may have in part arisen.<sup>40</sup> And it is further significant that Aeschylus thinks of this communal aspect of the Mysteries when he invokes Demeter and the Mysteries before the major *agon* (886–87), unlike the Aether and *γλώσσης στρόφιγξ* of Euripides (892ff.). Aeschylus thus associates himself with the Mystae, and even enters upon the stage in an almost mystic silence akin to the *semnotes* of his tragedies (832ff.).<sup>41</sup> The Mystae too apply the significant epithet *gennaios*, with its implications of the traditional communal concord, to the Muses whom they invoke (356). The Eleusinian procession and Iacchus himself, therefore, are brought into relation with the communal spirit of comedy and tragedy which Dionysus represents and Aeschylus defends.

The actual cult relationships between the different manifestations of Dionysus, moreover, show an unmistakable fusion by the late fifth century and further help to explain how Dionysus can appear in the *Frogs* as the god of Limnae, of Eleusis, and of the dramatic festivals. The *Bacchae* of Euripides contains instances of terms applied to the Bacchic Dionysus that are also associated with the Eleusinian Iacchus, e.g., *teletai*, flutes, and the easing of *πόνος*.<sup>42</sup> An ode of the *Bacchae*, furthermore, links together Demeter and Dionysus as the two greatest deities (274ff.); and an important fragment of Euripides connects the

Cretan Zeus, the Great Mother, Zagreus, and the Bacchic Dionysus.<sup>43</sup> Two scholars have even attempted to connect Dionysus and Iacchus more closely by trying to show that the mysteries described in the *Frogs* are not those of Eleusis, but the Lesser Mysteries at Agrae, where the god appears under his own name with Demeter and Persephone.<sup>44</sup> Be that as it may, it is clear that as early as 441 B.C. Sophocles could refer to the Eleusinian Dionysus "in the bosom of Demeter" as one of the equal manifestations of this "many-named" god along with the purely orgiastic divinity of Thebes, Parnassus, or Nysa.<sup>45</sup> The language of hymns to Dionysus too, whether Eleusinian, Bacchic, or "Orphic," all show from the fifth century on a high degree of conformity and fusion of common elements indicative of the union of the various aspects of the god into what could be regarded as a single divinity.<sup>46</sup> Hence there is small doubt that an Athenian audience in 405 B.C. would have felt little hesitation in identifying Dionysus and Iacchus as but different cult-figures of essentially the same god.<sup>47</sup>

Perhaps a more important link between Dionysus and Iacchus is the Lenaeon festival, at which the *Frogs* was performed. According to one interpretation, line 479 refers to a formula used at the Lenaea, καλεῖτε θεόν, to which the audience replies Σεμελί' "Ιακχε πλουτοδότα.<sup>48</sup> The relationship between Dionysus and the Eleusinian Iacchus and Demeter seems to have been particularly close at this festival, and thus perhaps provides a ritual reason for their association in Aristophanes' play.<sup>49</sup> Dionysus appears here in connection with a great Earth-Mother, interchangeably Demeter or Semele; sacrifice was made to the Eleusinian goddesses as well as to Dionysus and Semele, and to Zeus Chthonios and Ge Chthonia;<sup>50</sup> and the festival itself was managed by the ἐπιστάται Ἐλευσινόθεν.<sup>51</sup> There were thus unmistakable "mystic" elements at the Lenaea, and the festival itself seems to have blended several of the different aspects of Dionysus, although precise details are somewhat vague.<sup>52</sup>

Two other important Dionysian festivals are connected with the ancient sanctuary of the god in Limnae, both associated too with the Eleusinian Mysteries, namely the Lesser Mysteries at near-by Agrae<sup>53</sup> and, more important, the Anthesteria, which falls shortly after the Lenaea.<sup>54</sup> Here too the management of the festival was assisted by the ἱεροκῆρυξ and *epistatai* from Eleusis;<sup>55</sup> and the third day of the festival, the χύτροι, had chthonic associations and was especially sacred to Hermes Chthonius,<sup>56</sup> who, in fact, appears prominently, whether accidentally or not, in one of the disputes between Aeschylus and Euripides (1126, 1138, 1145). It has also been thought that the opening of the wine-vats

on the first day of the Anthesteria, the Pithoigia, also permitted the *eidola* of the dead to emerge from their coffins.<sup>57</sup> The second day, the *χόες*, was spent in the natural consequences of the opening of the wine-vats and is alluded to in *Frogs*, 217, ὁ κραιπαλόκωμος. The connection of this festival with the Mystae, moreover, is suggested by their frequent reference to flowers, after which, of course, the Anthesteria is named (325ff., 373, 449ff.).<sup>58</sup> The *onos* which appears in connection with Dionysus and the Mysteries in the *Frogs* seems also to have played a part in the Anthesteria, perhaps as a symbol of the *hieros gamos* between Dionysus and the Basilinna.<sup>59</sup> This dramatization of a sacred marriage and the theme of rebirth, associated both with the temporary return of the dead at the festival and with Dionysus as a vegetation-god who reawakens in the spring, is perhaps also related to the Mystae and the rebirth with which the *Frogs* ends.<sup>60</sup> There is perhaps a further particular connection between the Anthesteria and the occurrence of Limnae in the parodos of the *Frogs* in that only on the *Choes*, the second day of the Anthesteria, was the sanctuary of Limnae open, and the ceremony of the *hieros gamos* may have taken place in it.<sup>61</sup> All these relationships indicate a pre-existent similarity between the Dionysus of Limnae, of the Anthesteria, and of the Lenaea with the Eleusinian Iacchus, part of a coalescence of the different aspects of the god already well-advanced by the late fifth century which Aristophanes exploits in combining all these cult-figures in his play.

There are perhaps references to still other cult practices connected with Dionysus. Dionysus as the wine-god appears at the beginning with the epithet, "son of Stamnios" (22) and in Aeschylus' reproach (1150), Διόνυσσε, πίνεις οἶνον οὐκ ἀνθοσμίαν. The orgiastic Dionysus is, for reasons to be discussed below, absent, save for the possible reference to Mt. Nysa in 215 and the quotation from the *Hypsipyle* of Euripides (1211ff.).<sup>62</sup> The boat-trip of Dionysus across the Styx may possibly have some reference to the wide-spread ritual in which Dionysus' arrival by sea (as shown on the Exekias kylix in Munich) was re-enacted at the Anthesteria or perhaps the Greater Dionysia.<sup>63</sup> In the production of the *Frogs*, 180ff., an actual boat was apparently dragged across the stage.<sup>64</sup> This scene may be directed more at the comic possibilities of Charon than at a cult of Dionysus, but it is noteworthy that Xanthias does not accompany his master, although Charon refers his refusal to the battle of Arginusae (191). The whipping scene too may go back to some cult practice, perhaps referred to by the somewhat obscure scholion on line 621.<sup>65</sup> Such rituals are known elsewhere in connection with spring festivals, e.g., the beating of the statue of Pan in Arcadia to insure the



increase of the flock.<sup>66</sup> One scholar, however, has made a more explicit connection between the whipping in the *Frogs* and the mystic cult of Diomeian Heracles, referred to by Xanthias in the midst of the whipping scene (651), at which flagellation was a part of the ritual.<sup>67</sup>

There are, furthermore, some definite chthonic associations in the cult of Dionysus which perhaps made his presence in the underworld and his meeting with the Mystae less surprising to the original spectators of the *Frogs*. To the Anthesteria as a feast of the dead allusion has already been made. Heraclitus, in one of his darker moments, couples Hades and Dionysus as the same god: *αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀΐδης καὶ Διόνυσος ὅτεω μαίνονται καὶ ληναίζουσι*.<sup>68</sup> There is, moreover, a tradition of a descent of Dionysus to Hades to rescue his mother Semele which survives in a cult in Argos and Elis and is referred to as late as Plutarch.<sup>69</sup> This ritual proves a connection not only with Dionysus' descent as Heracles in the *Frogs*, but perhaps also with the swamps which he finds there, for these rites were performed in swampy ground similar to the Limnae at Athens. The Frogs too are perhaps related to a chthonic aspect of Dionysus' cult, for Juvenal refers to an apparently old tradition of black frogs inhabiting the Styx (*et Stygio ranas in gurgite nigras*, *Sat.* 2.150).<sup>70</sup> The chthonic aspects of Dionysus were likely to have been especially marked among the "Orphics," although the archaic origins of the Zagreus legend have been contested;<sup>71</sup> and there is said to have been an Orphic poem on a similar *katabasis* by Orpheus for Eurydice.<sup>72</sup> It is perhaps worth noting that Aristophanes refers explicitly to the *teletas* and prohibitions of Orpheus (1032), while the lines with which he taunts Euripides, "Who knows if life be death . . .," (1477f., 1082), though taken from his *Phrixos*, would also be applicable to the basic tenets of Orphic doctrine.<sup>73</sup>

It thus appears that the various manifestations of Dionysus in the *Frogs* are actually related in cult practice and represent different aspects of a god who was undoubtedly felt as a unified divine personality at this period.<sup>74</sup> The presentation of the *Frogs* at the Lenaea, shortly before the coming of the Anthesteria and the Lesser Mysteries, probably enhanced the cult significance of motifs like the frog-chorus, the Mystae, Limnae, Eleusis, and the descent to Hades.

These multiple cult allusions in the play are interesting also as illustrating the strength of Aristophanes' consciousness of the community and its participation in the traditional signs of mutual trust and cohesion which the sacred festivals represent. The two most detailed references to the festivals, the *kraipalokomos* of the Anthesteria (217) and the Eleusinian procession (406ff.) are made respectively by the chorus of Frogs, attached directly to the sanctuary at Limnae, and the Mystae,



both groups already participating in a sacred ritual. Dionysus at first ignores the Frogs as "nothing more than *koax*" (226), but is much impressed by the song of the Mystae and is eager to join the procession, although his motives are not to be referred entirely to religious ardor (417ff.). These two songs do have some effect on him, nevertheless, and provide at least an image of communal harmony toward which he can develop by the second part of the play. It is interesting too that in the one place in Hades where he does refer to his own cult, he appeals to the priest of Dionysus, "Priest, preserve me that I may be your drinking companion" (*sympotes*) (297), and thus alludes to the communal setting of comedy, the gathering of the citizens in the theatre for what is in origin, at least, a semireligious rite presided over by a priest.<sup>75</sup> It is as the god of this institution that he is to appear in the second half of the play; and his choice of Aeschylus redeems his early insensitivity to the Frog chorus, for the similarities in the compound language of both the Frogs and Aeschylus perhaps indicates a deeper sympathy between them.<sup>76</sup> They share too a common responsiveness to the Mystae, in whom the motifs of communal solidarity and the "rebirth" of the *polis* are fused.

It would, however, be mistaken to attempt to tie down the cult practices alluded to in the *Frogs* too closely to a single ritual, as has been attempted several times in the last hundred years of Aristophanic scholarship.<sup>77</sup> Aristophanes has combined a number of already related cult practices, a procedure facilitated by the fusion between the different aspects of Dionysus in the latter half of the fifth century. It is this very fusion which has led scholars into regarding the parodos as representing the Lesser Mysteries or the Lenaia and to see "Orphic" influences in the *katabasis*. The Dionysiac cults of the *Frogs* rather exploit the prevalent coalescence of the various aspects of the god. The incorporation into the play of some of the most important festivals of Athens is an effort to reaffirm as fully as possible the religious and ritual basis of the unity and solidarity of Athens which becomes objectified in the reintegrated character of Dionysus himself. In a sense, then, the new synthesis of cults which Aristophanes presents in the *Frogs* is as much his own poetic and imaginative creation as is his redevelopment and rehabilitation of the character of Dionysus.<sup>78</sup>

Dionysus' judgment of Aeschylus and Euripides is thus partly a re-enactment of all the dramatic performances at the proper festivals and an attempt to assert the meaning of these performances in the total life of the community. Hence, as Rogers notes, "not only was Dionysus the special patron of the drama at whose festivals and in whose honor all plays were exhibited: he was also . . . the spectator who had been present

at every dramatic performance from first to last."<sup>79</sup> His appearance in the *Frogs*, therefore, adds to the specific contest at hand a universal, generic element which is all the stronger because of the otherworldly setting. But the Dionysus of the *Frogs* is also closely bound to the Attic community. Even though the Hypothesis conjectures that the opening scenes are most likely in Thebes because of the Theban affiliations of Dionysus and Heracles, Dionysus appears as a purely Athenian god. He regards Agathon as having deserted him (83) by going, like Euripides, to the court of Archelaus in Macedonia; and he makes his final decision between the two tragedians on the basis of their advice for the particular problems of Athens. His *psyche* feels a certain kinship with Aeschylus (1468) who, in fact, is explicitly called τὸν Βακχεῖον ἄνακτα (1258-59). Dionysus thus becomes the representative of the confidence of the Athenian people in the state and its institutions as expressed in the jollity of the Eleusinian procession, the dramatic festivals, the *komoi* of the Anthesteria and Dionysia.<sup>80</sup>

### III

Closely related to the theme of the community in the *Frogs* and its connection with the dramatic and other festivals is the subject of the Muses and *mousike* generally. The Frogs, the Mystae, and Dionysus, in brief, are all closely connected with the Muses, whereas Euripides (and Socrates) are hostile to *mousike*. The Frogs sing of their devotion to the "beautiful-lyred Muses" (228ff.) and are a φιλωδὸν γένος (240); the presence of the Mystae is indicated by the sound of flutes wafted through the air (154, 313), and they invoke the Muses in nearly all their songs. Dionysus himself hopes to judge the contest μουσικώτατα (873); and a solemn invocation to the Muses follows his words (875ff.). Whereas the Muse of Euripides appears as a harlot, Dionysus defends the Muse of Aeschylus (or, according to another reading, the Muse herself) as more exalted.<sup>81</sup> The Muses, in short, indirectly play a large part in the comedy.

In contrast to the sweet songs of the Mystae, however, the Euripidean contingent in Hades has introduced shouting and reviling (757-58); Euripides' poetry is the product of πλευμόνων πολλὸν πόνον (839), in contrast to the Mystic Iacchus' freedom from effort (ἄνευ πόνου, 403) and the quiet serenity of the Mystic procession (315, 321, 339). When the Frogs, Mystae, or Aeschylus do engage in loud noise, however, as in the Eleusinian procession, it is the hearty, even harmonious back-slapping and freedom of citizens who trust one another, not the raucous and dissonant λουδορηγμός of the wrangling mob. Socrates, moreover, in the

one reference to him in the play, is accused of ἀποβαλόντα μουσικήν and substituting for it λαλεῖν, a word used also of the inferior contemporary tragedians (917) and attached to Euripides as the cause of the desertion of the palaestra, a charge analogous to the rejection of *mousike* in its pernicious effects on the coherence of the state and the preservation of healthy traditions:<sup>82</sup>

εἴτ' αὖ λαλιὰν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι καὶ στωμυλίαν ἐδίδαξας  
ἧ' ἔκενῶσεν τὰς τε παλαίστρας καὶ τὰς πυγὰς ἐνέτριψεν.

(1069–70)

Connected still more directly with the communal aspect of *mousike* is the emphasis on *choroi* throughout the play. Dancing as one of the earliest forms of communal performances in Greece is naturally related to Dionysus as the god of the festive aspect of life in the *polis*. The Mystae especially allude constantly to the dance (326, 330, 336, 352, etc.) and even exclude from their rites whoever has not danced the “rituals of the noble Muses” (356). Iacchus himself is invoked with the epithet φιλοχορευτά (404, 410, 416), and the attractiveness of the dance and procession entices Dionysus-Heracles to join in (419). These *choroi* are further connected with the communal and religious life of the state by the adjective *ieroí* (675, 686); they are “holy” not only because they are associated with the Mysteries, but also because they are expressive of the religious unity of the state and are inseparable from the cult of the gods (principally Dionysus) who embody this unity.<sup>83</sup> Hence the sacredness of the *choroi* is another reminder of the ultimately religious — or better, ritual — nature of the entire performance of the comedy. Thus it is natural that the initial ode of the parabasis, following Dionysus’ recovery of his proper divinity, begins with the invocation, Μοῦσα χορῶν ἱερῶν ἐπίβηθι (675), while the parabasis proper begins with the words τὸν ἱερὸν χορόν (686). Aeschylus uses the same epithet in comparing his work with that of his predecessor Phrynichus, “that I might not be seen plucking the same sacred meadow of the Muses (λειμῶνα Μουσῶν ἱερὸν) as Phrynichus” (1299f.).<sup>84</sup> The association of these *choroi* with the life of the *polis* appears most strikingly, however, when Dionysus comes to his final test between the two tragedians. He will choose whichever of them gives the best advice for the salvation of the city, but he couples the very salvation of the *polis* with the continued performances of *choroi*: ἢν' ἡ πόλις σωθῆῖσα τοὺς χοροὺς ἄγῃ (1419). This line sums up the final stage of Dionysus’ development as the true god of the festivals of the city, the symbols of the good spirit, mutual trust, internal harmony, and sense of tradition which belong to the healthy *polis*. In the parodos too the theme



of the salvation of the state is intimately connected with the *choroi*, for not only is Demeter invoked as *Soteira*, but she is asked to save her own *choros* (σῶζε τὸν σαυτῆς χορόν, 387); the mystic framework of the play has thus brought the entire Athenian community under the protection which the Eleusinian deities grant to their initiates. The meaning of *choros* has expanded to include for a wistful moment the entire community united in the reassuring ritual expression of long-established, common traditions.<sup>85</sup>

The attempt of Aristophanes to restore *mousike* is thus tantamount — at least theoretically — to an attempt to reestablish the communal values of literature; it is thus also a restatement of the educational function which *mousike* possessed in the archaic world, a function being replaced by the λεπτολογία and λαλιά of Euripides and Socrates which separate education from its traditional attachment to the *polis*. It is at this point too that Plato, with whose ideas Aristophanes will seem familiar a decade or so later in the *Ecclesiazusae*, will take up the problem; but for the present Aristophanes can only state his ideal as a longed-for but probably unattainable goal, and Dionysus can no longer say with Simonides, πόλις ἄνδρα διδάσκει (fr. 53 D).<sup>86</sup>

The gods and their rituals thus represent the solidity of the community and in a sense *are* the community. It is, however, primarily the Mystae who throughout the play reinforce this association of the gods and the *polis*.<sup>87</sup> They appear to Dionysus as the only friendly creatures in a dark and unfriendly Hades: the light of their torches illuminates the surrounding gloom, the sound of their flutes contrasts sharply with the ψοφὸν τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τὰς ἀπέλας of Aeacus (492–93), and their presence calms and reassures Dionysus after his fright by the goblin (313ff.). They declare themselves firmly for the older type of communal order in the proclamation of 354ff., in which they exclude any one who promotes *stasis* or is not εὐκολός to his fellow-citizens, in the latter instance associating themselves with Sophocles who, in contrast to Euripides, is also called *eukolos* (82). They revile the low demagogues who disturb the established order of the state (420ff.), and describe the spontaneity and unashamed freedom of their procession in a way which captures the enthusiasm of Dionysus and thus perhaps turns him still more toward the communal definition of himself which he is to find in the second half of the play (406–19). Here the *loidoresmos* which takes place is an expression of the good will of fellow citizens rather than the rancor of demagogues, with none of the unpleasant results of the latter (ὥστ' ἀζημίους παίζειν καὶ χορεύειν, 408).<sup>88</sup> The Mystae, in fact, pervade the play from start to finish: they are mentioned with respect by Aeschylus (886–87)

and probably referred to by Euripides in his humorous interpretation of Aeschylus' *Ἑρμῇ χθόνιε πατρῷ' ἐποπτεύων κράτη* (1141ff.),<sup>89</sup> thus alluding to a Mystic term already employed in the smaller *agon* by Xanthias (745). The signal proof of the importance of the Mystae in the total conception of Aristophanes' play is their appearance at the end, called upon by Pluto himself, the god of darkness, to "show their sacred torches" and escort Dionysus and Aeschylus to the upper world with their songs (1524ff.). The sacred torches recall not only the communal presence of the sacred Muses and the sacred *choroi*, but the torches of the Panathenaic race (131, 1090ff.), also called *λαμπάδας* and also a symbol of an older, more cohesive way of life in the *polis* which is now yielding to the divisive effects of the new education (1090ff.). Their appearance here after Dionysus' choice of Aeschylus marks the complete unification of the different aspects of the god into a single communal identity. The dignity of Dionysus is fully restored: the god who was at first but a foreign spectator of the Mystic rites now, whether as Iacchus or as Dionysus Eleuthereus, has an honored place among them; and along with this reintegration of the identity of Dionysus comes a poetic restoration of some of the most important and traditional rites of the Athenian *polis*: the Panathenaic torch-race, the Eleusinian Mysteries, the Anthesteria with its Dionysiac *komos*, and the performances of tragedy and comedy.

The concluding scene of the play thus puts in communal terms the individual rebirth that is usually promised by the Mystae. The Mystae themselves, moreover, introduce into the play an element of seriousness that is consistent with the high pronouncements of Aeschylus on the responsibilities of the poet. It is perhaps significant that the play has no *hieros gamos*, an absence perhaps the more surprising because of the prominence of this rite at the Lenaea where the comedy was performed,<sup>90</sup> although it does conclude with a rebirth.<sup>91</sup> The entire comedy plays consistently upon the theme of death, not only in the subject of Dionysus' descent to Hades and the corpse who refers contemptuously to a return to the land of the living (177ff.),<sup>92</sup> but also in the description of the Athenian mob, led by the demagogues as living *ἐν τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσιν* (424). Life and death, as in the lines quoted from Euripides' *Phrixos* (1082, 1477f.), are reversed; and the true vitality of the *γόνιμον ποιητήν* (96) is to be found only in the land of the dead. Aeschylus especially reflects this reversal of things and illustrates the survival of the only true poetry in Hades. In his contest with Euripides he dwells upon the theme of death (1392, 1403). The first of these passages is particularly significant: Euripides extols "*Logos*, the shrine of Persuasion" (1391), against which Aeschylus sets "Death," who "alone of the gods loves

not gifts." The contrast is sharper than at first appears, for this famous passage of Aeschylus continues, "But he is the only one of the gods from whom *Persuasion* stands away."<sup>93</sup> The theme of this death-life inversion suggests the problem of what real efficacy in the mind of Aristophanes the Aeschylean ideal could have if all genuine poetry has died. Yet the inversion itself has happy consequences, not only in the rebirth of Aeschylus, but also in the summons from Pluto which he is supposed to deliver to the worst of the demagogues (1500ff.). And Aristophanes himself perhaps indicates the presence of some remaining hope in the survival of Aeschylus' poetry — which, unlike that of Euripides, has not died along with its author (868–69) — and in the strong communal spirit which inspired it.<sup>94</sup> His hope in the rebirth of this spirit, however, already shaken by the results of Arginusae, was shown by the events of the following year to be premature. In momentarily reversing his imagery and denying the death of the poetry of Aeschylus — that is, allowing an element of true vitality to remain with τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσιν — he interrupts somewhat the unreality which the interchange of life and death introduces into the structure of his play; but perhaps the very unreality of his central image itself reflects his deeper awareness of the inevitability of the approaching collapse of Athens, and contains, therefore, all the more pathos because of a partial unwillingness to admit this inevitability despite his painfully accurate diagnosis of the situation.

The rebirth of Aeschylus is linked with that of Dionysus, for they are both to ascend to the upper world together. And yet Dionysus' rebirth or rediscovery of himself contains from the start a negative element in his recognition by the chthonic powers, Pluto and Persephone. The corpse whom he meets at the beginning of the journey, moreover (170ff.) — a peculiarly Athenian corpse at that, demanding an exorbitant two drachmas for a petty task — is perhaps symbolic of the spiritual death of the Athenians, who are only corpses in the upper world (424), and thus hints at the ultimate failure of the broader implications of Dionysus' mission. Dionysus was reborn only through a radical self-modification, a kind of self-destruction, of which the Athenians are no longer capable, for the transformation involved lies beyond their spiritual powers.<sup>95</sup>

Whatever possibility for an actual regeneration there is, however, is to come through the communal aspect of Dionysus. It is, therefore, perhaps instructive to consider briefly in this context Aristophanes' relation to the treatment of Dionysus in the *Bacchae* of Euripides, written within a year or two of the *Frogs*. There is good reason to believe that Aristophanes knew Euripides' play and may even be alluding to it in several passages.<sup>96</sup> In so far as the *Bacchae* may be regarded as a defense of the divinity of



Dionysus and an attempt to return to simpler and more immediate forms of belief, there may be perhaps, paradoxically, some basic similarity with the *Frogs*.<sup>97</sup> Both works would then appear to arise from a concern with a declining belief in the power of the gods and a weakening of *μῦθος*.<sup>98</sup> And yet the difference lies precisely in the types of Dionysus presented in the two plays. The god of the *Bacchae* is the orgiastic Dionysus, essentially asocial, a dangerous god, quick to punish offenses upon his divinity. Defiance of his worship produces individual convulsions that shake the state and negate accepted social values.<sup>99</sup> In this sense, the *Bacchae* represents the most extreme development of the forces of individualism which, always inherent in the nature of Greek tragedy, now become the directing motives of the plot.<sup>100</sup>

Against this individualistic, orgiastic god, who manifests himself in subjective illusion, Aristophanes sets the Dionysus of comedy, closely attached to the communal festivals where all the repressed eroticism of a Pentheus has free vent in such moments as that of the Eleusinian procession (411ff.). There is almost a deliberate attempt to free Dionysus from the dangerous elements that appear in the *Bacchae*. As a stock figure in Old Comedy, he will endure insults of all kinds, even being whipped as a slave, very much unlike Euripides' Dionysus, who explains as the cause of all the destruction he has wrought: *καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμῶν θεὸς ὦν ὑβριζόμεν* (*Bacch.* 1348; cf. *Frogs* 21). Hence Aristophanes is careful to exclude the orgiastic god from a significant part in the comedy, and, naturally, plays upon the innocent braggadocio and love of women and wine that characterize the god in Old Comedy. Dionysus even gives his initial judgments on the contemporary tragedians in language befitting the wine-god (92ff.). Aristophanes harps upon his timidity and lets his association with the more serious side of his cult as Iacchus and a vegetation-god appear only indirectly. Xanthias can even give as a private opinion of his master, *πῶς γὰρ οὐχὶ γεννάδας, / ὅστις γε πίνειν οἶδε καὶ βινεῖν μόνον* (739f.).

The problem of Aristophanes is to integrate this low-comic figure with the conception of the god who sponsors the communal festivals and represents civic unity. This end he achieves by the motif of Dionysus' own search for identity and his proper recognition by Pluto. Whereas the Dionysus of the *Frogs* is a peculiarly Attic god, moreover, that of the *Bacchae* is much more a universal deity, a wanderer from the East, defending cultural relativism (*Bacch.* 484) and explicable also as a semi-abstract principle, *τὸ βακχεύσιμον* or *τὸ μανιῶδες* (*Bacch.* 298-99), just as Demeter is *Ge* or "whatever name you wish" (*Bacch.* 276).<sup>101</sup> The difference between the Dionysus of each play is a significant indication

of the gap between the comic and the tragic outlook, between social man's joyful acceptance of his limitations and individual man's struggling and discontent with them. Each Dionysus is thus most characteristic of the tendencies of his respective genre.

It is precisely the comic-communal nature of Dionysus in the *Frogs* which enables him to reconcile such disparate elements as the frog-chorus and the Mystae, Iacchus and the wine-god, and even, in the second part of the play, comedy and tragedy. The play revolves about dichotomies which are reflected in its bipartite structure; and it is only the full development of the character of Dionysus which enables him to absorb both the low comedy of the first part and the serious issues of the second half of the play. Dionysus thus presents a statement of the solidarity of the community in men's ability to laugh and play together as well as to work and face the "serious" issues of life. Thus it is that in a comedy he can pronounce judgments on the tragic poets, and he most truly appears in the last scene as the god of *both* comedy and tragedy. The clue to this unification of his personality and thus of the entire play is suggested by a song of the Mystae, who pray to Demeter, πολλὰ μὲν γέλοιά μ' εἰπεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαῖα (391-92). This alternation of *geloion* and *spoudaion* provides one of the main unifying motifs of the play.<sup>102</sup> The comedy begins with Xanthias' request to say something ἐφ' οἷς αἰεὶ γελῶσιν οἱ θεώμενοι, and Dionysus' refusal already creates the essential dichotomy of the play. But a little later it is Dionysus himself who arouses the inextinguishable *gelos* of Heracles (42ff.). When Dionysus has regained some of the proper balance between *gelos* and *spoude*, however, after his recognition, the low-comic element, as represented by the slaves Xanthias and Aeacus, departs from the stage in deference to the *spoude* of their masters: ὥς ὅταν γ' οἱ δεσπόται / ἐσπουδάκωσιν, κλαύμαθ' ἡμῖν γίγνεται (812f.). Euripides similarly lacks the proper balance, for Dionysus rejects his proposal about Cleocritus with the words, γέλοισιν ἂν φαίνοιτο νοῦν δ' ἔχει τίνα; (1439). The proper combination of laughter and seriousness is symbolic of the proper unity of the *polis* and appears in the songs of the Mystae, where the seriousness of the religious ritual is relieved by the almost licentious good-fellowship of the procession and by the very alternation of the less severe, "dance-loving" Iacchus with the more solemn Demeter.<sup>103</sup> Even the phrase παῖσαί τε καὶ χορεῦσαι (390), in the same strophic system in which the *geloia-spoudaia* dichotomy is developed, may also reflect this binary aspect of the Mystic procession and, indeed, of the whole comedy: the combination of the sheer enjoyment of licentious banter and playfulness for its own sake with the more serious sense of

the ritual-communal act of the dance. It is perhaps this double attitude toward the gods, as opposed to the more inflexible, one-directional view of tragedy, that makes Comedy, and the *Frogs* especially, the exponent of a fully livable, even if in practice unattained, integration of religion in the community. Snell has well characterized this aspect of Greek "piety":<sup>104</sup>

We find it difficult to understand how the gods of one's faith could be subjected to Aristophanic jests. But the laughter is part of the meaning, the fruitfulness, the positive side of life, and it is, therefore, in the eyes of the Greeks, more godlike than the sour solemnity which we associate with piety.

The search of the spirit of Comedy to find its proper relation to the state and the gods is thus completed at the end of the play in the fully developed communal aspect of Dionysus; and what emerges is, in fact, a definition applicable to tragedy as well.<sup>105</sup> The second half of the play shows Aristophanes' renewed consciousness of the equality of the tragic and comic poet in their educative function, both as teachers of their *polis* and both serving but different aspects of a single, unified divine nature. The process of Dionysus' development can thus be regarded as the central and unifying theme of the play. He succeeds in integrating the old-comic buffoon with the god of the dramatic festivals, and into this wider conception of himself as the god of the festive aspect of communal life he absorbs also his various other religious functions, including his somewhat more solemn and serious side as Iacchus. The festal procession thus becomes a leitmotif of the play, and as such is connected too with *mousike* as a symbol of communal solidarity. The theme of rebirth also concerns the regeneration of the *polis* through this general attempt to unify religion and art, Iacchus and Dionysus Eleuthereus, as complementary, closely fitting expressions of a healthy communal life. The asocial, orgiastic Dionysus of the *Bacchae* is rejected, along with the entire Euripidean outlook, as being hostile to this spirit of communal regeneration. The *Frogs*, therefore, can be regarded as a defense of Old Comedy itself, which could flourish only in the atmosphere of confidence in the unity of the *polis* which Aristophanes is attempting to promote. Aristophanes seems to sense the imminent collapse of Athens, and tries to make a final defense of an art-form which, more than any other, is inseparable from its communal setting. His concern with the imagery of death and resurrection, however, suggests that he also sensed the futility of his effort.



## NOTES

1. The following works have been of especial service to me and will be cited frequently in the notes below; unless otherwise indicated, they will be cited henceforth by the author's name only: Fridericus Adami, "De Poetis Scaenicis Graecis Hymnorum Sacrorum Imitatoribus," Fleckeisen's *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Supplementband 26 (1901) 213-62; F. M. Cornford, *The Origins of Attic Comedy* (London 1914); Maurice Croiset, "Le Dionysalexandros de Cratinus," *REG* 17 (1904) 297-310; Ludwig Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin 1932, reprint 1956); Victor Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes* (Cambridge, Mass. 1951); Etienne Lapalus, "Le Dionysos et l'Héraclès des *Grenouilles*," *REG* 47 (1934) 1-20; Georges Méautis, "Le Dionysalexandros de Cratinus," *REA* 36 (1934) 462-66; Gilbert Murray, *Aristophanes* (Oxford 1933); Martin P. Nilsson, "Early Orphism and Kindred Movements," *HThR* 28 (1935) 181-230 (to be cited henceforth as Nilsson, "Early Orphism"), *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, ed. 2 (Munich 1955) 1.564-601 (to be cited henceforth as Nilsson, *Gesch.*), *Griechische Feste* (Leipzig 1906); Carlo Pascal, *Dioniso, Saggio sulla Religione e la Parodia Religiosa in Aristofane* (Catania 1911); Sir Arthur W. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (Oxford 1953) (to be cited henceforth as Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals*), *Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy* (Oxford 1927) (to be cited henceforth as Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb*); Ludwig Radermacher, "Aristophanes *Frösche*," *SB Wien*, phil.-hist. Kl. 198 (1922) Heft 4 (unfortunately inaccessible was the anastatic reproduction with additions and revisions under Walther Kraus [Vienna 1954]); Benjamin B. Rogers, ed., *The Frogs of Aristophanes* (London 1902); Michael Tierney, "The Parodos in Aristophanes' *Frogs*," *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* 42 (1934-35) Section C, no. 10, pp. 199-218, with reviews by Ludwig Deubner, *Gnomon* 12 (1936) 506 and W. C. K. Guthrie, *CR* 49 (1935) 203; J. Van Leeuwen, ed., *Aristophanis Ranae* (Leyden 1906). Other works will be cited fully in the notes.

I am indebted also to Prof. Cedric H. Whitman of Harvard University for his helpful criticisms, corrections, and suggestions to the first draft of this article.

2. See Radermacher, 3ff.

3. For Aristophanes' tendency to put the *agon* before the parabasis, see Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb*, 300. Pickard-Cambridge also regards the preliminary contest between Dionysus and Xanthias (*Frogs* 606-74) as a *proagon* (p. 304).

4. For the problem of the unity and construction of the play, see Lapalus, 5: "Trop souvent on a considéré cette pièce comme une œuvre mal construite, faite de deux parties juxtaposées traitant de sujets fort différents; trop souvent aussi on s'est attaché surtout au débat littéraire entre Eschyle et Euripide qui forme la seconde partie de la pièce." See also H. Erbse's review of Radermacher-Kraus, *Gnomon* 28 (1956) 273.

5. For the motif of the journey, see O. Becker, "Das Bild des Weges und verwandte Vorstellungen im frühgriechischen Denken," *Hermes*, Einzelschrift 4 (1937). The journey as symbolic of the search for identity is, of course, a theme common to all literatures from the *Odyssey* to the quests of the Arthurian heroes and Dante. See the description of the knight Owain in Heinrich Zimmer, *The King and the Corpse*, Bollingen Series 11 (New York 1947) 118: "a homeless

wanderer, questing without any tangible aim between two known but unapproachable spheres. This is the ageless way to the re-integration of the self."

6. See Pascal, 29: "Perchè mai Aristofane abbia scelto Dioniso come giudice della contesa tra Eschilo ed Euripide e lo abbia poi rappresentato in sì triste figura, è un problema cui non parmi si sia data adeguata risposta."

7. Nauck<sup>2</sup>, fr. 61. See Pascal, 58ff. The treatment of both Homer and Aeschylus had, of course, a more sinister side in the blindness which falls upon Lycurgus. And hymns to Dionysus could have a real religious spirit, as in *Antigone* 1115ff. and even the *Thesmophoriazusae* 987ff., where Aristophanes is merely reflecting popular sentiment. See also Pascal, 66-7.

8. See Pascal, 61.

9. On the treatment of Dionysus in Old Comedy generally, see Pascal, 61.

10. Schol. to *Peace* 347; Eupolis, frags. 250ff. K; Pascal, 52ff.; see also Arthur M. Young, "The *Frogs* of Aristophanes as a Type of Play," *CJ* 29 (1933) 28f., who stresses the effeminacy of Dionysus in the *Taxiarchoi*.

11. See Athenaeus 10.456A; Pascal, 54, n.3.

12. Oxyrrhynch. Pap. 663. Text most conveniently now in J. M. Edmonds, *The Fragments of Attic Comedy* (Brill 1957) 1.32ff. For discussions and reconstructions see also Croiset, Méautis, and J. U. Powell, ed., *New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature*, Third Series (Oxford 1933) 158-61, with further references to earlier literature.

13. See Croiset, 308: "La sensualité l'emportait pour un moment sur la peur; et c'était ainsi que par dérèglement de mœurs et libertinage il attirait la guerre sur la Troïade." These accusations of loose living and cowardliness were intended, according to the end of the Hypothesis, by Cratinus for Pericles. See also Méautis, 465.

14. See Croiset, 303: "Dionysos, sans doute, pleurait et priait aussi; mais ses prières et ses pleurs ne faisaient que le rendre ridicule."

15. *Frogs* 46. Agathon wears a *krokotos* in *Thesm.* 138, and the women of the *Lysistrata* 43f. are described as ἐξηγησμέναι / κροκωτοφορούσαι καὶ κεκαλλωπισμέναι. See Van Leeuwen *ad vs.* 46. He describes the *krokotos* as a garment which "Athenis solae mulieres lautitioris vitae in publicum prodeuntes uti solebant." For the *krokotos* as a possibly "mystic" symbol, see also Elderkin (below, n. 87) 11.

16. See Tierney, 215-16. Tierney's doubts, however, that there cannot also be a reference here to the *philoia* of Cratinus seem groundless. See below, n. 36.

17. See schol. *ad. loc.*: εἰσάγουσι γὰρ τὸν Διόνυσον προγάστορα καὶ οἰδαλέον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀργίας καὶ οἰνοφλυγίας. See also *Frogs* 663 for the γαστέρα of Dionysus, and for the *progastridion*, Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb*, 262 with n.2.

18. It may be worth noting that when Heracles was serving Omphale, he would be seen ἐν κροκωτῷ καὶ πορφυρίδι ἔρια ξαίνων (Lucian *De Hist. Conscr.* 10). See Van Leeuwen *ad vs.* 46.

19. See G. W. Elderkin, "Xanthias and Heracles," *CP* 31 (1936) 70 n.8, who cites Julian *Misopogon* 366c, ὥσπερ οἱ κωμῳδοὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ τὸν Διόνυσον ἔλκουσι καὶ περιφέρουσιν, and a similar passage from *Orat.* 7.204b.

20. For the significance of the change of garment as a symbol of identity, see Zimmer (above, n. 5) 19-25, esp. 19: "The bestowal of the special vestments, implements, signet rings, and crowns actually recreates the individual. Changes of food and the re-organization of the outer ceremonial of life make possible certain new things, certain actions and feelings, and prohibit others." See also 42ff.

21. See Méautis, 364, and Croiset, 302 n.2, who argues convincingly that the words *ἐαντὸν δ' εἰς κρῖον μετασκευάσας* in the Hypothesis need not refer to an actual metamorphosis, but only a disguise, "un travestissement," with a ram's skin. Apollodorus (3.4.3) tells also of a mythical transformation of Dionysus into a kid; and for the related cult of Dionysus Eriphos, see J. G. Frazer *ad loc.* (Loeb Classical Library 1921).

22. For the didactic element in Aristophanes' earlier plays, see the parabasis of the *Knights* and the *Peace*; the term *κωμωδοδιδάσκαλος* in *Knights* 507 and *Peace* 737, however, probably refers only to the training of a chorus and not to the comic poet as teacher, though see *Frogs* 1055. For a recent review of the problem of the educative function of the poet, with some reference to Aristophanes, see Walther Kraus, "Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum," *Wiener Studien* 68 (1955) 65ff.

23. See Pascal, 203; Rogers, 48-49 (*ad. vs.* 316).

24. Lapalus, following Pascal, emphasizes the grossness of Dionysus and his apparent lack of divine attributes: "Aristophane, dans sa comédie des *Grenouilles*, a dépouillé Dionysos de tous ses attributs; il en a fait un homme ridicule et grossier, un mystificateur, qui assiste en étranger aux mystères célébrés devant lui" (p. 2). He feels, nevertheless, that even this buffoonery of Dionysus is not inconsistent with his divine character, for even the Eleusinian Dionysus had a trace of jollity and perhaps sensuality about him, as in his adventure with Prosymnos (pp. 7ff.). Neither he nor Pascal, however, recognizes any development from this degraded condition within the play or any reattainment of divinity. The scholion to *Frogs* 479 similarly points out Dionysus' lapse from his divinity within the comic framework: *δείκνυσαι δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ὡς ὁ Διόνυσος οὐκ ἔστι θεός, ὡς ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ παλίων*.

25. For the gods' freedom from pain (a post-Homeric belief), see Radermacher, 228ff. and Melissus, fr. B 7 (Diels-Kranz, ed. 6), on the *kosmos*.

26. See Sophocles *Trach.* 248ff. There may well be in this entire Aeacus scene a further attempt to associate Dionysus with Heracles through the literary reminiscence of the *Peirithoos* of Critias (falsely attributed to Euripides: see *Vita Eurip.*, vss. 33-34 Nauck; U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Analecta Euripidea* [Berlin 1875] 165-68; Dorothy Stephans, *Critias, Life and Literary Remains* [Diss. Cincinnati 1939] 70-75; Albin Lesky, *Die Tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* [Göttingen 1956] 216, but see *contra* D. L. Page, *Gk. Lit. Papyri*). [Loeb Class. Lib. 1950] 120 ff. In this tragedy, Heracles encounters a surprised Aeacus. Part of their meeting scene is preserved by Ioannes Diaconus on Hermogenes (2.445.7ff., Rabe), who gives a brief outline of the plot and continues, "In this drama, Aeacus is introduced speaking with Heracles as follows." There ensues a quotation of sixteen lines of dialogue (Diels-Kranz<sup>6</sup> 88 B16; the earlier collection of Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Fragmenta* [ed. 2, 1889] p. 547, had overlooked this passage and gives only five lines from another source, numbered as Eurip., frag. 591). On the likelihood of Aristophanes' reference to the *Peirithoos*, see also E. Diehl, s.v. "Kritias," *RE* 22 (1922) 1907 and Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ed. 2 (Berlin 1920) 1.118 with n.1.

The reminiscence of the Heracles of the *Peirithoos* is significant here for Dionysus' development, for it associates him once more with the heroic image of Heracles in the first part of the comedy and delineates more clearly the beginning of the reintegration. The meeting with Aeacus in both works marks the formal



confrontation of the hero with the powers of the lower world and all that their mystery symbolizes in terms of the hidden capabilities of the self. The more traditional Heracles of Critias, however, simply asserts his heroic identity and his divine lineage and curtly and directly states his purpose, to take Cerberus and accomplish his *ἄθλον* (vs. 13). It is interesting to note that Critias seems to have made the meeting with Aeacus the central point in Heracles' descent to Hades, the real difficulty to be overcome, rather than the actual seizure of Cerberus; on this point see Wilamowitz, *Anal. Eurip.* 167–68. For Dionysus too the meeting with Aeacus is the critical obstacle, but his struggle lies precisely in the problem of his identity. Thus the parallel with the scene from the *Peirithoos*, presenting as it does another stage in Heracles' successful accomplishment of his mission and another step toward his eventual divinization, perhaps also reflects upon the success of Dionysus and his own reattainment of divinity. Be this as it may, the reminiscence of the *Peirithoos* does, nevertheless, serve to focus attention on this crucial moment in Dionysus' quest, when he begins to reabsorb into his own developing character the heroic identity of the Heracles whom he left behind in the upper world.

27. Cornford, 205: "The impression is gone again in a flash; but it seems to show how assiduously Aristophanes has watched against the risk elsewhere and to make us feel the reason why Comedy must either avoid the Gods and heroes altogether or set them at a heavy discount."

28. See Nilsson, "Early Orphism," *passim*. *Frogs* 145ff. has given rise to much speculation about the "Orphic" content of Dionysus' *katabasis*. It has been suggested, notably by Adami, 247ff., that such otherworldly punishments are known only to "Orphic" doctrine and not to the Eleusinian rites; yet the "Orphic" conception of punishment in the hereafter and a "hell of mud" rests on rather uncertain evidence and is in fact doubted by Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951 and Boston 1957) 150ff. and esp. n.102. It is, however, interesting that very little attention is actually paid to these sinners; Dionysus sees them and the mud (273–76) but merely mentions the fact. It is, of course, possible that this aspect of the Eleusinian rites — if it is Eleusinian — could not safely be parodied; but in general commentators hunting for Orphic influences seem to have given a disproportionate amount of emphasis to the sinners and punishments described in the *Frogs*.

29. For the judgment of the souls naked and stripped of all deceptive externals before Aeacus and the other judges, see Plato *Gorgias* 523c–e. See also Elderkin (below, n. 87) 16.

30. Cornford, 71, describes this third party as "a minor character, a friend or companion of the Agonist, who plays the part of the Buffoon, interjecting remarks and anecdotes, naive, humorous, or obscene, aside to the audience." But Dionysus can hardly be called a minor character, and very few of his remarks in the *agon* are obscene or naive. Cornford tends to go too far in reducing all the characters to schematized types and survivals of types. It is quite possible that Dionysus is such a survival, but account must be taken of what he is as Aristophanes has recast him in the play itself.

31. Pascal, 32–33, asks, "È, nella mente di Aristofane, un tipo di Dio cotesto?"

32. *Clouds* 520–21; *Wasps* 1056ff. See Murray, 86 and 106ff.

33. *Ibid.*, 108 n.1.

34. See Van Leeuwen *ad* vs. 944.

35. Rogers, 48-49 (*ad vs.* 316) thinks that such an association "would have seemed irreverent," although he admits that there may have been some relationship felt in the popular mind. See also above, n. 23. It has even been suggested that the presence of Dionysus and Heracles is intended to recall the fact that they were coupled as two of the early initiates into the Eleusinian Mysteries (ps.-Plato *Axiochus* 371e), and that the descent of Dionysus disguised as Heracles is intended as a parody on the spiritual elements in the Mystic journey to the underworld (Lapalus, 7ff.). Lapalus, 19, sums up his position thus: "Nous pensons cependant que le personnage d'Héraclès — comme celui de Dionysos — est là pour permettre à Aristophane de parodier, à propos de l'initiation mystique du héros, le bout et les moyens de l'initiation éleusiniennne." For Heracles as a mystic initiate, see also Eurip. *H.F.* 613.

36. *Frogs* 356-57. The reference to Cratinus, who was also famous for his *philoinia*, even more celebrated by his play, the *Pytine*, may thus contain a further allusion to Dionysus as god of wine. For *ταυροφάγος* as an epithet of Bacchic Dionysus, see Soph. fr. 607 (cited by the schol. to *Frogs* 357), Eurip. *Bacch.* 918, Aesch. fr. 57 (from the *Edoni*), and generally Pascal, 207-9; Nilsson, *Gesch.* 1.570ff.; Adami, 257, also notes the occurrence of similar epithets in Orphic hymns, e.g., 45.1, 30.4.

37. See Eurip. *Bacch.* 22 and 465.

38. Tierney, 205f., has shown convincingly that the *Soteira* of line 378 is Demeter and not Kore; and he reinterprets *ἐτέραν ὕμνων ἰδέαν* (384) to mean a second hymn to the same goddess, Demeter (p. 216). See also Guthrie's review and summary, *CR* 49.203 *ad fin.*

39. It has been suggested that this emphasis on *παίξιν* does not entirely suit the Eleusinian procession (see Deubner, *Gnomon* 12.506). The motif of play, however, appears frequently in hymns to Dionysus (e.g., *Bacchae* 161, and see the examples of Adami, 252). But the great stress which Aristophanes lays on it here may be unique and his own invention, part of his poetic remolding of the ritual materials for his own conception of the "comic" aspect in communal rite and of Dionysus as the god of communal festivity.

40. For the theory of the origin of comedy from *komoi*, especially those associated with the Lenaea and the Lesser Dionysia (when the *gephyrismos* occurred) see Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb* 240ff. and Radermacher, 4-14. Modern scholarship, however, has been less confident about the *komos*-theory. See the survey of recent discussions of the problem by C. T. Murphy, "A Survey of Recent Work on Aristophanes and Old Comedy," *CW* 49 (1956) 202-3. The similarities of *Frogs* 420ff. with the *gephyrismos*, moreover, should perhaps not be pressed, for in the true *gephyrismos* the outsiders reviled those in the procession, whereas the situation in the *Frogs*, as Tierney (200-1) pointed out, is the reverse. The similarity in mood, nevertheless, remains.

41. For the association of Aeschylus with the *Mystae* in the play, see Lapalus, 6.

42. See *Bacch.* 66, 280ff., 614 for *ponos* (*Frogs* 402); *Bacch.* 127-28 *Φρυγίων αὐλῶν πνεύματι* (*Frogs* 154f., 314f.); for *teletai*, see *Bacch.* 22, 40, 465. Tierney, following the detailed work of Adami, emphasizes the similarity of these motifs with the Orphic hymns, e.g., 50.6, *πανσίπονον θνητοῖσι φανεῖς ἄκος* (p. 214).

43. Eurip. fr. 472, esp. *vss.* 9ff.:

ἀγνὸν δὲ βλὸν τείνων ἐξ οὗ  
Διὸς Ἰδαίου μύστης γενόμεν

καὶ νυκτιπόλου Ζαγρέως βροντὰς  
 τοὺς ὠμοφάγους δαῖτας τελέσας,  
 ματρὶ τ' ὀρέϊω δᾶδας ἀνάσχων  
 καὶ Κουρήτων  
 Βάκχος ἐκλήθηεν ὀσιωθεὶς

See Nilsson, "Early Orphism" 222, and for the association of Dionysus and Cybele, Eurip. *Bacch.* 78ff. The Delphic Paean of Philodamus also associates Dionysus Baccheus of the orgies with the mystic Iacchus. See Otto Kern, s.v. "Dionysos," *RE* 9 (1903) 1043. Other evidence is also collected by Pascal, 202ff. For a similar fusion between Rhea-Cybele and the Eleusinian goddesses, see Eurip. *Helena*, second stasimon (1301-68), esp. 1346ff.

44. For the suggestion that the parodos of the *Frogs* actually represents the Lesser Mysteries, see T. G. Tucker, *CR* 18 (1904) 416-18, reprinted in his school edition, *The Frogs of Aristophanes* (London 1906) xxviii-xxxiv. This suggestion seems not to have met with general acceptance, despite its early approval by Jane Harrison in a postscript to Tucker's article in *CR*. Though it has some points in its favor, notably that the time of year of the Lesser Dionysia fits that of the Lenaea when the *Frogs* was performed, there is no really compelling evidence; and the argument that the spectators of the *Frogs* would be more familiar with the Lesser Mysteries of their own suburbs than with the Eleusinian Mysteries is highly supposititious, especially in view of the renewed popularity of the Eleusinian procession when carried out with the help of an armed escort under Alcibiades probably in 407 (Xen. *Hellen.* 1.4.20; Plutarch *Alcib.* 34.3-6). Some fifty years before Tucker, however, Eduard Gerhard made this same suggestion: "Ueber den Iakchoszug bei Aristophanes," *Philologus* 13 (1858) 210-12. He conjectured that the Lesser Mysteries became a kind of substitute for the Eleusinian procession after the occupation of Decelea, a supposition which he does not attempt to support by any kind of evidence. The argument based upon the presence of Kore Soteira at the Lenaea is exploded, in all probability, by Tierney's demonstration that Soteira in *Frogs* 378 may refer to Demeter, not Kore (see above, n. 38). Tierney similarly shows that Tucker's geographical arguments are without foundation, although he feels that some of his objections against the Eleusinian rites are valid (pp. 203ff.). Tierney then develops his own theory, that the parodos presents not the Eleusinian procession, but part of the Lenaeon festival, where Dionysus could appear in so many diverse forms. This theory, however, though supported by much detail, raises far more difficulties than it solves, and is firmly rejected by Deubner in his review in *Gnomon* 12.506. The prominence of Mystae, not only in the parodos but throughout the play, would surely suggest Eleusis, especially in isolated contexts like 745, 886-87, 1524ff. Tierney bases far too much of his argument on the "Orphic" parallels found by Adami, and must suppose a heavy importation of "Orphic" ideas into the Lenaeon festival (pp. 206ff.), suggesting that "even under State regulation its cult had something of a mystical colouring" (p. 211). But all such ideological influences are highly uncertain, especially in a cult where ritual always predominated over dogma. The strong emphasis on the name Iacchus throughout the parodos, moreover, also points to Eleusis, although, of course, Aristophanes mixes in other elements. The poet is not interested, as Tierney seems to presuppose, in giving an accurate description of any single real cult, but merely selects useful features from a number of related cults, though, as Tierney points out, the poet may be aided in such a



procedure by the composite nature of the Lenaea itself. Neither of the other objections raised by Tierney or Adami against Eleusis are really as "insuperable" as they are made to seem, viz., that a parody or even allusion to certain aspects of the Eleusinian rite constituted a dangerous sacrilege (Adami, 246-47) or that a reference to Eleusis at such a time of political and military crisis in Athens would only irritate the audience and that the allusion to Alcibiades' escort in 407 would but stir bitter memories, as Alcibiades was back in exile (Tierney, 201). As for the first objection, a certain amount of latitude may have been permitted as long as nothing was said about the actual revelations in the Telesterion, which Aristophanes does not mention (see Tierney, 201), and surely the procession itself was known to all. As to the second, Aristophanes is handling equally dangerous political realities — admittedly with care — in his references to Arginusae; and the appearance of the Mystae would probably appeal to the audience much more as a nostalgic escape from the present (an interpretation in harmony with the wistful, poetic atmosphere of the whole play) than as an irritating reminder of their danger, although this latter element is doubtless present as part of the escape motif itself. Lapalus, on the other extreme, has even gone so far as to see a direct parody of the spiritual tone of the Eleusinian Mysteries in the *katabasis* of Dionysus, who seeks from Heracles not spiritual guidance for the journey, but precise information about the best hotels, inns, and *πορνεία* (pp. 10ff.). He agrees with the view of Méautis, *Les Mystères d'Eleusis*, that "les réminiscences éleusiniennes dans la comédie d'Aristophane sont plus nombreuses, et surtout plus précises, qu'on ne l'imagine d'ordinaire" (20 n.1). His own view of Dionysus and Heracles as Mystic initiates (see above, n. 35) is difficult to support from the text of the play itself; but it is certainly likely that only our scanty knowledge of details about the Eleusinian Mysteries prevents the recognition of more allusions to Eleusis in the play. For further literature, see also below, n. 87.

45. Soph. *Antig.* 1115ff., esp. 1120-21. See Tierney, 211.

46. The similarities of the hymnic literature are worked out in detail by Adami, esp. pp. 244ff., with a summary of results, pp. 259-62. He was seeking for a common "Orphic" source, but actually proves merely the conventionality of epithets connected with the different aspects of Dionysus and the practical interchangeability of his different functions in the hymns, as the opening word of the *Antigone* ode, *πολυώνυμε*, already demonstrates.

47. For Dionysus' association with mystery cults generally, see Nilsson, *Gesch.* 1.599ff.

48. See Deubner, 125ff; Nilsson, *Gesch.* 1.584; Cornford, 85. The other interpretation of the scholion is *ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις ἐπιλεγόμενον, ἐκκέχνηται. καλεῖ θεόν*, which Van Leeuwen, *ad loc.*, rejects as "insulsum" and impious. He and Rogers (*ad loc.*, p. 75), however, seem to have perpetuated an error in Aristophanic scholarship, that this second interpretation refers to an *Eleusinian* formula, of which the scholion actually says nothing. Rogers assumes the scholion to be referring to "the Mystic feast," and Van Leeuwen adds, "Verba haec Dionysi etiam ab Iacchi in festis Eleusiniis obeundis invocatione repetit." Either they are confusing the Lenaeian festival with the Eleusinian or they are reading their own ideas into the scholiast's neutral *θυσίαις*. The earlier commentators, whose views Van Leeuwen somewhat misrepresents in rejecting them, say nothing about Eleusis. Brunck (London 1823) says only "ad sacrificiorum ritum" (1.220, *ad loc.*, repeated in Dindorf's variorum edition, Oxford 1837, 3.234-35); and Kock

similarly explains, "eine bei Libationen gewöhnliche Formel" (Berlin 1881, 3.102). That such a formula was common and well-worn enough to be innocently parodied appears from Kock's citation of a somewhat similar parody in *Birds* 890-91.

49. See Deubner, 125-26: "Vielmehr muss es sich auch hier um eine engere Verbindung mit den eleusinischen Gottheiten handeln, und dass auch Semele auftritt, passt gut zu dem oben angeführten liturgischen Ruf der Gemeinde, in dem der mit Dionysos gleichgesetzte Iakchos als Sohn der Semele bezeichnet wird."

50. Nilsson, *Gesch.* 1.578ff.

51. Deubner, *loc. cit.*; Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 33 and 24-25, testimonia nos. 13-15.

52. Tierney lays great stress on this composite nature of the Lenaea (see above, n. 44). Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 34, more cautiously sums up what can be regarded with "comparative certainty" about the mixture of Mystic-Eleusinian elements in the Lenaea: "The Lenaea included mystical elements which were in some way the concern of the officials of Eleusis, and very probably a nocturnal worship of Dionysus by women such as the vases depict."

53. See above, n. 44.

54. For a convenient summary of the major cult associations of Limnae, see Van Leeuwen *ad. vs.* 216. There has also been an attempt to connect the Lenaea with Limnae on the basis of an unfortunately corrupt notice in Hesychius, s.v. *Λίμναι*: ἐν Ἀθήναις τόπος ἀνειμένος Διονύσῳ ὅπου τὰ Λαῖα (?) ἤγετο. The word in question, however, is regarded by Nilsson as a mistake for *Λίμναια* rather than *Λίγναια*. See Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 37 with n.3.

55. See Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 8, testimonium no. 31, an inscription (*IG*<sup>2</sup> 2.1672) which, however, is from the year 329/8 B.C.

56. Schol. on *Frogs* 211ff. and on *Acharn.* 1076; see also Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 13f.; Deubner, 100ff.; Pascal, 201f. The scholiast to the *Acharnians* passage (1076) interestingly asserts that sacrifice was made to both Hermes and Dionysus, citing Didymus, though Pickard-Cambridge, *ibid.* 13 n.2, claims that the reference to Dionysus here is a blunder.

57. Deubner, 95-100; Nilsson, *Gesch.* 1.594ff. is more cautious.

58. Tierney, however, presents another, somewhat forced interpretation of the flowers, as characteristic of the abode of the Blest as it appears in the Orphic hymns (p. 218 with n.79). But this feature may have been traditional and common to all such visions of the hereafter, whether "Orphic" or Eleusinian. See, e.g., the ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα in *Odyssey* 11.539, 573 and 24.13 (although it may not refer to a flowering meadow: see J. Van Leeuwen, *Odyssea* [Leyden 1917] on 11.539); Vergil *Aen.* 6.638ff. (*amoena virecta* / *fortunatorum nemorum*, etc., and 6.679, in addition, of course, to Pindar *Ol.* 2.73ff.). See also Radermacher's rejection of Adami's similar "Orphic" parallels, p. 356. The cult connections of the Lenaea and Anthesteria and their close proximity in time make Tucker's explanation of the flowers more attractive, *CR* 18.418. See also E. R. Dodds, *Gorgias* (Oxford 1959) 375, on 524a2.

59. See Deubner, 101-2. A typical χοῦς of the type used at the festival shows an ass copulating with a mule (pl. 9.3).

60. See Nilsson, *Griechische Feste* 270-1; *Gesch.* 1.476-85; J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough*, Part 5, vol. 1, "Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild" (London 1919) 1-34.

61. See Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 11.
62. The reference to Nysa, however, may be a mere stock epithet, one of the conventions of Dionysiac hymn-writing. See Soph. *Antig.* 1131; Eurip. *Bacch.* 556ff.; and generally on place-names associated with Dionysus in the hymns, Adami, 227ff., 238, 255. The absence of the orgiastic Dionysus from the *Frogs* is perhaps the more striking as the Lenaea apparently takes its name from a cult of this type, λῆναι being equivalent to Βάκχη (so the title of Theocritus 26, Βάκχαι ἢ Λῆναι). See also Heraclitus, B 14-15; Nilsson, *Gesch.* 1.575-6; Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 26ff.
63. Nilsson, *Gesch.* 1. pl. 36.1; Deubner, 102 with pl. 11.1; Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 11 with figs. 6-8 and *Diithyramb*, figs. 5-7.
64. See A. L. M. Cary, "The Appearance of Charon in the Frogs," *CR* 51 (1937) 52-53, who argues that Aristophanes turns this difficult change of scene into a joke by having Charon shout ὥπ παραβαλοῦ (180) to the scene-changers.
65. Ἐπεὶ οἱ ἐλεύθεροι πρὸ τούτου ἐδέροντο πράσοις καὶ σκορόδοις, perhaps an allusion to a ritual like that described in the schol. to Theocritus 7.106, τῶν ἐφήβων ἐν Σικελίᾳ γίνεται ἀγὼν ἐν σκίλλαις. See Radermacher, 233.
66. See generally Radermacher, 232-33.
67. See G. W. Elderkin (above, n. 19) 69-70. He connects this festival also with the reference to Melite in *Frogs* 501 and thinks that there may be a pun on Xanthias and ξάινω, to card, referring both to whipping and to Heracles' carding wool for Omphale.
68. Heraclitus, B 15. See Nilsson, "Early Orphism" 222-23.
69. Plutarch, *Isis and Osiris* 35; Pascal, 31; Cornford, 85; Nilsson also notes that protomes of Dionysus holding an egg as a chthonic symbol are frequently found in Boeotian graves (*Gesch.* 1.598). For the mystic *katabasis* of Dionysus, see also Lapalus, 7ff. and above, n. 35.
70. Pascal, 66 n.2. For frogs generally as a symbol of transitus and mysterious passage, see C. G. Jung, "Ueber die Archetypen des kollektiven Unbewusstseins," *Eranos Jahrb.* (1934) 228f.
71. Wilamowitz suggested, against the authority of Pausanias, that the Titan-Dionysus myth is no older than the third century B.C.; but Dodds (above, n. 28) supports the sixth-century date for the legend (155-56 with nn. 127-29).
72. Nilsson, "Early Orphism" 211-12.
73. So too *Frogs* 424, ἐν τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσι. Dodds, 152 with n. 110, thinks that a parody of actual Orphic doctrine is intended.
74. Nilsson strongly emphasizes the unity of the different aspects of Dionysus: "Für die griechische Religion waren sie eine Einheit, als Einheit machten sie sich geltend, und so müssen sie in der Geschichte der griechischen Religion erfasst werden" (*Gesch.* 1.601).
75. It is also perhaps significant for the unity of the mystic and the comic Dionysus that the Eleusinian priestesses and other officials like the *Δαδοῦχος* and *Iakchagogos* had special seats in the theatre of Dionysus in Athens. See Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 277. There has been some dispute as to whether the *Frogs* was produced in the theatre of Dionysus or not. The latest treatment of this problem follows Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals*, in supporting the theatre of Dionysus: W. B. Stanford, "Notes on Aristophanes' *Frogs*," *Hermathena* 89 (1957) 65. He argues against M. Bieber's view favoring the "Lenaion Theatre"



(*AJA* 58 [1954] 277) on the ground that the cold winds and seasonal inclemencies of January, when the Lenaea took place, would require the greater shelter of the theatre of Dionysus. For further references, see Bieber, 277 n.3.

76. See, e.g., *Frogs* 249, the Frog-chorus' πομφολυγοπαφλάσμασιν and the ῥήματα γομφοπαγῇ of Aeschylus (824). The schol. to *vs.* 1296 also associates the τοφλαττοθρατ of Aeschylus with the φλέως of the Limnae (e.g., *vs.* 244).

77. See generally n. 44 above.

78. Tierney, especially in the second part of his paper, pp. 212ff., goes too far in trying to explain all the cult references in the parodos by actual ritual practices at the Lenaea. The fact that the *prorrhesis*, for instance, *vss.* 354-71, differs from the standard Eleusinian form is not evidence for the Lenaea (Tierney, 200), but only for the poet's re-forming of a cult motif to his own needs. See Deubner, *Gnomon* 12.506, and Radermacher, 184f., 356. It is, however, somewhat of an overstatement to call the parodos "eine freie Phantasieschöpfung . . . , zu der Eleusis ein Stück von Rahmen lieferte" (Radermacher, 185), since some of the poet's materials, like the hymns to Iacchus or Demeter, may be real ritual elements; but, on the whole, Radermacher's view is probably closer to the truth than Tierney's.

79. Rogers, *ad vs.* 811. It is perhaps possible too that the language used in his final judgment, ἔκρινα νικᾶν Αἴσχυλον, reflects the language of the dramatic festivals; and he uses the same term in speaking to the Frogs, τούτῳ (τῷ κοᾷξ) οὐ νικήσετε, as if referring to choruses in competition at a performance. More explicitly still, see *vss.* 392f., νικήσαντα ταινιοῦσθαι, with the notes of Rogers and Van Leeuwen *ad loc.*

80. For the religious feeling associated with the dramatic festivals, see Ehrenberg, 253ff. For the great procession at the Dionysia, see Deubner, 134ff.

81. *Frogs* 1308: αὐτῇ ποθ' ἢ Μοῦσ' οὐκ ἐλεσβλάξεν, οὔ. Rogers suggests αὐτῇ for αὐτῇ. The line itself is slightly obscure. Van Leeuwen remarks of it, "ioco obscaeno magis quam perspicuo."

82. For the pejorative connotation of λαλεῖν, see Eupolis, fr. 95K, λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν; also Soph. *Antig.* 320; Eurip. *Cycl.* 315, *Suppl.* 462.

83. See Rogers *ad vs.* 686.

84. For the further association of Aeschylus with Dionysus and the Mystae through the imagery of reaping (*Frogs* 576, 1206, 1300) and *sparagmos* (*vss.* 465ff., 1262), see Elderkin (below, n. 87) 20f. The situations of Aeschylus facing Euripides and Dionysus facing Aeacus are perhaps made parallel still further through the idea of bodily dismemberment, for in his interview with Aeacus Dionysus has to undergo the threats of being torn apart (esp. *vss.* 473-77), while Euripides (*vs.* 1262) shouts that he will cut up the μέλη (Elderkin notes the ambiguity of the word as both "songs" and "limbs") of Aeschylus. Aeschylus thus would appear to become the communal surrogate of Dionysus in undergoing — if only metaphorically — the sacrifice of the *sparagmos* for the good of the community and for an ultimate communal resurrection (see ἀναστήσει 480, 490).

85. For the association of the communal *choroi* with the very existence of the polis, see Eurip. *Tro.* 1071: φροῦδαί σοι θυσίαι χορῶν τ' / εὐφῆμοι κέλαδοι κατ' ὄρ- / φναν τε παννυχίδες θεῶν. For comedy and the festivals generally as expressing communal solidarity founded in deep-rooted traditions, see Cornford, *passim*. He sees in such rites as the scattering of sweetmeats in early comedy the attempt to

spread the influence of the regenerated god over as many members of the community as possible (p. 99) and in contests of choruses or villagers in *aischrologiai* an effort to promote the communal welfare (pp. 110ff., and see also 192ff., 207ff.). Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb* 348, has doubts about the ritual origins and meaning of some of these acts, but he does not call into question the general communal interest of Old Comedy.

86. For the educational significance of *mousike* and the archaic connection of the *polis* and education, see Ehrenberg, 287–92. In addition to the Simonides fragment (53D), he cites also Eurip. *Cycl.* 276, *τίς ὑμᾶς ἐξεπαίδευσεν πόλις*; see also the recent study by W. Kraus, cited above, n. 22.

87. Lapalus, 5ff., lays much stress on the Mystae as adding a note of higher seriousness to the play. See also G. W. Elderkin, *Mystic Allusions in the Frogs* (Princeton 1955), with the brief review in *Hermathena* 89 (1957) 91.

88. *Ἀζημιλούς* is interpreted by Tierney, 217, as referring to the impunity “partly due to the Dionysiac mask” at the festivals of Dionysus, though the actual evidence for masks elsewhere than in the comic and tragic festivals is weak. It does, at any rate, refer to the incorporation of licentious behavior into a state festival where such actions become expressions of concord rather than enmity and thus lose their asocial character.

89. Commentators seem to miss the point of Euripides, which lies probably in the ambiguity of *ἐποπτεύειν* as used by Xanthias previously (745) in its proverbial or colloquial sense of “attain to the highest earthly happiness” (see LSJ<sup>9</sup> s.v., 2 *ad fin.*). Rogers, following Hermann, has a needlessly complex note which obscures the whole issue. See also G. Cammelli, *StItal* N.S. 9 (1931) 81, and Elderkin (above, n. 87) 12.

90. See Deubner, 100ff.

91. See Cornford, 15, 85. For a detailed criticism of Cornford’s theory of the *hieros gamos* and the rebirth motif as indicative of an original fertility rite, however, see Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb* 330ff., 345ff. and — with special reference to the *Frogs* — 346.

92. Pascal, 194–95, conjectures that the reply of the corpse reflects the doctrines of the “Orphics” or the Mystae themselves, who have arrived at a true knowledge of the superiority of death to life. See also Dodds (above, n. 71).

93. Aeschylus, fr. 156 (cited by Van Leeuwen *ad vs.* 1392).

94. Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals* 87 with n. 1, offers another explanation for Aeschylus’ statement that his poetry has not died with him, namely that after his death the Athenians allowed the production of his plays in competition with living poets, whereas it was not until 386 B.C. that old tragedies were regularly revived and performed at the City Dionysia.

95. For the archetypal theme of the corpse as the objectification of the questing ego’s negative state, its image of itself as nothing before the business of positive rediscovery and reintegration begins, see Zimmer (above, n. 5) 211–35, especially 222f.

96. Pascal, 48, suggests that Dionysus’ initial *pothos* for Euripides derives from the gratitude which he felt for his defense in the *Bacchae*. More certain may be the similarity of Dionysus’ command to Aeacus not to torture him (*Frogs* 628) with *Bacch.* 504, the scene between Pentheus and the Stranger. See Cornford, 82 with n. 2, and Van Leeuwen *ad vs.* 628. Cf. also *Frogs* 838, *ἀχάλινον ἀκρατὲς ἀπύλωτον στόμα* with *Bacch.* 387f., *ἀχάλινων στομάτων / ἀνόμου τ’ ἀφροσύνας* /

τὸ τέλος δυστυχία and *Bacch.* 995, τὸν ἄθεον ἄνομον ἄδικον Ἐχίονος / γόνον γηγενῆ. The accumulation of alpha privative, however, is generally characteristic of Euripides' lyric style, so that Aristophanes may not have the *Bacchae* specifically in mind. See, for example, Eurip. *I.T.* 220 with M. Platnauer's commentary (Oxford 1938) *ad loc.* for further parallels. A parallel accumulation of alpha privative occurs also in the *Palamedes* of Gorgias, 36. See in general Tierney, 217, and Adami, 254ff. As already noted above, moreover, some of these parallels may be due simply to a conventional way of writing hymns to Dionysus.

97. Pascal, 35ff., doubtless goes too far in interpreting the *Bacchae* as simply a defense of Dionysus. He even sees in the play "eco della tendenza a dispogliare quel culto di tutto quanto aveva di pericoloso, di eccitante, di frenetico, ed a purificarlo, riducendolo ad una forma di aspirazione verso la vita tranquilla e serena" (p. 44)! Euripides' attitude is far more complex, and he seems to illustrate several different ways of regarding Dionysus, not all of them favorable. For the problem of his attitude toward actual Dionysiac cults, see R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Euripides and Dionysus* (Cambridge 1948) 149ff. and esp. 163ff.

98. See Ehrenberg, 264ff. He cites as an example (and admittedly out of context) Crates, frag. 21, ὁ μῦθος ἀπώλετο. See also Thucydides' famous rejection of τὸ μυθῶδες, 1.21.1 and 1.22.4. Similar too in sentiment is the attitude toward *mythos* in Eurip. *Hippol.* 197 and *Electra* 743-45.

99. On the opposition of Aristophanes and the comic writers generally to the orgiastic Dionysus, see Elderkin (above, n. 87) 23 with n. 59. He notes that "the *Bacchae* is not Delphic Eleusinian," whereas "in the comedy of the *Frogs* . . . Dionysus, though the national god of Lydia, is Eleusinian in character."

100. For the problem of individualism in Euripides and its relation to the *polis* and Aristophanes, see Ehrenberg, 294; also Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, tr. T. Rosenmeyer (Cambridge, Mass. 1953) 126ff., 131-32.

101. This treatment of Dionysus and Demeter in *Bacch.* 274-85 suggests the influence of Prodicus, who seems to have reduced the gods to beneficent natural principles. See Diels-Kranz, ed. 6, 84 B5.

102. In connection with the combination of *spoudaion* and *geloion*, it is interesting that Aristotle lays so much emphasis upon the lack of *to spoudaion* in comedy (*Poetics*, ch. 5, 1449b), perhaps reflecting a traditional view of comedy which Aristophanes too is building upon and even modifying in his insistence upon the *spoudaion*. See also Plato *Rep.* 10.602b for a similar juxtaposition.

103. Radermacher, 185, notes of the parodos, "Scherz und Lustigkeit beginnen sofort, wenn Iakchos in die Erscheinung tritt."

104. Snell (above, n. 100) 41.

105. For the unity of tragedy and comedy, see Plato *Sympos.* 223d.



## NOTES ON THE LANGUAGE AND TEXT OF OVID'S *TRISTIA*

BY GEORG LUCK

OVID is haunted by the idea that the poetry of his exile is inferior to his other work. In the prologues to Books 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the *Tristia*, he apologizes to the reader for the poor literary quality of these letters and begs his indulgence. The same theme appears in the epilogues to Books 1 and 3 and elsewhere. Ovid is ready to admit that he has lost the ability to write "good" or "high" Latin: *siqua videbuntur casu non dicta Latine / in qua scribebat, barbara terra fuit* (3.1.17-18), and is afraid that foreign words may have found their way into his writings (3.14.49-50), because he has no Roman audience in Tomis (3.14.39-40; 4.1.89-90; 5.12.53-54). Moreover, since he expects no lasting literary fame from these poems, he sees no reason why he should polish them carefully: *saepe aliquod verbum cupiens mutare reliqui; / iudicium vires destituuntque meum. / saepe piget (quid enim dubitem tibi vera fateri?) / corrigere et longi ferre laboris onus* (ex P. 3.9.17-20; cf. Tr. 5.1.69-72).

It is rare, perhaps unique, for a Latin poet to condemn his work so openly and persistently and to assume the role of his own severest critic. Are we to believe that Ovid's self-criticism is absolutely sincere, and that contemporary readers felt the decline of his creative abilities as strongly as he did? Or is this apparent self-accusation actually an accusation against the Emperor who destroyed, by his cruel punishment, not only Ovid's material existence, but his genius; an accusation against the society which tolerated such needless cruelty and did not loudly protest against it? When Ovid was sent into exile, Rome lost its last great poet; this is no doubt the implication of Tr. 5.12.31-32, *contudit ingenium patientia longa malorum, / et pars antiqui nulla vigoris adest* (cf. 3.14.33-34). If his apologies are, indeed, hidden accusations, we should not take them too seriously.

This problem could only be solved by a thorough investigation of the language and style of Ovid's late works, as compared with his earlier ones. Such an analysis has yet to be written; in the meantime, I should like to propose a few isolated remarks. It should be kept in mind that the textual tradition of the *Tristia* is notably poor. Any linguistic or

stylistic observation that may help us to determine the text and the meaning of a disputed passage will be valuable enough.

# I. SOME TYPES OF REPETITION

Ovid occasionally repeats the same word within the same context of one or several distichs, without wishing to emphasize it. Such repetitions may strike one as idle, as a mere negligence or possible oversight, but the question arises and has often arisen whether the text is sound. We may assume that the ancient poets were not so sensitive to seemingly pointless repetitions as we are. In many instances, they seem quite natural; for example, 1.8.13-16, *ut neque respiceres nec solarere iacentem, | dure, neque exequias prosequeres meas? | illud amicitiae sanctum et venerabile nomen | re tibi pro vili sub pedibusque iacet?*; 2.153-156, *sic abeunt redeuntque mei variantque timores | et spem placandi dantque negantque tui. | per superos igitur, qui dent* (G<sup>1</sup> z alii: dant M G<sup>2</sup> plurr.) *tibi longa dabuntque | tempora . . .* But in others, there is room for doubt; for example 1.3.95-98, *se modo, desertos modo complorasse penates | nomen et erepti saepe vocasse viri | nec gemuisse minus, quam si nataeque virique* (G H V : meumque G<sup>2</sup>A alii : meumue T alii) *| vidisset structos corpus habere rogos*; 2.7-9, *carmina fecerunt, ut me moresque notaret | iam demi iussa* (M Fr. Trev. : demum uisa G A : pridem uisa D alii : pridem inuisa K alii : pridem emissa Luck, *Philologus* 1959, 101-103) *Caesar ab Arte mea. | deme mihi studium, vitae quoque crimina demes*; 551-554, *idque tuo nuper scriptum sub nomine, Caesar, | et tibi sacratum sors mea rupit opus. | et dedimus tragicis scriptum regale coturnis, | quaeque gravis debet verba coturnus habet*. Here, Bentley and Housman objected to the repetition of *scriptum*; Bentley wrote in the margin of his copy *coeptum sub numine* (551), but his emendation seems to miss the point, because *coepta* occurs again in 555. In another passage, 1.7.30, *defuit et scriptis ultima lima meis*, one MS has *certis*, which tempted Heinsius to write *ceris*, but there we may have to read *coeptis* (cf. *Met.* 2.555). There is no need to change *sub nomine*; cf., e.g., 4.2.9 *et, qui Caesareo iuvenes sub nomine crescunt*; *Met.* 4.522; 9.557. Housman (*ad Manil.* 5.458) preferred to change the second *scriptum* and revived the conjecture of Francius, *sceptrum*, a very attractive suggestion, if one compares *Am.* 3.1.13-14 (personified Tragedy) *laeva manus sceptrum late regale movebat, | Lydius alta pedum vincla coturnus erat* (cf. 63; 2.18.13; *Sen. ep.* 76.31). Moreover, Housman removed the repetition of *coturnus* by substituting *tyrannis* (553), for which he referred to *ex P.* 4.16.31, *cum Varius Graccusque darent fera dicta tyrannis*. If we accept the probability of two corruptions within the

same line, Housman's proposal, 553, *et dedimus tragicis sceptrum regale tyrannis* makes excellent sense, while it avoids the repetition of both *scriptum* and *coturnus* in a carefully wrought and highly stylized context.

In 4.2.53–56, *ipse sono plausuque simul fremituque † canente † | quadriugos cernes saepe resistere equos; | inde petes arcem [et], delubra faventia votis, | et dabitur merito laurea vota Iovi*, I have suggested (*Philologus* 1959, 110–11) for the obviously corrupt *canente* (M : *canentum* M<sup>2</sup>G A alii : *calentes* G<sup>2</sup>D alii : *pavescentes* Dresd.) *faventum*, although the same verb occurs in the next distich. Mr. E. J. Kenney has communicated to me a very plausible solution: instead of *sono . . . canente* (which is in the text of the current editions), he conjectures *foro . . . boante*; in this case, there would be no repetition.

In 4.5.25–27, *sic tua processus habeat fortuna perennes; | sic ope non egeas ipse iuvesque tuos; | sic aequet tua nupta virum bonitate perenni, | . . .*, Heinsius and Withof disliked the repetition of *perennis*; from among their repeated attempts to emend v. 27, I mention Heinsius' *sic aequet tua nupta suum bonitate parentem* and Withof's *sic aequet tua nupta virum probitate serena*, following the cod. Puteanus, whereas M G K read *novitate*. In this particular context, the repetition of *perennis* seems tolerable, because it lends a certain emphasis to Ovid's wish and is not more disturbing than the repetition of *perpetuus*, 4.2.10/14. But the expression *bonitate perenni* is awkward, and another passage where *bonitas* occurs, *ex P.* 1.6.45–46, *quamvis est igitur meritis indebita nostris, | magna tamen spes est in bonitate dei*, is, perhaps, a medieval interpolation.

A well-known case is the threefold repetition of *temptare* in Ovid's autobiography, 4.10.21–26:

saepe pater dixit 'studium quid inutile temptas ?

Maeonides nullas ipse reliquit opes.'

motus eram dictis totoque Helicone relicto

scribere temptabam verba soluta modis.

sponte sua carmen numeros veniebat ad aptos,

et quod temptabam scribere, versus erat.

21 *carpis* cod. Francof. alii : *quaeris* cod. Seguer. :

*captas* dub. Burm. 24 *conabar* G<sup>2</sup>D alii :

26 *conabar* E alii *dicere* A alii.

There is no need for a change in v. 24 and 26; the Chiasmus *scribere temptabam* and *temptabam scribere* is clearly intended. If, for one reason or another, one prefers *dicere* in v. 26, the stylistic figure vanishes altogether, but then it is absurd to print *temptabam dicere* (26), as Owen (Oxford edition) did. If Ovid, for the sake of variety, switched from



*scribere* to *dicere*, why should he not have switched from *temptabam* to *conabar*? On the assumption that *temptabam* is right in vv. 24 and 26, one is inclined to distrust *temptas* in v. 21, but I have no solution to offer.

Another type of repetition frequently found in Ovid is that called Anastrophe. The same word appears at the end of one colon and at the beginning of the next, but often in a different grammatical form (Polyp-ton; see next paragraph). Examples: 1.1.37-38, *iudicis officium est, ut res, ita tempora rerum / quaerere: quaesito tempore tutus eris*; 1.2.49, *qui venit hic fluctus, fluctus supereminet omnis*; 1.3.85-86, *te iubet e patria discedere Caesaris ira, me pietas: pietas haec mihi Caesar erit*; 1.11.25, *attigero portum, portu terrebor ab ipso*; 2.21, *Musaque quam movit, motam quoque leniet iram*; 47, *quaeque dies bellum, belli tibi sustulit iram*. 4.6.37-38, *nos quoque, quae ferimus, tulimus patientius ante, / quae mala sunt longa multiplicata die* is probably corrupt; for the second *quae* we find *quam* in T and other MSS (Bersmann's and Gronovius' conjecture), *et* in Moretus' MS and others, accepted by Heinsius and explained as *nam* (cf. Tursellinus-Hand 2. 483); *vae!* is Owen's conjecture. The difficulty may be in the inversion *quae mala*, and the first *quae* an attempt to normalize the construction. *Quoque quae* is no more satisfactory than † *quoque quam* † in 1.2.63. An easy change would be: *nos quoque vix ferimus (tulimus patientius ante) / quae mala sunt longa multiplicata die*; cf. 3.2.13-14, *suffecitque malis animus, nam corpus ab illo / accepit vires, vixque ferenda tulit*. When he wrote 4.6, Ovid had the earlier passage in mind.

The Polyp-ton is a play on the various grammatical forms of the same word. Properly speaking, this term is only applied to nouns, but since an equivalent is lacking, I shall extend its use to adjectives and verbs. It is often found with proper names: 2.230, *bellaque pro magno Caesare Caesar obit*; 401, *quid* (sc. loquar) *Danaen Danaesque nurum matremque Lyaei*, where D<sup>2</sup> and others have substituted *Danaique*. A similar substitution may have taken place in 1.1.89-90, *dum petit infirmis nimium sublimia pennis / Icarus, Icariis nomina fecit aquis*, which is Poliziano's conjecture, also found as v. 1. in two MSS. Editors before Heinsius printed *Icarus, Icarias nomine fecit aquas* (G<sup>2</sup> and most MSS). This reading was revived by Merkel (ed. Reimer 1837), but the more recent editors have removed the Polyp-ton and print *Icarus aequoreis nomina fecit aquis* (D<sup>1</sup> A<sup>2</sup>), or *Icarus aequoreas nomine fecit aquas* (G<sup>1</sup> A<sup>1</sup> and others). Surely the last reading, adopted by Wheeler (Loeb Classical Library), yields no meaning whatsoever. Similarly, the Polyp-ton has vanished in the more recent editions from 2.4.21-22, *quid fuit, ut tutas*

*agitaret Daedalus alas, | Icarus Icarias nomine signet aquas?* Here, *Icarias* is poorly attested (although recommended by Bentley, in his note on Hor. C. 2.20.13), but so is *aequoreas*, and the reading of M, G, and most MSS, *immensas*, seems to enlarge the small Icarian sea beyond measure. Neither is it possible to weigh the evidence of one passage against that of the other, nor to determine which passage has influenced which; but why should we refuse to believe that Ovid used an ingenious figure he was fond of, more than once?

Polyptoton of nouns and adjectives: 1.1.128, *a terra terra remota mea*; 1.2.51, *nec letum timeo: genus est miserabile leti*; 1.3.65, *uxor in aeternum vivo mihi viva negatur*; 82, *te sequar et coniunx exulis exul ero*; 3.11.49, *ut munus munere penses* (cf. ex P. 1.2.24, *et quod iners hiemi continuatur hiems*); 4.3.39-40, *atque utinam lugenda tibi non vita, sed esset | mors mea: morte fores sola relicta mea*; 14, *deque fide certa sit tibi certa fides* (also Paronomasia, see next paragraph); 4.6.43, *corpore sed mens est aegro magis aegra*; 4.7.15, *quadrupedesque hominis cum pectore pectora iunctos*; 4.10.78, *addiderat lustris altera lustra decem*; 5.1.5, *flebilis ut noster status est, ita flebile carmen*; etc. It is interesting to see that Ovid uses this figure when he wishes to imply a close physical, logical, or temporal connexion between two persons, things, or events, particularly if this connexion is reciprocal.

In one case, all MSS have eliminated a Polyptoton which may, at the same time, be classified as Paronomasia. 1.11.11-12, *seu stupor huic studio, sive est insania nomen: | omnis ad hac cura cura levata mea est* must be read after an inscription; all MSS have *mens relevata*. Housman (preface to Manil.<sup>2</sup>, lx; ad Manil. 2.130) has used this passage to substantiate his claim that all MSS of the *Tristia* are interpolated. The reading of the inscription must be right, because it confirms everything we know about Ovid's language and style; cf. *Tr.* 4.3.14 (quoted above); *Rem.* 169-70, *rura quoque oblectant animos studiumque colendi: | quaelibet huic curae cedere cura potest*; 484, *et posita est cura cura repulsa nova*. There is another passage, where all MSS but two or three have failed to recognize a Polyptoton, and even those few have misunderstood the idiom (4.1.65-66):

utque neque insidias capitisque pericula narrem:  
(vera quidem, veri sed graviora fide) ...

veri Francius : vera M aliiue : vidi G cum plurimis

Francius' conjecture is confirmed by such passages as *Her.* 16.90, *vera loquar, veri vix habitura fidem* (cf. Heins. ad loc.); *Met.* 3.659-660, *tam me tibi vera referre, | quam veri maiora fide*.

Polypotton of noun (or adjective) and verb: 3.4.13, *haec ego si monitor monitus prius ipse fuisset*; 3.6.33–34, *nil igitur referam, nisi me peccasse, sed illo | praemia peccato nulla petita mihi*. In 1.6.27–28, *adsimilemque sui longa adsuetudine fecit, | grandia si parvis adsimulare licet*, recent editors print *adsimulare*; but this spelling, no matter how well it may be attested, obscures the etymological figure. On the other hand, I believe a Polypotton has been introduced into the text of the *Tristia* where none was intended. In 3.12.19–20, recent editors rightly print *usus equi nunc est, levibus nunc luditur armis, | nunc pila, nunc celeri volvitur orbe trochus*, following G<sup>1</sup>, B and three or four of Heinsius' MSS. The vulgate, revived by Merkel, offered *lusus equo*; *lusus equi* is found in G<sup>2</sup>, p and others; *ludus equi* in the Puteanus (= Parisinus 7993) and five or six other MSS of Heinsius. The arrival of spring is greeted in Rome by various games and amusements. It is possible that Ovid refers to the *ludus* (or *lusus*) *Troiae* (described by Vergil, *Aen.* 5.545–603; cf. E. Mehl: *RE Supp.* 8.888–905), which was celebrated in spring. But the fact remains that there are two parallels for *usus equi* (*Met.* 3.554: *Fast.* 2.297), none for *lusus equi*, and it is doubtful whether this last expression could be understood as *lusus Troiae*.

Polypotton of verbs: 1.3.17, *uxor amans flentem flens acrius ipsa tenebat* (cf. *Met.* 14.305); 87, *taliam temptabat, sicut temptaverat ante*; 1.4.28, *si modo, qui perit, non periisse potest*; 2.49–50, *utque tuus gaudet miles, quod vicerit hostem, | sic, victum cur se gaudeat, hostis habet* (cf. *Am.* 1.2.52); 67–68, *non tua carminibus maior fit gloria nec quo, | ut maior fiat, crescere possit, habet*; 145, *ipse licet sperare vetes, sperabimus usque*; 476, *mittere quo deceat, quo dare missa modo* (cf. *Ars* 2.204, *tu male iactato, tu male iacta dato*); 3.1.65–67, *quaerebam fratres . . . | quaerentem frustra*; 3.2.13–14, *suffecitque malis animus, nam corpus ab illo | accepit vires vixque ferenda tulit* (cf. above); 3.8.12, *quae non ulla tulit fertque feretque dies* (on 4.2.46 and 4.6.37 see above); 5.11.7, *perfer et obdura: multo graviora tulisti*; ex P. 3.7.13, *hoc quoque, Naso, feres; etenim peiora tulisti*; *Ars* 2.647, *quod male fers, adsuesce, feres bene*; *Am.* 3.6.18, *nec tulit haec unquam nec feret ulla dies*; etc.); 3.9.27–28, *atque ita divellit divulsaque membra per agros | dissipat* (cf. *Fast.* 3.21, *Mars videt hanc, visamque cupit, potiturque cupita*); 3.10.31, *quaque rates ierant, pedibus nunc itur*; 37–39, *vidimus ingentem glacie consistere pontum, | . . . | nec vidisse sat est*; 4.1.99, *cum vice mutata, qui sim fuerimque recordor*; 4.3.37, *fleque meos casus: est quaedam flere voluptas*; 4.4.23–24, *nec nova, quod tecum loquor, est iniuria nostra, | incolumis cum quo saepe locutus eram*; 4.10.79–80, *non aliter flevi, quam me fleturus ademptum | ille fuit*; 5.5.7–8, *quaque semel toto vestis mihi sumitur anno, | sumatur fati discolor alba*



*meis*; 5.9.1-2, *o tua si sineres in nostris nomina poni | carminibus, positus quam mihi saepe fores*! (cf. 2.361-362, *denique composui teneros non solus amores: | composito poenas solus amore dedi*); 5.12.29-30, *me quoque despera, fuerim cum parvus et ante, | illi qui fueram posse redire parem*; 5.14.5, *dumque legar, pariter mecum tua fama legetur*; 11, *non ego divitias dando tibi plura dedissem*; 45-46, *qui monet, ut facias, quod iam facis, ille monendo | laudat*.

This list shows Ovid's fondness for the repetition of the same verb with a different ending. He probably wrote 1.11.35-36, *quo magis his debes ignoscere, candide lector, | si spe sint, ut sunt, inferiora tua (sint D with most MSS: sunt M G and others)*; cf. 4.1.1, *siqua meis fuerint, ut erunt, vitiosa libellis*; 4.9.9, *sim licet extremum, sicut sum, missus in orbem*. A similar passage has been mentioned above (p. 244 on 2.155). No change is necessary in 3.5.11, *vidi ego confusos vultus visosque notavi (ususque G<sup>1</sup>: uisusque G<sup>2</sup>K and others: visusque notavi Heinsius: visosque probavi Schrader)*; cf. *Fa.* 3.21 (above p. 248).

Another stylistic device involving repetition, but less frequent in the *Tristia*, is the sequence of a compound verb and its simple form with the same meaning. W. V. Clausen (*AJP* 1955, 49-50) gives many examples from other Latin authors and quotes from the *Tristia* 5.4.41-42, *qua consolatus amicum | sis ope, solandus cum simul ipse fores*. It is not surprising that D should corrupt this passage (*qua tu solatus*). The reverse procedure (compound following simple verb) may be illustrated by 1.5.81-82, *denique quaesitos tetigit tamen ille penates, | quaeque diu petiit, contigit arva tamen*. This passage has been needlessly tampered with (*rediit tandem ille Wassenberg: reperit tamen ille Burman*).

When a word at the beginning of a new colon has already appeared in the preceding colon (not at the beginning or at the end), the rhetoricians speak of an Epiploke. Examples: 1.7.11-13, *grata tua est pietas, sed carmina maior imago | sunt mea, quae, mando, qualiacumque legas, | carmina mutatas hominum dicentia formas*; 1.10.28-30, *inque Propontiacis haerentem Cyzicon oris, | Cyzicon, Haemoniae nobile gentis opus*; 2.558-559, *vacuo iubeas hinc tibi pauca legi, | pauca, quibus prima surgens ab origine mundi | in tua deduxi tempora, Caesar, opus*; 4.1.63-64, *hic quoque cognosco natalis stamina nostri, | stamina de nigro vellera facta mihi*; etc. The understanding of this device helps us in two cases. First, in a matter of punctuation: 4.8.39-42, *ipsaque delictis victa est clementia nostris, | nec tamen errori vita negata meo est, | vita procul patria peragenda sub axe boreo, | qua maris Euxini terra sinistra iacet*. Why should one separate the two couplets by an interrogation mark (Owen) or an exclamation mark (Ehwald-Levy), leaving the second couplet without a

copula ? There is a subtle emphasis on *vita*: "Yes, I am alive; but what kind of a life is this ?" Ovid cannot say this explicitly; he must show his gratitude to the Emperor; instead, he underlines the depressing conditions under which he lives. The second case is more difficult: 1.8.37-38, *non ego te genitum placida reor urbe Quirini, | urbe, meo quae iam non adeunda pede est*. For *meo*, V offers *modo*, for *pede est*, M<sup>1</sup> reads *mihi*. Hence Ehwald's conjecture: *urbe mea, quae iam non adeunda mihi*; but this is even less satisfactory than the vulgate. I should like to suggest: *urbe, mihi quae iam non adeunda pede est*; cf. 1.1.16, *contingam certe, quo licet, illa pede*.

The *versus recurrens* is well known from Ovid's earlier works: *Am.* 1.9.1-2, *militat omnis amans, et habet sua castra Cupido: | Attice, crede mihi, militat omnis amans*; cf. 3.2.27-28; 43-44; 3.6.61-62; *Her.* 5.117-118, *Graia iuvenca venit, quae te patriamque domumque | perdat: io prohibe ! Graia iuvenca venit*; *Rem.* 385-386; *Fa.* 4.365-366. There is one example in the *Tristia*, 4.3.77/78:

*ars tua, Tiphy, iacet, si non sit in aequore fluctus;  
si valeant homines, ars tua, Phoebe, iacet.*

77 *iacet* M (*i ex eras. u*) *rell. : vacet* Heinsius. 78 *iacet*  
M G alii : *uacet* duo Heinsii : *uacet* D alii.

Obviously, the same verb is expected at the beginning and at the end of the distich, be it *iacet* or *vacet*. But neither of those supplies the contrast to v. 80, *apparet virtus arguiturque malis*. What we need is *latet*. This form is often confused with *iacet* in MSS, for example, 3.1.50; 4.1.85; *Fa.* 2.244. The fact that *latet* occurs in the following distich does not speak against it; it is the key word of the whole passage 75-82, and sums up the two examples provided by Tiphys and Phoebus.

## II. POLYSYNDETIQUE

Since Ennius (*Ann.* 334 *noctesque diesque*), we find nouns connected with *-que . . . -que* (or *-ve . . . -ve*.) at the end of lines in Latin hexameter poetry. This use is characteristic of the elevated style. Verbs and adjectives are connected in the same way. Sometimes they rhyme; sometimes they are separated by one or several other words. The following survey is arranged according to these distinctions.

1.3.27, *iamque quiescebant voces hominumque canumque*; 3.3.13, *lassus in extremis iaceo populisque locisque*; 4.3.23-24, *tunc subeunt curae, dum te lectusque locusque | tangit*. Examples of this type are not too frequent in the *Tristia*; hence, we should, perhaps, follow in 1.5.67, *nec mihi Duli-*

*chium domus est Ithaceve Samosve*, the testimony of most MSS; only very few (not listed specifically by Merkel) have *Ithaceve Sameve*, but this was recommended by Heinsius and Bentley as the more unusual and elegant form. In his note to Persius 5.64 (ed. maior 1956), W. V. Clausen has dealt with a similar problem; there, the best MSS read *puerique senesque*, while *iuvenesque senesque* is found in G L N.

1.1.92, *consilium resque locusque dabunt*; 1.2.95-96, *nec, quae damnaverit ille / crimina defendi fasque piumque puto*; 1.3.97-98, *nataeque virique* (v. 1 *meumque*, see above); 1.10.10, *fida manet trepidae duxque comesque fugae* (cf. 3.7.18, *utque pater natae duxque comesque fui*); 1.11.9, *ipse etenim miror tantis animique marisque / fluctibus ingenium non cecidisse meum*; 2.23, *matresque nurusque*; 562, *teque tuosque canam*; 3.1.25, *terraque marique*; 3.7.45, *cum caream patria vobisque domoque*; 3.10.5, *Bessique Getaeque* (cf. 4.1.67, *Bessosque Getasque*; 5.7.11, *Graecosque Getasque*; but 3.11.55, *inter Scythiamque Getasque* is hardly possible; the MSS vary between *Scithicosque*, *zizicosque*, etc. This must be the same tribe that has been corrupted in 2.191, *Ciziges* [?] . . . *Getaeque*); 3.12.44, *et fieri famae parsque gradusque potest*. Two passages which must be mentioned in this connection are, perhaps, spurious. Heinsius and Schrader rejected 3.14.43, *saepe aliquod quaero verbum nomenque locumque*; a similar line, not very satisfactory either, is 3.8.37, *cumque locum moresque hominum cultusque sonumque*. Apart from the unusual elision (only here and in 3.5.47, a corrupt line) the juxtaposition of *cultus* and *sonus* is surprising. *Vultus* might be a likely suggestion, cf. 5.7.17, *vox fera, trux vultus*, where *vox* corresponds to *sonus*, but even so it is not a good line.

1.2.17-18, *ergo idem venti . . . / velaque nescio quo votaue nostra ferunt*; 53, *est aliquid, fatoque suo ferroque cadentem / in solida moriens ponere corpus humo*; 2.37, *iure igitur genitorque deum rectorque vocatur*; 4.1.73, *nunc senior gladioque latus scutoque sinistram / . . . subicio*; 4.2.53, *ipse sono plausuque simul fremituque* (see above p. 245); 5.5.19, *illa domo nataque sua patriaque fruatur*. At one place, the MSS offer again a choice between a rhyming and a nonrhyming variant: 5.4.39, *verba solet vultumque tuum gemitusque referre* (G alii: *uultusque tuos* D K alii: *gemitumque tuum uultumque* p alii: *gemitusque tuos uultusque* l).

2.89, *at, memini, vitamque meam moresque probabas*; 3.8.15, *ille tibi pennasque potest currusque volucres / tradere* (cf. 4.10.101, *quid referam comitumque nefas famulosque nocentes?* for the similarity of structure).

1.2.31, *rector in incerto est nec, quid fugiatve petatve / invenit*; 38, *hoc unum nostri scitque gemitque mali*; 1.7.6, *in digito qui me fers refersque tuo* (cf. *ex P.* 4.1.26; *Fa.* 6.334; *Verg. Aen.* 4.438; 12.866); 2.153-154, 9+C.P.



*sic abeunt redeuntque mei variantque timores / et spem placandi dantque negantque tui* (cf. *Her.* 7.170; *Ars* 3.134); 3.7.47, *ingenio tamen ipse meo comitorque fruorque*: 4.1.91, *ipse mihi — quid enim faciam? — scriboque legoque*; 5.7.14, *per medias in equis itque reditque vias* (cf. *Her.* 15.118; *Verg. Aen.* 6.122).

3.8.12, *quae non ulla tulit fertque feretque dies* (see above p. 248; ex *P.* 4.1.26, one MS has *fertque feretque*, Heinsius' conjecture; the others *fertque refertque*; see above p. 246); 4.1.79-80, . . . *pecudem . . . / per sata, per silvas fertque trahitque* (= φέρει τε ἄγει τε) *lupus*.

3.1.53, *me miserum! vereorque locum vereorque potentem (uereorque . . . uenerorque V, Heins. : uenerorque . . . uenerorque cod. Servii alique)*.

I have not found in the *Tristia* an example of the polysyndetic *-que* with rhyming adjectives not separated by another word (type: *Hom. Il.* 1.167 σοὶ τὸ γέρας πολὺ μείζον, ἐγὼ δ' ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε), and only one of nonrhyming adjectives: 5.4.43, *pro quibus adfirmat fore se memoremque piumque*.

3.5.19, *multaque praeterea manifestaue signa favoris* (F : manifesta M : manifesti G cum plurimis); 4.7.16, *tergeminumque virum tergeminumque canem*; 5.4.2, *lassaque facta mari lassaque facta via* (cf. ex *P.* 4.16.6, *Iliacusque Macer sidereusque Peto*).

3.9.30, *pallentesque manus sanguineumque caput*; 4.7.18, *centimanumque Gygen semibovemque virum* (cf. *Ars* 2.24, *semibovemque virum semivirumque bovem*).

Very unusual is 4.7.21, *innumeri montes inter me teque viaeque* (cf. Christensen, *ALL* 15.174). Triple *-que*, not found before the *Metamorphoses* (3.206ff.; 8.22, etc.), occurs in 2.501, *matronaque virque puerque* (cf. ex *P.* 5.10.47, *Peniusque Hypanisque Calesque*). An equivalent to polysyndetic *-que* is polysyndetic *et*, frequently used by Ovid with verbs at the beginning of a line: 1.2.95, *et iubet et merui*; 2.464, *et placet et iam te principe notus erat*; 5.7.57, *et* (E Q R : en G alique) *pudet et fateor*; cf. ex *P.* 4.15.29, *et pudet et metuo*; *Rem.* 407, *et pudet et dicam* (cf. also *Her.* 12.33; 17.177; *Rem.* 604; *Fa.* 4.560; 6.118; *Met.* 10.461; 14.279; *Lucr.* 1.780; *Val. Fl.* 1.155).

### III. PECULIARITIES OF WORD ORDER

Following the example of the Alexandrians, the Latin poets from Catullus onward often invert particles for the sake of metrical convenience, but also because they wish to remove indifferent words from the beginning of a line and replace them by more significant ones. The inversion of *et* is frequent in Ovid's late works; he seems to avoid it,

however, in the *Metamorphoses*. Hence, it would be pointless to list all the examples from the *Tristia* of *et* as the second word of a clause. The inversion has been misunderstood in two instances in some MSS: 1.4.10, *ingemit et* (G plurr. : *ingemuit* E alii) *nostris ipsa carina malis*; 3.7.42, *Irus et est subito* (G. plurr. : *fit subito pauper* r alii), *qui modo Croesus erat*. As the third word of a clause, *et* is rare, and only one passage out of the three I have found offers an undisputed reading: 5.7.40, *experior curis et dare verba meis*; but 3.4.50:

*vix satis et noti nomina pauca loci*

*uix satis et* H p : *uix satis est* M A P :

*uixque satis* V alii / *noti* G alii : *nato* M A K :

*noto* cod. Servii / *loci* G alii : *loqui* M A H Q

is probably corrupt; we expect something like *vix et finitimo nomina nota Getae* (cf. *ex P.* 1.2.76, *finitimo vix loca nota Getae*) or, perhaps, *notaque vix ipsis nomina Sauromatis*. The third passage, 5.5.14, is also doubtful:

*si quod et instabat dominae miserabile vulnus*

*si quod et* V plurr. : *sitque quod* G<sup>2</sup>D alii :

*sic quod et* K : *sit quidquid* m : alii alia

The connective *-que* is attached to the second word of a clause in 1.8.23–24, *denique lugubres vultus numquamque videndos / cernere supremo dum licuitque die* (on the resulting Hyperbaton cf. Housman *ad Manil.* 1.429; 2.167, *ut faciuntque tui, sidus iuvenale, nepotes, / per tua perque tui facta parentis eant* (but the Etonensis, followed by Heinsius, has *utque tui faciunt*, and D offers *efficiantque tui*). It is attached to the third word of a clause: 1.1.66, *si quis erit, qui te, quia sis meus, esse legendum / non putet e gremio reiciatque suo*; 4.1.33–34, *sentit amans sua damna fere, tamen haeret in illis / materiam culpae persequiturque suae*; 4.5.5–6, *qui veritus non es portus aperire fideles / fulmine percussae confugiumque rati*. It is attached to a verb where it actually connects two nouns: 4.1.73–74, *nunc senior gladioque latus scutoque sinistram, / canitiem galeae subicioque meam* (cf. *Tib.* 1.3.55–56, *hic iacet immitti consumptus morte Tibullus, / Messallam terra dum sequiturque mari*; 2.6.15–16), to an adjective where it actually connects two verbs: 2.531–532, *invida me spatio natura coercuit arto / ingenio vires exiguasque dedit*; 4.1.39–40, *semper in obtutu mentem vetat esse malorum / praesentis casus immemoremque facit*; to a noun where it actually connects two verbs: 5.10.39–40, *meque palam de me tuto male saepe loquuntur / forsitan obiciunt exiliumque mihi* (cf. *ex P.* 3.6.47–48, *sed pavor attonito rationis ademerat usum / cesserat omne novis consiliumque malis*; *Tib.* 1.10.51).

For the inversion of *atque*, one instance from the *Tristia* is often quoted (3.2.11):

ultima nunc patior, nec me mare portubus orbum  
perdere, diversae nec potuere viae,  
sufficit atque malis animus . . .

*sufficit atque* M K : *suffecitque* G plurr.

Here the main difficulty is not the inversion of *atque* (for which cf. *Ars* 3.282; *Met.* 13.410; Haupt, *Opusc.* 1.125; Ehwald, BJ 43.269; Norden, *Verg. Aen.* VI, p. 402<sup>3</sup>), but the fact that the Augustan poets avoided unelided *atque* (B. Axelson, *Unpoetische Wörter*, 1945, pp. 83–85; M. Platnauer, *Latin Elegiac Verse*, 1941, pp. 20–21). The reading *suffecitque* is clearly preferable, unless one wishes to consider *sufficit usque* (Luck, *Philologus* 1959, pp. 108–109).

The inversion of *nec* is common enough in the *Tristia*, but there are a few instances where *nec* is replaced by *non* in interpolated MSS: 2.393, *impia nec* (non E) *tragicos tetigisset Scylla coturnos* (cf. 5.3.40, *impia nec poena Pentheos umbra vacet*); 5.3.29, *illo nec* (non B alii) *levius cecidi*; 2.414, *pulsus Aristides nec* (non B O) *tamen urbe sua est*; 4.2.62, *immunes tanti nec* (non D alii) *sinit esse boni*.

The inversion of *sed* may account for the corruption of 4.1.66, *vera quidem, veri* (Francius: *vidi* G plurr.) *sed graviora fide* (above, p. 247). The inversion of *cum* is “rectified” in some interpolated MSS at 2.207, *perdiderint cum me duo crimina* (*cum duo perdiderint me* D) and 5.11.8, *eripuit cum me principis ira tibi* (*cum me surripuit* E, accepted by Heinsius), but even the “best” MSS change 5.3.55, *si, veterum digne vereor cum scripta virorum* into *conscripta virorum*. A good example is 3.10.77, *ergo tam late pateat cum maximus orbis*, where the meter permits us to rearrange the words in four different ways, three of which are actually found in MSS.

*Dum* as the second word: 3.9.32, *ut genitor luctuque novo tardetur et, artus / dum legit extinctos, triste moretur iter*; as the third word: 4.5.9, *temporis oblitum dum me rapit impetus huius*; 5.2.73, *hinc ego dum muter*; as the fifth word: 2.217, *de te pendentum sic dum circumspicis orbem*. This last passage helps us to emend a similar line (2.175):

dimidioque tui praesens et respicis urbem,  
dimidio procul es saevaue bella geris

*praesens es et aspicias* cod. Putean. aliiue, Heinsius, Bentl. :  
*praesens es respicis* P V : *praesens qui respicis* T :  
*praesens hanc respicis* D aliiue



Goldbacher suggested *tui* <es> *praesens et respicis*, Schenkl *praesens en aspiciis*. But Ovid wants to say that Augustus helps his fighting armies abroad even while he actually stays in Rome. The half of him that is absent is his "gods and great auspices" (174), so that he fights through his victorious general (173), while, at the same time, he minds and protects (on the meaning of *respicere* see the commentators on Hor. C. 1.2.36) the city. Read:

dimidioque tui praesens dum respicis urbem,  
dimidio procul es . . .

The inversion of other particles has been misunderstood in some MSS. I shall only give a few examples: 2.126, *venerit ut* (M K : *ut fuerit* G plurr.); 2.275, *carmen, recta si mente* (M alique : *si recta mente* G alique) *legatur*; 4.1.100, *cum vice mutata qui sim fuerimque, recordor / et, tulerit quo me casus et unde, subit . . .*; here, the word order can be varied in two ways (*tulerit me quo* F K alique : *quo me tulerit* cod. Buslid.), but cf. Munro *ad Lucr.* 2.547; 3.293.

Ovid's use of prepositions requires a few additional remarks. A simple case of postposition is 4.2.47, *hos super in curru, Caesar, victore veheris* (cf. *ex P.* 1.1.26, *deos contra*; 2.1.51, *te contra*; 4.10.57, *quos inter*; Verg. *Ge.* 3.260, *quem super*). The order attributive-noun-preposition is observed 1.6.33, *prima locum sanctas heroidas inter haberes* (cf. Prop. 2.28.29, *et tibi Maeonias omnis heroidas inter / primus erit . . . locus*; but here, the order *Maeonias inter heroidas omnis* is also found in some MSS.; on the metrical difficulty cf. Conington-Nettleship *ad Verg. Aen.* 12.68 and the exc.; Haupt-Korn-Ehwald *ad Ov. Met.* 15.217). The order noun-preposition-attributive is frequent enough, especially in such formulas as *tempus in omne* (1.3.34; 1.6.36; 3.4.36; *ex P.* 4.9.70; cf. *Tr.* 2.255, *carmine ab omni*), also 1.9.11, *utque comes radios per solis euntibus umbra est*; 2.83-84, *partes / in proclinas omne recumbit onus*; 4.7.13, *esse canes utero sub virginis* (cf. *ex P.* 2.9.2, *nomen in Eumolpi*). The most frequent order is attributive-preposition-noun: 1.2.27. *purpureo . . . ab ortu*; 29, *sicca . . . ab arcto*; 65, *Stygias . . . in undas*; 1.5.43, *nostris pro casibus*, etc.

The inverted preposition is separated from the noun by one or several words in the following instances: 1.9.55, *at nostrum* (sc. *studium*) *tenebris utinam latuisset in imis*; 1.10.15, *quae simul Aeoliae mare me deduxit in Helles*; 47, *altera namque parat Symplegadas ire per artas*; 1.11.25, *portu terrebor ab ipso*; 4.10.25, *sponte sua carmen numeros veniebat ad aptos*; 5.2.75, *vel rapidae flammis urar patienter in Aetnae* (order: noun-preposition-attributive) and 4.3.74, *quae stabat geminas*

*ante cruenta fores*; 4.5.1, *o mihi dilectos inter pars prima sodales* (cf. *ex P.* 1.2.150, *iure venit cultos ad sibi quisque deos*; 4.9.35, *hic ego praesentis inter numerarer amicos*; 4.10.2; 4.14.15; *Prop.* 4.8.31, *altera Tarpeios est inter Teia lucos*; this order, attributive-preposition-noun, with one or several words intervening between preposition and noun, is frequent in Lucretius; cf. Munro *ad* 1.841). In the following passages, the preposition is not really separated from the noun: 1.10.36, *arta sub Anchiali moenia tendat iter*; 3.7.17, *primus id aspexi teneris in virginis annis*; 3.13.12, *extremam gelidi misit in orbis humum* (Cf. *ex P.* 2.2.19; 4.5.1).

The non-inverted preposition is also occasionally separated from its noun: 4.9.23, *trans ego tellurem, trans altis audiar undas* (cf. *ex P.* 1.3.48, *in tamen humano contigit esse loco*; 1.8.1, etc.; the intervening word is usually an enclitic or a pronoun; constructions of the type *discipulo perii solus ab ipse meo*, *ex P.* 3.3.46, are by no means typical of Ovid's late works; cf. Haupt, *Opusc.* 1.186; Vahlen, *Ges. Philol. Schriften* 2.106; Bömer *ad Ov. Fa.* 5.551). If, in 4.4.85, *aque mea terra prope sunt funebria sacra*, Owen's conjecture (*atque* M plurr.) has been confirmed by the Trier Fragment and accepted by recent editors, it is hard to understand why they have not adopted Heinsius' *aque procul Latio diversum missus in orbem* (4.2.69, where all MSS read *atque*, but cf. Platnauer, *Lat. Eleg. Verse*, pp. 81, 99, who refers to *ex P.* 1.8.33; *Her.* 21.180, and recommends *aque* in *ex P.* 2.9.60). Some more complex arrangements are: 2.168, *per tua perque tui facta parentis eant*; 295, *venerit in magni templum, tua munera, Martis*; 3.9.2, *inter inhumanae nomina barbariae* (cf. *ex P.* 3.3.19, *qualis in aeriae tergo solet esse columbae*; *Rem.* 610, *inque suae portu paene salutis erat*); 3.1.60, *ducor ad intonsi candida templa dei* (cf. *Rem.* 152, *vade per urbanae splendida castra togae*; *Fa.* 2.337); 3.9.18, *pallor in attonitae* (G plurr. : *attonito* K r, Heinsius) *virginis ore fuit*; 4.4.62, *paene sub eiusdem sideris axe iacent* (cf. *ex P.* 2.1.29, *cum magnae vocis honore*; *Fa.* 4.294, *ad Tusci fluminis ora*).

The separation of words belonging together is called Hyperbaton. Some simple instances (often described as Tmesis): 1.1.44, *ego perditus ensem | haesurum iugulo iam puto iamque meo* (cf. *Tib.* 1.1.25, *iam modo iam possim contentus vivere parvo*); 1.10.22, *hac dominum tenus est (hactenus est dominum D) illa secuta suum* is not found in Latin before Verg. *Aen.* 5.603; 6.62 (cf. also *Ov. Met.* 5.642); 2.78, *a ! ferus et nobis nimium crudeliter hostis, | delicias legit qui tibi cumque meas* (cf. *Am.* 2.14.40 *qui modo cumque vident*; *ex P.* 3.4.6, *quale tamen cumque est*; 4.13.6; Wackernagel, *Kl. Schr.* 1.84, 75). For another type of Hyperbaton, the German term "Sperrung" has been suggested. Example: 1.1.1, *parve (nec invideo) sine me liber ibis in urbem* (cf. *ex P.* 1.8.21, *at tibi,*

*rex aevo, detur fortissime nostro*). Similar cases with prepositions have been discussed above. Three interesting examples of Hyperbaton are the following: 1.1.17-18, *si quis, ut in populo, nostri non immemor illi, | si quis, qui, quid agam, forte requiret, erit, . . .* where the conditional clause is broken up by a parenthetical remark (*ut in populo*; cf. 2.158; *ex P* 1.7.16; 4.5.11; Norden, *Tac. Germania*<sup>3</sup>, o. 52) and a relative clause (*qui forte requiret*) which, in turn, is broken up by an indirect question (*quid agam*). The various members of this period are built into each other in the manner of carved Chinese ivory balls. The structure has been normalized in some MSS (G<sup>2</sup>D and others), which read *exstat* instead of *illi* (cf. *ex P*. 4.15.1, *si quis adhuc usquam nostri non immemor exstat, | quidve relegatus Naso, requirit, agam*). But the repetition of *si quis* stresses the construction intended by the poet (cf. Verg. *Aen.* 9.210-211, *sed si quis — quae multa vides discrimine tali — si quis in adversum rapiat casusve deusve*), and for the principle, Cic. *Quinct.* 39 may be compared (Marouzeau, *Styl. Lat.*, p. 224). 3.5.23-24, *si tamen interea, quid in his ego perditus oris | (quod te credibile est quaerere) quaeris, agam, . . .* is quite similar. Finally, in 3.9.12, *quem procul ut vidit tumulo spectator ab alto, | 'hospes', ait 'nosco, Colchide, vela venit,'* the word order is motivated psychologically: the speaker is surprised and disturbed at the sudden arrival of the fleet from Colchis. He wants to say *hospes venit Colchide: vela nosco*, "we have a visitor from Colchis; I recognize the sails," but the words are tumbling out of his mouth — a very skillful device in this accomplished elegiac narrative. It is easy to see why the Hyperbaton has been misunderstood by many MSS and editors (*Colchide vela dari* cod. Putean. alique : *Colchide vela sequi* Z, Merkel, etc.).

#### IV. PARATAXIS

The relatively few cases in the *Tristia* where two sentences are coordinated, one of which should logically be subordinated, can be divided into three groups:

1. Imperative instead of *si*-clause: 1.1.47, *da mihi Maeoniden et tot circumspice casus, | ingenium tantis excidet omne malis = si mihi das Maeoniden et tot casus circumspicis, (et) ingenium omne . . . excidet*. Here the difficulty consists in the insertion of *ei*, hence *circumice* (Heinsius), *circumobice* (Schrader). The first, however, is, according to the *Thes.* 1. L., *vox pedestris sermonis*; the second, although attractive, is not even mentioned by recent editors. Further examples: 1.2.52, *demite naufragium, mors mihi munus erit*; 5.6.26, *finge tamen motam* (sc. mentem): *quotiens Agamemnone natum | dixisse in Pyladen improba verba putas?*



(cf. *ex P.* 4.1.17, *da mihi, siquid ea est, hebetantem pectora Lethen, | oblitus potero non tamen esse tui*; *Am.* 2.2.40; *Rem.* 63–66; *Fa.* 1.317–318, etc.).

2. Subjunctive instead of *si-* or *cum-* clause: 1.1.62, *dissimulare velis, te liquet esse meum* (concessive; cf. *Met.* 8.187, *omnia possideat, non possidet aera Minos*, etc.); 3.8.15–16, *ille tibi pennasque potest currusque volucres | tradere: det redditum, protinus ales eris* (jussive; cf. *Am.* 1.4.29, *quod tibi miscuerit, sapias, bibat ipse iubeto*; 2.2.59; 3.2.9, etc.); 3.3.23, *nuntiet (nuntiat p alique, cf. edd. ad Fa. 2.153–154) huc aliquis dominam venisse, resurgam* (potential; cf. *Ars* 3.781–82; Dieterich, *Kl. Schr.*, p. 187).

3. Indicative instead of *cum-* or *si-* clause: 1.11.25, *attigero portum, portu terrebor ab ipso*; 2.259, *sumpserit Annales, . . . leget*; 261, *sumpserit 'Aeneadam genetrix' ubi prima, requiret . . .* (parallel to 257, *quodcumque attigerit, . . . instruet*); 295, *venerit in . . . templum . . . Martis, | stat Venus Ultori iuncta* (parallel to 289, *cum steterit Iovis aede, . . . succurret*); 4.3.33–34, *tristis es? indignor quod sim tibi causa doloris; | non es? at amisso coniuge digna fores* (conditional alternative, cf. *Fa.* 5.321–22).

## V. SOME FORMS OF PLEONASTIC EXPRESSION

1. The periphrastic use of *posse*, relatively frequent in Propertius (cf. E. Neumann, *Diss. Berl.* 1925, pp. 51–52), is not found very often in the *Tristia* (in 2.80, 204, 573 *posse* is necessary to the sense): 1.9.3, *atque utinam pro te possent (possint cod. Francof. alique) mea vota valere* (cf. 3.5.30, *ut doceas votum posse valere meum*); 5.2.46, *si fas est homini cum Iove posse loqui*.

2. In certain contexts, Ovid likes to reinforce an idea by accumulating two or more synonyms. One example has been pointed out by Schrader, in his commentary on Musaeus (p. 250): 3.1.59–60, *inde tenore pari gradibus sublimia celsis | ducor ad intonsi candida templa dei*. Here, *gradibus celsis* and *sublimia templa* are practically synonymous, but they convey the impression of a huge monument, just as in Verg. *Aen.* 2.458, *evado ad summi fastigia culminis*, or 7.170–171, *tectum augustum, ingens, centum sublime columnis | urbe fuit summa*; of a lofty place, as in Lucan 5.16, *Lentulus excelsa sublimis sede profatur*. The opposite idea, falling down to the ground, is also underlined effectively by the use of synonymous expressions: 2.121–122, *corrui haec igitur Musis accepta sub uno, | si non exiguo crimine lapsa domus*; here, some MSS have weakened the image by substituting *laesa* or *nostra* to *lapsa*; but cf. 1.2.106, *alta cadens obruat unda caput*; *Her.* 20. 208, *deciderint humero pallia lapsa meo*; *Ars* 1.547, *cecidit delapsus*; *Cic. Nat. Deor.* 2.128, *elapsum excidit*; 2.89

(from Accius), *ruit prolapsa*; Verg. *Aen.* 6.310, *lapsa cadunt folia*; Prop. 3.15.34, *sic cadit inflexo lapsa puella genu*; 4.4.64, *ipsaque in Oceanum sidera lapsa cadunt* (cf. Burm. *ad Petron.* 16.2; Vahlen, *Opusc. Acad.* 1, 1907, p. 450; Housman *ad Manil.* 5.732; Pease *ad Cic. Nat. Deor.* 2.89). Finally, it seems to be the uselessness of some action or endeavor that tempts Ovid (and other Latin authors) to employ synonyms: 1.2.13, *verba miser frustra non proficientia perdo*; cf. Catullus 64.103, *non ingrata tamen frustra munuscula divis / promittens*; 111, *nequiquam vanis iactantem cornua ventis*; 65.17, *ne tua dicta vagis nequiquam credita ventis / effluxisse . . . putes*; Lucr. 5. 1002, *hic temere in cassum frustra mare saepe coortum / saevibat*; Cic. *Arat.* 32, *frustra temere . . . ratione sine ulla*; Tac. *Hist.* 2.11, *prima consiliorum frustra ceciderant*; Phdr. 2.5.24 *non multum egisti et opera nequiquam perit* (cf. Housman *ad Manil.* 1.504, add.; 3.108).

## VI. SOUND PATTERNS, INTENDED AND ACCIDENTAL

There are a few lines in the *Tristia* where the sound underlines the sense. Without trying to read too much into the text, one must assume that the hollow ring of 1.2.47, *tabulae laterum feriuntur ab undis*, the dark vowels of 1.3.4, *labitur ex oculis nunc quoque gutta meis*, the lulling flow of 5.2.24, *quotve soporiferum grana papaver habet*, the liquid melody of 3.10.9, *ille (the Danube) suis liquidus (liquidis G<sup>2</sup>V<sup>1</sup> aliique) bella repellit aquis*, the sigmatism of 2.189, *solus ad egressus (egressum Heinsius) missus septemplicis Histri*, the roughness of 5.7.17, *vox fera, trux vultus, verissima Martis imago*, are intentional. Some of Ovid's alliterations are effective: 3.6.32, *illa tegi caeca condita nocte decet*; 3.11.35, *pendimus, enī, profugi (satia tua pectora) poenas* (cf. *ex P.* 1.2.125).

Naturally, one should not overstress these observations. We cannot always rely on our ear to judge the intentions of an ancient writer. The rhyme *vera facis, sed sera meae convicia culpaē* (*ex P.* 2.6.7; cf. Plin. *Ep.* 8.12.5, *funebribus laudationibus seris quidem sed tanto magis veris interesse*) has been qualified as a "geistreicher Einfall" by Wölfflin (*ALL* 1.359), but it is doubtful whether Ovid was conscious of the rhyme we detect in *Tr.* 1.6.17, *ergo quam misero, tam vero teste probaris*, and whether rhymes of the type, 4.10.55, *utque ego maiores, sic me coluere minores* (cf. *Met.* 2.398, *conligit amentes et adhuc terrore paventes*; Verg. *Aen.* 9.634, *cava tempora ferro / traicit. 'i, verbis virtutem include superbis. . . .')* are meant to serve a special purpose. We are rarely justified in emending a line that seems to offend our musical sensibilities. 1.1.18, *si quis, qui, quid agam, forte requiret, erit* (see above, p. 257), with its

sequence of monosyllables and its repetition of *qui-* (four times), is, perhaps, not a very successful line. Heinsius suggested *civis, qui, quid agam* and found Schrader's approval, but Lucretius wrote *nequiquam quoniam* (4.1110), Catullus *qui, quacumque aliquid* (67.3), *de quoquam quicquam* (73.1). Similarly, in 1.3.25, *si licet exemplis in parvo* (A *aliique : parvis* G *aliique*) *grandibus uti*, it is not the repetition of *i* (five times) and, *s* (six times) that recommends *parvo*, but the testimony of an inscription (CLE 1988.3) and the ambiguity of *parvis* which, standing closer to *exemplis*, might be misunderstood. The repetition of *i* and *s* (cf. 2.538 *bucolicis iuvenis luserat ante modis*) is put to good use by Horace C. 1.2.1-2, *iam satis terris nivis atque dirae / grandinis misit pater* (cf. Kiessling-Heinze *ad loc.*).

When the final syllable of a word is identical with or very similar to the first syllable of the following one, the combination of syllables is called Parechema. Examples are found in all Latin poets (cf. Lobeck, *Paralip. diss.*, vol. 4; Jahn *ad Pers.* 3.92). Tibullus seems to be very fond of this sound effect, as Muretus, in his commentary to 1.1, has pointed out: "Apparet hunc poetam elegantiam quandam putasse in eiusdem syllabae continuata repetitione, ut constet, hoc non casu, sed dedita opera factum." At the beginning of the first elegy of book 1, we find *me mea* (5); *ipse seram* (7); *poma manu* (8). Examples from the *Tristia*: 1.1.2, *domino non* (cf. *ex P.* 1.1.1, *non novus*; 1.5.28, *non nocuisset*; Verg. *Aen.* 2.250, *Oceano nox*; 6.731, *non noxia*); 1.1.116, *quemquam quamvis* (see above); 1.9.59, *vita tamen*; 2.366, *tuta tamen*; 4.6.21, *quaesita tamen* (cf. Cat. 36.7, *scripta tardipedi*); 4.8.30, *posse senex* (cf. *Am.* 1.6.49, *verso sonuerunt*); 1.2.99, *me meus*; 4.10.75, *me mea* (cf. 5.3.5; *Am.* 2.17.23); 1.5.3, *me memini* (cf. *Am.* 3.7.26; Cat. 99.4); 2.29, *me meruisse*; 3.7.39, *dignissima magnis*; 4.10.106, *arma manu*; 5.7.7, *summa malorum*; 17, *verissima Martis*. Κακέμφοτα of the type *Dorica castra* (Verg. *Aen.* 2.27; 6.88 and Norden's note; Prop. 2.8.32; cf. Kraffert, *ZGW* 1887, p. 713ff.; E. Neumann, *Diss. Berl.* 1925, p. 72) are absent from the *Tristia* as far as I can see.

## VII. CONCLUSION

From the point of view of language and style, Ovid's *Tristia* do not seem to take a place apart from his earlier work. It would be extremely difficult to single out any characteristic features of his "late style" or list any liberties that he would not have taken before. I do not think that a more systematic survey would invalidate this conclusion, which is based on a series of detached observations. Nor does it appear that verse



and meter are handled more carelessly than elsewhere. In short, the poetic idiom and the literary form show Ovid still the accomplished craftsman that he was in Rome.

And yet he continually apologizes for the poor quality of his letters from Tomis. The modern handbooks of Latin literature are content to repeat Ovid's own criticisms and claim to find in the *Tristia* a notable decline of his formal talent. Taking into consideration the poor textual tradition, we have seen that this claim cannot be substantiated. We have suggested, moreover, that Ovid has a good reason to exaggerate any real or imagined shortcomings of his work produced in exile (above, p. 243). How did the contemporaries feel about its literary value? We have no direct statement, but there is no doubt that the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* were read by many in Rome. Their influence is manifest in verse inscriptions (above, p. 247). One main criticism, however, was voiced by readers. Ovid deals with it, at great length, in a remarkable document, *ex P.* 3.9 (1-2):

Quod sit in his eadem sententia, Brute, libellis,  
carmina nescioquem carpere nostra refers.

The poet admits readily that this objection is justified. He knows that his subject matter is monotonous, and he realizes regretfully that his once superb talent for *inventio* and *variatio* has vanished. While he tries to explain and excuse this fact in detail, he passes over briefly the lack of polish (17-20; see above, p. 243). But then, we know that Ovid, like Catullus, has often minimized the *limae labor*; the most carefully wrought poems are simply *nugae*, *lusus*. He wants his readers to believe that these letters are personal, written down spontaneously, improvised, as it were; but in reality, he has an eye firmly fixed on the reading public and on posterity. He is aware of one limitation: the spacious realm of his imagination, once crowded with life, full of grandiose heroes and heroines, exquisite mythological tales, picturesque personal adventures, is suddenly empty, and his *ingenium* has to exercise itself on a barren subject. Here lies the one and only difference between his late work and his earlier writings. For Ovid, it was an enormous difference; but his style and language still reveal the old Ovid, with all his elegance and extravagance.



## THE USE OF *POIEMA* AND *POIESIS*

BY NATHAN A. GREENBERG

THE following discussion<sup>1</sup> of the technical use of the terms *poiema* and *poiesis* in Hellenistic criticism of poetry involves a number of considerations.<sup>2</sup> First, these terms assumed considerable importance in the literary theories of the Hellenistic Age, a period neatly bounded by the *Poetics* of Aristotle and the *Ars Poetica* of Horace. No complete treatise on poetic criticism has survived from these three centuries. We hope to throw a little light upon one segment of the critical thinking of that age.

Again, the terms *poiema* and *poiesis* represent a type of analysis, a mode of thought exercised during the Hellenistic Age. We are the heirs of classical thought, a fact which is both a help and a hindrance, for our thinking is very similar to that of the ancients, but it is not identical with it. As a result, we tend to project our own modes of thought backward and foist them upon ancient thinkers. This can be a serious error, and it seems to have happened in the case of *poiema* and *poiesis*. The Hellenistic use of these terms is, I think, rather subtly different from what we have supposed. The terms represent a way of thinking about poetry which is not quite our own.

Hence, it has seemed desirable to give a brief account of the modern treatment of the problem. It is an interesting story in its own right, and an object lesson in the strengths and weaknesses of the scholarship of our century. More to the point, the modern treatment of *poiema* and *poiesis* is puzzling indeed if no account is taken of the historical development of that treatment.

### I. NEOPTOLEMUS AND HORACE

One of the most famous, or better, notorious, notes in the Horatian scholia is that of Porphyrio to the first line of the *Ars Poetica*: *In quem librum congescit praecepta Neoptolemi τοῦ Παριανοῦ de arte poetica, non quidem omnia, sed eminentissima*. The names of Horace and Neoptolemus are linked here most enticingly and in a way which particularly challenged the *Quellenforschung* tendencies of the late nineteenth century. The lines stood as a provocative indication that somewhere, somehow, the lost



works of Neoptolemus contained much that might solve the many problems which have plagued students of the *Ars Poetica*. In 1918, Jensen announced that the name "Neoptolemus" could be read in a section of the very mutilated *Peri poiematon* of Philodemus.<sup>3</sup> Jensen believed, quite correctly, that his discovery would lead to a better understanding of Horace's work, but the situation was complicated since the fashionable problem had been previously set. In the case of the *Ars Poetica*, out of a myriad of possible approaches, Jensen believed that his new evidence best applied to that problem which was concerned with the scheme of organization of the work, in Germanic terminology, with its *Dispositionsprinzip*. The work of Dahlmann suggests that in so doing Jensen forced his material to answer questions with which it was not concerned.<sup>4</sup>

The organization of the *Ars Poetica* does present difficulties which were the object of much discussion in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There were three main approaches to the problem. There were those who would transpose verses generously so as to arrive at what they felt was a more sensible arrangement — but of course they never agreed on these transpositions. There was a second group who denied the presence of any set principle of organization, who spoke of the "art of artlessness" and the "form of formlessness." And finally there were those who believed that there was a discernible principle of organization in the work as it stands. Chief of these was Norden, whose major article on the *Ars Poetica* was published in 1905.<sup>5</sup> This article had two main theses. The first was that in the analysis of arrangement of minor topics within the *Ars Poetica*, control was possible by comparing the arrangements of works on rhetoric. The clear implication was that this procedure was second best but necessary because of the lack of any complete treatise on poetics post-dating Aristotle. The name of Neoptolemus could only be mentioned.<sup>6</sup> Secondly, Norden emphasized the frequently noted division of the *Ars Poetica* into two major parts at about line 295. This division, he believed, represented a main principle of arrangement, wherein the first part was devoted to a discussion of the art itself, the *ars* or *techne*, while the second dealt with the artist, the *artifex* or *technites*. Norden demonstrated to his own satisfaction, and indeed to the satisfaction of almost all scholars,<sup>7</sup> that this *ars-artifex* scheme was common to a long tradition of isogogic works, works meant to introduce the novice into the details of a set discipline, an *ars* or *techne*, and that two great exempla were extant in the works of Horace and Quintilian.

The historico-scholarly background of the problem was now prepared, and it was into this situation that Jensen introduced his newly discovered

critique by Philodemus of the poetic theory of Neoptolemus. All that remained was to show, as seemed possible, that Neoptolemus had employed the *ars-artifex* arrangement; one might then assume with some assurance that Horace had adopted this scheme from Neoptolemus, and the problem of the organization of the *Ars Poetica* would be, in large measure, solved. Jensen believed that he had achieved this solution.<sup>8</sup>

To be sure, there were complications. Instead of simply speaking of the art and the artist, Neoptolemus had an unconscionable manner of speaking not only of the poet, but also of *poiema* and *poesis*. It seemed clear to Jensen that the two terms together signified the *ars* or *techne*, and that each meant some subdivision of it. What is more, with the pre-conceptions set up by the historical development of the problem, it was crystal-clear to Jensen that Neoptolemus had divided his treatise on poetry into three parts: one on *poiema*, one on *poesis*, and one on the poet. Two questions remained: just what did *poiema* and *poesis* mean, and, since it was now assumed that Horace had copied Neoptolemus' arrangement, which part of the first 294 lines of the *Ars Poetica* corresponded to *poiema* and which to *poesis*? The scholarly answers differed, but all agreed these were the proper questions to ask, and this was the matrix of the problem for the next thirty years.<sup>9</sup>

It is to the great credit of Dahlmann that he was able at last to break through the bonds placed upon the problem by its historical development. In 1953, he attacked the whole imposing edifice: first, that the *ars-artifex* arrangement was traditional and that Horace got it from Neoptolemus, and second, that the terms *poiema*, *poesis* and "poet" represent a tripartite variation of the *ars-artifex* scheme. Dahlmann was the first to point out the weaknesses in the chain of reasoning of the traditional approach. These weaknesses are blatant in the presentation given here, but they were by no means apparent before his examination.

Dahlmann attacked Norden's thesis that the *ars-artifex* arrangement was traditional. He holds, in fact, that Horace and Quintilian may have been the first to employ arrangements of that sort for poetics and rhetoric.<sup>10</sup> Up to their time, in his opinion, technical works dealt either with the *ars* or with the *artifex*, and the works dealing with the *artifex* were usually of an historical type. He summons as exempla the treatises of Cicero, and contrasts the *Poetics* of Aristotle with the lost exoteric work *On Poets*.<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand, Norden did amass an imposing amount of evidence which seemed to bear out the traditionalism of the *ars-artifex* scheme. The onus was upon Dahlmann to find some other hypothesis which would account for the body of evidence. His answer may be called the

hypothesis of the preliminary definition. According to this, the ordinary technical treatise which dealt wholly with the *ars* was introduced by a series of definitions of technical terms.<sup>12</sup> This thesis is quite attractive. When we look again at the body of evidence gathered by Norden and attempt to survey it without the preconception that it must apply to the disposition of the *Ars Poetica*, then it is a far more economical, and hence more probable, hypothesis that the citations given are, in the main, derived from sets of introductory definitions. This certainly seems to be true in the case of the text of Philodemus. This sort of material was easily quoted, hence easily preserved, and efficiently characterized the theorist. For example, Norden quotes the beginning of the *Ars Rhetorica* of Fortunatianus: *Quid est rhetorica? — bene dicendi scientia. Quid est orator? — vir bonus dicendi peritus. Quod est oratoris officium? — bene dicere in civilibus quaestionibus. Qui finis? — persuadere.* We can well imagine that different theorists would answer the question: *quod est poetae officium?* in widely varying ways. The main point, however, is that these preliminary sets of definitions need have nothing to do with the disposition of the works they introduce. Certainly we have no evidence that they did, and no one would ever have inferred that they did, were it not for the historical development of the problem.

There is additional reason to believe that the views of Neoptolemus cited by Philodemus embody in fact no more than the introductory statements of the former's treatise on poetry. Dahlmann and others assert with great likelihood that Philodemus did not know Neoptolemus' work first-hand, but was working with the handbook of a certain Philomelos.<sup>13</sup> This last most probably contained little more than a collection of such introductory definitions by various theorists. What is more, the labors of Boyancé,<sup>14</sup> Ardizzoni, and Dahlmann have supplied us with series of sets of definitions of the terms *poiema* and *poiesis*, although Dahlmann is the first to note their probable significance.

As a result, we can make the following points: first, Neoptolemus' use of the terms *poiema*, *poiesis* and "poet" does not necessarily refer to the disposition or arrangement of his treatise on poetics. There is simply no evidence for this. Second and more significant, despite a lengthy, if fragmentary, tradition postdating Aristotle which defines the terms *poiema* and *poiesis* over and over, it is perfectly clear that Horace did not define these terms in his *Ars Poetica*, did not employ them in a technical sense, used the word *poesis* only once, and in fact seems to have avoided the whole problem of technical terminology. It is highly improbable that Horace was ignorant of these technical terms. They occur not only in Neoptolemus, but in Lucilius and Varro.<sup>15</sup> What is more, the place



where these definitions should occur, the beginning of the work, is utilized rather for the shock-value of the famous line: *Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam*. Here is *in medias res* with a vengeance. It is exceedingly difficult to believe that the position of this line derives from a Hellenistic pattern. In any case, the thesis that the *Dispositionsprinzip* of the *Ars Poetica* can be explained on the basis of the Philodemean text has been demolished by Dahlmann.

## II. THE MEANING OF POIEMA AND POESIS

The discussion of the meaning of the terms *poiema* and *poesis* follows lines laid down by Ardizzoni and, especially, Dahlmann. At some time closely postdating Aristotle, the words *poiema* and *poesis* were given a specific technical meaning which coexisted with the ordinary meanings of these words. Our best guess is that this was done by Theophrastus.<sup>16</sup> Our evidence for such technical usage is a formidable collection of ancient technical definitions of these terms most recently compiled by Ardizzoni and Dahlmann. An additional piece of evidence, not noted previously, is that Philodemus speaks of *poesis* as understood *koinos* and contrasts it with another usage that can only be *idios*, but this text will be discussed below. It is however, interesting to note that the use of *poiema* and *poesis* as technical terms did not last. The scholarly and scholiastic traditions preserved the formal definitions to some extent, but the terms were not *used*, and the tradition soon became confused.<sup>17</sup> Horace, and the critics after him, Dionysius, Demetrius, Pseudo-Longinus, Plutarch, all knew the work of the three centuries after Aristotle, but did not employ these terms in their technical sense. We can hazard a conjecture as to why this should be so. *Poiema* and *poesis* did not continue to be used *qua* technical terms because they did not prove helpful or productive as technical terms should. They hindered rather than promoted clarity of discussion.

Now the ordinary or nontechnical meanings of the terms are clear enough. *Poesis* is the act of composing poetry, the product of such composing, and poetry itself in almost any vague and nebulous sense. *Poiema* is the product of poetic composition, again in a vague and general way.

It is not so easy to determine the post-Aristotelian technical meanings of these terms. The task involves, in fact, the formulation of an hypothesis which will contain those sets of definitions which are judged, almost intuitively, to contain some glimmer of the "real tradition." The test of an hypothesis is its consistency and its economy. Our hypothesis, however, must account for a progressive misuse of these terms, and for an

inherent lack of clarity in their definitions which led to their abandonment. The lack of clarity will be found; the progressive misuse may be charged to the responsibility of critical factions bending the terms to suit their special pleadings.

Two passages in Aristotle seem germinal in the formation of the technical usage. The first is found in the *Rhetoric*: διὸ ῥυθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μή. ποίημα γὰρ ἔσται. (1408b30). The second occurs at the beginning of the *Poetics*: . . . καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἔξειν ἢ ποίησις. If meter is impressed upon a *logos*, the *logos* will become *poiema*. A *poiesis* contains or expresses *mythoi*. These conclusions are explicit or else implied by the text. We know that Aristotle did not use these terms in a technical sense, but compare the following definitions of Posidonius and Varro, both traditionalists, neither outstanding for originality: ποίημα δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος φησιν ἐν τῇ περὶ λέξεως εἰσαγωγῇ, λέξις ἑμμετρος ἢ ἔνρυθμος μετὰ σκευῆς τὸ λογοειδὲς ἐκβεβηκυῖα. . . . ποίησις δέ ἐστι σημαντικὸν ποίημα μίμησιν περιέχον θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπείων.<sup>18</sup> This seems clear enough, but the paraphrase must be carefully made. *Poiema* is poetic *lexis*. This does not mean that *poiema* is style, or form, or anything so abstract as that. A *poiema* is a series of words that is not prose because of the presence of poetic features of a formal sort. This interpretation is supported to some extent by reference to Varro's definition of the terms: *poema est lexis enrythmos, id est verba plura modice in quandam coniecta formam. itaque etiam distichon epigrammation vocant poema. poesis est perpetuum argumentum ex rhythmis, ut Ilias Homeri et Annalis Enni. poetice est ars earum rerum.*<sup>19</sup>

This definition, though similar in some respects to that of Posidonius, exhibits some striking differences. It begins as does that of Posidonius. *Poiema* is *lexis enrythmos*, but then he explicitly says that this means a series of words in poetic form: *id est verba plura modice in quandam coniecta formam*. The next sentence makes it even clearer that a *poiema* is not an abstract quality, or a subdivision of a treatise on poetics, but indeed a series of words in poetic form: *itaque etiam distichon epigrammation vocant poema*. A *poiema* is a series of words embodying certain formal features. A two-line epigram is a series of words of that sort.

Now, just what formal features were necessary was probably a subject of controversy in classical criticism. The difficulty lay in that *poiema*, like our own word "poem," was not simply a descriptive term; it was also an accolade. Literary criticism involves both analysis and evaluation. When a descriptive term is also used evaluatively, a lack of clarity usually results. It is clear that a *poiema* had to have meter. Otherwise the *poiema*

would be prose. It was probably argued, however, that the *poima* should also share a number of formal features characterizing artistic prose. This is the notion involved in Posidonius' words *meta skeues*. A convenient possible formulation would be the *aretai lexeos* formulated by Theophrastus.<sup>20</sup>

*Poesis* is quite another matter. As Posidonius said, a *poesis* is also a *poima*, i.e., it is a series of words (usually quite lengthy) which embodies poetic features of a formal sort, but it must also express a content which is poetic. This is the essential feature which differentiates *poesis* from *poima*. One may well ask what is a poetic content. The answer had been supplied by Aristotle, and insofar as his answer was understood, it was preserved as such. A poetic content is a *mythos*, a *mimesis* of things divine and human. The Aristotelian nature of Posidonius' definition is apparent. Other formulations, however, characterize poetic content not by the nature of its subject matter, but by the architectonics, the organizational structure of the content. This too is Aristotelian, where good *mythoi* have a beginning, a middle, and an end. Artistic unity seems to be the criterion here; one which avoids the vexing problem of *mimesis*. Aristotle spoke of the ἐν καὶ ὅλον (1451a1) and ὅλον δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν (1450b26f.). This was taken up by theorists who omit the criterion of *mimesis*. Thus Varro speaks of *perpetuum argumentum*; Lucilius of *opus totum, una thesis, opus unum*; Diomedes of *contextus et corpus totius operis effecti*; Athonius of *corpus operis confecti*; the Dionysius-scholia of ἐντελής ὑπόθεσις ἔχουσα ἀρχὰς καὶ μέσα καὶ πέρατα.<sup>21</sup>

We can be certain that the definition of poetic content was a matter of controversy, and, in truth, centuries of criticism have found inadequacies in Aristotle's limitations in this regard. It is not at all surprising to find only one definition mentioning *mimesis* while all the rest adopt the crystal-clear principle of organic unity. Could subjective lyric conform with the *mimesis* principle of Aristotle? He seems to have omitted the genre from consideration. Putting it into the technical terminology, we might ask this very pertinent question: Is an ode of Sappho a *poima* only, or is it also a *poesis*? Can we suspect, at least, that had he used these terms, Aristotle would have replied: ποίημα μὲν, ποίησις δ' οὐ. *Anagnorisis* and *peripeteia* are exceedingly rare in Sappho, and *hamartia* is not always apparent. Others, of course, might contend to their dying breath that the ode was *poesis*, and not merely *poima*, and they would be right depending upon their own understanding of the terms. As in the case of *poima*, the difficulty lay in the evaluative connotation of the word. In brief, we can surmise that the terms *poima* and *poesis* did not generate productive discourse. Terminological bickering occurred for neither the first nor



last time in the history of criticism. In sum, it is a tribute to the well known good sense of Horace that he avoided the use of the terms *poiema* and *poiesis*.

Our conclusion, then, is that *poiema* is closely connected to form and *poiesis* to content, but they are not equal to form and content. The critics employing these terms simply did not abstract in just this way. They had words practically equivalent to our own notions of content and form, but they did not choose to use them. Instead, the development of the terms *poiema* and *poiesis* was such that they seemed to comprehend completely the character of poetry. A *poiema* was a series of words in poetic form. A *poiesis* was a *poiema* expressing poetic content. The difficulties inherent in such a scheme are too numerous to list. These were compounded by use of the terms in a complex that did not clearly separate analysis from evaluation. The terms themselves were a form of evaluation, but it did not stop there. The question was not simply whether a work was a *poiema* or *poiesis* or not. Was it a good *poiema* or a good *poiesis*? Again, the term *poiema* opened a line of theorizing toward a poetry devoid of content, or at least one whose value in no way depended upon the content expressed.<sup>22</sup>

This completes our prolegomena. We can now examine the relevant texts in Philodemus with a certain sophistication. To forestall criticism, it is at once admitted that the hypothesis above is not the only one possible. I believe it is plausible, a sufficiently worthy goal considering the brief and fragmentary nature of the evidence.

### III. PHILODEMUS' USE OF POIEMA AND POIESIS

Although the following passage of Philodemus' *Peri poiematon* does not define the terms *poiema* and *poiesis*, it is of peculiar significance in that the terms are *used* in their technical sense. As a result, some previously unnoted evidence is given concerning the importance of these terms to Philodemus, and, more important, how these terms were integrated into theoretical procedure.

Cols. XXXIV.2-XXXV.15 (Jensen):

[Εἰ δ' ἔ -  
 φη [τ]ις ἀρ[ετῇ]ν εἶναι ποι -  
 ητοῦ τὸ δύ[ν]ασθαι πᾶν  
 5 ποίη[μ]α σ[υνθ]εῖν[α] καλῶς,  
 τὰ [ζ]ητούμ[εν] ἄ[ν]θρωμο -  
 λογείτο. τ[ῇ] γὰρ δυνάμει  
 ζητούμεν, ἐπειδὴν τίς  
 ὁ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν ποιη -

## Col. XXXV

- 10 τή[ς] ἐξετάζωμεν, ὅπως  
 τὰ [π]οιήματα συντιθεῖς  
 καλῶς συντίθῃσιν, ὁ δὲ  
 τὸν καλῶς φησιν. εἰ δὲ  
 καὶ τὸ πᾶν γένος ποιήμα -  
 15 τος ἀξιοῖ, παντε -  
 λῶς ἀγέννητον καταλεί -  
 π[ει] τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐδεὶς  
 γὰρ ἐδυνήθη πᾶμ ποῆσαι  
 καλῶς. ὥς δ' ἐγὼ πείθο -  
 20 μαι, καὶ ἀδύνατον. οὐδὲ  
 γὰρ δύναιτ' ἄν. ἄλλως  
 μὲν τοῦτ' οὐδ' ἐν μοναχῶι  
 γένει διωμάλικέν τις  
 ποιητής. εἰ δὲ τὸ δύνασ -  
 25 θαι σ[υνθεῖ]ναι ποίησιν  
 ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν, ἥττομ  
 μὲν ἀτόπως, ἀλ[λ]ὰ προ -  
 γινώσκειν ἡμᾶς δεή -  
 σ[ει, τίς ἐστιν] ἀρετὴ ποιή -  
 30 σεως, ἥς θεωρηθείσης  
 φανερός [ὁ ταύ]την [ποι -  
 ῶν ὅτι σπ[ουδ]αῖος, καὶ τε -  
 λείου ποιητοῦ φή[σα]ι[μ]ε[ν]  
 ἂν ταύτην ἀρετὴν. [ἐ -  
 κείν[ου γ]ὰρ εἰ[πό]ντο[ς]  
 [τὸ δύνασθαι ποιῆσαι κα - ]  
 λ]ῶς, τοὺς ο[ὕτως πεποι -  
 ηκότας ἀγνοεῖσθαι δ[ε]ή -  
 5 σει κατὰ τὸν λ[ό]γον, εἰ τὴν  
 ἀρετὴν εἶχον τὴν [τοῦ ποιη -  
 τοῦ. κοινῶ[ς δ]ὲ τῆς ποιή -  
 σεως ὑπακουομένης ὥς  
 καὶ τῶν ἐπιγραμματο -  
 10 ποιῶν καὶ Σαπφούς, ἐ[κε]ῖ -  
 νο]ς ταῦτόν ἐρεῖ τῶι ποι -  
 ητὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν  
 ποιημάτων κα[λ]ῶν συν -  
 θέτην, ὃ καὶ πρὶν Θεόγνιν  
 15 γεγονέναι κατείχομεν.

If one has said that the *arete* of the poet is the ability to compose every *poïema* beautifully, then he has (merely) restated the problem. For whenever we inquire who is the good poet, we inquire, in effect, how the composer of *poïemata* composes beautifully; but the opponent's answer is

simply to repeat "beautifully." If he demands (that the good poet compose beautifully) also every sort of *poiema*, then he admits that the *arete* has never existed, for no one has been able to compose every one beautifully. In my opinion, moreover, it is impossible for no one would be able to do so. Besides, no poet has maintained such a standard in any single sort (of *poiema*).

But if (he has said that the *arete* of the poet is) the ability to compose a *poiesis* (itself) possessing *arete*, then that is less absurd, but we ought to know first what is the *arete* of a *poiesis*, which having been investigated, it would be clear that the one who composes this is a *spoudaios* (poet), and we would say<sup>23</sup> that this is the *arete* of the *teleios* poet. But if he says that it is the ability to compose beautifully, then according to (our previous) reasoning he must fail to realize whether such compositions comprehend the *arete* of the poet. If *poiesis* is taken in a general sense as (including) also (the productions) of the epigrammatists and of Sappho, then that one merely repeats the equivalent of the statement that the good poet is the composer of beautiful *poiemata*, which we understood before Theognis was born.<sup>24</sup>

This passage occurs in that section of the work (Cols. XXVI.23–XXXVI.14)<sup>25</sup> where Philodemus attacks various anonymous critical statements. It is, however, one of the comparatively rare sections where it seems clear that Philodemus is stating his own opinion.<sup>26</sup>

The first statement under attack is: "the *arete* of the poet is the ability to compose every *poiema* beautifully." Now we have no way of knowing whether the anonymous theorist meant *poiema* in its technical sense or simply poetry, poems in general. Philodemus' criticism is not very helpful in this regard. In effect, he rejects this statement completely, since in his opinion, as we shall see below, the *arete* of the poet is coupled with *poiesis* and not with *poiema*. But that is not what he says here. Instead, he attempts to show that the statement of the opponent is either inadequate or impossible. First, he objects that the opponent is only restating the problem. Next, he attacks the word *pan* in the opponent's statement because it demands too much. At this point, Philodemus introduces the interesting word *genos* (lines 14, 23). It is tempting to assert here that Philodemus is dealing with *poiema* in the technical sense, and that *genos* refers to a technical subdivision. Thus one *genos* might be *poiema* in iambics, another in hexameters and so on. This is possible, but the evidence does not warrant any conclusion. In any case, Philodemus makes the categorical statement that no poet has ever been able to compose every *genos* of *poiema* beautifully, and indeed, that no poet has ever maintained such a standard within a single *genos* of *poiema*. The notion that even Homer nods was a common one.



Of more interest is the qualified approval given to the second statement: "... the ability to compose a *poiesis* (itself) possessing *arete*." His comment is *hettom men atopos*, which for Philodemus is high praise indeed. The statement remains useless because the *arete* of a *poiesis* has been left undefined. The phrasing which follows is of particular interest and should be carefully noted. Philodemus says that this statement properly completed will clearly characterize the *spoudaios* poet, and in his own opinion would characterize the *teleios* poet. In other words, all would agree that the one who composes a *poiesis* possessing *arete* which has been properly defined is a good poet, but Philodemus would say that he is the perfect or best poet. Here we see the traces of a bewildering array of evaluative distinctions, dealing with the good poet, the best poet and so on. We shall attempt some schematization below. We return to the text, for Philodemus adds one more proviso. The statement of the opponent is valid only if *poiesis* is not taken in a general sense, i.e., *poiesis* must be understood in a technical sense which expressly excludes epigram and the works of Sappho. Such works are technically *poiemata* and not *poiesis*.

We are already familiar with Varro's definition which states that a two-line epigram is a *poiema*, but, presumably, not a *poiesis*. If our hypothesis is correct, this would mean that an epigram is accepted as poetic in form but not in content. This is difficult but not impossible to comprehend. Can we say that Philodemus denied poetic content to an ode of Sappho? We can and we do, to the extent that Philodemus said a Sapphic ode was a *poiema* but not a *poiesis*. To repeat, a *poiesis* is a *poiema* with poetic content. There are two criteria for such content. The first is that the content must be a *mythos*, a *mimesis* in the Aristotelian sense; the second is that the content must have artistic unity. The first criterion should suffice to exclude the Sapphic ode. We may assume that Philodemus and others denied the name *poiesis* to Sappho's work because they thought the Aristotelian notion of *mimesis* was not embodied there. On the other hand, we have noted that most of the definitions of *poiesis* dwell on the issue of unity rather than upon that of *mimesis*. However this notion of unity as expressed in the word *contextus* implies a certain complexity, an interweaving of themes which might be absent in any work of small scope. It is for this reason, perhaps, that Philodemus refuses to call the work of Sappho *poiesis*. No certainty is possible; Philodemus' verdict is due to either or both reasons.

One question has been left in abeyance. In order to know how Philodemus characterized the *teleios* poet, we ought to know how he defined the *arete* of a *poiesis*. We surmise that this depended upon the content of

the poetry. Presumably there must be a certain type of subject endowed with the proper artistic unity. It is not surprising to find that this reduces to a problem of selection and arrangement. The dichotomy of selection and arrangement pervaded classical criticism, as did that of content and form. In an analysis which was either naive or cynical so far as any understanding of the creative process is concerned, the process of writing poetry was broken down into the two steps of selecting the right words (*ekloge*) and putting them into the right order (*synthesis*). The following passage shows Philodemus applying these procedures to the consideration of poetic content. It is concerned, I believe, with Philodemus' notion of *poiesis*.

Col. VII.18-34 (Jensen):

τὸ δεῖ[ν  
δὲ μ]ετὰ [τ]οῦ [εὔ] ποιεῖν  
20 καὶ τοῦ στ[ίβου το]ῦ ἀγαθοῦ  
ποιητοῦ καὶ τὸ διαφέρειν  
α]ὐτοῦ τὸ[ν] εὔ ποιοῦντα  
πάντ]ως δέχομα[ι]. δύνα -  
τ[αι γάρ] τι[ς] ἀλογόν τινα  
25 μῦθον καὶ ὑπόθ[ε]σιν  
προθέμενος ἐξέ[ργ]άσας -  
θα[ι π]οιη[τι]κῶς, καὶ τι -  
νες πο[ιηταί] γεγόνασι τοι -  
οῦτοι. τ[έ]λ[ει]ος δὲ καὶ ἀγα -  
30 θὸς ποιητῆς ὁ σὺν τῇ κα[ὶ]  
τούτων ἐκλογῇ ν[ο]εῖται.  
τὴν μέντοι διάθ[εσιν] τοι -  
αύ]την οἷα παρ' Ὀμ[ήρῳ] καὶ  
Σοφοκλεῖ τίς [οἶδ]ς τ' [έσ]τιν πα -  
[ρασκευάζειν]<sup>28</sup>

I thoroughly approve the statement that in addition to good composing the way of the good poet is necessary, and that there is a distinction between him (the good poet) and the one who composes well. For anyone can take some irrational myth and plot and work it into poetic form, and there have been some poets of that sort. But the one with the selection also of these (myths and plots)<sup>29</sup> is considered a perfect (*teleios*) and good poet. And who is able to offer such arrangement<sup>30</sup> (of myths and plots) as that in Homer and Sophocles?

There is no doubt that lines 23ff. of this passage contain the view of Philodemus. First he expresses agreement with the statement of the opponent<sup>31</sup> that there is a difference between the good poet and the one

who composes well. Then he goes on to state what this difference is, and significantly in so doing adds gratuitously the word *teleios*, which is absent in the statement of the opponent. For Philodemus, that which characterizes the perfect poet is the proper selection and arrangement of subject matter. Lines 32–34 are in a very fragmentary state, but the notion as reconstructed by Jensen is not in doubt. Good *diathesis*, good arrangement or disposition of subject matter is a feature of the works of Homer and Sophocles, who are undoubtedly exempla of the perfect poet. The essential task of the poet is the selection and arrangement of his subject matter. When properly executed, this characterizes the perfect poet.

It has already been suggested that Philodemus defines the *arete* of the perfect poet as the ability to compose a *poiesis* that possesses *arete*. This *poiesis* cannot be an epigram or a short ode, but the *Iliad* or the *Oedipus Rex* suits Philodemus' requirements very well. These are *poieseis* in the technical sense, and they possess *arete*. This *arete* consists of the proper selection and disposition of subject matter. The poet who can select and arrange his subject matter properly possesses the *arete* of the *teleios* poet.

It should be added that a necessary qualification for any poet is the ability to "work it into poetic form." This means no more than the ability to compose a *poiema*. The composing of a *poiema* is the *ergasia* of the poet. Note, however, that there is another term beside *poietai*. Philodemus also uses the term *poion*. This indicates the following possible schematization:

The *poion* selects and arranges words so that they have poetic form, i.e., he produces *poiema*. The *eu poion* does this well, i.e., he produces a good or beautiful *poiema*. Now, just as every *poiesis* is a special sort of *poiema*, just so the *poietai* is a special sort of *poion*, i.e., he is the *poion* who produces a *poiema* which is also a *poiesis*. The *poietai*, then, produces a *poiema* which expresses poetic content. Such content is the product of selection and arrangement. The good *poietai* (Philodemus would say *teleios*) exercises such selection and arrangement properly.

We complete this section with a conjecture concerning Philodemus' use of the word *teleios*. Clearly, he is making a claim for the composer of a good *poiesis* that not all would grant. A possible basis for this distinction is that Philodemus' discussion is amoral. Unlike most theorists, he did not believe that the poet must produce work that is morally edifying.<sup>32</sup> It must be admitted that we are still not very close to the substantive strata of Philodemus' poetic theory. He says that the best poet is the one who composes a *poiesis* with *arete*. This entails the ability to exercise



proper selection and disposition of content. The content should not be *alogos*, whatever that means, and Homer and Sophocles seem to be examples of such best poets. Still, his notion of *poiema* and *poiesis* is now sufficiently clear to allow progress toward the interpretation of the next notorious passage.

#### IV. PHILODEMUS AND NEOPTOLEMUS

In contrast to the texts already considered, the passage which follows has been discussed many times. Jensen, Rostagni,<sup>33</sup> Boyance, and Ardizzone have all considered the text at length. No attempt is made here to record all the results of their investigations, but what we say is to be read in the light of their work. We deal with selected issues in a way which is supplementary and, we hope, corrective.<sup>34</sup>

Cols. XI. 5–XII.13 (Jensen):

- 5 ἀτόπως δ[έ] κα[ὶ] τὸν] τήν  
 τέχνην [καὶ τήν δύν]α -  
 μιν ἔχοντα τ[ὴν ποι]ητι -  
 κήν εἶδος [π]αρίσ[τησι  
 τῇ[ς] τέ[χ]νῃ[ς μ]ετὰ τοῦ  
 10 ποήματο[ς] καὶ τῆς πο -  
 ῆσεως· [πῶ]ς δὲ καὶ ταῦ -  
 τα; μᾶ[λλο]ν γὰρ ἐχρήν  
 τὰς δια[θέσει]ς ποιήσεις  
 ἐπικαλεῖ]ν, ἔτι δὲ βέλ -  
 15 τιον ἔ[ρ]γα τὰ ποήματα,  
 τὰς δὲ ποιήσεις οἵ[ον] ὕ -  
 φη, πο[ιη]τῇ[ν] δὲ τὸν [τ]ήν  
 δύνα[μ]ιν [ἔχ]οντα καὶ ἁ -  
 πὸ ταύτης [ἔ]ργαζόμε -  
 20 νον. εἰ δ[έ] τ[ὴν] ἐργασίαν  
 ποιητικὴν καλεῖ, τ[ῇ]ς  
 τέχνης οὕτω προσ[αγο -  
 ρευομένης, ἀ[γ]νοε[ῖ] καὶ  
 ταύτης εἶδος λέγειν  
 25 τὸν [ποι]ητὴν καταγέ[λ]α[σ] -  
 τον. θαυμα[στὸ]ν δ' αὖ -  
 τοῦ καὶ [τὸ] τῇ[ς] ποήσεω[ς]  
 εἶναι τ[ῇ]ν ὑπόθεσιν [μό -  
 νον, καὶ τοῦ ποήματο[ς] καὶ  
 30 πάντων ὅλως τῆς ποήσε[ε -  
 ως ὄντων. ἡ μὲν [γὰρ] πό -  
 ησις καὶ π[ό]ημά γ' ἔστιν,

Col. XII

35 ολον ἢ Ἰλι[άς], οἱ δ[ὲ] πρῶτοι  
 στίχοι τρι[άκ]οντα τα[ύ]της  
 πόημα μ[ε]ν, οὐ μέντοι ποί -  
 η]σις· καὶ τὸ ποιή[ματος] μό -  
 νον τήν [σύνθεσιν] τῆς  
 λέξεως μ[ε]τέχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ  
 τὰς διανο[ίας] καὶ τάξεις  
 5 καὶ πράξεις καὶ π[ροσω] -  
 ποποι[ας]. εἰ δ' ἐν [τῇ]  
 λέξει πεποιῆσθαι τ[ι]  
 πρέ]πει, κἀνταῦ[θα] νῆ Δι' οὐ -  
 κ' ἔστι τι πεποι[ῆσθαι] το[ύ] -  
 10 των χωρ[ίς], ἀλλ' [ἴδι]ο[ν] το[ῦ]  
 συνκεῖσθαι [τῇ]ν λέξιν τὸ  
 συνκεῖσθαι [τῇ]ν πρᾶξ[ιν] εἰ -  
 ναι φαίνεται μ[οι].

It is also absurd to classify the one who possesses the poetic art and ability as an *eidos*<sup>35</sup> of the art together with the *poïema* and the *poiesis*. And in what sense (does Neoptolemus understand) the latter (*poïema* and *poiesis*)? For one ought rather to have given the name *poïeseis* to the arrangements (*diatheseis*), or, better yet, to have given the name "works" (*erga*) to the *poïemata* and the name "a sort of weaving" (*hoion hyphe*) to the *poïeseis*, and the name "poet" to the one who possesses the ability and works from it. But if he gives the name *poïetike* to the working, when the art is so named, then he is ignorant; and to say that the poet is an *eidos* of it (the art) is ridiculous. Also astonishing is his (statement) that that which concerns the *poiesis* is only the plot, when also the *poïema* and in general all else is comprehended within the *poiesis*. For the *poiesis* is also a *poïema*, such as the *Iliad*, but the first thirty verses of it are a *poïema* and not a *poiesis*. (Astonishing) also is his statement that only the composition of the *lexis* has any part in the *poïema*, and not the thoughts, arrangements, actions, and characterizations. For if it is fitting that something artful be created in the *lexis*, then, by Zeus, it cannot be created without these (thoughts, arrangements, etc.). Rather it seems to me that the composition of the action is an essential part of the composition of the *lexis*.

In his essay on Crates of Pergamum, Jensen has given us some invaluable insight into the methods used by Philodemus: "... ich schloss ... dass Philodem ganz entsprechend dem sonst von ihm geübten Verfahren auch in seinem Werk *Peri poiêmátôn* die *doxai* welche er zu prüfen beabsichtigte, zunächst im Auszug vorgelegt hatte. ... Wir sahen schon, dass er nicht scheut, einzelne Sätze seiner Gegner ganz oder teilweise aus dem Zusammenhang herauszureissen und als sinnlos hinzustellen, dass er auch öfter in ihre Termini einen ihnen fremden

Sinn hineinlegt.”<sup>36</sup> Disregarding the uncharitable conclusion, it is our conjecture that Philodemus followed this same procedure in his critique of Neoptolemus, i.e., he quoted Neoptolemus’ views at some length without interruption in some portion of the work now lost to us, while the preserved text contains the criticism of those views.<sup>37</sup> Now, while everything we know about Neoptolemus’ poetic theories is contained in Cols. X–XIII of the preserved text, it by no means follows that Philodemus has taken under close consideration here every bit of the connected account of Neoptolemus’ views which he gave elsewhere. On the contrary, it is far more probable that he is following his usual procedure of dealing only with “*einzelne Sätze*.” This conjecture is supported by the tenor of the passage itself, which quotes Neoptolemus’ definition of *poiētes*, but not of *poiēma* and *poiēsis*. Our major assumption is that the connected account of Neoptolemus’ views also contained formal definitions of these terms, in close analogy to the sets of definitions formulated by other theoreticians.<sup>38</sup>

Neoptolemus’ definition of poet is quoted first. It reads “the one who possesses the poetic *technē* and *dynamis*.” Philodemus would correct this definition to read: “the one who possesses the *dynamis* and works from it.” We are also told by Philodemus that “to say that the poet is an *eidos* of it (the *technē*) is ridiculous.” Now, why does Philodemus object to the definition of poet as given by Neoptolemus? A generally approved notion is that the objection is based upon the use of the word *technē* in the definition, for that which possesses the *technē* cannot be an *eidos* of the *technē*, and it has been noted that Philodemus’ redefinition of the term omits the word *technē*.<sup>39</sup> This seems fair enough, but more can be said about Philodemus’ definition of poet, and we shall return to it.

Neoptolemus’ definitions of *poiēma* and *poiēsis* are not given, but we assume that they appeared in the previous connected account which is lost. Presumably this account contained three statements in the following form:

*poiēma* is *x*  
*poiēsis* is *y*  
*poiētes* is the one who possesses, etc.

The phrasing of lines 12–17 has never been properly noted. Ardizzoni merely characterizes the passage as follows: “Segue invece un periodo in cui Filodemo nervosamente dice quale significato avrebbe dare Neottolemo alla *poiēsis*, al *poiēma* e al *poiētēs*.”<sup>40</sup> However, the usage of the definite article in these lines is peculiar. It is not prefixed to *poiēseis* in line 13 or to *poiēten* in line 17, but it is prefixed to *poēmata* in line 15



and to *poieseis* in line 16.<sup>41</sup> This usage allows the formation of a hypothesis which is rather elegant and, at the same time, conforms with the spirit of the passage. Confronted by the three definitions given in the form above, Philodemus first suggests that Neoptolemus' statement, "*poiesis* is *y*," should be changed to read, "*poiesis* is *diathesis*." Undoubtedly, he feels that *diathesis* is an improvement over *y*, whatever that was. However, on second thought, this suggestion does not satisfy him (*Eti de beltion* . . .), and he makes a different and more satisfactory correction which involves the terms *erga* and *hoion hyphe*. Why is Philodemus dissatisfied with his first suggestion? Here, then, is our hypothesis. Philodemus knows that a *poiesis* is a *poiema* that expresses poetic content. It is, in fact, a literary creation of a particular sort; in short, a poem. This is not equivalent to *diathesis*, a term which refers to the disposition of content. But from this point of view, are the newly suggested terms *erga* and *hoion hyphe* any improvement? An *ergon* is the end product of an *ergasia* but it is not a *poiema*. Just so, *hoion hyphe* (like the term *contextus*) refers to the interweaving of themes of content, but it is not a *poiesis* any more than *diathesis* is. At this point, the peculiar usage of the definite article must be taken into account. Careful reading leads to the conclusion that *erga* and *hoion hyphe* are *not* substitutions for the *x* and *y* in Neoptolemus' statements. Instead of suggesting different predicates for Neoptolemus' statements, Philodemus is, in fact, suggesting new subjects. A diagram will make this clearer.

Neoptolemus said: *poiema* is *x*

*poiesis* is *y*

Philodemus' first suggestion: *poiesis* is *diathesis*

Philodemus' second suggestion: *ergon* is *x*

*hoion hyphe* is *y*

This, in effect, would eliminate the terms *poiema* and *poiesis* from the definitions of Neoptolemus. Just as the definition of *poietes* is amended so as to omit the offending word *techne*, so the other definitions are amended so as to eliminate the offending terms *poiema* and *poiesis*.

This interpretation may seem oversubtle. One can well object that if Philodemus meant what I think he meant, he has expressed his views in a very obscure manner. I have no quarrel with such an objection. The fact that Philodemus wrote down one suggestion, and then added a second which he thought was better is clear evidence that he was forming his arguments as he wrote. A second draft, presumably, would have been more finished, and perhaps clearer. Nevertheless, I still contend that any tenable hypothesis must account for the presence of the second

suggestion and its peculiar use of the definite article. Our hypothesis does account for both aspects of the passage. Its validity will be supported by the possibilities it opens for interpretation in our discussion of the remainder of the text, for in addition to the terminological definitions we have posited, Neoptolemus made some supplementary remarks using these terms. Some of them have been preserved in our text.

Consider the following statement of Neoptolemus: "that which concerns the *poiesis* is the plot alone." It should be noted that Neoptolemus does *not* say *poiesis* is plot.<sup>42</sup> The Greek uses a genitive construction which is open to broad interpretation, but Philodemus does not choose to interpret it broadly. He objects that this statement is not consistent with the fact that the *poiema* and all else is comprehended within the *poiesis*, for a *poiesis* is also a *poiema*. Now, the statement that the *poiema* and all else is comprehended within the *poiesis* is in the genitive absolute construction. The question is whether this is a report of Neoptolemus' own opinion or an objection on Philodemus' part. In the first case, Philodemus notes what is, in his opinion, a contradiction within Neoptolemus' theory. In the second case, he opposes his own opinion to that of Neoptolemus. At first sight, it would seem that the latter is the correct interpretation. However, with great discernment, Rostagni was able to demonstrate that this clause contains, in fact, the opinion of Neoptolemus.<sup>43</sup> This is not really surprising. The notion that every *poiesis* is also a *poiema* must have been widely spread. What then did Neoptolemus mean by saying that "that which concerns the *poiesis* is the content alone"? As we have said, the genitive construction is ambiguous, but the word *monon* is explicit enough. To be brief, this *monon* has exercised a great deal of scholarly ingenuity. Dahlmann cuts the knot by paraphrasing as follows: ". . . dass das Wichtigste für die *poiêsis* die Tatsache sei, dass sie das Postulat der Einheit des Stoffes erfülle."<sup>44</sup> This paraphrase may well be correct, but if so, I, in company with Philodemus, find Neoptolemus' phrasing unfortunate, provided of course that it has been accurately reported. In accordance with our hypothesis it was probably Philodemus' opinion that Neoptolemus' statements would have been clearer or less controversial if the terms *ergon* and *hoion hyphe* had been substituted throughout for *poiema* and *poiesis*. Certainly this would have solved the problem here, for if the statement read, "that which concerns *hoion hyphe* is the content alone," one could not object that *hoion hyphe* is also a *poiema*. It is certain that Philodemus found Neoptolemus' use of the terms *poiema* and *poiesis* unfortunate. Probably it was Philodemus' opinion that Neoptolemus ought not to have used the terms at all. It is curious, at any rate, that Horace, who we know

followed Neoptolemus in many respects and who probably also was personally acquainted with Philodemus, did not use these technical terms in his treatise.

It must be remembered that Philodemus had no objection to the use of the terms *poiema* and *poiesis* in a discussion of poetic theory. If asked about the *arete* of a *poiesis*, Philodemus would reply that it was the proper *ekloge* and *diathesis* of content, or, to change slightly Neoptolemus' phrasing, "that that which concerns the *arete* of a *poiesis* is the content alone." But the *arete* of a *poiesis* is not the only property of a *poiesis*. Hence his objection to Neoptolemus' use of the term.

Philodemus' objections to Neoptolemus' use of the term *poiema* are somewhat more complicated. In the case of *poiesis*, Philodemus used a more or less standard notion as a point of reference. Everyone agreed that a *poiesis* was a kind of *poiema*. In the case of *poiema*, however, Philodemus had his own axe to grind. This is indicated by the fervor of his criticism; the tone of sweet reason is no longer there. Neoptolemus said that only the composition of the *lexis* has any part in the *poiema*. Note the words and tone of Philodemus' objection: "For if it is fitting that something artful be created in the *lexis*, then by Zeus it cannot be created without these (thoughts, arrangements, etc.). Rather it seems to me that the composition of the action is an essential part of the composition of the *lexis*."

Note that Philodemus does not refer to any generally accepted technical meaning of *poiema*. Instead he vehemently states his own opinion that a *poiema* cannot be composed without regard for the content it expresses. There is nothing startling or revolutionary about this; it is only a restatement of *to prepon*, that old *arete lexeos* which goes back at least as far as Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1408a). Why then does Philodemus reassert its so violently? Because it had been denied, and because the general notion of *poiema* as a series of words in poetic form apparently allowed such a denial. When Neoptolemus said, "... only the composition of the *lexis*, but not the thoughts, etc.," he possibly implied that the *poiema* could be composed or at least evaluated without consideration of its relation to the content expressed. More important, it is certain that other theoreticians had explicitly asserted that a *poiema* could be evaluated without concern for the content expressed.<sup>45</sup> Philodemus always opposed any suggestion or implication that poetic form could be judged apart from content. There is no reason to believe that Neoptolemus explicitly espoused the theory that the *poiema* could be evaluated apart from its content, but his statement left room for such an interpretation. This is the basis of Philodemus' objection.



According to our hypothesis, Philodemus would have found Neoptolemus' statements more palatable if the terms *ergon* and *hoion hyphe* had been used instead of *poiema* and *poiesis*. We stated our views concerning *hoion hyphe* above, and found that the term was associated with a general notion concerning the selection and arrangement of content. The association of *ergon* with *poiema* was not quite so general. In fact, a case can be made for stating that the term *ergon* represents a terminological distinction which was, so far as we know, peculiar to Philodemus.<sup>46</sup> What did Philodemus mean when he suggested that Neoptolemus use the term *ergon* instead of the term *poiema*? We have already quoted two texts which point the way to a solution. The first is Col. VII.23-29: "For anyone can (*dynatai*) take some irrational myth and plot and work it into poetic form (*exergasasthai poietikos*), and there have been poets of that sort." The other is Philodemus' suggested definition of poet: "the one who possesses the ability (*dynamis*) and works from it (*apo tautes ergazomenon*)" (Col. XI.17-20). This second passage is of particular interest since it occurs so near Philodemus' use of the term *ergon*. Neoptolemus' definition of poet read: "the one who possesses the poetic *techne* and *dynamis*." It has been noted that Philodemus' suggestion eliminates the offending term *techne*. He replaces it with the participle *ergazomenon*, whose relation to *ergon* is clear. But that is not all. Neoptolemus' definition placed *techne* and *dynamis* on an equal level. Philodemus, however, has made *ergazomenon* subordinate to *dynamis* by the addition of the words *apo tautes*. He was, therefore, of the opinion that *dynamis* is prior, comes first in the creative process.<sup>47</sup> We assert that *dynamis*, for Philodemus, meant that ability or talent having to do with content, i.e., the faculties of *ekloge* and *diathesis* of content. Note, for example, the use of *dynatai* in Col. VII.23-24 quoted above. Now, the exercise of this *dynamis* is prior to the *ergasia* of the poet. The poet, in Philodemus' view, begins with a mental construct of the content which is held in abeyance. With this construct in mind, the poet exercises his *ergasia*, i.e., he expresses this content in a series of words which have certain formal characteristics, of which one must be meter. This series of words is the *ergon* of the poet. At this point we may well ask: is not this *ergon* also a *poiema*? For we have said that a *poiema*, in its technical sense, was a series of words displaying certain formal characteristics of which one was meter. Philodemus, however, would say that an *ergon* is not a *poiema*. He knew that he was in an area of controversy, and hence the vehement nature of his opposition to Neoptolemus' statement concerning *poiema*. The *ergon* of a poet is a string of words exhibiting meter and other formal qualities. Philodemus refused to bestow the title *poiema*

upon such an *ergon* unless the language was appropriate to the content expressed. "For if it is fitting that something artful be created in the *lexis*, then, by Zeus, it cannot be created without these. Rather it seems to me that the composition of the action is an essential part of the composition of the *lexis*" (Col. XII.6-13). The poet should not perform his *ergasia* in a vacuum, but *apo tautes*, in accordance with and in subordination to the content he has conceived.

We can now reconstruct the hierarchy of Philodemus' poetic terminology. An *ergon* is a string of words in poetic form (in opposition to the general conception that this was a *poiema*). A *poiema* is an *ergon* which is appropriate to the content it expresses. If *ekloge* and *diathesis* have been exercised upon the content of a *poiema* in such a way that it displays certain characteristics of type and organization, the *poiema* is then also a *poiesis*. As we have said, these characteristics were matters of controversy. So far as we can tell, Philodemus demanded that the content should not be *alogos*, and presumably he agreed with everyone else in demanding unity in the organization. He may also have posited other requirements.<sup>48</sup>

Productive usage of the terms *poiema* and *poiesis* did not survive the Hellenistic Age. The difficulty lay not so much in *poiesis* as in *poiema*, a word which denoted poetic form in a way which was too specialized, too complicated, and too controversial for usefulness. It pointed the way toward a poetry which discounted content, toward a poetry which valued mere aural titillation. This was a goal which the main stream of classical criticism refused to approach. It is due to the text of Philodemus that we are aware of lesser schools in the intellectual welter of the Hellenistic period who were willing to push their definitions as far as they would go.

A related topic will form a fitting conclusion to this section. The central thesis of Rostagni's appreciation of Philodemus is the assertion that the inseparability of form and content was a major part of his poetic doctrine, i.e., that neither could be the object of consideration or judgment without due and simultaneous consideration of the other and of their reciprocal relation.<sup>49</sup> It is here submitted that Philodemus' actual view was not so far-reaching. It is one thing to say that content cannot be evaluated without regard for the form in which it is expressed. It is another to say that form cannot be evaluated without regard for the content it expresses. Philodemus was a vehement defender of the latter position, but he never asserted the former attitude. In Philodemus' view, form was subordinate to content; the opposite relation, however, did not hold true. For Philodemus, content taken in the sense of the selection and disposition of subject matter could be the object of separate consideration and was by

itself a legitimate object of intellectual judgment. This is implicit in his conception of *poiesis*. It is quite clear that poetic style or form had no such independent status, but his position here was no more than a particular and vehement reaffirmation of *to prepon*. He opposed any consideration of form apart from content, but he did not and could not have said that content should not be considered alone, for he himself isolated content and considered it alone in his conception of the *arete* of *poiesis*.

#### V. NEOPTOLEMUS AND HORACE

We begin and end with the statement of Porphyrio: "*In quem librum conguessit praecepta Neoptolemi τοῦ Παριανοῦ de arte poetica, non quidem omnia sed eminentissima.*" We began thus since the modern discussion of *poiema* and *poiesis* is incomprehensible without a consideration of this sentence, and we end with it since we do not wish to leave the impression that the sentence means nothing at all. To be sure we have concluded, in agreement with Dahlmann, that the testimony of Philodemus' text does not help us a bit so far as the problem of the *Dispositionsprinzip* of the *Ars Poetica* is concerned.<sup>50</sup> It is to be noted, however, that Porphyrio never claimed that Neoptolemus supplied the organizational principle of Horace's work. "In this book he has gathered the precepts of Neoptolemus of Parium, not indeed all of them, but the most outstanding." No one has quoted or discussed Porphyrio's next sentence: "*Primum praeceptum est περὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας.*" There is no break; the obvious meaning is that the first precept stated by Horace and taken from Neoptolemus is that concerning *akolouthia*. This word has not received much attention, although its approximate opposite, *anacoluthon*, is a well-known term. The notion involved is consequence or consistency. When a verb agrees syntactically with its subject, or an adjective with its noun, that is *akolouthia*. The scholiast goes on to explain just what he means, and it is also clear from the beginning of the *Ars Poetica* itself: A painter should not couple a horse's neck with a man's head. Such a combination lacks *akolouthia*. We have Porphyrio's word that Neoptolemus also said something of this sort, but we cannot go much further. The notion as developed at the beginning of the *Ars Poetica* is a negative one; it is a plea against excess. Compare lines 9-13:

'Pictoribus atque poetis  
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.'  
Scimus, et hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim;  
sed non ut placidis coeant immitia, non ut  
serpentes avibus gementur, tigribus agni.



It is safe to assume that Neoptolemus and Horace agree thus far. But when Horace pleads against excess in avoiding excess: *in vitium ducit culpa fuga, si caret arte* (*A.P.* 31), then we can no longer be sure that Neoptolemus agrees. Nevertheless, this negative aspect of Neoptolemus' teaching may be of some significance.

Thus far with the note of Porphyrio. Returning to the text of Philodemus, we can again be brief.<sup>51</sup> We are given Neoptolemus' definition of poet: "the one who possesses the poetic *techne* and *dynamis*." But *techne* and *dynamis* are equivalent to technique and talent. The Latin equivalents are *ars* and *ingenium* or *ars* and *natura*.<sup>52</sup> The question of the relative importance of *ars* and *natura* in poetry is an issue of long standing. Neoptolemus' definition of the poet employs these terms in a way which implies that he thought they were of equal importance. In fact, the word *techne* comes first. Compare *Ars Poetica* 408-11:

Natura fieret laudabile carmen an arte  
quaesitum est: ego nec studium sine divite vena  
nec rude quid prosit video ingenium alterius sic  
altera poscit opem res et conjurat amice.

D'Alton has discussed the problem of *ars* vs. *natura* at some length.<sup>53</sup> A possible conclusion is that Neoptolemus originated this middle position, perhaps with a slight emphasis on *ars*. Certainly, the earlier figures we hear about who dealt with the question, Pindar, Plato, and Democritus, all plump heavily for *natura*. Compare the following passage of the *Ars Poetica*:

Ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte  
credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas  
Democritus, bona pars non unguis ponere curat,  
non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat. (295-298)

Here, then, is a possible echo of Neoptolemus in Horace. There are others. Neoptolemus said: "that the perfect poet, in order to achieve perfection, must not only effect psychagogy but also benefit his hearers and give them good teachings" (*Col.* XIII.8-13). Compare *Ars Poetica* 333-34:

aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae  
aut simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae.

The echo of Neoptolemus is clear.

Porphyrio's statement, then, is not meaningless. Horace did adopt many of the precepts of Neoptolemus. It is clear that many aspects of Neoptolemus' theoretical position appealed to Horace. Both raised *ars*

to at least the level of *natura*. Both stressed the positive avoidance of error. Both felt that poetry should delight and give benefit.

The terms *poiema* and *poiesis* received a specialized and technical meaning in Hellenistic poetic theory. *Poiema* characterized a literary production that was poetic in form, *poiesis* was a literary production that was poetic in form and in content. It was a system of nomenclature that seemed simple and useful, but the essential notions of poetic form and of poetic content were subject to such controversy that the level of theoretical discussion had to be set at this point. As a result, *poiema* and *poiesis* as technical terms did not survive the period. Their use demanded a consensus of opinion that was not forthcoming.

The text of Philodemus is our most important source of information about the Hellenistic use of these terms. It is from this same text that one gains some idea of the theoretical wrangling that filled this period. It may well be that *poiema* and *poiesis* have assumed more importance in modern scholarship than they actually possessed in Hellenistic literary theory, but the labors of Jensen, Rostagni, and Dahlmann, aroused by this problem, have revealed much that was previously unknown. It need only be added that scholarship has barely scratched the surface. Philodemus' text still has much to tell us.

## NOTES

1. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to two great scholars. Professor Werner W. Jaeger directed me toward this field of inquiry, and it was my privilege to study for one year under Professor Augusto Rostagni. Even where our conclusions differ, my huge debt to the latter must surely be apparent.

2. The following abbreviations are used in the notes. Ardizzoni=Anthos Ardizzoni, *ΠΟΙΗΜΑ, Ricerche sulla teoria del linguaggio poetico nell'antichità* (Bari 1953). Dahlmann=Hellfried Dahlmann, "Varros Schrift 'de poematis' und die hellenistisch-römische Poetik," *AbhMainz, Geist. u. Sozial.Kl.* 1953, Nr. 3; my copy has a double pagination, 89-158 is used here. Jensen=Christian Jensen, *Philodemos über die Gedichte, fünftes Buch* (Berlin 1923). Jensen's Greek text is referred to by Column (Roman numeral) and line (Arabic numeral).

3. Jensen p. ix n.1.

4. Dahlmann 103f.

5. Eduard Norden, "Die Composition und Literaturgattung der horazischen Epistula ad Pisones," *Hermes* 40 (1905) 481-528. The historical background given here is drawn from this article, 481-83.

6. Norden (above, n. 5) 527.

7. Dahlmann 105ff. cites the early opposition of Börner.

8. See, for example, Jensen 104.

9. See Dahlmann 103f.; 103 n.2 contains valuable bibliographical references.
10. Dahlmann 111 n.2.
11. Dahlmann 101f.
12. Dahlmann 100, 104.
13. Dahlmann 105.
14. Pierre Boyancé, "A propos l'Art Poétique d'Horace," *RevPhil* 10 (1936) 20-36.
15. See citations in Dahlmann 112, 118.
16. Cf. Dahlmann 125-27.
17. Cf. Dahlmann 121 n.3.
18. Diog. Laert. 7.60.
19. Cited in Dahlmann 112.
20. Ioannes Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi* (Leipzig 1912).
21. All cited in Dahlmann 121.
22. Examples of this type of theorizing are given in Nathan Greenberg, "Metathesis as an Instrument in the Criticism of Poetry," *TAPA* 89 (1959).
23. The text could admit  $\phi\eta[\sigma\alpha]\iota[\tau]\epsilon$  here, but the general tenor of the passage and indeed of the whole work supports Jensen's reading. Besides, Philodemus has referred to himself in the first person plural in line 28. The second person plural is not used at all in the passage.
24. A sarcastic proverbial citation. Cf. Jensen 77n.
25. This final section of Papyrus 1525 (i.e., Jensen's text) is introduced by the words: "... we shall conclude this already lengthy work by refuting the opinions found in Zeno." It is generally agreed that the reference is to Philodemus' teacher, Zeno of Sidon, who seems to have compiled a handbook of poetic theories which Philodemus used as a source. Further, it is practically certain that Philodemus quoted these theories in a prior lost portion of Papyrus 1425, and that Papyrus 228, *HV*<sup>2</sup> (*Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt Collectio Altera*, Naples 1862-1876) 8.163-65, is a part of this lost portion. Cf. Jensen 94. See also Christian Jensen, "Aristoteles in der *Auge* des Machon," *RhM* 83 (1934) 193-200. The final columns of Papyrus 1425 have been treated extensively only by Pasquale Giuffrida, *L'epicureismo nella letteratura latina nel I secolo a. C.* Vol. 1: *Esame e ricostruzione delle fonti: Filodemo* (Turin 1940) 146-81, although Jensen established their text and translated them. Giuffrida (p. 146) is of the opinion that this last section is directed against various unnamed Stoics whose doctrines had no particular importance, and that since they presented no sustained theory, Philodemus was induced to express his own opinion rather than simply to attempt to show these theories contradictory within their own terms. This is indeed correct, but for the passage under discussion Giuffrida (pp. 174-76) fails to note that any distinction is drawn between *poïema* and *poiesis*.
26. See note 23 above.
27. Cf. Ardizzoni 18, 27, and Dahlmann 121 n.2.
28. The revised text of Christian Jensen, "Herakleides vom Pontos bei Philodem und Horaz," *SBBerlin* (1936) 310f. has been accepted here.
29. To my mind there is no doubt that the antecedent of *touton* (line 31) is *mython kai hypothesin* (line 25). The interpretation of Clemente Benvenega, "Per la critica e l'estetica di Filodemo," *RendNap* 26 (1951) 227, does violence to the meaning of *ekloge* (line 31).
30. For the meaning of *diathesis* see Ardizzoni 24f.



31. The most recent discussion concerning the identity of the opponent is by Benvenge (above, n. 29) 239 n.1. This paper does not attempt an investigation of the problem.

32. Cf. Col. XXIX. 17-19 (Jensen). The topic is abstruse and deserves a discussion of its own. See Augusto Rostagni, *Arte Poetica di Orazio* (Turin 1930) page c (100 of introduction), also Benvenge (above, n. 29) 250.

33. Augusto Rostagni, "Sulle tracce di un' estetica dell' intuizione presso gli antichi," *AeR* 1 (1920) 46-57; "Risonanze dell' estetica di Filodemo in Cicerone," *AeR* 3 (1922) 28-44; "Filodemo contro l'estetica classica," *RivFC* 1 (1923) 401-24 and 2 (1924) 1-28.

34. In particular, we are applying our modified version of Dahlmann's hypotheses. Dahlmann did not deal in detail with the text of Philodemus.

35. I have thought it best not to attempt a translation of *eidōs*, since its meaning is vague. See Dahlmann 119 n.2 as contrasted with Ardizzoni 11 n.4. The very vagueness of the term precludes basing any far-reaching hypothesis upon its exact significance. I might add that one cannot even tell from the text whether or not Neoptolemus himself used the word, despite the paraphrase of Mette in *RE* 16 (1935) 2468.

36. Jensen 153f.

37. This view is supported to some extent by the words *kathaper epenoesamen* (Col. XI. 4). Originally, Jensen believed that these words referred to Cols. I-VIII. Cf., e.g., Jensen 121. This view is now universally rejected. In 1936, Jensen himself rejected it in *op. cit.* (above, n. 28). Hence, the words must refer to a lost portion of the work. Cf. also note 25 above.

38. So also Dahlmann 104, but not for the same reasons.

39. See e.g., Ardizzoni 11.

40. Ardizzoni 13.

41. The text is quite secure. The reading δια[θέσει]ς (line 13) is convincingly defended by Ardizzoni 24 n.21. ἐπικαλεῖν (line 14), as Ardizzoni 17 n.10 points out, could be replaced indifferently by ὀνομάζειν, ἐπιλέγειν or νομίζειν.

42. Compare Ardizzoni 20: "... nella dottrina di Neottolemo *poiēsis* equivaleva ad *hypothesis*, cioè a 'contenuto', 'argomento'..." This interpretation allowed Ardizzoni to form his major (and highly questionable) hypothesis that the poetic theory of Neoptolemus was "un *unicum* nel campo degli studi intorno alla Poetica" (p. 30).

43. Rostagni in *RivFC* 2 (1924) 24 n.2. This view is supported by Boyancé (above, n. 14) 22, 29, and by Dahlmann 122 n.1. Another objection to Ardizzoni's hypothesis (see note 42 above) is that he is thereby forced to reject Rostagni's convincing demonstration. See Ardizzoni 19 n.13. Giuffrida (above, n. 25) 78 n.1 and Benvenge (above, n. 29) 243 n.1 also reject Rostagni's proof, but not convincingly.

44. Dahlmann 122.

45. See note 22 above.

46. See Ardizzoni 14 n.8. Discussing *ergasia*, he says: "Nel senso di 'esecuzione letteraria' è adoperato solo da Filodemo nel luogo in questione."

47. See the good discussion of Ardizzoni 14.

48. I believe that the text of Cols. XXII.34-XXIII.11 applies here, but adequate discussion would lead too far afield.

49. Rostagni's thesis has been minutely examined by Benvenge (above,

n. 29). It is a confirmation of our hypothesis that Benvenga has approached our basic position by a quite different route: ". . . Filodemo, invece, pone come primo fondamentale elemento di partenza il guidizio del contenuto" (251).

50. Dahlmann 136ff. makes a new attempt at the problem.

51. The evidence which follows has been discussed repeatedly, first by Jensen 100ff. The general conclusions are my own.

52. So also Ardizzoni 12.

53. J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism* (London 1931) 475.





## REPUBLICAN AUTHORS IN SERVIUS AND THE SCHOLIA DANIELIS

BY ROBERT B. LLOYD

THERE has been a great deal of scholarship on Servius and the Servius problem in the present century, and much of it has arisen from E. K. Rand's<sup>1</sup> suggestion that Donatus is the author of the Scholia Danielis (D), i.e., those additional scholia scattered in the text of the vulgate Servius (S) found by Pierre Daniel in certain anonymous manuscripts<sup>2</sup> and published in his edition of Vergil (1600). Daniel of course believed that his longer version (DS) was the true Servius and that the vulgate was an abridgement.

It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that scholars began to notice that the two parts of DS were really distinct.<sup>3</sup> The monumental work of G. Thilo<sup>4</sup> and E. Thomas<sup>5</sup> discerned two different sets of scholia too divergent to be by the same hand.<sup>6</sup> Both Thilo and Thomas recognized the true Servius in S, but they assumed that the additional scholia of D were the interpolations of a later hand. Thilo conjectured that DS was fashioned by an English scholar of about the seventh century.<sup>7</sup>

It was the work of K. Barwick<sup>8</sup> which led directly to the conclusion of Rand and others that D and the supposedly lost commentary on Vergil of Donatus should somehow be equated. Barwick saw in the D scholia a unity barring their appropriation from various sources by a late compiler. Rather, he postulated, D is the remnant of a single commentary, probably antedating S and in part at least a source for S.<sup>9</sup> Thilo's seventh century compiler then was not an originator but the conflator of two ancient commentaries on Vergil: the one being Servius and the other of unknown authorship but of a period probably between Donatus and Servius.

In closing the gap and assigning Donatus as the author of D, Rand elicited some very cogent arguments:

1. (Following Barwick) D must be older and obviously a source for S since so many comments in the latter seem to be simply excerpts from the former.<sup>10</sup>

2. (Also following Barwick) there are many coincidences between D and the extant Donatus commentary on Terence.

3. D bears the marks of just such a *variorum* edition as is announced in the extant dedicatory letter of the Donatus commentary.<sup>11</sup>

4. Donatus commented on the works of Vergil in the order *Bucolics*, *Georgics*, *Aeneid*. This is also the original order of D. S, however, differs in treating the works of Vergil in the order *Aeneid*, *Bucolics*, *Georgics*.

5. The existence of the Donatus commentary into the Middle Ages is known from a remark of the scholiast of the *Turonensis* manuscript of Vergil (on *Aen.* 1.179), who quotes both Servius and Donatus by name.<sup>12</sup>

6. In the *Liber Glossarum* there are at least three instances where material attributed to Donatus is to be found in D.

Although none of this evidence is conclusive in and of itself, it is highly suggestive, and most of the scholarship that has been expended upon the Servius problem since the appearance of Rand's article has more or less supported his view.<sup>13</sup> The careful work of Rand's students has proved less conclusive than they had hoped. G. B. Waldrop made a comparison of the notices in the Vergil commentary with notices in the extant Terence commentary by Donatus.<sup>14</sup> These only tended to substantiate an identical authorship. There were many instances of correspondence, although a few cases proved contradictory. These could be explained only by assuming a lapse of time between the composition of the two commentaries. A. H. Travis made a stylistic comparison of the Terence commentary and the Scholia Danielis.<sup>15</sup> He found them more divergent than he had expected, although we must wonder how much of the style of Donatus has been preserved in the Terence commentary, which has suffered extensive interpolation in transmission.<sup>16</sup> Thus, however, there was doubt that D had preserved the *ipsissima verba* of Donatus, although the notion that D reproduced Donatus in substance prevailed.

Two Italian scholars, in works appearing significantly enough in the same year as the initial volume of the Harvard Servius,<sup>17</sup> gave a new emphasis to Rand's position. Both A. Santoro<sup>18</sup> and N. Marinone,<sup>19</sup> after careful and extensive examination of parallels in Macrobius, Servius, and the Scholia Danielis, concluded that Donatus is indeed the immediate source of D. Santoro, in a monograph of the same year,<sup>20</sup> placed side by side passages from the text of Daniel and Macrobius<sup>21</sup> to show how comments begun in S and continued in D are reproduced in Macrobius as if from a single source. The source, he concluded, is Donatus whose words are preserved in the D scholia. We are promised a full discussion of the Servius question in the *prolegomena* of the Harvard edition which will appear in volume I, to be published last.<sup>22</sup> Since

volume III is yet to appear,<sup>23</sup> it seems likely that the conclusions of the *prolegomena* are a good many years off.

Most recently H. T. Rowell has successfully demonstrated that the references in the D scholia to the poet Naevius are clearly authored by Donatus.<sup>24</sup> It was in fact a remark of Professor Rowell which gave impetus to the present study some time ago,<sup>25</sup> for he had observed that all the references to Naevius in the Servian corpus were found in D, and wondered if this were an isolated instance or a general circumstance which might throw some light on the Servius question.

The present paper, then, is an examination of the quotations from authors of the period of the Republic in Servius and the D scholia.<sup>26</sup> Chief attention has been given to those authors whose works have survived only in fragmentary form, these quotations being the subject of Part I. Part II deals with the quotations from the extant authors Plautus and Terence, for what additional information they may provide. General conclusions are placed at the end, although some conclusions which are of a general nature are reached along the way at the point where they become most obvious. The most important of these are recapitulated at the end.

Of great help in compiling the references have been the index of E. L. Crum<sup>27</sup> and that of J. F. Mountford and J. T. Schultz.<sup>28</sup> The former is limited by being an index of proper names only and hence does not list unlabeled quotations. The latter, while very complete in this regard, contains some inaccuracies and omissions.<sup>29</sup> It is most helpful, however, in supplying parallel references to the Terence commentary of Donatus.

Quotations from the Servian corpus are for the most part from Thilo-Hagen since the Harvard Servius is available for *Aeneid* 1-2 only. Here it is understood that the parts which appear in italics are from the D scholia. When the Harvard Servius is used the unique scheme of that edition is reproduced,<sup>30</sup> i.e. (briefly), what is found in both S and DS is printed across the full width of the page; where these two differ or one is lacking, S is printed on the right side and DS on the left.

## I

For the sake of convenience the authors discussed here have been divided into five categories: (1) early epic poets and dramatists, (2) historians, (3) later epic poets and dramatists, (4) Lucilius and the minor poets, (5) grammarians. Assignment of authors to one or another of these groups is in some cases arbitrary, but in general each author is considered in the field where his chief fame rests; thus Cato, although his



writings were varied, is placed among the historians, and Varro, who because of the encyclopaedic nature of his works defies classification, has been treated with the grammarians.

#### EARLY EPIC POETS AND DRAMATISTS

In this group are Livius Andronicus, Naevius, Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius. The frequency of quotations from these authors can be most readily seen from the following scheme:

	<i>S</i>	<i>D</i>
Livius <sup>31</sup>	1	2
Naevius <sup>32</sup>	0	9
Ennius <sup>33</sup>	54	52
Pacuvius <sup>34</sup>	8	10
Accius <sup>35</sup>	1	13

It will be at once observed that *S* quotes repeatedly only from Ennius and Pacuvius, whereas *D* quotes rather freely from all except Livius Andronicus. When we examine these quotations in detail, even wider divergences between *S* and *D* are to be found.

The quotations from Ennius offer the largest sample, and so it is best to consider them first. As bona fide quotations the number in *S* should be reduced to forty-five and those in *D* to fifty. There are eight places in *S* where Ennius is only mentioned and not quoted.<sup>36</sup> A ninth locus quotes anonymously a fragment only doubtfully attributed to Ennius (*Aen.* 1.412). One instance in *D* does not quote Ennius directly (*Aen.* 1.273), and a second attributes to Cicero an Ennian phrase appearing twice in the *Tusculan Disputations*.<sup>37</sup> The ninety-eight remaining quotations, however, are enough to indicate that both *S* and *D* were comfortable quoting from Ennius. This is hardly a matter to inspire wonder when we consider Ennius' position in the history of Latin letters. The similarity between *S* and *D* disappears, however, when the methods and characteristics of each in making these quotations are examined.

First, on the question of length: there is but one instance in *S* of a quotation longer than a metrical line (*Aen.* 10.396). The most common length is a short phrase or even a single word. In *D*, on the other hand, there are eight instances of quotations over a line in length.<sup>38</sup> To be sure, the bulk of quotations in both *S* and *D* consists of those of about half a line, but the quotations in *D* range from a hemistich upwards, whereas the opposite is true in *S*. This can best be illustrated graphically:

<i>Length of quotation</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>D</i>
more than a line	1	8
full line	12 <sup>39</sup>	17
phrase	17	24
single word	15	1 <sup>40</sup>
	—	—
	45	50

The difference in the manner of citing is also most striking. Never is any information beyond the author's name given in S. This might be taken to indicate greater familiarity except for what we have just seen with regard to the length of quotations. In eleven instances in D, however, some further detail of source is given.<sup>41</sup> Sometimes author, work, and book are indicated: *Ennius Annalium septimo*. Again just author and work: *Ennius Annalibus*. Sometimes the *Annales* are understood: *apud Ennium in primo*. It is not just the *Annales* which are named. D also cites by name the *Iphigenia* and *Satura*.

The same features are apparent when we examine the quotations from Pacuvius. Nine of the ten references in D are direct quotations of about a line each. The tenth (*Aen.* 4.469) outlines the plot of the *Pentheus*. In S, on the other hand, there is only one verbal quotation of any length, and that is of an almost proverbial line: "Priamus si adesset, ipse eius commiseresceret."<sup>42</sup> Of the remaining seven in S, three are single-word quotations illustrating usage (in each case Ennius and Pacuvius are cited together),<sup>43</sup> and four involve brief mention of mythological elements found in the dramas of Pacuvius.<sup>44</sup> In method of citing, D alone in six instances gives the title of the work.<sup>45</sup> Plays thus named are: *Antiopa*, *Hermiona*, *Medus*, and *Teucer*.

S quotes only once from Accius and this in a rather roundabout way:

IT NIGRUM CAMPIS AGMEN *ut 'it portis iubare exorto.'* et est hemistichium Ennii de elephantis dictum, quod ante Accius est usus de Indis.

The point of the scholium is a borrowing by Vergil from Ennius. That Accius had previously done so is parenthetic. One wonders, if Vergil's borrowing had been exclusively from Accius, whether the fact would have been included by S. Again the quotations in D are typical. One gives in some detail the genealogy of the Atridae found in the *Atrous* (*Aen.* 8.130). The rest are quotations mostly of about a metrical line in length. In nine of the twelve instances the name of the play is given.<sup>46</sup> Named are: *Clytemestra*, *Deiphobus*, *Atrous*, *Bacchae*, *Troades*, *Pelops*, and *Philocteta*.

Livius Andronicus is cited only once in S (*Aen.* 10.636), a typical one-word quotation on form: "nam 'nubs' non dicimus, quod ait Livius Andronicus, qui primus edidit fabulam (Latinam) apud nos." Servius seems to refer to Livius with some caution, adding the explanatory phrase *qui primus edidit fabulam apud nos*. Of the two quotations in D, one cites the author and work (*Odyssey*) and a complete saturnian (*Aen.* 1.92). The second is somewhat problematical. Livius is cited as authority for the fact that the Carthaginians held triumphs. For this reason Morel has regarded it as a *fragmentum falsum* (Livius rerum scriptor?) in spite of D's clear identification *Andronicus*.<sup>47</sup>

Finally, as has been mentioned before, Naevius is not cited at all in S. D has nine references to him. Only four of these are actual quotations,<sup>48</sup> but the rest involve rather detailed information concerning the subject matter of the *Bellum Punicum*. This epic is mentioned four times by title;<sup>49</sup> twice reference is made to the very book. The quotations are generous. In two instances D quotes over two lines of Naevius' poem.<sup>50</sup>

The exclusion of Naevius and the near exclusion of Livius Andronicus and Accius by S is certainly of some significance. We need not conclude from this that Servius was himself unfamiliar with these authors, for it is quite likely that such an exclusion was intentional. If the commentary of Servius was written chiefly as a school edition, references to the less well known authors might well have been avoided.<sup>51</sup> The necessity which S felt to add an explanatory note to his one reference to Livius would reinforce this point.

The problem of why Servius virtually does not quote from Accius, while quoting several times from Pacuvius, is difficult, especially when we consider that as a tragic poet Accius' fame in later times seems to have surpassed that of his older contemporary.<sup>52</sup> The problem is to some extent resolved when we reconsider the direct quotations from Pacuvius in S and realize that they are practically limited to one-word grammatical illustrations where in each case but one Pacuvius' name is linked with Ennius. The joining of Pacuvius' name with that of his illustrious uncle may be responsible for his inclusion here.<sup>53</sup> It is worth recalling in this connection that in the single instance of a reference to Accius in S he likewise is linked with Ennius.

The general favoring of short quotations by S is also of some significance. It is obvious that the shorter the quotation the greater the probability that it is derived from a lexicon or gloss rather than the actual work of the author. This supposition is reinforced by the fact that the shorter quotations, particularly of the one-word variety, have to do almost exclusively with usage, gender, quantity, and such things as



would be treated in grammatical handbooks. We have seen, on the other hand, that there is a virtual absence of one-word quotations in D. From the sizable quotations and from the familiar way in which D handles detailed comparisons of mythology and expression in Vergil and the authors he cites, it would be attractive to say that the author of D always had a text of the source he quotes before him. This would be overstating the case, however, for even in D certain elements show the unmistakable influence of lexicons and glosses.

Here again it is most apparent in the briefer quotations. For example, the scholium on *Aen.* 4.267 in which D quotes from Naevius reads as follows:

*EXTRUIS a struice: Plautus in Menaechmis 'tantas struices concinnat patinarias.' Naevius nominativo singulari: 'struix malorum.'*

Under 'Struices' in Festus we read the following (Lindsay, p. 408):

STRUICES antiqui dicebant extructiones omnium rerum. Plautus: 'Cerialis cenas dat. ita mensas extruit, tantas struices concinnat patinarias.' Et Livius 'quo Castalia per struices saxeas lapsu accidit.'

It would appear that these are two extracts from a single source which quoted from Plautus, Naevius, and Livius to illustrate the usage of *struix*: certainly the *De Verborum Significatu* of Verrius Flaccus<sup>54</sup> of which Festus is the recognized epitome. D chose the Plautus and Naevius quotations; Festus chose those of Plautus and Livius. It is interesting that while the D scholium abbreviates the Plautus quotation it carefully preserves the title of the play.

We cannot then exclude D, or the original commentary which it represents, as a possible source for the brief notices of a lexicographical variety in S. We can only affirm that S strongly favors quotations of this type. If S found them in the commentary from which the D scholia are derived he either reduced many longer quotations to the one-word type, or he reproduced virtually all the quotations of this type, leaving few for the conflator of DS to reinsert.

It may be unjust, on the other hand, to cite isolated instances of what appear to be lexicon-derived quotations in D, unless we assume that the D scholia have reproduced the entire substance of the original commentary.<sup>55</sup> If, for example, we consider the single one-word quotation from Ennius in D (*Aen.* 12.657):

MUSSAT modo dubitat. et cunctatur rex ipse in quo summa rerum est. veteres 'mussat' pro 'timet,' Ennius 'mussare' pro 'tacere' posuit. Clodius Tuscus<sup>56</sup> 'mussare est ex Graeco, comprimere oculos: Graeci μῦσαι dicunt,'

we must understand that D gives a cursory mention to Ennius here because he has commented more fully before on his use of the verb *musso* (*Geo.* 4.188);<sup>57</sup>

*FIT SONITUS MUSSANTQUE ORAS* 'mussant' hic murmurant: quae vox ponitur et in tacendi significatione ut apud Ennium in XVII 'non possunt mussare boni, qui factam labore enixi militiam peperere,' interdum et pro dubitare, ut 'mussat rex ipse Latinus, quos generos vocet.' (*Aen.* 12.657) 'mussant' autem murmurant: Ennius in X sic ait 'aspectabat virtutem legionis sive spectans si mussaret dubitaretque denique causam pugnandi fieret aut duri laboris.'

Taken together, these notices provide a rather full account of *musso* and Ennius' use of it. The quotations are generous, if slightly garbled, and cite the book. This does not, however, preclude the use of a very comprehensive lexicon by the author of D. In the excerpt of Paulus s.v. (unfortunately Festus is not available), we read (Lindsay, p. 131):

MUSSARE murmurare. Ennius: "In occulto mussabat." Vulgo vero pro tacere dicitur, ut idem Ennius: "Non decet mussare bonos."

If the author of D did use the work of Verrius Flaccus at this juncture, however, he did not, in spite of the length of his comments, reproduce his source entirely (he does not quote Ennius: *In occulto mussabat*), nor is it likely that he used it exclusively (whence the obscure quotation from Clodius Tuscus?).

We must acknowledge the consistent superiority of D over S in making quotations from and references to these early poets and dramatists. The following points regarding this superiority can be summarized:

1. The D scholia quote frequently from the more obscure as well as the more renowned early writers. S quotes rarely if at all from the less well known authors.
2. The quotations in D are consistently more generous than those in S.
3. D frequently gives more information as to source than simply the author's name, i.e., title of work or even the book number. S never does.
4. S seems to favor short references of a lexicographical nature. Such notices, while not absent from D, are far less common.

This is entirely in conformity with our knowledge of the Servius commentary as one principally for school use and supplementary to Servius' career as a teacher and expositor of Vergil.<sup>58</sup> Certainly lengthy and precise quotations from obscure sources would have less point in such a commentary, and briefer notes on usage, gender, quantity, and the like would abound.<sup>59</sup> The character of D, on the other hand, is

obviously more scholarly. The D scholia reflect a commentary of a more technical nature designed for the use of mature scholars.

# HISTORIANS

Of all the Republican historians, S quotes only from Cato (thirty-one times) and, curiously enough, L. Cornelius Sisenna.<sup>60</sup> The list in D is more impressive:

Annales Maximi <sup>61</sup>	I
Fabius Pictor <sup>62</sup>	4
Cincius (Alimentus) <sup>63</sup>	2
Postumius Albinus	I ( <i>Aen.</i> 9.707 = <i>HRRel</i> fr. 3)
Cato	28
Cassius Hemina <sup>64</sup>	6
Fabius Maximus (Servilianus)	I ( <i>Aen.</i> 1.3 = <i>HRRel</i> fr. 1)
(Calpurnius) Piso <sup>65</sup>	2
(Cn.) Gellius <sup>66</sup>	2
Coelius (Antipater) <sup>67</sup>	7
(Sempronius) Asellio	I ( <i>Aen.</i> 12.121 = <i>HRRel</i> fr. 14)
(Aemilius) Scaurus	I ( <i>Ibid.</i> = <i>HRRel</i> fr. 6)
Lutatius (Catulus) <sup>68</sup>	2
Claudius Quadrigarius <sup>69</sup>	3
(Aelius) Tubero <sup>70</sup>	2
(Lucius ?) Saufeius <sup>71</sup>	I

The ample number of quotations from Cato in both S and D will provide a basis for comparison of method.<sup>72</sup> The comparison is most interesting, because here we have a decided departure from the observed practice of S. In about half the instances of quotations from Cato, S names the work: the *Origines* are mentioned twelve times; the *Libri Ad Filium*, twice; and there are two references to the orations as a whole. In one instance even the book is cited: "ait Cato in secundo originum libro." Obviously S here feels the need to distinguish among the works of the author. When we consider the diversity of Cato's literary efforts this is perhaps not surprising. One might immediately object that the works of Ennius are equally varied and nowhere among some forty-eight direct quotations does S name the work. The case of Ennius, however, must be recognized as quite different. In the Empire Ennius' fame rested squarely upon the *Annales*, and his other works became more and more the property of the specialist, whereas Cato's reputation never depended upon a single work, but he maintained a significance in at least



three fields: rhetoric<sup>73</sup> (the *Orations*); history (the *Origines*); and practical science (*Ad Filium* and *De Agricultura*),<sup>74</sup> all important areas of school instruction. Cato, moreover, had an historical significance in his own right. The almost playful familiarity of Roman schoolboys with Cato even in late antiquity seems clear enough from the *chria* preserved in Diomedes' *Ars Grammatica* (Keil, *GrammLat* 1.310):

Nom.: Marcus Porcius Cato dixit litterarum radices amaras esse, fructus iocundiores.

Gen.: Marci Porcii Catonis dictum fertur litterarum radices, etc.

The continued prominence of his works as educational materials gave significance to specific references by title in a commentary on the school level.

The general distinction of greater care on the part of D, however, still holds true for his quotations from Cato. A far greater number of works is cited by title in D. In addition to the *Origines* and the *Ad Filium*, the *De Re Militari*<sup>75</sup> and five specific orations are quoted: *De Suo Consulatu*, *De Achaeis*, *In Legem Vaconiam*, *In L. Furium de Aqua*, and *Ne Spolia Figerentur Nisi de Hoste Capta*.

With Cato as with other prose authors we find that verbatim quotations are somewhat rarer than with the poets. For example, Cato is most often cited on some point of legendary history or religious tradition, and thus his words are summarized or paraphrased rather than quoted directly. Here again, however, S and D differ: there is but a single verbal quotation in S (*Aen.* 1.6), while D quotes directly in some thirteen instances.<sup>76</sup>

A second apparent variation in the practice of S is found in the fact that he quotes from Sisenna, the only Republican historian cited by him beyond Cato himself. Stranger still is the fact that he is consulted on points of legendary history. Sisenna's history, which seems to have concentrated on times nearest his own (i.e., the period of Sulla), would have treated legendary materials but briefly in a prefatory manner.<sup>77</sup> We can hardly suppose that Sisenna appeared to S of greater renown as an historian than men like Cassius Hemina and Coelius Antipater.

Sisenna must have had a significance of a more particular nature which led S to include references to him. The answer probably lies in the fact that Sisenna's work was filled with strange archaisms<sup>78</sup> and thus became a mine of ancient usage for lexicographers and grammarians. This can quickly be demonstrated in Peter (*HRRel* 1<sup>2</sup>.276ff.), where we find that of the 143 fragments of his history 122 are preserved by Nonius Marcellus in his *De Compensiosa Doctrina*. They are cited purely for their grammatical and lexicographical interest. The work of Nonius, moreover,

has great significance for the point at hand, for it is a precise example of the type of grammatical handbook which was available for scholastic use in the fourth century. The relative importance of Sisenna can readily be seen from a comparison of the number of times each of the historians here discussed is cited by Nonius:<sup>79</sup>

Fabius Pictor	5
Cato	38
Cassius Hemina	14
Cn. Gellius	1 <i>dubium</i> <sup>80</sup>
Coelius Antipater <sup>81</sup>	12
Sempronius Asellio	2
Claudius Quadrigarius	27 (31) <sup>82</sup>
Cornelius Sisenna	128
Aelius Tubero	2

It is overwhelming that Sisenna should be quoted more than all the other historians of the Republic combined. It can hardly be attributed to a quirk of Nonius, since his work is known to have been largely dependent upon secondary sources.<sup>83</sup> The problem of why S chose to quote from Sisenna is certainly greatly alleviated by this comparison.

But the three references to Sisenna in S are *not* grammatical; as has been pointed out, Sisenna is cited as authority for points of legendary history. From this we can assume that the intermediate source of those quotations found in Nonius and those in S is not the same. A brief review of the manner in which Servius worked will provide a connection. Working with a much fuller and more scholarly commentary on Vergil before him (probably D, or rather the commentary which the D scholia represent), Servius appropriated what he would, often with minor changes in phrasing.<sup>84</sup> His problem was one of selection and abbreviation in keeping his commentary in tune with its purpose as a school text. This affected the quotations, as we have seen, by limiting them to those authors with whom his student readers had some familiarity and by favoring those of brevity having to do most often with points of usage, grammar, and so forth. Details of title and book were omitted unless they were of special significance. Thus he repeatedly included quotations from Cato, who was still playing an important role in the school curriculum. Thus, too, when he found quotations from Sisenna, who enjoyed a considerable vogue in the grammatical handbooks of the day, he included them, albeit in his source the quotations were historical rather than lexicographical. These historical quotations from Sisenna, relating to legendary history, imply a great deal about the scope of the

original commentary. The absence of any additional quotations from Sisenna in D raises again the question of how thoroughly even the D scholia preserve this unusual source.

There are, as a matter of fact, several instances among the quotations from the historians where by comparing S and D we can see S deliberately suppressing some detail of source, either an author's name or the title of his work. Sometimes an author's name is replaced by an expression like *alii dicunt*, as *Aen.* 12.603: "ET NODUM INFORMIS LETI alii dicunt [*Fabios Pictor dicit: Paris.* 7929] quod *Amata*, etc." Sometimes the name can be omitted with little alteration of the text, as *Aen.* 2.15:<sup>85</sup>

EQUUM de hoc equo varie in historiis dictum. ut enim Hyginus et Tubero dicunt, machinamentum bellicum fuit, etc.	EQUUM de hoc equo varia in historiis lecta sunt. ut Hyginus dicit, machinamentum bellicum fuit, etc.
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Here the name of the famous mythographer Hyginus has been retained while that of the annalist Tubero is dropped. Again, to omit the title of a work was still an easier task, as *Aen.* 3.711: "nam Cato eum [sc. Anchisen] in *originibus* ad Italiam venisse docet." These few instances are enough to indicate that the above analysis of Servius' procedure is substantially correct.

As a subscript to the historians should be added the few quotations from the Republican orators and jurists. Apart from three references to the speeches of the Gracchi in S (*Geo.* 2.288; *Aen.* 7.715; 11.301 = ORF<sup>2</sup> C. Sempronius Gracchus 69, 68, 14), they are all found in D. There is one quotation from Hortensius (*Aen.* 11.496) and three from the *De Triumpho Luculli* of Memmius (*Aen.* 1.161 bis; 4.261 = ORF<sup>2</sup> 4, 5, 6). Among the jurists only Trebatius Testa is quoted (*Geo.* 2.383; *Aen.* 11.316 = Bremer, *JAH* 1.405, fr. 6, 7). A *Lex Papiria* (sc. S. Papirius) *de Ritu Sacrorum* is mentioned on *Aen.* 12.836 (Bremer, p. 135).

#### LATER EPIC POETS AND DRAMATISTS

Neither S nor D abounds in quotations from this group, although the previously observed distinctions between the two commentaries persist. D quotes Turpilius (twice),<sup>86</sup> Titinius (twice),<sup>87</sup> Atta (three times),<sup>88</sup> Afranius (four times),<sup>89</sup> Hostius (twice)<sup>90</sup> and Varro Atacinus (three times).<sup>91</sup> Of these S quotes only Varro (three times).<sup>92</sup> Quotations from Varro of Atax are difficult both to assign and to appraise because of the possibility of confusion with the more illustrious M. Terentius Varro. He is cited specifically as Atacinus, however, once each in S (*Aen.*



10.396) and the D scholia (*Geo.* 3.176). D continues to make quotations here with some precision as to source. The work is named in slightly less than half the instances, and the normal length of quotation is about one line. One instance from Varro, however, involves seven lines, probably the longest citation from any Republican author in D (*Geo.* 1.375). S also is inclined to be generous in dealing with Varro: on *Ecl.* 1.65 he quotes over two lines, considerably more than his usual practice.

Most of the quotations from these poets involve points of grammar and usage, although some seem to indicate a considerable knowledge of the context of the passage cited. The background of one of the plays of Turpilius is given in some detail on *Aen.* 3.279, and the seven complete hexameters from Varro would suggest a certain familiarity with the text. The inevitable influence of lexicons and glosses, however, is felt in several instances involving usage. For example on *Aen.* 4.194 we read:<sup>93</sup>

*CUPIDINE* (*cupidinem*) *veteres inmoderatum amorem dicebant: Afranius [Ci]neraria 'alius est amor, alius cupido.'* [*idem in Omine*] '*amant sapientes, cupiunt ceteri.*' Plautus cum distinctione posuit '*cupidon te † cum sicut anne amor?*' quod intellegitur vehementer illam amare vel impatienter. ipse alibi '*quem Venus Cupidoque imperat, suadet amor*' dicendo '*imperat*' violentiam ostendit, '*suadet*' addendo moderationem significat.

The difficulties of the text need not concern us. It is clear that D quotes from Afranius and Plautus to illustrate the distinction between *cupido* and *amor*. That these quotations are derived from a lexicon seems certain when we find the same lines cited by Nonius (Lindsay, p. 681):

CUPIDO et AMOR idem significare videntur. et est diversitas. *cupido* enim inconsideratae est necessitatis, *amor* iudicii. Plautus Bacchidibus: '*Cupidon tecum † saevis anne Amor?*' idem in Curculione discrevit et vim eiusdem diversitatis expressit dicens: '*quod Venus Cupidoque imperat suadetque Amor.*' Afranius in Omine '*amabit sapiens, cupient ceteri.*'

The Afranius passage seems to have been somewhat proverbial. We find it quoted also by Apuleius (*Apol.* 12).

Again Afranius is cited in the D scholium on *Geo.* 3.175 along with Lucretius (1.326) to illustrate the usage of *vescus*. Nonius (Lindsay, p. 274f.) on the same point cites the identical passages of Vergil and Afranius and adds one of Lucilius. The much abbreviated excerpt of Festus by Paulus, s.v. (Lindsay, p. 506) quotes only the Lucretius passage, but this is enough to point back with some certainty to Verrius Flaccus as ultimate source for the whole series.

Still another group of quotations, including one from Atta, can be traced back to the Vergil commentary of Aemilius Asper. It appears in fullest form assigned to Asper in the *Scholia Veronensia* on *Ecl.* 7.33 where we find Cicero, the *Curculio* of Plautus (75ff.), the first book of Varro's *De Vita Populi Romani*, and the *Megalenses* of Atta cited on the usage of *sīnum*. The D scholia *ad loc.* reproduce only the quotations from Varro and Atta. Again Nonius (Lindsay, p. 877) cites the Varro and Vergil passages, and Priscian (*GrammLat* 2.262f.) the Varro, Vergil, and Plautus passages. Obviously these are all ultimately derived from the same source, although only the *Scholia Veronensia* mention Asper. We must wonder how fully this would have appeared in the original commentary which went back to Asper on this point.<sup>94</sup>

#### LUCILIUS AND THE MINOR POETS

This group is small, comprising Calvus, Cinna, and Cornificius in addition to Lucilius. Cinna and Cornificius are cited only once in D. He cites two lines from the *Smyrna* of Cinna (*Geo.* 1.288 = Morel, fr. 6) and an unidentified line of Cornificius (*Geo.* 1.55 = Morel, fr. 3). A comment on who Cinna was is demanded of S by the text of *Ecl.* 9.35, and we are told: "poeta optimus fuit, qui scripsit Smyrnam: quem libellum decem annos elimavit."

Lucilius is quoted eleven times by S<sup>95</sup> and in twenty-two additional places by D.<sup>96</sup> The name of Lucilius' work, the *Saturae*, is never mentioned but is frequently understood when the number of the book is given. As is usual with S, he is inclined not to mention more than the author's name. In only one instance does he mention the book number, and if we examine the text it would appear that his inclination was to omit it even here (*Aen.* 10.104): "ACCIPITE ERGO ANIMIS totus hic locus de primo Lucilii translatus est *libro* ubi inducuntur dii habere concilium, etc." We cannot, however, make too much of the suppression of the word *libro* by S. Had he been determined to omit reference to the book he could surely have written *de Lucilio* instead of *de primo Lucilii*. In view of his practice elsewhere, however (only once before, in Cato, have we seen him mention the precise book), the comparison of the texts of S and D is of interest. D, on the other hand, mentions the book in half the instances, quoting from books 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (in error, see Marx on 158), 12, 13, and 30.

The length of the quotations from Lucilius again bears out our observations on the distinction between the two commentaries. The D scholia quote usually a complete or nearly complete line or more: S seldom

quotes an entire line and often much less. The following table will show this comparison:

<i>Length of quotation</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>D</i>
more than a line	1	2
full line (or nearly)	1	11
short phrase	5	7
single word	3	1
paraphrase	1	1
	—	—
	11	22

In more than half the instances, then, D quotes a line or more. In three-quarters of the instances S quotes only a few words.

There are four quotations from Calvus in D.<sup>97</sup> They are of the usual type, of about a line in length, and in two instances the work (*Io*) is named. There is but one quotation in S (*Aen.* 2.632), taken from a secondary source, but it appears in a very important scholium to which there are significant additions by D. The implications of the passage have been clearly seen by Santoro:<sup>98</sup>

AC DUCENTE DEO secundum eos qui dicunt utriusque sexus participationem habere numina. nam Calvus in libro suo ait *pollentemque deum Venerem*. item Vergilius *nec dextrae erranti deus afuit*, cum aut Iuno fuerit aut Allecto. est etiam in Cypro simulacrum barbatae Veneris, corpore et veste muliebri, cum sceptro et natura virili, quod *Ἀφροδίτην* vocant, cui viri in veste muliebri, mulieres in virili veste sacrificant. quamquam veteres 'deum' pro 'magno numine' dicebant. Sallustius *ut tanta mutatio non sine deo videretur*.

This must be compared with Macrobius, *Sat.* 3.8.1:

... cum ille doctissime dixerit *ducente deo*, non *dea*. nam et apud Calvum Aterianus adfirmat legendum *pollentemque deum Venerem*, non *deam*. signum etiam eius est Cypri barbatum corpore sed veste muliebri, cum sceptro ac natura virili, et putant eandem marem ac feminam esse. Aristophanes eam *Ἀφροδίτην* appellat. Laevius etiam sic ait *Venerem igitur alium adorans, sive femina sive mas est, ita uti alma Noctiluca est*. Philochorus quoque in Atthide eandem adfirmat esse Lunam et ei sacrificium facere viros cum veste muliebri, mulieres cum virili, quod eadem et mas aestimatur et femina.



Significant here is the fact that Macrobius has reproduced a comment, part of which is found in S and part in D, continuously as if from a single source. The relationship of these two passages will bear looking at in some detail. All told there are six elements involved in these comments taken together, in addition to the reference to *Aen.* 2.632, which of course is the point of departure:

- (I) the quotation from Calvus;
- (II) the quotation from Vergil (*Aen.* 7.498);
- (III) the male-female image on Cyprus, called *Aphroditos* by Aristophanes;
- (IV) the quotation from Laevius to show that Venus is regarded as male and female, as is Noctiluca;
- (v) the quotation from Philochorus to show that Luna is likewise a male-female deity and is sacrificed to in transvestite garb;
- (vi) the quotation from Sallust.

S contains I, II, and part of III (the existence of the Cypriote statue). D contains more of III (without naming Aristophanes), skips to the end of v to pick up the item about worship in transvestite clothes, and then records vi. Macrobius contains I (giving Aterianus<sup>99</sup> as source), III, IV, and v. The fact that both S and D taken individually have elements which Macrobius does not, and that Macrobius has elements which S and D combined do not, shows clearly that the relationship between Macrobius and the Servian corpus is not one of interdependence but of common source. Santoro concludes that this source is Donatus and that this commentator's words are preserved in the D scholia.

Be that as it may, it is well to observe that a comparison of these passages also demonstrates as fact a point which has up to now been stated only hypothetically: not even do the Scholia Danielis reproduce this source in its entirety. The compiler of DS, then, added some but not all of the source commentary to S. Moreover, as we can see in the instance at hand, this has not always been done without some resultant confusion. In D the worship in transvestite costume has been attributed to the goddess as *Aphroditos* at Cyprus rather than as Luna (in Attica ?) as it appeared in the source.<sup>100</sup>

#### GRAMMARIANS

Aelius Stilo, Servius Clodius, Cornelius Epicadus, Ateius Philologus, Nigidius Figulus, and M. Terentius Varro make up this group. The first three are cited only in the D scholia. There is only one reference to Stilo (*Geo.* 1.75 = *GrammRomFrag* 5) and Epicadus (*Aen.* 1.649 = *ibid.*, test. 6).

The source of the latter is given as Varro, and it is likely that quotations from all three stem from that source. Servius Clodius<sup>101</sup> is quoted four times.<sup>102</sup> He is referred to as Clodius or Clodius Scriba and each instance includes the title, the *Commentarii*, with one reference to the fourth book. The cognomen *Scriba* for Clodius is found only in these scholia. It may go back to a formula of Varro, *Clodius scribit*,<sup>103</sup> which would again point to Varro as an ultimate source.

There are three quotations from Ateius Philologus: two in S (*Aen.* 1. 601; 5.45 = *GrammRomFrag* 5 and 12); and one in D (*Aen.* 1.273 = *ibid.* 14; *HRRel* 2.41). There is no reason to doubt Funaioli's fragments 12 and 14 simply because the distinguishing cognomen 'Philologus' is absent. The unquestioned fragment 5 and fragment 12 deal with similar vocabulary distinctions; and fragment 14 sounds like the sort of history a grammarian would write, and we know from Suetonius (*Gram.* 10) that Philologus wrote such a work.

Of thirteen quotations from Nigidius Figulus eleven are in D.<sup>104</sup> The two references to him in S appear under the same lemma (*Aen.* 10.175 = Swoboda, fr. 79). Actually there is only one quotation: "et notandum quod ait Nigidius Figulus, has artes ita inter sese esse coniunctas, ut alterum sine altero esse non possit; etc." At the end of the scholium we get an explanation of who Nigidius was: "Nigidius autem solus est post Varronem,<sup>105</sup> licet Varro praecellat in theologia, hic in communibus litteris: nam uterque utrumque scripserunt." It is as if Servius, knowing this was an isolated reference to Nigidius, bothered to insert a clarifying note. We have seen him do this same thing before in the case of single references to Livius Andronicus (above, p. 296) and Cinna (above, p. 304). Nigidius' popularity for all but the specialist had already waned by Gellius' day.<sup>106</sup>

Nigidius, as we might expect, is cited more familiarly as well as more frequently in D. Eight of the eleven quotations mention the work by title, quoting the *De Diis*, *Sphaerae Graecanicae*, *Sphaerae Barbaricae*, *Commentarius Grammaticalis*, *De Animalibus*, *De Hominum Naturalibus*, *De Terris* (?).<sup>107</sup> Of the three places where D does not name the work, in one it can be shown that the original commentary took it from a secondary source which did not have these details; and in another it can be demonstrated that the original commentary did name the book not mentioned in the D scholia.

In D on *Geo.* 1.260 the quotation appears as follows:

*Aulus Gellius: mature veluti celeriter dicimus. Nigidius mature fieri, quod neque cito, neque tarde fiat: quod hinc debet intellegi, quia poma, quae neque acerba sint neque putrida, matura dicuntur.*

In Gellius, the named source, we find the following (NA 10.11.1ff.):

‘Mature’ nunc significat ‘propere’ et ‘cito’ contra ipsius verbi sententiam; aliud enim est ‘mature’ quam dicitur. Propterea P. Nigidius, homo in omnium bonarum artium disciplinis egregius, ‘mature,’ inquit, *est quod neque citius est neque serius, sed medium quiddam et temperatum est.*

Bene atque proprie P. Nigidius. Nam et in frugibus et in pomis ‘matura’ dicuntur, quae neque cruda et inmitia sunt neque caduca et decocta, sed tempore suo adulta maturataque, etc.

It will be noted that D’s source does not mention the title of Nigidius’ work. Also significant, however, is the extent to which the information which Gellius offers has been condensed and to a certain degree confused, for what appears to have been Gellius’ own comment, the reference to the terminology used of fruit, would appear from the D scholia to belong to Nigidius. Whether this is rightfully Gellius’ own comment need not concern us here. Gellius is clearly D’s source, and he closes his quotation from Nigidius with the words *bene atque proprie P. Nigidius.*

One wonders if this and other confusions in the D scholium at hand<sup>108</sup> are not the result of overcompression of the original commentary from which it is derived. Macrobius, who as we have seen (p. 306) worked with this same source commentary before him, seems to have transported virtually the whole of Gellius’ chapter on *mature* to his *Saturnalia* (6.8.8ff.) with no such confusion. He nowhere mentions Gellius, as the D scholium carefully does. Now it has long been assumed that Macrobius lifted this and many other passages practically verbatim from Gellius<sup>109</sup> and it would be hazardous to suggest otherwise,<sup>110</sup> but it is also thoroughly recognized that there are occasional, but decided, departures from Gellius’ text, enough to show that he used a parallel source offering information not found in Gellius.<sup>111</sup> Both Linke and Wissowa describe this source as some commentary or other on Vergil. We now can see that that commentary was also the prime source for S, of which we have considerable remains in the D scholia, a point which is reinforced by the fact that the departures from the text of Gellius in Macrobius can often be related to passages in the Servian corpus.<sup>112</sup>

In a second quotation from Nigidius we can affirm with certainty that this original commentary contained a detail of source not mentioned in D. On *Aen.* 1.378 the D scholium concerning the Penates reads in part as follows:

nam alii, ut Nigidius et Labeo, deos penates Aeneae Neptunum et Apollinem tradunt, quorum mentio fit



*taurum Neptuno, taurum tibi, pulcher  
Apollo.* Varro, etc.

The whole of the scholium again is paralleled in Macrobius (*Sat.* 3.4.6ff.), from which the pertinent segment is:

Nigidius enim De Dis Libro Nono Decimo requirit num di Penates sint Troianorum Apollo et Neptunus, qui muros eis fecisse dicuntur et num eos in Italiam Aeneas advexerit. Cornelius quoque Labeo de dis Penatibus eadem existimat. hanc opinionem sequitur Maro cum dicit:

sic fatus meritos aris mactabat honores  
taurum Neptuno, taurum tibi, pulcher Apollo.

Varro, etc.

We need not here be concerned with whether the substance of these passages is ultimately derived entirely from Labeo or not.<sup>113</sup> What is significant is that here again we can see Macrobius and the D scholia working from their mutual source, which Wessner argues with some cogency must at this juncture be Donatus.<sup>114</sup> Whether we are ready to accept this or not, it is important to note that D in omitting, among other things, reference to the work and book of Nigidius has not reproduced this source in its entirety. It is thus clear that the original commentary was a fuller one than is represented by S and D combined and, moreover, just as D is more precise and complete about quotations than S, so the source commentary was more precise still.

The quotations from the great Roman polymath Varro present many difficulties, not the least of which is the lack of a definitive edition to furnish a common basis for citing.<sup>115</sup> The great number of Varro's works,<sup>116</sup> combined with the overlapping of subject matter and the author's discursive style, makes the assignment of unlabeled quotations to specific works virtually impossible. Moreover, his works are far and away the most often cited here of the lost literature of the Republic: there are eighty-seven references in S<sup>117</sup> and 101 in D.<sup>118</sup> We have, then, discreetly avoided making such assignments and, for want of a better classification, will discuss the numerous quotations from Varro in two groups: those which are assigned to particular works by S and D, and those cited simply with the name of Varro.

Immediately to be observed is the fact that here S frequently cites the title of the work, a practice which we have seen him use before only in the case of Cato, and in a few instances he even refers to the precise book,<sup>119</sup> an isolated phenomenon among those quotations we have thus far examined in S.<sup>120</sup> S quotes the work by name with some regularity,

citing the *Res Divinae*<sup>121</sup> (see note 119 and *Geo.* 1.315; *Aen.* 10.894<sup>122</sup>); *Logistorici* (*Aen.* 5.80; 11.97); *De Lingua Latina* (as *Ad Ciceronem*: *Aen.* 5.409); *De Re Rustica* (see note 119 and *Geo.* 1.43); *Aetia* (*Ecl.* 8.29; *Aen.* 1.408; 8.128); *De Gente Populi Romani* (*Geo.* 3.18; *Aen.* 6.760; 7.176, 657; 9.600); *De Familiis Troianis* (*Aen.* 5.704); *De Gradibus* (*Aen.* 5.412).<sup>123</sup>

There are many reasons why Servius would be inclined to make reference to the title of Varro's works. Their almost phenomenal number and variety make some further identification to the point. That Varro's works continued to enjoy a wide popularity in later antiquity is amply evidenced by the dependence of such authors as Tertullian, Censorinus, Lactantius, and Augustine upon them<sup>124</sup> — not merely for the incidentals which were available from secondary sources, but for the very essence of their writings. The works of Varro, certain ones at least, had a wide circulation in the late Empire; his fame was greater perhaps than that of any other prose author of the Republic, save Cicero. Indeed it is extraordinary that his writings have suffered such nearly complete loss.

It is of significance to note in this respect that, of the eight works to which we find specific reference in S, three were Augustine's prime sources:<sup>125</sup> the *Antiquitates*, especially the *Res Divinae*; the *Logistorici*; and the *De Gente Populi Romani*. Two more are the extant *De Re Rustica* and partially extant *De Lingua Latina*. The implication seems clear that by the fourth century certain works of Varro were being singled out for continued popularity and others were falling into neglect. Any statement that S cited only the more popular works of Varro would seem refuted by the appearance of isolated references to the *De Familiis Troianis* and *De Gradibus*. This may be deceptive, however, for the former is probably to be closely associated with the popular *De Gente Populi Romani*,<sup>126</sup> and the latter perhaps formed part of a better known work (see above, note 123).

The *Aetia* was of special interest in at least two respects: (1) it was a Roman adaptation following the principle of the *Αἴτια* of Callimachus; (2) it was probably a source for Plutarch's *Αἴτια Ῥωμαϊκά*.<sup>127</sup> Servius' interest is obviously the first, as he himself indicates on *Aen.* 1.408. Moreover, we read in Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 5.8.50) that Euphorion and Callimachus' *Ibis* and *Aetia*, as well as the *Alexandra* of Lycophron, served as *γυμνάσιον εἰς ἐξήγησιν* for the sons of grammarians.<sup>128</sup> It would seem, then, that these authors played an active part in the grammatical schools, at least at Alexandria. That Servius is reflecting this tradition seems clear not only from his references to the *Aetia* of

Callimachus,<sup>129</sup> but his frequent citing of Euphorion as well, including one reference to them together.<sup>130</sup> Again Euphorion's Roman adaptor Gallus is repeatedly mentioned with him in S (*Ecl.* 6.72; 10.1 and 50) so that we detect here a study of Greek and Roman literary counterparts as units, or perhaps more accurately a knowledge of the Greek originals largely through their Roman imitators.

The superiority of the D scholia in making quotations from Varro, however, is still manifest. Of the *Libri Antiquitates* D cites both the *Res Humanae* and the *Res Divinae*.<sup>131</sup> The former, as was mentioned, is not cited at all by S, and even in D we can see interest waning, for whereas the *Res Divinae* are in each instance but one referred to by specific book, there is with one exception no specific mention of the book of the *Res Humanae*.<sup>132</sup> The *De Lingua Latina* is cited both by that title and *Ad Ciceronem* six times,<sup>133</sup> twice by book number. In the case of the *Logistorici* and the *Menippean Satires* reference is always made to the title of the individual book, i.e., for the former: *De Pudicitia* (*Aen.* 4.45), *De Saeculis* (*Aen.* 8.526), *Calenus* (*Aen.* 9.52), *Scaurus* (*Geo.* 1.19), *Admirabilium* (= *De Admirandis?* *Geo.* 3.133); and for the latter: *Age Modo* (*Geo.* 2.168), *De Salute* (*ibid.* 336), *Cynistor* (*ibid.* 478). In addition the following titles are cited in D: *De Vita Populi Romani* (*Ecl.* 7.33; *Aen.* 1.727), *De Scaenicis Originibus* (*Geo.* 1.19), *Epistolicae Quaestiones* (*Geo.* 1.43) and *De Ora Maritima* (*Aen.* 1.108, 112; 5.19; 8.710).

Again in the matter of verbatim quotations S and D are distinct. Of all the instances in S where the work is cited by title, only one (*Aen.* 1.408) is a verbal quotation. The quotations in D listed above, however, involve twenty-one instances where the actual words of Varro are reproduced.<sup>134</sup>

Thus far we have discussed only those quotations from Varro which are assigned by S or D to a specific work. The unassigned quotations constitute by far the larger group: these number some sixty-six in S and sixty-four in D. In making these references S and D would seem on the surface to be most similar. They are mostly narrative in style and seldom quote directly, but rather paraphrase. Varro is appealed to as an authority in three general fields: (1) religion, (2) grammatical questions, (3) history, including legend, geography, and social customs. These references are roughly equal in both commentaries, except that S refers to Varro a bit less on religious matters (odd, considering his careful citing of the *Res Divinae*), and D, a bit less on grammatical points. These break down into 15 religious, 24 grammatical, and 22 historical in S<sup>135</sup> and 22 religious, 16 grammatical, and 22 historical in D.<sup>136</sup> There are a few quotations in S and D having to do with agricultural topics, few of which can be related to specific passages in the *De Re Rustica*,<sup>137</sup> and two



references in S which belong to none of these classifications: *Aen.* 5.295 (the five ages of man), *Aen.* 6.733 (the four passions).

Despite many similarities in the Varro quotations in the two commentaries, it is obvious that the D scholia consistently preserve their common source with greater accuracy. This can be seen in many places. It is particularly apparent on *Aen.* 1.277, where D contains much of the reference to Varro which S does not. The comment concerns the sacred taboo on the secret name of Rome:<sup>138</sup>

urbis enim illius [i.e. Romae] verum nomen nemo vel in sacris enuntiat.

denique tribunus plebei quidam, Valerius Soranus, ut ait Varro et multi alii, quia hoc nomen ausus est enuntiare, ut quidam dicunt, raptus a senatu et in crucem levatus est, ut alii, metu supplicii fugit et in Sicilia comprehensus a praetore praecepto senatus occisus est. hoc autem urbis nomen ne Hyginus quidem, cum de situ urbis loqueretur, expressit.

denique tribunus plebei quidam, ut ait Varro, hoc nomen ausus enuntiare, in crucem levatus est; quod ne Hyginus quidem, cum de situ urbis loqueretur, expressit.

We see here how much S has omitted: the name of the certain culprit, the alternate version of his flight to Sicily, and the fact that the story is derived from various authorities. These authorities are not named by D, but we must wonder if the *multi alii . . . ut quidam . . . ut alii* do not conceal some actual names in the original commentary. Similar instances of shortening the reference to Varro by S can be seen on *Geo.* 1.166 and *Aen.* 1.532. In the former a verbal quotation has been suppressed.

Parallels with Macrobius again lead us inevitably to the common source of S and D. For instance, in the *Saturnalia* 3.4.7ff., immediately following the quotations from Nigidius and Labeo quoted above (p. 309), we read:

Varro Humanarum secundo Dardanum refert deos Penates ex Samothrace in Phrygiam, et Aeneam ex Phrygia in Italiam detulisse. qui sint autem di Penates in libro quidem memorato Varro non exprimit, sed qui diligentius eruunt veritatem Penates esse dixerunt, per quos penitus spiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos rationem animi possidemus: esse autem medium aethera Iovem, Iunonem vero imum aera cum terra et Minervam summum aetheris cacumen: et argumento utuntur, quod Tarquinius, Demarati Corinthii filius Samothracicis religionibus mystice imbutus, uno templo ac sub eodem tecto numina memorata coniunxit.

Cassius vero Hemina dicit Samothraces deos eosdemque Romanorum Penates proprie dici θεοὺς μεγάλους, θεοὺς χρηστούς, θεοὺς δυνατούς. noster haec sciens ait *cum sociis natoque Penatibus et magnis dis.* etc.

The D scholium on *Aen.* 1.378, after the same reference to Nigidius and Labeo, reads as follows:

Varro deos penates quaedam sigilla lignea vel marmorea ab Aenea in Italiam dicit advecta, cuius rei ita Vergilius meminit [citatur *Aen.* 3.148ff.] . . . idem Varro hos deos Dardanum ex Samothraca in Phrygiam, de Phrygia Aenean in Italiam memorat portavisse. alii autem, ut Cassius Hemina, dicunt deos penates ex Samothraca appellatos θεοὺς μεγάλους, θεοὺς δυνατούς, θεοὺς χρηστούς. quorum diversis locis ita meminit *natoque penatibus et magnis dis.*

The passages in Macrobius which seem to be left out by D appear in other places in the D scholia. The precise reference to the *Res Humanae*, for example, occurs on *Aen.* 3.148. The passage running from *per quos penitus spiramus* through the story of Tarquinius and beyond appears on *Aen.* 2.296, and further parallels can be found on *Aen.* 2.325, 3.12, etc. These are our most important sources for the nature of the Penates, a vexed question even in antiquity; to discuss them properly would itself require a monograph.<sup>139</sup>

What is germane here, however, is that once again we find Macrobius and D dependent upon the same Vergil commentary. In this case it is D (if we take his scattered comments as a whole) who has reproduced the source more completely. Macrobius, for example, does not mention the *sigilla lignea* and seems unaware of what is recorded by both S and D (*Aen.* 3.12), although not without considerable confusion — that Varro commented at some length on who the Penates were.<sup>140</sup> Similar parallels with Macrobius involving quotations from Varro are found on *Aen.* 2.225 (= *Sat.* 3.4.2); *Aen.* 4.219 (= *Sat.* 3.2.8); *Aen.* 8.276 (= *Sat.* 3.12.3); *Aen.* 8.363 (= *Sat.* 3.6.10). As has been mentioned above (p. 309), Wessner regards these parallels in *Saturnalia* 3 as doubtlessly derived from Donatus' commentary.

## II

Before coming to any general conclusions it will be best to check the quotations in the Servian corpus from two extant authors: Plautus and Terence. They have not been chosen at random or because they are chronologically first, but rather because, being representatives of a similar age and genre, they may more reasonably be compared. There is the additional factor that Donatus, who has figured so prominently in the question of authorship of the D scholia, was an exegete of Terence as well as of Vergil.

## PLAUTUS

The plays of Plautus are cited with great frequency. There are forty-seven references in S<sup>141</sup> and an additional seventy-three in D.<sup>142</sup> The quotations in both commentaries are for the most part from the Varronian twenty-one,<sup>143</sup> with one known exception, the *Addictus*, cited by D.<sup>144</sup> We find there are quotations from, or references to, the following plays:

<i>Servius</i>		<i>D Scholia</i>	
Amphitryo	(4)	Amphitryo	(7)
Asinaria	(1)	Asinaria	(3)
Aulularia	(5)	Aulularia	(4)
Bacchides	(3)	Bacchides	(8)
		Captivi	(2)
		Casina	(4)
		[Cistellaria	(2)] <sup>145</sup>
Curculio	(1)	Curculio	(3)
		Epidicus	(2)
Menaechmi	(1)	Menaechmi	(4)
		Mercator	(3)
Miles	(7)	Miles	(10)
Mostellaria	(6)	Mostellaria	(4)
Persa	(1)	Persa	(2)
Poenulus	(2)	Poenulus	(1)
Pseudolus	(4)	Pseudolus	(7)
		Rudens	(1)
		Trinummus	(1)
		Truculentus	(2)
Vidularia	(1 ?) <sup>146</sup>		



In the case of these extant plays, of course, quotations of any length can usually be assigned to their proper source. When we examine the actual methods employed by S and D, however, we will see how divergent they are, a divergence which continues to support the observations made in Part I. In S the title of the play accompanies the quotation in only eleven instances, and only seven plays are named: *Amphitryo* (*Aen.* 4.229; 8.564), *Asinaria* (*Aen.* 9.645), *Bacchides* (*Aen.* 2.13; 6.383), *Miles* (*Aen.* 12.87; as *Pyrgopolynices*: *Aen.* 4.149; 12.7),<sup>147</sup> *Mostellaria* (*Aen.* 5.112), *Poenulus* (*Aen.* 8.724), *Pseudolus* (*Aen.* 1.140). In the D scholia, on the other hand, forty-five instances, well over half the total, give the title of the play: *Amphitryo* (*Geo.* 1.208; *Aen.* 1.191, 268; 2.206; 8.127), *Asinaria* (*Aen.* 11.361), *Aulularia* (*Geo.* 1.189; 2.193; *Aen.* 3.46), *Bacchides* (*Ecl.* 8.71; *Aen.* 10.493; 12.7), *Captivi* (*Geo.* 4.376), *Casina* (*Geo.* 3.222; *Aen.* 1.543), *Curculio* (*Aen.* 4.424, 608), *Epidicus* (*Aen.* 11.160), *Menaechmi* (*Geo.* 1.137; *Aen.* 4.267, 373; 8.632), *Mercator* (*Geo.* 1.266; *Aen.* 1.636), *Miles* (*Ecl.* 5.58; 9.21; *Geo.* 2. 134, 393; *Aen.* 1.233, 543; 4.608), *Mostellaria* (*Aen.* 9.693; 10.231), *Persa* (*Ecl.* 5.58), *Poenulus* (*Aen.* 1.16),<sup>148</sup> *Pseudolus* (*Aen.* 1.378; 4.301; 9.484 bis, 614; 10.231, 727), and *Rudens* (*Geo.* 2.348), in addition to the lost *Addictus*.

The tendency of S to suppress details of source is clearly seen in two additional places where the title of the play, carefully recorded in D, has been dropped by S: *Geo.* 1.344 (*Aulularia*); *Aen.* 9.4 (*Mostellaria*). There are, moreover, two quotations from Plautus in S cited anonymously: *Aen.* 7.88; 11.65.

Again when we examine the length of the passages quoted from Plautus we find S and D following the same pattern noted in connection with Ennius and Lucilius in Part I. The usual length of the quotations in both commentaries runs from a half to a full line, but those in S vary from this toward the shorter, whereas those in D range upward from this norm. This can be seen from the following table:

<i>Length of Quotation</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>D</i>
more than a line	1	10
full line	12	34
less than a line	11	17
phrase	10	11
single word	7	0
reference only	6	1
	—	—
	47	73

There is, however, no variation between the two commentaries in the object of their citations from Plautus. Their quotations have to do almost exclusively with usage.

In the present case, where a large number of the works cited is extant, there is the additional difficult problem of the accuracy of the quotations. There are many obstacles which make the task formidable. In the case of two equally good readings, which is to be preferred, that of the Vergilian scholiast or the Plautine manuscript tradition? Are divergences from the extant text due to inaccuracy on the part of the author of the scholium or to faulty transmission? Are some variations intentional, to stress the point of usage being illustrated? Does the commentator mean to quote or simply paraphrase? Granting that these difficulties may at times obscure the details, nevertheless the variation between S and D on the question of accurate quotation from Plautus is demonstrably so great as to allow us to reach some safe conclusions.

In S we have a total of twenty-nine quotations to compare with the extant text.<sup>149</sup> Of these only nine do not differ from the Plautine manuscripts.<sup>150</sup> These are all very short quotations of one or two words; only two are as much as half a line in length. An additional five are not far from the extant text,<sup>151</sup> but the remaining fifteen are very free and can only be attributed to the carelessness of the commentator.<sup>152</sup> They are too far from the text for their divergences to be explained as mechanical errors. For example, *Am.* 719: "So. verum non est puero grvida. Am. quid igitur? So. insania," is quoted (*Aen.* 4.229): "sic Plautus in Amphitruone, 'uxor tua non puero sed peste grvida est.'" Sometimes the variation is so great that, even though the play is named, the passage is difficult to identify. For example, *Aen.* 1.140: "de Pseudolo Plauti translatur est ubi ait, 'nisi forte carcerem aliquando effregistis vestram domum,'" possibly refers to line 1172: "an etiam umquam ille expugnavit carcerem, patriam tuam?" There is one instance which is perhaps attributable to a scribal error. *Most.* 46: *tu tibi istos habeas turtures* is quoted (*Ecl.* 1.58): *tibi obustos turtures*.<sup>153</sup>

The quotations in D present quite a different picture. There are sixty-one quotations which can be compared with the extant text.<sup>154</sup> Of these, twenty-seven correspond precisely,<sup>155</sup> and there are twenty-seven additional places which present variations of a most minor sort, any one of which could be due to faulty transmission rather than slips of the commentator. Some amount to nothing more than a difference in word order, like *natalem hunc mihi diem scitis esse* (*Aen.* 9.641) for *natalem scitis mi esse diem hunc* (*Ps.* 179).<sup>156</sup> Some involve a small change of the number or case of a noun, or the person or tense of a verb, like *ut me*

*deponas vino, eam affectas viam* (Geo. 4.561) for *ut me deponat vino, eam adfectat viam* (Aul. 575).<sup>157</sup> Again some use a similar word or variant compound, for example, *necesse est versis gladiis repugnarier* (Geo. 3.222) for *necessumst vorsis gladiis depugnarier* (Cas. 344).<sup>158</sup> Occasionally a word is dropped or added, in all cases an insignificant one, as in *luto usus multo multam terram confode* (Geo. 2.348) for *luto usust multo multam terram confode* (Rud. 100).<sup>159</sup> In only three instances is a completely different word substituted: *scio* for *experior* (Aen. 1.233); *magnus* for *rapidus* (Aen. 9.327)<sup>160</sup> and *invenio* for *reperio* (Aen. 11.361). These are typical of scribal errors which are many times more frequent when, as here, the passages are cited out of context.

There are, then, only seven quotations from Plautus in D which could be termed at all free.<sup>161</sup> Some of these, however, are very hard to distinguish from the group just discussed, and the divergences may simply represent corruptions in transmission to a slightly greater degree. None of these is as remote from the extant text as those examples cited from S above, with the possible exception of the quotation on Aen. 2.357. But this can only doubtfully be said to refer to Truc. 268; it may well be from one of the lost plays.

In summary, we note in the quotations from the plays of Plautus a continued distinction between the two commentaries S and D along the lines already noted in Part I. The D scholia are consistently more detailed in every conceivable way. While S quotes from eleven or twelve of the extant plays, D quotes from nineteen in addition to the lost *Addictus*. The title of the play accompanies the quotation only eleven times in S; there are forty-five such instances in D. The quotations in D are considerably longer than those in S. And here we can mark a new distinction between the two commentaries: the question of accuracy. Less than half the quotations in S, where checking is possible, can be said to be accurate or nearly so. There are few if any errors in D which can be said with certainty to be the fault of carelessness on the part of the commentator.

The question arises: if (as the evidence of Part I seemed to show again and again) S is a free adaptation and D a more authentic remnant of the same original commentary, do the inaccuracies of quotation go back to this source? Perhaps some do, but the great divergence between S and D on this point seems conclusive of the fact that the majority at least originate with Servius. We can hardly suppose that Servius by chance chose those quotations from his source which were inaccurate!



## TERENCE

There are 222 references to Terence in the Servian corpus, of which 137 are in S<sup>162</sup> and 85 in the D scholia.<sup>163</sup> It is immediately apparent that Terence is cited more than any other Republican author here discussed. Moreover, a far greater percentage of the total number of quotations appears in S than has been the case before: 62 per cent, as compared with 52 per cent for Ennius, 53 per cent for Cato, 46 per cent for Varro, and 39 per cent for Plautus. Lines from all six plays are cited in both commentaries, but in spite of the great frequency of quotations from Terence there are fewer specific references than we would expect. The name of the play appears in S only four times, the *Heauton* (*Ecl.* 10.19; *Aen.* 1.548), *Phormio* (*Geo.* 4.444), and *Hecyra* (*Aen.* 10.532) being so named. D includes the title of the play in nineteen instances, a less than usual proportion of the total; named are the *Heauton* (*Ecl.* 6.58; 10.46; *Aen.* 1.657; 9.289), *Eunuchus* (*Geo.* 1.248; 3.305; *Aen.* 2.424, 502; 3.216), *Phormio* (*Ecl.* 7.31; *Geo.* 1.248; *Aen.* 1.392, 657; 2.235), *Hecyra* (*Geo.* 1.125; *Aen.* 4.435), and *Adelphi* (*Aen.* 2.424; 3.477; 10.567). Noticeably absent is specific reference to the *Andria*, which is strange, since it and the *Eunuchus* account for over half the total number of quotations from Terence: each is cited fifty-nine times in the combined commentaries.<sup>164</sup> The answer probably lies in the fact that about three-quarters of the total number of references to the *Andria* are in S, who, as we can see, was reluctant to include the title. Yet it is surprising that D does not mention it, especially when we observe that in only four quotations from the *Hecyra* D gives the title twice.

If we compare the quotations from Plautus, for example, with far fewer instances (120), S includes the title eleven times and D, a total of more than forty-five. This is over twice as many specific references as appear in the case of Terence, from whom there are nearly twice as many quotations. The discrepancy is too great to attribute to chance. A lack of precision of this sort could be attributed to two quite opposite causes: either greater obscurity or greater familiarity. The fact that Terence is quoted more often than any of the authors we have examined would rule out the former.

The question arises whether this greater familiarity reflects the special interest of S or goes back to the source commentary. The fact that D also is less interested than usual in indicating the title here would suggest that this was a feature of the commentary which was their common source. But we have more to go on than this. There are seventeen instances in S where even the name of Terence is omitted in making the

quotation and six similar places in D.<sup>165</sup> The relatively frequent appearance of anonymous quotations from Terence in both S and D (there are only two such from Plautus; see above, p. 315) would argue for the existence of quotations of this type in their source. Again the reason for this lack of specific attribution is certainly familiarity. This is again apparent when we consider that the twenty instances where quotations from Terence appear without attribution either by S or D are reduced to only fourteen different passages through repetition,<sup>166</sup> and of these fourteen passages nine appear elsewhere in the Servian corpus fully attributed.<sup>167</sup> A source commentary manifesting a familiarity with Terence is suggestive of Donatus, who interestingly enough cites eight of the above fourteen passages at least once in the extant Terence commentary.<sup>168</sup> A ninth (*Eun.* 732) appears in his *Ars Grammatica* (Keil, *GrammLat* 4.400.11).

Again when we consider the length of the quotations the practice of S is surprising. He quotes at far greater length and in general approaches the standard previously encountered in D. This will be seen from the following table:

<i>Length of quotation</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>D</i>
more than a line	11	10
full line	45	19
less than a line	55	38
phrase	21	16
single word	3	2
reference only	2	0
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	137	85

A comparison of this table with similar tables for Ennius, Lucilius, and Plautus will show that the quotations in S are here considerably longer. What is somewhat disturbing at first glance is that D appears to quote not only less frequently but more briefly than heretofore. Upon reflection, however, this is only logical and entirely in support of the assumption that S and D depend upon the same source. Quotations from Terence in the source commentary were of a fixed number and of a fixed length, so that any change in the practice of S in extracting them is bound to manifest itself in the character of the D scholia; that is, if S chose to include more and lengthier quotations from Terence, obviously fewer and shorter are the quotations supplied by D, since the conflator provided the D scholia only where S was wanting.<sup>169</sup>

There are, however, several indications of the usual superiority and

care of D: first, the greater proportion of quotations of more than a line in length; second, a few instances where a more complete quotation is given in D than appears in S (e.g., *Aen.* 5.613); and finally, several places where D, varying from S, preserves a reading closer to the extant text of Terence. This brings us to the question of the accuracy of these quotations, which must be considered in some detail.

The accuracy of the quotations from Terence in Servius and Servius auctus has already been discussed by Kirchner and more recently by J. D. Craig,<sup>170</sup> but since Craig's interest was the text of Terence it would be well to examine them again for the light they throw on the Servian commentaries. Craig, moreover, has started from what seems to be a presupposition that Servius will be unreliable and this has somewhat colored his investigation. Servius is actually unusually accurate. In eighty-five instances there is no conflict with the extant text of Terence.<sup>171</sup> In ten more there is only a slight transposition of words.<sup>172</sup> There are some thirty quotations which vary only slightly from the Terence manuscripts. Most of these drop a word or a short phrase from the passage quoted, usually an insignificant one which does not destroy the sense.<sup>173</sup> Sometimes a word becomes changed to a similar one.<sup>174</sup> In these it is sometimes a question whether S does not preserve a better reading. Several times a word will appear in a different form,<sup>175</sup> rarely a word is replaced by an altogether different one.<sup>176</sup> In three instances a word is added *ad sensum* (*Aen.* 1.140; 10.133; 12.120: *Eun.* 601). There are, however, seven instances of quotations in S which are free or quite remote from the Terence text.<sup>177</sup>

It would be convenient to say that all the minor variations are due to faulty transmission of the text of S. While this is undoubtedly true for some of them, there is clear evidence that such errors often originate with Servius. *Heaut.* 71f. and *And.* 429 are both quoted twice with the same error.<sup>178</sup> More telling are the instances where the omissions of S are corrected by D: for instance, on *Aen.* 5.613: "venit meditatus *alicunde* ex solo loco" (*And.* 406).<sup>179</sup> From these it is clear that some of the variations at least began with S and had no precedent in the original commentary.

This becomes more apparent when we examine a particularly bothersome quotation where the comment seems to hinge upon an incorrect reading (*Aen.* 3.594):

CONSERTUM TEGUMEN SPINIS inligatum spinis; hinc est in Terentio "video quendam sertum *squalidum*" (*Eun.* 236).

The mss. of Terence have *video sentum squalidum*. Let us suppose for a



moment that the source commentary had a reading which agreed with the extant text as the addition of the D scholia would seem to indicate: *video quendam* (supplied from line 234) *sentum squalidum*. An adaptor might be quick to alter *sentum* to *sertum* in relating it to Vergil's *consertum*, especially if the original point in citing the line were at all subtle. Then, since *sertum* requires an ablative not supplied by *squalidum*, the logical thing was for the *squalidum* to be dropped, an incomplete idea being preferable to an obscure one. But what could be the connection between the two passages if we destroy the tie with *sertum*? It could be the general similarity of the physical description of the impoverished spendthrift in the *Eunuchus* and Achaemenides in *Aeneid* 3. Our suspicions are confirmed beyond a doubt when we find Eugraphius making precisely this comparison (ed. Lindsay, *ad. Eun.* 236):

VIDEO SENTUM SQUALIDUM etc. miserorum expressio his modis semper impletur: vultu, habitu corporis atque vestitu. ita vestitus est quod dixit 'sentum' et 'pannis obsitum,' corporis habitus 'squalidum,' vultus est 'aegrum.' sic Virgilius 'respicimus: dira inlucies inmissaque barba, consortum tegimen spinis' et supra 'miserandaque cultu procedit.'

Obviously this was the tenor of the remark in the original commentary which served also as a source for Eugraphius.<sup>180</sup> It will be noted that the Terence passage is cited correctly.<sup>181</sup> Servius appropriated it as a comment on usage rather than descriptive technique, with the resultant altering of the text.<sup>182</sup>

As for the quotations in D, forty-six present no variations from the extant text.<sup>183</sup> Five more instances involve a simple transposition of the words.<sup>184</sup> All the remaining quotations in D vary from the text in the slightest way, usually involving the alteration of a single word. In many the word in question appears in a different form;<sup>185</sup> in several others the word has been changed to one that is similar in appearance;<sup>186</sup> and in a very few instances the word has been replaced by an entirely different one.<sup>187</sup> Sometimes an insignificant word is dropped,<sup>188</sup> or an explanatory one added.<sup>189</sup> These slight omissions and additions may at times be intentional and are not necessarily to be construed as careless misquoting. The other errors listed above are all typical of those made in copying, particularly of passages out of context. There are several indications of a tangible sort, moreover, showing that such errors in D are scribal. In at least one instance the incorrect line is cited elsewhere in D quite correctly (*Geo.* 4.293; cf. *Aen.* 4.480). Again the word which is the point of the comment has been miscopied (*Geo.* 1.248: *Phor.* 826) or omitted (*Geo.* 3.305: *Hec.* 618).<sup>190</sup> Finally it should be noted that there are

no quotations from Terence in D which are remote from the extant text.<sup>191</sup>

We have observed, then, in the quotations from Terence a marked departure in the practice of S, who cites from all the plays with greater frequency, at greater length, and with greater accuracy than usual. These features are especially apparent when we compare his quotations from Plautus. There are, however, some definite indications of carelessness. Certain minor errors which might appear to be scribal can be shown to originate with Servius, and there are several quotations which are quite remote from the extant text. This change in S has had some effect upon the D scholia, but there are several signs of their continued greater care and more faithful reproduction of the original commentary in giving a further detail of source, or quoting more fully or more accurately. On the question of accuracy the variations from the extant text in D are in all cases minor and in many cases demonstrably the result of scribal error. There are, however, new features of both S and D here which reflect something of the nature of the original commentary: although the number of quotations from Terence is greater, there are fewer specific references by title than there were for Plautus; moreover, there appear for the first time a considerable number of quotations from Terence cited anonymously. Such treatment is surely the result of familiarity.

These factors indicate some special interest in Terence on the part of the source commentary. Nowhere among grammarians before Servius do we find a preponderance of quotations from Terence over Plautus. In Festus, for example, the preponderance is quite the reverse: there are over 200 references to Plautus as opposed to twenty to Terence. In Nonius there are at least 636 quotations from Plautus to be compared with at most 221 from Terence.<sup>192</sup> Quotations from the two dramatists are about equal in Servius' contemporaries Charisius and Diomedes,<sup>193</sup> but by the time of Priscian (sixth century) quotations from Terence strongly predominate.<sup>194</sup> It is certainly the Terence commentary of Donatus, coming at the precise time that this change is noted, which is responsible. It is entirely appropriate that this effect should first be felt in Servius, disciple and expositor of Donatus. But what is most significant is that this interest in Terence is also traceable through the D scholia to the original commentary on Vergil which was their common source. What is more logical in view of the mutual interest in Terence and Vergil than to equate this source with the lost Vergil commentary of Donatus? The existence of many of the same anonymously cited passages in the Servian corpus and the Terence commentary, the great attention paid to the *Andria* and *Eunuchus* in both, and their

mutual interrelationship with Eugraphius would reinforce this hypothesis.

Our investigation of the quotations from Republican authors in Servius and the Scholia Danielis has revealed the most widespread difference between the two commentaries in (1) the number of authors quoted, (2) the details of source given, (3) the length of quotations, and (4) their accuracy (where this is measurable). It is the D scholia which are virtually everywhere superior to S on each of these points. S quotes repeatedly from ten authors of the Republic whose works are lost, for the most part the obvious favorites, with isolated references to four more. D, on the other hand, quotes repeatedly from twenty-eight, the more obscure as well as the more renowned, with isolated quotations from thirteen more. They both, of course, quote from the plays of Plautus and Terence.

S is prone not to give any further details of source beyond the author's name. In the case of Cato and Varro he occasionally gives the title as well. This is true also of the extant Plautus and Terence. With the exception of Varro, however, there are in S only isolated references to a specific book number. D, on the other hand, is fairly consistent in recording details of title about half the time and not infrequently giving the book number where this is appropriate. The length of quotations in S is short, averaging less than half a line for poets and only rare verbal quotations from prose authors. Brief quotations illustrating usage abound. D quotes at decidedly greater length, averaging a line or more from the poets, with a goodly number of verbatim quotations from the prose authors, who are usually paraphrased.

The accuracy of S in quotations from Plautus is very low. There is a large number of free quotations, and some are so loose as to make identification difficult. Quite the opposite is the case of quotations from Terence, where S is surprisingly accurate. Terence presents an unusual case here, the significance of which we must return to. Even from Terence, however, there are a few quotations in S which wander far from the text. D, on the other hand, is consistent in maintaining a high degree of accuracy for both Plautus and Terence. He never strays far from the text, and most errors could be the result of scribal mistakes, a point which is demonstrable in many instances.

We can notice, then, as the primary distinction between the two commentaries, a difference in scope and scholarly nature. S seems obviously a school edition while D appears to be the remnant of a more comprehensive work (see above, pp. 298f.). If, as is generally conceded, they have



a common source, S has deliberately omitted references to more obscure authors, suppressed details of source, shortened quotations, and in general been less exact. D, on the other hand, must reflect the common source in point of detail, accuracy, and compass. The source was clearly a great *variorum* work designed for the use of scholars.

Proceeding from the apparent fact that S and D stem from this same source, is there anything which prevents us from assuming that S and D combined reproduce this source in its entirety? In other words, did the contaminator, working with the original commentary before him, append to Servius *all* the omissions when he produced the conflation DS? On subjective conclusions of the internal evidence alone we could assume that the source commentary offered a still wider range of quotations than appears here. When we see Sisenna, for example, whose work could have treated the subject only incidentally, quoted on points of legendary history, we glimpse a commentary of very large scope indeed (see above, pp. 300-302).

But the external evidence on this point is conclusive. We can from parallels in Macrobius and Eugraphius occasionally reconstruct the original commentary with enough accuracy to indicate that the D scholia do not reproduce it entirely. The relationship between Macrobius and the Servian commentaries has for some time been recognized as one not of interdependence but of common source (see above, p. 292). At several junctures it is apparent not only that S, D, and Macrobius go back to the same source, but that none of them reproduces this source in its entirety (see above, pp. 306, 313). In at least one instance the source of the original commentary is available (Gellius). Here it can be demonstrated that the D scholia abbreviated to the point of confusion (see above, p. 308; cf. p. 313). In other places it can be seen that whereas the D scholia are more precise and complete about making quotations than S, the source commentary was more precise still (see above, p. 309).

The existence of parallels in Eugraphius (see above, p. 321) adds a new dimension to the original commentary: an interest in Terence. Commentaries on both Terence and Vergil were written by Aemilius Asper, who was one of the sources of the original commentary (cf. above, p. 304), and Aelius Donatus. For half a century scholars have been trying to establish as fact the logical supposition that Donatus is the source behind S and D. The results of the present investigation would more than support this assumption. The D scholia, filled as they are with precise references to many of the obscure authors and works of the Republic, point to a commentary of considerable extent. Parallels in other authors would indicate an even wider scope and precision. Such was certainly the

nature of the lost Donatus commentary on Vergil, as is clear from the extant dedicatory letter (see below, note 11), in which the following points are made:

1. Almost all previous Vergilian scholarship was reviewed and excerpts made (*brevitati* is not to be taken too seriously).<sup>195</sup>
2. The commentary is faithful to its sources: *agnosce . . . in hoc munere . . . sinceram vocem priscae auctoritatis*.
3. In adding his own judgments the author included the words *optima fide* of those whose opinions he rejected.<sup>196</sup>
4. The commentary was designed for the use of budding grammarians *rudi ac nuper exorto*.

These goals were certainly fulfilled in the commentary which served as source for Servius and the D scholia. But we reach an inevitable stumbling block in the obvious fact that there were other Vergilian commentaries of such scope.<sup>197</sup> As Donatus himself points out, there were many commentators before him who wrote much.

But the combined interest in Vergil and Terence seems decisive. This interest is apparent not only from a few parallels in Euphrasius but from the internal evidence of the quotations from Terence in the Servian corpus. More attention is given this author than any other here examined. The fact that this predominance is not chance is evidenced by several clear departures from usual practice, particularly by S. Servius cites Terence decidedly more often, more accurately, and at greater length than is his habit, and here alone approaches the standard usual of the D scholia. That both commentaries give fewer specific references to his plays by title and not infrequently quote anonymously can only be the reflection of familiarity.

This interest in Terence can be placed in perspective in a most instructive way by a comparison with Plautus. In no grammarian before Servius do we find a favoring of quotations from Terence over Plautus; in fact quite the opposite is the case. But beginning with Servius, and exclusively with Servius in his generation, the greater popularity of Terence is manifest. This is increasingly apparent in grammarians after the fourth century (see above, p. 322) and reaches a peak in the Middle Ages.<sup>198</sup> Certainly Donatus is at the beginning of this development, and certainly it is under his immediate influence that Servius displays his interest in Terence. But the D scholia and Euphrasius indicate that this interest in Terence was also a feature of the common source. Can we any longer fail to equate this with the lost commentary of Donatus?

How then can we explain the present state of the contaminated text of Daniel, and what is the precise origin of the D scholia if they do not

reproduce the commentary of Donatus in full? This can best be shown by sketching the probable history of the text. Servius, after some years of explaining Vergil daily to the Roman youth,<sup>199</sup> desired to edit a commentary which, while based upon the best Vergilian scholarship of his day, should still be within the grasp of his students. For a basis he turned to the scholarly work of Aelius Donatus, from which he proceeded to eliminate much that was intended for more advanced scholars. Labored arguments were compressed and references to less well-known authors were eliminated, although the substance of their remarks could be retained with an impersonal *alii dicunt*. For the most part he reduced to the essentials even those references which he chose to include, shortening and paraphrasing quotations and in general leaving out specific mention of titles and book numbers except where they had a significance on the school level.

The result was a commentary greatly abbreviated, yet with a marked similarity to the original in that there was nothing, at best little, in the derived commentary which was not in its predecessor.<sup>200</sup> Thus Donatus' commentary on Vergil and its abbreviated counterpart by Servius existed for centuries, the longer commentary by a familiar process in late antiquity giving way in popularity to the shorter, until some scholar of the seventh or eighth century (see above, p. 291) augmented his copy of Servius with notes from the recognizably similar but fuller commentary of Donatus. Although it is probable that Donatus' commentary was still extant at the time of this fusion (see above, p. 292), we cannot be sure that the contaminator had a complete copy. Certain gaps in the D scholia can be most readily explained if we assume that he did not (see below, notes 55 and 169). Be that as it may, the compiler of DS did not add to the text of Servius all the additional material he found in Donatus, but was himself an abbreviator.<sup>201</sup> He made his notations in a much more mechanical way, however, than had Servius. For this we can be grateful in one respect, since what is preserved in the D scholia is closer to the spirit of the original, with precise references and general greater accuracy in the handling of sources; but on the other hand, by dropping out portions and running the remaining parts together, he creates occasional confusion.

It seems likely, moreover, that the additions were being made in the first instance to a copy of Servius. This is strongly indicated by the fact that the comments of S are for the most part not altered but supplemented.<sup>202</sup> There would be under such circumstances definite restrictions of available space, and thus we find that D scholia of any length appear at the end of an S comment or under a separate lemma of their



own. Only briefer additions are interspersed in Servius' text. From this it is clear that a comment of Donatus, condensed by Servius, could not easily be reintroduced in its original form, but necessarily had to be modified. Material left completely untouched by S the compiler could copy out verbatim and at greater length either marginally or at the end of Servius' comment. Even here, however, his space was not unlimited, and he must have had to shorten some lengthy passages.

When this is understood there should be no objection to the fact that interpretations ascribed to Donatus by S do not appear again in D. Since S had already discussed Donatus' view, however briefly and by way of refutation, the compiler did not reintroduce the topic, although he could and did intersperse explanatory phrases through it.<sup>203</sup> Even when on rare occasions what is contained in D seems directly to refute what S quotes as Donatus' opinion,<sup>204</sup> there is no great problem, for Donatus, as he himself tells us, often recorded the words of those whose opinions he rejected, and the D scholia, as we have seen, do not record his arguments in full. In sum, the present study has not only led us to a better understanding of the basically different nature of Servius and the D scholia, but has given us a more precise concept of their common source, and has marshaled evidence of a conclusive nature that this common source was the lost Vergil commentary of Aelius Donatus.

## NOTES

1. "Is Donatus's Commentary on Virgil Lost?" *CQ* 10 (1916) 158-64. The suggestion was made independently by two other scholars: F. Lammert, "De Hieronymo Donati Discipulo," *Commentationes Philologicae Ienenses* 9, no. 2 (1911), p. 42; P. Wessner in Teuffel III<sup>6</sup> (1913) § 431.3; cf. Bursian's *Jahresberichte* 252 (1936) 149.

2. For a description of Daniel's manuscripts see J. J. H. Savage, "The Manuscripts of the Commentary of Servius Danielis on Vergil," *HSCP* 43 (1932) 77-121.

3. Doubts had been expressed earlier by Pancratius Masvicius, whose edition of Vergil with the Servius commentary appeared in 1717, and by K. O. Mueller, *Die Etrusker* (1826) *praef.*; cf. G. Thilo and H. Hagen, *Servii Grammatici Qui Feruntur in Vergilii Carmina Commentarii* (Leipzig 1881-1902) *praef.* iv (hereafter referred to as Thilo-Hagen). As late as 1866 Ribbeck, *P. Virgili Maronis Opera, prolegomena*, 104ff., was arguing for the theory of Daniel.

4. "Beiträge zur Kritik der Scholiasten des Vergilius," *RhMus* 14 (1859) 535-51, 15 (1860) 119-54; *Quaestiones Servianae* (Halle 1867); Thilo-Hagen, *praef.*

5. *Essai sur Servius et son commentaire sur Virgile* (Paris 1879).

6. See also R. B. Steele, "Servius and the Scholia Danielis," *AJP* 20 (1899) 272-91, 361-87.

7. Thilo-Hagen, *praef.* lxvi ff. Thomas (above, note 5) 127 suggests an earlier date of the fifth or sixth century.

8. "Zur Serviusfrage," *Philologus* 70 (1911) 106-45.

9. *Ibid.* 122f. and 144, where "500" is a misprint for "400"; cf. W. M. Lindsay and H. J. Thomson, *Ancient Lore in Medieval Latin Glossaries* (Oxford 1921) 56 [*St. Andrews University Publications XIII*].

10. Servius' debt to Donatus has long been recognized: Thilo-Hagen, *praef.* lxxv ff.; J. Ender, *Aelii Donati Commentii Vergiliani Reliquiae* (Greifswald 1910) 7ff.

11. C. G. Hardie, *Vitae Vergilianae Antiquae* (Oxford 1954).

12. *Bernensis* 165, saec. ix; see also J. J. Savage, "Was the Commentary on Virgil by Aelius Donatus Extant in the Ninth Century?" *CP* 26 (1931) 405-11.

13. There have been some dissenters, notably Lindsay and Thomson (above, note 9) 57ff.; see also Thomson, "Servius Auctus and Donatus," *CQ* 21 (1927) 205-6. Their objections seem more than satisfactorily answered by J. J. Savage, "More on Donatus' Commentary on Virgil," *CQ* 23 (1929) 56-59.

14. "Donatus, the Interpreter of Vergil and Terence," *HSCP* 38 (1927) 75-142.

15. "Donatus and the Scholia Danielis: a Stylistic Comparison," *HSCP* 53 (1942) 157-69; "Addendum to 'Donatus and the Scholia Danielis,'" *CP* 45 (1950) 38-39. See also his doctoral dissertation: "De Servii Carminum Vergilianorum Interpretis Dicendi Rationibus," summarized in *HSCP* 51 (1940) 328-29.

16. See P. Wessner, *Aeli Donati Quod Fertur Commentum Terenti* (Leipzig 1902) *praef.* xlv-xlix.

17. E. K. Rand et al., *Servianorum in Vergilii Carmina Commentariorum Editionis Harvardianae* vol. II (Lancaster 1946), hereafter referred to as the Harvard Servius.

18. *Esegeti Vergiliani Antichi: Donato, Macrobio, Servio* (Bari 1946).

19. *Elio Donato, Macrobio e Servio, Commentatori di Virgilio* (Vercelli 1946).

20. "Il 'Servio Danielino' è Donato," *StudItal* 20 (1946) 79-104.

21. The interrelationship of Servius and Macrobius has long been a subject of study: cf. Thilo-Hagen, *praef.* xxii-xxvii; Barwick (above, note 8) 120.

22. Harvard Servius II, *praef.* iii; A. F. Stocker, "Epilegomena to Volume II of the Harvard Servius," *TAPA* 77 (1946) 323-24.

23. A. H. Travis, "Progress Report: Volume III of the Harvard Servius," *Vergilian Digest* 2 (1956) 11-12.

24. "Aelius Donatus and the D Scholia on the *Bellum Punicum* of Naevius," *YCS* 15 (1957) 113-19; cf. "The Scholium on Naevius in *Parisinus Latinus* 7930," *AJP* 78 (1957) 1-22.

25. The results of this paper were partially embodied in a doctoral dissertation presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of The Johns Hopkins University in 1952.

26. Some consideration has been given to this subject by J. Kirchner, *De Servii, Carminum Vergilianorum Interpretis, Commentario Plenior Qui Dicitur* I, II (Brieg 1910-11) [*Beilage zum Jahresbericht des königlichen Gymnasiums zu Brieg*]. His lists are often incomplete, a fact which I assume is due to the lack of a satisfactory index.

27. *Index of Proper Names in Servius* (Iowa City 1927) [*Univ. of Iowa Humanistic Studies* IV, no. 1].

28. *Index Rerum et Nominum in Scholiis Servii et Aelii Donati Tractatorum* (Ithaca 1930) [Cornell Stud. Class. Phil. 23].

29. The Harvard Servius promises an index based upon Mountford-Schultz: see J. P. Elder, "The New Servius," *Speculum* 21 (1946) 493-95 and n.7. It is to be hoped that inaccuracies will be removed.

30. See Harvard Servius II, *praef.* x-xiii.

31. S: *Aen.* 10.636 (de Gubernatis, p. 45). D: *Aen.* 1.92 (Morel, fr. 16); *Aen.* 4.37 (Morel, fr. 46, cf. de Gubernatis, p. 46); cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) I, pp. 7, 10.

32. D: *Aen.* 1.170 (Morel, fr. 11), 198 (fr. 16), 213 (cf. Rowell in YCS 15 [1957] 113, note 4), 273 (Morel, fr. 25); *Aen.* 2.797 (fr. 5); *Aen.* 3.10 (fr. 4); *Aen.* 4.9 (fr. 6), 267 (Klotz, *TF Inc.* vii); *Aen.* 9.712 (Morel, fr. 17); cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) I, p. 6. The D Scholia on *Geo.* 1.266 contains a quotation from an *Andromache* of Novius which some believe should be ascribed to Naevius. See Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin* 2.110, cf. *CRF*<sup>3</sup> 308 and Rowell (this note). It is perhaps worth noting that this is the only reference to Novius in the Servian corpus.

33. S: *Ecl.* 10.10 (Vahlen, *Inc.* 6); *Geo.* 2.424 (*Ann.* 540); *Geo.* 3.76 (*Ann.* 556); *Aen.* 1.4 (*Scen.* 410), 20 (*Ann.* 286a), 26 (*Inc.* 23), 51 (*Ann.* 594), 224 (*Scen.* 79, cf. *Ann.* 388), 281 (*Ann.* 291), 412 (*Ann.* 609), 741 (*Inc.* 43, cf. *Ann.* 29); *Aen.* 2.241 (*Scen.* 92), 274 (*Ann.* 7), 651 (*Inc.* 30); *Aen.* 4.9 (*Inc.* 25), 404 (*Ann.* 474), 576 (*Ann.* 64); *Aen.* 6.219 (*Ann.* 155), 545 (*Ann.* 309), 595 (*Ann.* 138), 685 (*Ann.* 424), 686 (*Scen.* 427), 705 (*Ann.* 596), 748 (*Ann.* 558), 763 (*Ann.* 115), 777 (*Ann.* 35), 779 (*Inc.* 28), 845 (*Ann.* 370); *Aen.* 7.320 (*Scen.* 194), 568 (*Ann.* 440), 622 (*Ann.* 267), 683 (*Ann.* 603), 691 (*Ann.* 376), 804 (*Ann.* 323); *Aen.* 8.631 (*Ann.* 68); *Aen.* 9.37 (*Ann.* 597), 163 (*Ann.* 511), 253 (*Scen.* 414), 501 (*Ann.* 140), 675 (*Ann.* 400); *Aen.* 10.5 (*Ann.* 61), 396 (*Ann.* 472), 532 (*Ann.* 199); *Aen.* 11.27 (*Ann.* 599), 236 (*Ann.* 119), 601 (*Var.* 14), 608 (*Ann.* 537), 660 (*Ann.* 1); *Aen.* 12.115 (*Ann.* 600), 298 (*Inc.* 27), 499 (*Ann.* 513), 552 (*Ann.* 161), 605 (*Inc.* 24), 709 (*Ann.* 555, cf. 119). D: *Ecl.* 9.23 (*Inc.* 2); *Geo.* 1.12 (*Ann.* 497 and *Scen.* 384), 18 (*Ann.* 419 and 436), 75 (*Sat.* 12); *Geo.* 2.449 (*Ann.* 262); *Geo.* 3.35 (*Ann.* 30), 116 (*Ann.* 232); *Geo.* 4.59 (*Ann.* 21), 170 (*Scen.* 426), 188 (*Ann.* 343 and 446), 230 (*Ann.* 419 and 436 f.); *Aen.* 1.31 (*Ann.* 542), 52 (*Scen.* 233), 69 (*Ann.* 512), 81 (*Ann.* 551), 123 (*Ann.* 497), 190 (*Inc.* 15), 254 (*Ann.* 457), 273 (*Ann.* 35), 726 (*Scen.* 95); *Aen.* 2.62 (*Scen.* 135), 173 (*Ann.* 606), 355 (*Ann.* 68); *Aen.* 3.241 (*Scen.* 174), 333 (*Ann.* 58 and 141), 384 (*Ann.* 100a); *Aen.* 5.37 (*Ann.* 506); *Aen.* 8.361 (*Ann.* 563 and 564), 500 (*Ann.* 308); *Aen.* 9.327 (*Ann.* 482 and 554), 399 (*Scen.* 426), 420 (*Ann.* 99), 526 (*Ann.* 174), 641 (*Ann.* 301), 653 (*Ann.* 56), 744 (*Inc.* 3); *Aen.* 10.6 (quotation in D: *Ann.* 127), 10 (*Inc.* 4); *Aen.* 11.19 (*Ann.* 461), 299 (*Ann.* 497), 306 (*Ann.* 493), 326 (*Ann.* 477); *Aen.* 12.121 (*Sat.* 3), 294 (*Ann.* 601), 657 (*Ann.* 446). Two additional places show reflections of Ennius: *Aen.* 5.114 and 11.143; cf. Vahlen, *Ann.* 227 and 156.

34. S: *Aen.* 2.557 (Klotz, *TF Inc.* xxxiii), 651 (*Inc.* lix); *Aen.* 4.9 (*Inc.* lviii), 469 (*Pentheus*), 473 (*Inc.* liii); *Aen.* 7.320 (*Inc.* xxxiv); *Aen.* 11.259 (*Inc.* xxviii); *Aen.* 12.298 (*Inc.* lvi). D: *Geo.* 4.436 (*Inc.* xxix); *Aen.* 1.55 (*Inc.* xlv), 87 (*Teucer* xv); *Aen.* 4.469 (*Pentheus*); *Aen.* 5.28 (*Inc.* xxxix), 40 (*Hermiona* xxii); *Aen.* 9.664 (*Teucer* xv); *Aen.* 11.169 (*Hermiona* iv), 543 (*Medus* xiii); *Aen.* 12.605 (*Antiope* xii).

35. S: *Aen.* 4.404 (Morel, fr. 26). D: *Aen.* 1.42 (Klotz, *TF Inc.* ii), 44 (*Clytemestra* v), 88 (*ibid.* iii), 122 (*Inc.* xxi), 179 (*Troades* i); *Aen.* 2.17 (*Deiphobus* i);



*Aen.* 4.641 (*Aegistheus* iii); *Aen.* 5.40 (*Pelopidae* iii); *Aen.* 8.130 (*Atrous* i); *Aen.* 9.619 (*Philocteta* ix); *Aen.* 12.605 (*Bacchae* viii and xiii).

36. *Aen.* 1.20, 281, 741; 6.748, 777; 8.631; 11.601, 608.

37. *Aen.* 1.726; cf. *Tusc.* 1.35.85, 2.19.44.

38. *Geo.* 2.449; 3.116; 4.188 bis, 230; *Aen.* 1.254; 2.62; 12.121.

39. Of these twelve, eight are known from parallel sources. They include the most obvious: *Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem*; *Romulus in caelo*, etc.

40. This one-word quotation involves the second mention by D (*Aen.* 12.657) of a passage quoted at length elsewhere (*Geo.* 4.188). See above, pp. 297f.

41. *Geo.* 3.116; 4.59, 188 bis, 230 bis; *Aen.* 1.52; 3.333, 384; 9.420; 12.121.

42. *Aen.* 11.259; cf. Terence, *Hec.* 129, Ovid, *Met.* 14.474, Seneca, *Ag.* 521.

43. *Aen.* 2.651; 4.9; 12.298.

44. *Aen.* 2.557; 4.469, 473; 7.320.

45. *Aen.* 1.87; 5.40; 9.664; 11.169, 543; 12.605.

46. *Aen.* 1.44, 88, 179; 2.17; 5.40; 8.130; 9.619; 12.605 bis.

47. See also M. Lenchantin de Gubernatis, *Livi Andronici Fragmenta* (Turin 1937) 46.

48. *Aen.* 1.213; 2.797; 3.10; 4.267.

49. *Aen.* 1.170, 198; 2.797; 9.712.

50. *Aen.* 2.797; 3.10. If the *Andromache* quoted on *Geo.* 1.266 is to be assigned to Naevius (see above, note 32) it should be noted that it also is a two-line quotation.

51. Thilo was the first to recognize that some of the elements of the D scholia on the other hand, were divergent from this principle: "ita alia [i.e., scholia] reconditae doctrinae plena sunt et ad doctorum hominum magis quam ad adolescentium studia adiuvanda pertinent" (*praef.* xxxii).

52. Schanz-Hosius I<sup>4</sup> 133.

53. The linking of Ennius and Pacuvius to illustrate archaic usage is rather common: cf. Festus, s.v. *Topper*; Keil, *GrammLat* 5.206.28, etc.

54. Verrius Flaccus' influence on the Vergilian commentators has long been recognized; see H. Nettleship, "The Ancient Commentators on Vergil," in Conington's *Vergili Opera*<sup>4</sup> (London 1881) 1.lvii ff.

55. There is evidence that the compiler of DS did not have a complete text of D. The D scholia are entirely lacking for *Ecl.* 1-3, and it has been observed that they are much sparser for *Aen.* 6-7 (Teuffel<sup>6</sup> § 431.3). There is also some evidence that the original commentary existed in parts; see J. J. H. Savage (above, note 2) 120f., cf. Wessner in *RE* s.v. *Servius* 1838.

56. This quotation from Clodius Tuscus is unique; cf. *GrammRomFrag* 1.467. Scholars have been inclined to attribute the fragment to Servius Clodius since Clodius Tuscus is not known to have written any grammatical works; see Teuffel<sup>7</sup> § 263.5. His connection, however, with Sinnius Capito (Gell. *NA* 5.20.2) at least suggests an interest. To the present writer it hardly seems logical that D should quote Servius Clodius (as *Clodius* or *Clodius Scriba* with the title of his work, the *Commentarii*; see above, p. 307) in three other places and here suddenly refer to him as Clodius Tuscus.

57. An interesting parallel is presented between D and the Terence commentary of Donatus (*Ad.* 207): see Waldrop (above, note 14) 110, 132; cf. Servius on *Aen.* 11.345.

58. Cf. Macrobius, *Sat.* 1.24.8; 6.6.1.

59. The case is perhaps overstated in Schanz IV 1<sup>2</sup>.172: "In der Erklärung

folgt Servius der damaligen Methode des Schulunterrichts, welche das Gelehrte möglichst fernhielt und sich besonders auf das Grammatische und Rhetorische beschränkte; sein Commentar ist daher mehr für die Geschichte des Unterrichts als für die Altertumswissenschaft von Bedeutung."

60. *Aen.* 1.108 (*HRRel* fr. 4), 242 (fr. 1); 11.316 (fr. 2).

61. *Aen.* 1.373 (*HRRel* 1<sup>2</sup>.iii ff.). There is a second reference to an historical work of Mucius (*Aen.* 8.648) who may be P. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 133 B.C.) who superintended the publication of the *Annales Maximi* to his own day.

62. *Geo.* 1.21 (*HRRel* 1<sup>2</sup>.115, fr. 3); *Aen.* 5.73 (p. 5, fr. 3a); 8.630 (p. 112, fr. 4); 12.603 (p. 112, fr. 1); cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) 1.7. Confusion with other Fabii (particularly Servius Fabius Pictor and Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus) is possible. It is not known if the Latin adaptation of the *Annals* was by the author himself or a later hand, but it appears that D quotes it (*Aen.* 8.630). It is instructive to note, however, that F on *Aen.* 12.603 reads *Fabios* (sic) *Pictor dicit*. Cf. *HRRel* 1<sup>2</sup>.lxix-c, clxxiv-clxxviii; R. Zimmermann, "Zu Fabius Pictor," *Klio* 26 (1933) 248-66.

63. *Geo.* 1.10 (*HRRel* fr. 2); *Aen.* 2.225 (*HRRel* 1<sup>2</sup>.cv; *GrammRomFrag* 1.377). I see no reason for assigning these two fragments to two different authors (the latter is assigned to L. Cincius by both Peter and Funaioli); they are most similar in type and subject matter.

64. *Geo.* 1.10 (*HRRel* fr. 4); *Aen.* 1.56 (fr. 22), 378 (fr. 6), 421 (fr. 38); 7.631 (fr. 3); 12.603 (fr. 15); cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) 1.7.

65. *Aen.* 2.761 (*HRRel* fr. 4); 10.76 (fr. 44).

66. *Aen.* 4.390 (*HRRel* fr. 33); 8.638 (fr. 10).

67. *Geo.* 1.77 (*HRRel* fr. 31); 2.345 (fr. 48); *Aen.* 3.402 (fr. 53); 4.206 (fr. 55), 390 (fr. 58); 6.9 (fr. 54); 10.145 (fr. 52).

68. *Geo.* 4.563 (*HRRel* fr. 7); *Aen.* 9.707 (fr. 8).

69. *Geo.* 1.103 (*HRRel* fr. 91), 135 (fr. 52); *Aen.* 1.108 (fr. 31).

70. *Aen.* 2.15 (*HRRel* fr. 2); 4.390 (fr. 13).

71. *Aen.* 1.6 (*HRRel* fr. 1; cf. *GrammRomFrag* 1.438f.). On Saufeius see A. Raubitschek, "Phaidros and his Roman Pupils," *Hesperia* 18 (1949) 96-103.

72. S: *Geo.* 1.43; 2.95, 96 (Jordan, *Ad Filium* 8), 159 (*HRRel* fr. 38), 412 (*Ad Filium* 9); *Aen.* 1.5 (*HRRel* fr. 4), 6 (fr. 5), 95 (fr. 1 n.), 267 (fr. 9), 570 (fr. 9 n.), 726 (fr. 119); *Aen.* 3.711 (fr. 9 n.); *Aen.* 4.427 (fr. 9 n.), 620 (fr. 10); *Aen.* 5.564 (fr. 54), 755 (fr. 18); *Aen.* 6.752, 760 (fr. 11), 841; *Aen.* 7.158 (fr. 4 n.), 259 (Jordan, *proleg.* xcvi; cf. *ORF*<sup>2</sup> 16), 539 (Jordan, *Memorabilia* 63 n.), 678 (*HRRel* fr. 59 n.); *Aen.* 8.670; *Aen.* 9.600 (fr. 76), 742 (fr. 10 n.); *Aen.* 10.13 (fr. 85), 184 (fr. 46); *Aen.* 11.301 (*ORF*<sup>2</sup> 16), 316 (*HRRel* fr. 8), 567 (fr. 62), 700 (fr. 32). These include four instances where Cato is only briefly mentioned or identified: *Geo.* 1.43; *Aen.* 6.752, 841; 8.670. D: *Ecl.* 4.5 (*ORF*<sup>2</sup> 27), 6.76 (*ORF*<sup>2</sup> 187); *Geo.* 1.46 (*Ad Filium* 6), 75 (*HRRel* fr. 122), 260 (Jordan, *Orat.* 11.4; cf. *ORF*<sup>2</sup> 131); *Geo.* 2.417 (Jordan, *De Re Militari* 9); *Aen.* 1.269 (*HRRel* fr. 13), 421 (fr. 78 n.), 573 (*ORF*<sup>2</sup> 159); *Aen.* 3.64 (*HRRel* fr. 115), 314 (fr. 137), 402 (fr. 70), 637 (fr. 123), 707 (fr. 89); *Aen.* 4.121 (fr. 138; *ORF*<sup>2</sup> 80), 244 *bis* (*ORF*<sup>2</sup> 103 and 97), 293 (*HRRel* fr. 139), 682 (fr. 80), 698 (fr. 114 n.); *Aen.* 7.682 (fr. 60), 697 (fr. 48); *Aen.* 8.638 (fr. 51), 694 (fr. 140); *Aen.* 10.179 (fr. 45), 541 (fr. 55); *Aen.* 11.715 (fr. 31); *Aen.* 12.134 (fr. 14).

73. Quintilian complains of his excessive influence: *Inst. Orat.* 2.5.21.

74. Fronto, *Ambrosianus* 265 (=Naber 203; =Haines 2.200) seems to com-

memorate all three. The text, however, is very difficult; see *CR* 33 (1919) 153, and *WS* 54 (1936) 162.

75. Probably not part of the *Ad Filium*, see Jordan, *proleg.* cii.

76. *Ecl.* 4.5; 6.76; *Geo.* 1.46; 2.417; *Aen.* 1.573; 4.121, 244 *bis*, 293, 698; 7.682; 8.694; 11.715.

77. See *HRRel* 1<sup>2</sup>. *praef.* cccxl.

78. Cf. Cicero, *Brut.* 74.259; Gell. *NA* 2.25.

79. I rely upon the index of Lindsay's edition (Leipzig 1903). Cincius Alimentus, Postumius Albinus, Fabius Maximus Servilianus, Calpurnius Piso, Aemilius Scaurus, and Lutatius Catulus are not mentioned.

80. See *HRRel* Gellius, fr. 34; Asellio, fr. 2a.

81. Lindsay assigns one of these (p. 113) to Caecilius; cf. *HRRel* Antipater, fr. 5.

82. Cited erroneously four times as *Caelius* or *Coelius*.

83. Teuffel<sup>6</sup> § 404a.4; Schanz IV 1<sup>2</sup>.143.

84. See Rand (above, note 1) 159.

85. Compare *Aen.* 2.225, where a parenthetical *ut Cincius* was apparently dropped by S.

86. *Ecl.* 7.45 (*CRF*<sup>3</sup> *Inc.* iv); *Aen.* 3.279 (*Leucadia*).

87. *Aen.* 4.346 (*CRF*<sup>3</sup> *Inc.* xvi); 11.457 (*Setina* xi).

88. *Ecl.* 7.33 (*CRF*<sup>3</sup> *Megalensia*); *Geo.* 1.43 *bis* (*Inc.* i and ii).

89. *Ecl.* 9.23 (*CRF*<sup>3</sup> *Inc.* xvi); *Geo.* 3.175 (*Sorores* i); *Aen.* 4.194 (*Cinerarius* iii); 11.373 (*Inc.* xv).

90. *Aen.* 12.121 *bis* (Morel, frs. 1 and 5). On the quotations from Atta, Afranius, and Hostius see Kirchner (above, note 26) 1.6f.

91. *Geo.* 1.375 (Morel, fr. 22); 3.176 (fr. 12) and possibly *Aen.* 1.122 (fr. 16 ?).

92. *Ecl.* 1.65 (Morel, fr. 3); *Geo.* 2.404 (fr. 6); *Aen.* 10.396 (fr. 11).

93. The text is a bit difficult; for the *lacunae* I follow Ribbeck, *CRF*<sup>3</sup> 228.

94. A. Tomsin, *Étude sur le commentaire Virgilien d'Aemilius Asper* (Paris 1952) 120, believes that Donatus, the conceded source for S and D, didn't cite Asper by name except when "il combat son opinion ou croit nécessaire de se couvrir de son autorité" (is there another possibility?). He proceeds to postulate a separate source for the opinions attributed to Asper in Servius, Servius auctus, the Berne scholia and Macrobius because some of these do not agree with opinions Donatus seems to have held (p. 122). See above, p. 327.

95. *Geo.* 2.98 (Marx, 1131); *Aen.* 1.181 (950), 703 (1350), 726 (1290); 6.90 (469); 9.225 (4); 10.104 (3), 532 (719), 564 (957), 623 (1254); 11.601 (1190). A fragment attributed to Lucretius on *Aen.* 12.419 probably belongs to Lucilius, see Marx on 1367.

96. *Ecl.* 6.53 (Marx, 138); *Geo.* 1.129 (1106), 266 (201); 3.159 (1054); 4.25 (452), 376 (1206), 386 (466); *Aen.* 1.76 (235), 244 (125); 2.77 (427); 3.119 (23); 4.158 (452), 458 (30); 6.1 (966); 8.9 (1149); 9.641 (225); 10.184 (1271), 244 (127), 329 (166), 398 (215); 12.5 (1319), 646 (158).

97. *Ecl.* 6.47 (Morel, fr. 9); 8.4 (fr. 13); *Aen.* 4.58 (fr. 6); 11.169 (fr. 8).

98. Santoro (above, note 20) 95ff.; cf. Barwick (above, note 8) 126.

99. Cf. Wessner in *RE* s.v. *Haterianus* (2).

100. Modern scholars have been inclined to take the D scholium at face value here. See Tümpel in *RE* s.v. *Aphroditos*; G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge 1940) 1.79f.; cf. F. Jacoby, *FGH* 3B, 328 (Philochorus) fr. 184 and particularly his commentary *ad loc.* in the *Supplement* 552f., who supposes a digression in Philochorus on the Cypriote cult.



101. Not to be confused with Clodius Tuscus, see above, note 56. D quotes the *Commentarii* which seems to have been the name of Servius Clodius' work: Gell. *NA* 13.23.19.

102. *Aen.* 1.52 (*GrammRomFrag* 5), 176 *bis* (frs. 1 and 2); 2.229 (fr. 3); cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) 1.7.

103. Teuffel<sup>7</sup> § 263.5; cf. Schanz-Hosius I<sup>4</sup> § 196.3, II<sup>4</sup> § 353.3.

104. *Ecl.* 4.10 (Swoboda, fr. 67); *Geo.* 1.19 (fr. 102), 43 (fr. 84), 47 (fr. 43), 120 (fr. 62), 218 (fr. 85), 260 (fr. 48); *Geo.* 3.146 (fr. 114); *Aen.* 1.177 (fr. 107), 378 (fr. 69); *Aen.* 11.715 (fr. 101); cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) 1.7f., 10.

105. Cf. Gell. *NA* 4.9.1.

106. *Ibid.*, 19.14.2ff.

107. See Thilo-Hagen 2.559 *app. crit.* 5.

108. Just before the portion quoted above, the D scholia distinguish two meanings of *maturare* and then cite a passage from Cato distinguishing *properare* and *festinare*. Cf. Gell. *NA* 16.14.2; Festus, ed. Lindsay, p. 268; Nonius, ed. Lindsay, p. 709.

109. P. Wessner in *RE* s.v. *Macrobius* 182f.

110. But cf. H. Nettleship in *AJP* 4 (1883) 405.

111. H. Linke, *Quaestiones de Macrobi Saturnaliorum Fontibus* (Vratislaviae 1880) 45f.; G. Wissowa, *De Macrobi Saturnaliorum Fontibus* (Vratislaviae 1880) 9f. They both concluded, incidentally, that Macrobius was a source for the Scholia Danielis. Thilo (*praef.* xxv) rightly saw that they rather descend from the same source; cf. Santoro (above, note 20) 95.

112. Compare *Sat.* 6.8.10 with Servius *Aen.* 1.137; *Sat.* 6.8.18 and 21 with Servius *Aen.* 6.273, etc.

113. Wissowa, *Ges. Abh.* 102ff.

114. Wessner (above, note 109) 186ff.; cf. Santoro (above, note 20) 100.

115. The following collections are noteworthy and will be referred to by the symbol given in brackets: R. Merkel, *P. Ovidii Nasonis Fastorum Libri Sex* (Berlin 1841) *proleg.* cvi–ccxlvi [M]; L. Mercklin, "Aetia des Varro," *Philologus* 3 (1848) 267–77 [Me]; A. Riese, *M. Terenti Varronis Saturarum Menippearum Reliquiae* (Leipzig 1865) [R]; P. Mirsch, "De M. Terenti Varronis Antiquitatum Rerum Humanarum Libris XXV," *LeipzigStud* 5 (1882) 1–144 [Mi]; R. Reitzenstein, "Die geographischen Bücher Varros," *Hermes* 20 (1885) 514–51 [Reit]; R. Agahd, "M. Terenti Varronis Antiquitatum Rerum Divinarum Libri I, XIV, XV, XVI," *Fleckeisen's Jahrb.*, suppl. 24 (1898) 1–220 [A]; H. Peter, *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae* 2 (1906) 9–25 [HRRel II]; H. Funaioli, *Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta* 1 (Leipzig 1907) 179–371 [F]; G. Goetz and F. Schoell, *M. Terenti Varronis de Lingua Latina* (Leipzig 1910) [G]; F. Buecheler, *Petronii Saturae*<sup>8</sup> (Berlin 1922, rep. 1958) 255–328 [B]; B. Riposati, *M. Terenti Varronis De Vita Populi Romani* (Milan 1939) [Ri].

116. Jerome's list (preserved by Rufinus in the preface to his translation of Origen's exegesis on *Genesis*; cf. *Apologia* 2.20 and Jerome's *De Vir. Ill.* 54) enumerates some 39 works and a total of 490 books. The list is admittedly not complete. Ritschl (*Op. Phil.* 3.487f.) calculates the whole number of his works at 74, consisting of about 620 books. See also A. Klotz, "Der Katalog der varronischen Schriften," *Hermes* 46 (1911) 1.17.

117. *Ecl.* 7.21 *bis* (A xv 10b), 58; 8.29 *bis* (Me 4, 5; F 431); *Geo. praef.*; *Geo.* 1.21 (M xiv 4; A xiv 2), 43, 151 (A xiv 75b; F 450), 166 (cf. *Rust.* 1. 22), 186 (F 422; G 126), 270 (M viii 2), 315 (M p. clxxxvii; A xiv 79b; F 164); *Geo.* 2.201

(cf. Mi xi 2; F 403); *Geo.* 3.1 (M xv 4; A xiv 84), 18 (*HRRel* II, p. 23, 23; F 188), 24 (F 315), 273, 446; *Geo.* 4.63 (cf. *Rust.* 3.16.10); *Aen.* 1.22 (Mi xiii 5; F 395), 52 (Mi xii 5; F 378), 172 (F 280b; G 77a), 246 (Mi x 6), 277 (Mi viii 2), 382 (Mi ii 2; Mi ii 10), 408 (Me 2), 449 (F 458), 532 (Mi iii 3; F 397), 648 (F 441), 697, 740 (Mi v 1; F 32; G 31); *Aen.* 2.81 (G 42), 166 (*HRRel* II, p. 9, 1), 268 (Mi xv 4; cf. *Ling.* 6.5 ff.); *Aen.* 3.12 (cf. F 374), 256 (Mi ii 3), 386 (Mi x 7; F 386), 444 (M iv 2), 445 (M iv 3; F 179), 578 (cf. M p. clxxxix); *Aen.* 4.167 (cf. *Ling.* 5.61), 427 (Mi ii 16); *Aen.* 5.4 (cf. Mi ii 11), 45 (M xiv 8; F 424), 80 (R p. 258; F 108), 145 (F 420), 269 (Mi xxii 13), 295 (Mi xiv 2), 409 (F 28; G 32), 411 (Mi x 8), 412 (F 222), 560 (Mi iv 5; F 406), 704 (*HRRel* II, p. 9, 1), 824 (Mi xii 6); *Aen.* 6.36 *bis* (cf. *Aen.* 3.445 above; M iv 4), 72 (cf. M iv 4), 74 (M iv 5), 216 (Ri iii 111), 224 (F 428; Ri iii 108a), 273 (F 460), 304 (F 28), 638 (F 413), 703 (Mi i 8; A i 26), 733 (A i 27), 760 (*HRRel* II, p. 23, 22); *Aen.* 7.176 (*HRRel* II, p. 23, 21), 563 (Mi xi 6; F 381), 601 (R p. 258; Mi i 13; F 232), 657 (*HRRel* II, p. 22, 18; F 187), 664 (Mi xxii 4; F 425), 712 (Mi xi 2; cf. F 403); *Aen.* 8.51 (F 398), 128 (Me 1; Mi xxii 11), 233, 322 (Mi x 2; F 394), 564 (M xiv 11; Mi i 11); *Aen.* 9.192 (F 444), 600 (*HRRel* II, p. 23, 20), 615 (F 283; G 84b); *Aen.* 10.174, 175, 894 (M x 3; F 151); *Aen.* 11.97 (R p. 258; F 108), 787 (Mi i 5; cf. F 391); *Aen.* 12.7 (Mi vi 1; cf. *Ling.* 7.52).

118. *Ecl.* 5.66 (M v 2; F 412); 6.72; 7.33 (Ri i 58b); 8.12 *bis* (Mi xxii 12; F 432), 75 (cf. *Ling.* 5.11ff.), 99; *Geo.* 1.11 (*Ling.* 7.36), 19 *bis* (R p. 256; F 77, 78), 34 (B 560), 43 (Peter in *Abh. sächs. Ges. Wiss.* 20 [1903] no. 3, p. 216), 75 (F 31; G 34), 170 (cf. *Ling.* 5.135), 275 (Mi xvi 6); *Geo.* 2.168 (B 17), 336 (B 84), 478 (B 231), 533; *Geo.* 3.113 (R p. 253), 313 (*Rust.* 2.11.12), 431 (F 21; G 28); *Geo.* 4.63 (cf. *Rust.* 3.16.10), 265 (M vi 5); *Aen.* 1.42 (Mi iii 2), 43 (*Ling.* 7.23), 108 (Reit, p. 523), 112 (*ibid.*), 122? (see above, note 91), 182 (Mi xxv 5), 378 *bis* (Mi ii 8), 415, 448 (B 577), 505 *bis* (*Ling.* 5.161), 595 (F 421; G 103), 649, 727 (F 428; Ri iii 107); *Aen.* 2.141 (M xiv 3; A xiv 1), 225 (M vi 3; F 154), 512 *bis* (M vi 2), 636 (Mi ii 9), 801 (cf. Mi ii 10); *Aen.* 3.12 (cf. *Ling.* 5.58), 67, 85 (cf. R p. 247), 113 (M xvi 17; A xvi 47), 134 (M v 5; F 158), 148 *bis* (cf. Mi ii 8), 167 (Mi ii 7), 279 (Mi ii 13), 334 (Mi iii 2; F 384), 349 *bis* (Mi ii 12), 359 (Mi iii 3; R p. 253), 366 (F 440), 392 (Mi ii 18), 443 (cf. F 66; *Ling.* 7.36), 516 (*Ling.* 7.74), 631; *Aen.* 4.45 (R p. 258), 56 (cf. *Aen.* 2.225 above), 59 (A xvi 56), 166 (F 446), 219 (M v 3; F 128), 682 (Mi ii 11); *Aen.* 5.19 (Reit, p. 523); *Aen.* 8.51 (M xiv 10; Mi viii 1), 230 (F 426), 275 (M xiv 1; A i 22e), 276 (Mi ii 5), 285 (Mi ii 5), 330 (Mi x 3; cf. F p. 117, 15), 363 (M v 6), 526 (R p. 258), 564 (M xv 9; A xv 20; F 369), 600 (Mi ii 3; F 400), 698, 710 (Reit, p. 523); *Aen.* 9.4 (M xv 10; Ri ii 82a), 8 (Mi ii 14), 52 (R p. 247), 581 (M xv 11), 603 (Mi xxii 3; F 122), 707 (Mi iii 8; F 382); *Aen.* 10.13 (Mi x 14; F 379), 76 (F 375; Ri ii 82b; cf. M xv 10), 145 (Mi xi 3; F 385); *Aen.* 11.143 (Ri iii 109), 211 (cf. F 158), 306 (Mi ii 6), 503 (Mi xxii 5), 682 (Mi xxii 7; F 455), 743 (F 368); *Aen.* 12.121 (Mi xxii 6), 139 *bis* (M xiv 15; A xiv 88; F 6; G 2), 603; cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) 1.10ff.

119. The *Res Divinae* are cited by book number on *Aen.* 1.382, 3.256, and 6.703. The first book of *Rust.* is cited on *Geo.* 4.63; the quotation in question, however, is found in book three.

120. One reference to the second book of Cato's *Origines* (*Aen.* 11.700) and one to the first book of Lucilius (*Aen.* 10.104).

121. The *Libri Antiquitates* in two parts (August., *De Civ. D.* 6.3): *Res Humanae* 1-25; *Res Divinae* 26-41. Jerome's list in error gives 45 as the total number of books. Cf. Schanz-Hosius I<sup>4</sup> § 187.1.

122. Cited here as the *De Ludis Theatralibus*, possibly the tenth book of the work in question, given by Augustine (above, note 121) as *De Ludis Scaenicis*, cf. M x 3.

123. The last two are cited only here in antiquity; on the *De Gradibus* see Ritschl (above, note 116) 473 who assumes it was part of a juristic work, but cf. Schanz, "Beiträge zur römischen Literaturgeschichte," *RhMus* 54 (1899) 23ff., who thinks the work was of a more comprehensive character, e.g., *gradus aetatis*, *gradus animae*, *gradus vitae humanae*. He might have added *gradus* as a grammatical term, e.g., *gradus agendi* (*Ling.* 6.41, 51, 77); *gradus explanandi* (*ibid.* 5.7-9); *gradus analogiae* (*ibid.* 10.83f.); *gradus numerorum* (*ibid.* 10.86f.); see H. Dahlmann in *RE* suppl. 6 s.v. *Varro* 1255.

124. E. Schwarz, "De M. Terentii Varronis Apud Sanctos Patres Vestigiis," *Fleckeisen's Jahrb.*, suppl. 16 (1888) 405-99; Agahd (above, note 115); S. Angus, *The Sources of the First Ten Books of Augustine's 'De Civitate Dei'* (Princeton 1906).

125. For *De Civ. D.* at least; see Teuffel<sup>6</sup> § 440.7b.

126. The continued interest in such subjects in later antiquity is evident from the compilation of such a curious work as the *Origo Gentis Romanae*; see Teuffel<sup>6</sup> § 414.5; Schanz IV<sup>2</sup> § 798.

127. The degree of relationship is debated; see H. J. Rose, *The Roman Questions of Plutarch* (Oxford 1924) 28ff.

128. Reading *παύσιν* for *ἀπαύσιν*; see O. Schneider, *Callimachea* II (Leipzig 1873) 36.

129. *Aen.* 1.408; 7.778 (Pfeiffer 189, 190). Cf. *Ecl.* 10.12; *Aen.* 3.16 (Pfeiffer 696, 697).

130. *Aen.* 3.16. Euphorion is referred to in eight other places in S. There are no further references in the D scholia.

131. *Hum.*: *Aen.* 2.636; 3.148, 167; 8.276; 9.603; 12.121. *Div.*: *Geo.* 4.265; *Aen.* 1.42; 2.225, 512; 3.134; 4.219; 8.363; 12.139.

132. That Petrarch saw these works is not credible; see his *Epistulae Ad Fam.* 24.6 and P. de Nolhac, *Pétrarque et l'humanisme*<sup>2</sup> (Paris 1907) 1.267; 2.109-15.

133. *Geo.* 1.11, 75; 3.431; *Aen.* 1.43, 505; 12.139.

134. *Ecl.* 7.33; *Geo.* 1.11, 19, 43; 2.168, 478; 3.431; 4.265; *Aen.* 1.43, 108, 112, 505, 727; 2.512; 4.45; 5.19; 8.526; 9.52; 12.121, 139 *bis*.

135. The classifications are in some cases rather arbitrary due to the overlapping of subject matter. *Rel.*: *Ecl.* 7.21 *bis*; *Geo.* 1.21, 270; *Aen.* 1.277; 3.12, 444, 445; 5.45; 6.36 *bis*, 72, 74, 216; 10.175. *Gram.*: *Ecl.* 7.58; *Geo.* 1.151, 166, 186; 3.1; *Aen.* 1.22, 172, 246, 449, 532, 648, 740; 2.268; 5.145; 6.224, 273, 304, 638; 7.664; 8.51, 233, 322; 9.192; 12.7. *Hist.*: *Geo.* 2.201; 3.24; *Aen.* 1.52, 697; 2.81, 166; 3.386, 578; 4.167, 427; 5.4, 269, 411, 560, 824; 7.563, 601, 712; 8.564; 9.615; 10.174; 11.787.

136. *Rel.*: *Ecl.* 6.72; 8.12 *bis*; *Aen.* 1.378, 415, 505; 2.141, 512; 3.12, 67, 85, 113, 359; 4.56, 59; 8.275, 285, 564, 698; 9.4, 581; 10.76. *Gram.*: *Ecl.* 5.66; *Geo.* 1.170; *Aen.* 1.122, 448, 595; 3.366, 443, 516, 631; 4.166; 8.230, 330; 10.145; 11.211, 682, 743. *Hist.*: *Ecl.* 8.75; *Geo.* 1.34, 275; 2.533; *Aen.* 1.182, 378; 2.801; 3.279, 334, 349 *bis*, 392; 4.682; 8.51, 600; 9.8, 707; 10.13; 11.143, 306, 503; 12.603.

137. S: *Geo. praef.*, 3.273, 446. D: *Ecl.* 8.99; *Geo.* 3.313; 4.63; *Aen.* 1.649.

138. Cf. J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*<sup>3</sup> (London 1911) 3.391; A. Brelich, *Die geheime Schutzgottheit von Rom* (Zürich 1949).



139. See Wissowa, *Ges. Abh.* 95ff.; B. Hemberg, *Die Kabiren* (Uppsala 1950); cf. R. B. Lloyd, "Penatibus et Magins Dis," *AJP* 77 (1956) 38-46. A collection of the *testimonia* relative to the Samothracian deities will be found in N. Lewis, *Samothrace I* (New York 1958).

140. Cf. *Ling.* 5.58, 65; August. *De Civ. D.* 7.28; Tert. *Ad Nat.* 2.12, etc.

141. References are to Lindsay's edition (Oxford 1904): *Ecl.* 1.58 (*Most.* 46); 3.16 (*Aul.* 325); *Geo.* 1.344 (*Aul.* 354); 2.115 (*Mil.* 412), 288 (*Am.* fr. xii); 3.497 (*Most.* 218); 4.296 (*Mil.* 504); *Aen. praef.*, 1.140 (*Ps.* 1172 ?), 478 bis (*Ps.* 164 ?; fr. 166), 480 (fr. dub. iii), 703 (*Ps.* 178), 724 (fr. 159); *Aen.* 2.13 (*Bacch.* 953), 51 (*Ps.* 823); *Aen.* 3.42 (voc. 'scelerare'), 484 (*Aul.* 508 ?), 539 (*Vid.* fr. iii ?; cf. fr. 167, *Aul.* 174), 686 (*Men.* 110); *Aen.* 4.82 (cf. *Am.* 640; fr. dub. vi), 149 (*Mil.* 1106), 229 (*Am.* 719); *Aen.* 5.19 (*Most.* 767), 112 (*Most.* 644); *Aen.* 6.62 (*Bacch.* 793), 90 (*Aul.* 555), 205 (fr. 168), 222 (*Mil.* 628), 229 (fr. 169), 383 (*Bacch.* 7), 775 (fr. 170); *Aen.* 7.88 (*Curc.* 266), 715 (*Poen.* 478); *Aen.* 8.310 (fr. 172), 564 (*Am.* 461), 724 (*Poen.* 975); *Aen.* 9.4 (*Most.* 1103 ?), 263 (*Most.* 644), 645 (*As.* 383); *Aen.* 10.198 (*Aul.* 556), 424 (*Am.* 294); *Aen.* 11.64 (*Mil.* 628), 65 (*Pers.* 305); *Aen.* 12.7 (*Mil.* 75), 87 (*Mil.* 658), 519 (fr. 167).

142. *Ecl.* 5.58 bis (*Pers.* 23; *Mil.* 61); 8.71 (*Bacch.* 27); 9.21 (*Mil.* 1090); 10.69 (*Pers.* 1); *Geo.* 1.74 (*Bacch.* 305), 124 (*Addictus*), 137 (*Men.* 77), 189 (*Aul.* 22), 208 (*Am.* 276), 266 (*Merc.* 988); *Geo.* 2.134 (*Mil.* 648), 193 (*Aul.* 332), 344 (*Merc.* 860), 348 (*Rud.* 100), 393 (*Mil.* 61); *Geo.* 3.222 (*Cas.* 344); *Geo.* 4.39 (*Most.* 275), 170 (fr. 165), 171 (*Bacch.* 10), 376 (*Capt.* 521), 561 (*Aul.* 575); *Aen.* 1.16 (*Poen.* 1187), 191 (*Am.* 223), 233 (*Mil.* 405), 268 bis (*Cas.* 994; *Am.* 98), 378 (*Ps.* 268), 435 (*Truc.* 269), 460 (*Mil.* 512), 543 bis (*Mil.* 1209; *Cas.* 346), 636 (*Merc.* 4), 738 (fr. 162); *Aen.* 2.62 (*Ep.* 371), 206 (*Am.* 1108), 357 (*Truc.* 268 ?; cf. fr. 163); *Aen.* 3.46 (*Aul.* 45); *Aen.* 4.194 bis (*Bacch.* 20; *Curc.* 3), 231 (*Trin.* 340); 267 (*Men.* 102), 301 (*Ps.* 109), 373 (*Men.* 121), 424 bis (*Curc.* 5; *As.* 172), 533 (fr. 164), 608 bis (*Mil.* 951; *Curc.* 434), 662 (*Am.* 98); *Aen.* 8.127 (*Am.* fr. xiii), 632 (*Men.* 19); *Aen.* 9.327 (*Bacch.* 85), 373 (*ibid.*), 399 (fr. 165), 484 bis (*Ps.* 817, 1054), 641 (*Ps.* 179), 693 (*Most.* 342); *Aen.* 10.231 bis (*Ps.* 661; *Most.* 220), 493 (*Bacch.* 25), 532 (*Mil.* 1220), 559 (*Capt.* 123), 615 (*Cas.* 39), 727 (*Ps.* 10), 785 (*As.* 35); *Aen.* 11.160 (*Ep.* 177), 343 (*Most.* 1102), 361 (*As.* 728), 725 (*Am.* 507); *Aen.* 12.7 (*Bacch.* 8), 587 (cf. *Aul.* 297); cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) 1.13ff. His list of quotations from Plautus is very incomplete.

143. See Schanz-Hosius I<sup>4</sup> § 31; E. H. Clift, *Latin Pseudepigrapha* (Baltimore 1945) 59-65.

144. *Geo.* 1.124, the only quotation from this play which we have. If we may trust Gellius (3.3.14), Varro regarded it also as genuine.

145. Quoted twice by title (*Aen.* 4.424; 10.615), but the lines are rather from *Asinaria* (172) and *Casina* (39-41). The corruption of *Cistellaria* for *Asinaria* could be explained by the similar endings. The change from *Casina* to *Cistellaria* is harder to explain, unless we conjecture an intermediate *Asinaria*.

146. *Aen.* 3.539 relating only in part to *Vidularia*, fr. iii (cf. *Aul.* 174; fr. 167).

147. It will be noted that the greatest number of quotations are from this play in both S. and D.

148. Also cited on *Geo.* 4.39 in error for *Most.* 275.

149. Of the 47 references in S, six do not quote Plautus' actual words (*Aen. praef.*; 2.13; 4.82; 5.112; 9.263, 645) and twelve are quotations from lines which do not seem to be extant (*Geo.* 2.288; *Aen.* 1.478, 480, 724; 3.42, 539 ?; 6.205, 229, 383, 775; 8.310; 12.519).

150. Checking with the Lindsay edition: *Geo.* 2.115; *Aen.* 2.51; 3.484, 686; 5.19; 6.62, 222; 11.64, 65. I have not considered "modernized" spellings as constituting any variation.

151. *Ecl.* 3.16; *Aen.* 1.703; 8.564 (where S preserves the more authentic *faxit*, mss. *faciat*), 724; 10.198.

152. *Geo.* 1.344; 3.497; 4.296; *Aen.* 1.478 (*Ps.* 164?); 4.149; 6.90; 7.88, 715; 9.4; 10.424; 12.7, 87 and the examples cited.

153. The S mss. do not all agree; M has *tibi obustos habeas turtures*. Cf. Lindsay *ad loc.*

154. There are eleven quotations from apparently non extant passages: *Ecl.* 8.71; *Geo.* 1.124; 4.170, 171; *Aen.* 1.738; 4.194 (*Bacch.* 20), 533; 8.127; 9.399; 10.493; 12.7. A twelfth is not really a quotation: *Aen.* 12.587.

155. *Ecl.* 5.58 *bis*; *Geo.* 1.74, 208; 2.193, 393; 4.39; *Aen.* 1.16, 191, 268 *bis*, 435, 460, 543 (*Mil.* 1209), 636; 2.62; 3.46; 4.267, 424 (*Curc.* 5), 662; 9.373, 484 (*Ps.* 817), 693; 10.231 (*Ps.* 661), 532, 785; 11.343. Two of these skip (*Ecl.* 5.58; *Geo.* 2.393 = *Mil.* 61 ff.) but present no variation in wording.

156. See *Geo.* 1.137, 266; *Aen.* 4.424 (*As.* 172); 9.484 (*Ps.* 1054).

157. See *Ecl.* 10.69; *Geo.* 1.189; *Aen.* 1.543 (*Cas.* 346); 2.206; 4.194 (*Curc.* 3), 608 (*Mil.* 951).

158. See *Ecl.* 9.21; *Aen.* 4.608 (*Curc.* 434); 10.559, 615; 11.725.

159. See *Geo.* 4.376; *Aen.* 1.378; 4.231; 10.231 (*Most.* 220), 727.

160. D quotes the same line correctly on *Aen.* 9.373.

161. *Geo.* 2.134, 344; *Aen.* 2.357; 4.301, 373; 8.632; 11.160.

162. References are to the Kauer-Lindsay edition (Oxford 1926): *Ecl.* 2.14 (*And.* 555), 34 (*Heaut.* 72); 3.1 (*Eun.* 321), 53 (*Heaut.* 56), 106 (*Eun.* 48); 4.10 (*And.* 473); 8.43 (*Eun.* 1053); 10.19 (*Heaut.* 776); *Geo.* 1.57 (*Eun.* 413), 94 (*Heaut.* 88), 96 (*And.* 402), 187 (*Heaut.* 828), 287 (*Eun.* 204), 302 (*Phor.* 44), 369 (*Adel.* 377); *Geo.* 2.94 (*Eun.* 729); *Geo.* 3.37 (*And.* 857); *Geo.* 4.127 (*And.* 429), 212 (*And.* 169), 444 (*Phor.* 732), 459 (*Adel.* 196); *Aen.* 1.8 (*And.* 473), 35 (*Eun.* 400), 92 (*Hec.* 320), 106 (*Heaut.* 825), 135 (*And.* 164), 140 (*And.* 199), 181 (*And.* 55), 208 (*Adel.* 329), 261 (*Eun.* 445), 267 (*Hec.* 1), 377 (*Hec.* 610), 399 (*Adel.* 966), 410 *ter* (*Heaut.* 960; *Hec.* 205; *et laudatur*), 436 (*Eun.* 268), 460 (*Eun.* 105), 502 (*Hec.* 107), 519 (*And.* 621), 548 (*Heaut.* 71), 567 (*Eun.* 204), 601 (*And.* 473), 644 (*Hec.* 58), 647 (*Eun.* 471), 669 (*Eun.* 288), 686 (*Eun.* 732), 720 (*And.* 339); *Aen.* 2.1 (*And.* 85), 3 (*And.* 533), 12 (*And.* 429), 60 (*And.* 576), 87 (*Adel.* 384), 155 (*Eun.* 48), 196 (*Eun.* 67), 247 (*Heaut.* 63), 357 (*And.* 27), 375 (*Adel.* 231), 463 (*Adel.* 196), 715 (*Heaut.* 228); *Aen.* 3.278 (*Adel.* 871), 353 (*Eun.* 1082), 493 (*And.* 696), 594 (*Eun.* 236), 595 (*Heaut.* 625), 639 (*Eun.* 580), 670 (*Heaut.* 301); *Aen.* 4.1 (*Eun.* 448), 83 (*Adel.* 668), 96 (*Eun.* 204), 133 (*Heaut.* 240), 166 (*Eun.* 604), 295 (*Phor.* 635), 318 (*And.* 294), 335 *bis* (*Adel.* 681; *And.* 139), 373 (*Adel.* 330), 381 (*Adel.* 134), 534 (*Eun.* 46), 590 (*Adel.* 196); *Aen.* 5.80 (*And.* 696), 122 (*Eun.* 32), 343 (*Adel.* 409), 613 (*And.* 406), 655 (*Heaut.* 190), 669 (*Phor.* 71); *Aen.* 6.218 (*Eun.* 348), 497 (*Eun.* 356), 544 (*And.* 868), 664 (*And.* 330), 890 (*And.* 980); *Aen.* 7.30 (*Eun.* 629), 49 (*Adel.* 196), 268 (*And.* 100), 427 (*Eun.* 204), 556 (*Adel.* 698), 629 (*Eun.* 204); *Aen.* 8.77 (*non citatur*), 84 (*And.* 282), 127 *bis* (*Phor.* 140; *Adel.* 491), 307 (*Eun.* 236), 412 (*And.* 74), 577 (*Phor.* 575), 632 (*Adel.* 377), 653 (*Phor.* 269); *Aen.* 9.230 (*And.* 610), 377 (*Eun.* 635), 482 (*Phor.* 549), 693 (*And.* 708), 778 (*Eun.* 46); *Aen.* 10.106 (*Hec.* 20), 133 (*Eun.* 474), 532 (*Hec.* 212), 612 (*And.* 857), 848 (*Eun.* 48), 861 (*And.* 61); *Aen.* 11.97 (*And.* 696), 152 (*Adel.* 560), 361 (*And.* 458), 532 (*And.* 473), 537 (*And.* 538), 545 *bis* (*And.* 406; *Phor.* 978), 687 (*Hec.*

383), 699 (*Phor.* 175), 704 (*And.* 183), 788 (*Adel.* 849), 801 (*Adel.* 126); *Aen.* 12.120 bis (*Eun.* 601; *And.* 726), 257 (*Phor.* 311), 296 (*And.* 82), 352 (*And.* 610), 584 (*And.* 533), 618 (*And.* 933), 816 (*Hec.* 268); cf. Harvard Servius on *Aen.* 1.215 *app. crit.* 2 (*Eun.* 105).

163. *Ecl.* 6.50 (*Heaut.* 531), 58 (*Heaut.* 476); 7.9 (*And.* 29), 31 bis (*And.* 959; *Phor.* 830); 10.46 (*Heaut.* 192); *Geo.* 1.7 (*Phor.* 119), 125 (*Hec.* 79), 248 bis (*Eun.* 604; *Phor.* 826); *Geo.* 3.60 (*And.* 473), 305 bis (*Hec.* 618; *Eun.* 582); *Geo.* 4.104 (*Eun.* 268), 293 (*Eun.* 471), 444 (*And.* 876), 488 (*Phor.* 1014), 561 (*Heaut.* 300); *Aen.* 1.6 (*Adel.* 361), 37 (*Eun.* 51), 58 (*Adel.* 196), 73 ter (*Phor.* 62; *And.* 716; 960), 152 (*And.* 933), 203 (*Eun.* 1061), 233 (*Adel.* 961), 392 (*Phor.* 525), 445 (*Adel.* 501), 548 (*Phor.* 20), 567 (*Eun.* 312), 573 (*Eun.* 653), 605 (*Adel.* 304), 657 bis (*Heaut.* 365; *Phor.* 259); *Aen.* 2.235 (*Phor.* 318), 324 (*Adel.* 196), 424 bis (*Adel.* 790; *Eun.* 54), 482 (*Eun.* 653), 502 (*Eun.* 943), 531 (*And.* 127), 559 (*Eun.* 83), 610 (*And.* 473); *Aen.* 3.140 (*Adel.* 498), 216 (*Eun.* 684), 217 (*Adel.* 985), 261 (*And.* 533), 430 bis (*Adel.* 28; *Heaut.* 882), 477 (*Adel.* 537); *Aen.* 4.10 (*Eun.* 317), 31 (*Eun.* 934), 54 (*Eun.* 587), 195 (*Adel.* 93), 376 (*Adel.* 197), 379 (*Adel.* 35), 408 (*Adel.* 665), 415 (*And.* 311), 435 (*Hec.* 605), 448 (*Hec.* 123), 461 (*Eun.* 454), 480 (*Eun.* 471), 606 (*Heaut.* 374); *Aen.* 9.1 (*Eun.* 320), 44 (*Phor.* 635), 229 (*Eun.* 304), 289 (*Heaut.* 645), 424 (*And.* 31); *Aen.* 10.284 (*Phor.* 203), 432 (*Adel.* 907), 529 (*Eun.* 653), 567 (*Adel.* 50); *Aen.* 11.352 bis (*Eun.* 1030; 1084), 354 (*Heaut.* 379), 373 (*And.* 849), 486 (*Phor.* 318); *Aen.* 12.342 (*And.* 345), 453 bis (*Eun.* 653; *Adel.* 319), 538 (*Phor.* 74), 589 (*Heaut.* 225), 694 bis (*And.* 629; *Eun.* 924). Cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) 1.16f., but his figures on Terence are so filled with omissions and errors as to be virtually unusable.

164. It is worthy of mention that Donatus in his commentary seems to have treated the *Andria* and *Eunuchus* first and in all likelihood at greater length. The extant scholia on these two plays, at any rate, are about equal to those of the other plays combined. *Heauton* is of course lacking. Cf. Waldrop (above, note 14) 140. On Donatus' order in discussing the plays see Wessner's edition I (Leipzig 1902) *praef.* xxiv ff.

165. S: *Geo.* 4.459; *Aen.* 1.8, 267, 601 (but cf. Harvard Servius *ad loc.*), 647, 686; 2.3, 12, 60, 463; 5.80, 122; 7.49, 427, 629; 8.307; 12.584. Thirteen of these are either from the *Andria* or the *Eunuchus*. D: *Aen.* 1.58; 2.324, 531, 610; 9.44; 10.529. Incidentally D supplies the name in three places where it is omitted by S: *Aen.* 7.629; 8.307; 12.584.

166. *And.* 127 (D: *Aen.* 2.531), 429 (S: *Aen.* 2.12), 473 (S: *Aen.* 1.8, 601; D: *Aen.* 2.610), 533 (S: *Aen.* 2.3), 576 (S: *Aen.* 2.60), 696 (S: *Aen.* 5.80); *Eun.* 32 (S: *Aen.* 5.122), 204 (S: *Aen.* 7.427), 471 (S: *Aen.* 1.647), 653 (D: *Aen.* 10.529), 732 (S: *Aen.* 1.686); *Phor.* 635 (D: *Aen.* 9.44); *Hec.* 1 (S: *Aen.* 1.267); *Adel.* 196 (S: *Geo.* 4.459; *Aen.* 2.463; 7.49; D: *Aen.* 1.58; 2.324).

167. *And.* 429 (S: *Geo.* 4.127), 473 (S: *Ecl.* 4.10; *Aen.* 11.532; D: *Geo.* 3.60), 533 (D: *Aen.* 3.261; cf. 12.584), 696 (S: *Aen.* 3.493; 11.97); *Eun.* 204 (S: *Geo.* 1.287; *Aen.* 1.567; 4.96; cf. 7.629), 471 (D: *Geo.* 4.293; *Aen.* 4.480), 653 (D: *Aen.* 1.573; 2.482; 12.453); *Phor.* 635 (S: *Aen.* 4.295); *Adel.* 196 (S: *Aen.* 4.590).

168. *And.* 127 (*ad Hec.* 143), 429 (*Phor.* 74), 473 (*And.* 210), 533 (*Eun.* 790), 696 (*Adel.* 622); *Eun.* 32 (*Eun.* 302), 204 (*Eun.* 954; *Adel.* 40), 653 (*Adel.* 807). See also Waldrop (above, note 14); the material he examines there, however, leads him to conclude that if a relationship is to be established between the author of the Vergil commentary and the author of the Terence commentary "VC probably was earlier than TC in origin."



169. It should be noted that there are few if any quotations in the D scholia on *Aen.* 5-7. This can be quickly seen by consulting the lists of quotations in D from Ennius (above, note 33), Cato (note 72), Lucilius (note 96), Varro (note 118), Plautus (note 142), and Terence (note 163). It has already been observed that the D scholia are much sparser for books 6 and 7 of the *Aeneid* (see above, note 55). This is true to some extent of book 5 as well.

170. "Terence Quotations in Servius," *CQ* 24 (1930) 183-87, and "Terence Quotations in Servius Auctus," *CQ* 25 (1931) 151-55; cf. Kirchner (above, note 26) 2.7ff., who checks the quotations in Servius against the old edition of Umpfenbach (Berlin 1870).

171. Checking with the Kauer-Lindsay edition: *Ecl.* 2.14; 3.1, 106; 4.10; 8.43; 10.19; *Geo.* 1.57, 187, 287, 302, 369; 3.37 (S and T mss. offer the same variants; Craig, p. 184a); 4.212, 459; *Aen.* 1.8, 35, 106, 135, 181, 267, 377, 399, 410 (*Heaut.* 960), 436, 460, 519, 567, 601, 644, 647, 686, 720; 2.1, 3, 60, 87, 155, 247, 357, 375, 463; 3.278, 493, 595, 639; 4.96, 133, 166, 295, 318, \*335 (*And.* 139), 381, 534, 590; 5.80, 122, 343, 655, 669; 6.218, 544; 7.30, 49, \*268, 427, 629; 8.84, 127 (*Phor.* 140), 632 (S at least); 9.230, 377, 778; 10.106, 612 (see above, *Geo.* 3.37), 848, 861; 11.97, 532, 687, 704, 801; 12.296, 352 (Craig, p. 185b), 584, 618. Craig has omitted the italicized references from his list. Those starred he finds "loose or curtailed"; I find they agree (at least one S ms.) with the extant text. Again I have not regarded "modernized" spellings as constituting any variation.

172. *Ecl.* 3.53; *Geo.* 1.96; *Aen.* 1.502; 2.715; 8.577; 10.532; 11.699, 788; 12.120 (*And.* 726), 816. Craig lists almost all of these as "having no claim to serious consideration as citations." This is too harsh for simple changes of word order: e.g., *vel virtus tua me vel vicinitas, quod ego in propinqua parte amicitiae puto* (*Heaut.* 56f.) quoted *vel virtus me tua vel vicinitas, quod ego in propinqua parte amicitiae puto* (*Ecl.* 3.53).

173. *Ecl.* 2.34 (Craig, p. 185c); *Geo.* 2.94; *Aen.* 1.208, 548; 2.196; 3.353; 4.335 (*Adel.* 681), 373; 5.613 (*alicunde* supplied by D); 6.497; 8.412; 9.693; 11.361.

174. *Geo.* 1.94 (*depone* for *adpone*); 4.444 (*agressa* for *egressa*); *Aen.* 1.261 (*remordeat* for *mordeat*; Craig, p. 185d); 3.594 (*sertum* for *sentum*; see Craig, p. 185g and here below); 4.1 (*sit* for *fit*); 6.664 (*poni* for *adponi*); 11.545 (*And.* 406; *aliunde* for *alicunde*).

175. *Geo.* 4.127 (*videre* for *videri*); *Aen.* 1.669 (*quae* for *qui* and *placeant* for *placeat*; Craig, p. 185e); 2.12 (*videre* for *videri*); 3.670 (*dominam* for *dominas*); 4.83 (*praesentem* for *praesenti*; Craig, p. 185g); 6.890 (*restat* for *restet*); 8.307 (*obsitus* for *obsitum*).

176. *Aen.* 1.410 (*Hec.* 205; *causam* for *rem*); 8.653 (*pro* for *cum*); 9.482 (*quin* for *tum*; Craig, p. 185g).

177. *Aen.* 1.92; 7.556; 8.127 (*Adel.* 491); 11.152, 537, 545 (*Phor.* 978); 12.257.

178. *Ecl.* 2.34; *Aen.* 1.548 and *Geo.* 4.127; *Aen.* 2.12.

179. See also *Aen.* 6.664 and 3.594 (discussed below).

180. Wessner's edition of Donatus' Terence commentary III (Leipzig 1908) 103.

181. H. Gerstenberg, *De Eugraphio Terentii Interprete* (Jena 1886) 36ff., examines Eugraphius' relationship not only to the Terence commentary of Donatus, but also the Vergil commentary of Servius. From a list of parallels he concludes that Donatus is the common source, i.e., his Vergil commentary as

well as his Terence commentary. Gerstenberg is certainly correct, and when, as in the instance at hand, the parallels are in S and Eugephius and not in the Terence commentary, the lost commentary of Donatus on Vergil is the logical source.

182. Whether equally plausible explanations are behind other comments which seem to hinge on incorrect readings (*Aen.* 3.217 in D; *Aen.* 8.653 in S) we are at a loss to say. Interestingly enough, however, in the first of these Eugephius reads *proluuium* with D (cf. Nonius, Lindsay p. 594). See Waldrop (above, note 14) 137ff.

183. *Ecl.* 6.58; 7.9; 10.46; *Geo.* 3.60; 4.444; *Aen.* 1.58, 73 (*And.* 960), 152, 233, 445, 567, 573, 605, 657 (*Phor.* 259); 2.235, 324, 424 *bis* (Craig, p. 155, 4), 482, 559, 610; 3.261, 430 (*Adel.* 28); 4.10, 31, 54, 415, 435 (Craig, p. 154), 448, 461, 480, 606; 9.1, 229, 289, 424; 10.284, 432 (Craig, p. 154, 4), 529, 567 (Craig, p. 154, 5); 11.352 (*Eun.* 1030), 354 (with  $\Sigma$ ), 486; 12.342, 453 (*Eun.* 653), 538. Again those in italics Craig has not listed.

184. *Ecl.* 7.31 (*And.* 959); *Geo.* 1.7; *Aen.* 1.73 (*And.* 716); 12.453 (*Adel.* 319), 589. Craig (p. 151f.) classifies these as "loose or curtailed."

185. *Ecl.* 6.50 (*timuit* for *timui*); *Geo.* 1.125 (*quaerit* for *quaeret*), 248 (*Phor.* 826: *ostentata* for *ostenta*); 3.305 (*Eun.* 582: *lavent* for *lavet*); 4.104 (*hi* for *hic*; Craig, p. 155, 3), 488 (*conmeritam* for *meritum* and *quae* for *qui*); *Aen.* 1.37 (*incipias* for *incipies* and *pertendas* for *pertendes*), 203 (*sunt* for *sient*); 2.531 (*evadat* for *evadas*); 3.140 (*illum* for *illas*); 4.195 (*esse* for *est*), 379 (*redit* for *rediit*), 408 (*credis* for *creditis* and *cum illa* for *illam*; Craig, p. 154, 3); 11.373 (*responde* for *respondes*); 12.694 (*Eun.* 924: *capit* for *capiet*).

186. *Aen.* 1.548 (*beneficiis* for *benedictis*); 2.502 (*adulescentem* for *adulescentulum*); 3.217 (*proluuium* for *prolubium* and *haec* for *istaec*), 477 (*en* for *em* and *quid est* for *quidnamst*); 12.694 (*And.* 629: *modo* for *immo*).

187. *Aen.* 1.6 (*incedere* for *ire* and *quid* for *ubi*); 3.216 (*heu* for *tibi*; Craig, p. 154, 1); 9.44 (*illa* for *haec*).

188. *Ecl.* 7.31 (*Phor.* 830); *Geo.* 1.248 (*Eun.* 604); 3.305 (*Hec.* 618; Craig, p. 155, 2); 4.561; *Aen.* 1.657 (*Heut.* 365); 3.430 (*Heaut.* 882); 11.352 (*Eun.* 1084; Craig, p. 154, 2).

189. *Geo.* 4.293 (*in* is certainly a scribal addition; Craig, p. 152); *Aen.* 1.73 (*Phor.* 62), 392; 4.376.

190. See Craig (above, note 170) 152.

191. It is curious in the light of this that Waldrop (above, note 14) 139f. should conclude that the original commentary quoted Terence invariably from memory.

192. I am dependent upon the indices of the editions of Lindsay: Festus (Leipzig 1933); Nonius (Leipzig 1903) III.

193. See the index of Keil *GrammLat* I.

194. *Ibid.* III.

195. See Rand (above, note 1) 161.

196. Keeping the sense of the ms. *respuerant*; cf. Rand (above, note 1) 160.

197. Consult the list in Nettleship (above, note 54).

198. See Schanz-Hosius I<sup>4</sup> § 45a; cf. § 35.

199. Cf. Macrobius, *Sat.* 6.6.1.

200. Just as there is nothing in the *Vita* by Servius which is not in the extant *Vita* by Donatus (ultimately from Suetonius) except for a reference to the *Copa* and the lines of *Aen.* 2.566-89. The latter Donatus apparently discussed *ad loc.*, and it is there that they are found in D. On the *lacuna* at the end of the Servius

*Vita* see Hardie (above, note 11); cf. the Harvard Servius *ad loc.*, and E. T. Silk in *AJP* 69 (1948) 96.

201. Cf. Savage (above, note 13) 58.

202. Notable exceptions are five places (*Aen.* 2.798; 3.242; 6.177; 8.333; 9.544) where references in S to Donatus (who significantly enough is not mentioned in D) are corrected in DS to an impersonal *alii* or *quidam*. This is certainly the work of the compiler. Something might be made of this except for the fact that a similar situation occurs with Urbanus. Cf. Thilo-Hagen, *praef.* xv f.

203. Cf. Rand (above, note 1) 161f.

204. See Lindsay and Thomson (above, note 9) 58f.; Thomson (above, note 13); cf. J. J. Savage (above, note 13). More recently Tomsin (above, note 94) 122 has been led to postulate a source separate from Donatus for the Asper quotations in Servius.





SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D.

ARNOLD J. BAND—*Aristophanes: The Comedy of Issues\**

UNIQUE in the history of the theater, Aristophanic comedy is still an antiquarian curiosity studied for archaeological rather than artistic reasons, produced more often as exotic pornography than as vital theater. Its complex structure is considered awkward and overly canonical; its ebullient tone, amoral and unchristian, at best an archaic prototype of vaudeville. To escape this widespread critical attitude we depart from the obvious but usually overlooked premise that Aristophanic comedy was both coherent and effective to the Athenian audience, and address ourselves to the seemingly simple question: How do these comedies operate as complete units of dramatic art?

Upon exploring the main avenues of Aristophanic scholarship since the end of the eighteenth century, one discovers that little has been done toward answering this question. The modern period of Aristophanic scholarship begins with the Schlegels, who broke with the age-old habit of philological commentary. To them we owe the thorough application of such critical considerations as romantic irony, the Dionysian element in comic buffoonery and sportiveness, comic fancy, comedy as parody of the tragic *Weltanschauung*, comic detachment, and the paradox inherent in the concomitance of utter levity and high seriousness. Unfortunately, these insights were neglected by most scholars, who turned toward the preparation of a scholarly apparatus for the plays. Two new tendencies appeared toward the end of the century: the treatment of the plays as sources for the reconstruction of the contemporary socio-economic milieu; and, of greater importance, the study of the prosodic organization of the comedies. Zielinski clarified the function of the *agon* and detected the centrality of the epirrhetic syzygy in each play. At the beginning of this century scholars tried to trace the rise of comedy from its primitive origins. Though subsequently discredited in detail, Cornford's general anthropological approach still contributes much to our understanding of the dynamics of the plays: the play is a representation of the recurring struggle of life with death, with the inevitable victory of the former; comedy presents man in society, optimistic, master of his

\* Degree in Comparative Literature, 1960.

own destiny, independent of the gods; comedy and tragedy are not only art forms but different attitudes toward the human condition. Our understanding of the operation of the plays has not advanced appreciably in the past generation.

A consideration of various theories of comedy serves as a basis for the treatment of the dynamics of the plays. Of particular value is the work of S. Langer and J. Huizinga. Through an analysis of the function of symbols in art, the former arrives at a concept of comedy not unlike that which can be abstracted from Cornford—comedy is a dramatic symbol of the *élan vital*, the motion and rhythm of living. Huizinga views comedy as a sophisticated form of play, one of the cardinal culture-creating activities of mankind. Within the broad framework presented by these two, one can place the stock theories of comedy: the sudden glory or primitive joy; incongruity or defeat of expectation; relative disinterestedness and sportiveness; relief from tension and inhibition. The notion that the comic and the serious are by no means mutually exclusive entities is particularly crucial in understanding Aristophanes.

Approaching the comedies themselves, one must posit that each play is a world in itself, a "comic context" in which the ordinary laws of reality are suspended. The play is a representational artifact embodying an attitude toward life but not purporting to present a veristic picture of actual life. Fancy can therefore reign, and issues crucial to the life of the *polis* are treated as comic material. The presentation and resolution of an issue, in fact, both motivate and characterize Aristophanic comedy. The hero sets out upon a quest which would be utterly absurd in ordinary life but is invariably achieved within the "comic context." His quest is the satisfactory resolution of the issue of the particular play. The issue and the quest breathe through the complex prosodic structure. Generally, the plays can be divided into two logical parts, the exposition and resolution of the issue, before the *parabasis*, and the demonstration of the results of the favorable resolution, after the *parabasis*.

The theoretical conclusions arrived at are applied to *The Acharnians*, which is studied in detail as a paradigm of Aristophanic dramaturgy. The method employed involves: a consideration of the specific issue treated as comic material; a schematization of the dramatic structure, i.e., the movement of the issue through the formal prosodic elements; an analysis of the play, situation by situation. Studied in the light of the two complementary concepts, "comic context" and "comedy of issues," the play becomes remarkably coherent, and every situation, even those after the *parabasis*, fulfills a necessary dramatic function. The elaborate



prosodic configurations are seen as natural artistic devices, not merely canonical formulas with no dramatic value.

Once the method has been established in our paradigm, we proceed to analyze the ten remaining plays more briefly with an eye to the degree to which they conform to or depart from the paradigm. This provides us with a criterion for measuring the development of Aristophanic dramaturgy from play to play over more than a generation. By this method the prosodic system can be both simplified and explained in detail, many plays assume a striking artistic unity which they did not seem to have before, and certain plays even take on new meanings. Furthermore, we can arrive at a highly plausible reconstruction of the first version of *The Clouds* and thereby solve the riddle concerning the meaning of this confused text.

As a result of this new reading of the plays we can arrive at a more plausible understanding of the comic vision of Aristophanes. In considering himself the *didaskalos* of Athens, Aristophanes did not refer to the specific issues he was treating. The issues were used as comic material; the plays themselves, however, embodied broader attitudes which the playwright imparted to his audience. By portraying the eternal struggle in the *polis* between the forces of life and death, he both called attention to this struggle and expressed the comedian's faith that the forces of life will triumph. This triumph is contingent upon the application of flexibility and intelligence to the problems of the *polis*. Aristophanes does not preach conservatism per se, if at all; above all, he is the apostle of reasonableness. The good life he points to is not the heroism of the epic but the *joie de vivre* of the banquet table. Far from presenting a better world beyond or prior to this world, far from creating a superhuman ideal toward which we must strive, he urges man to utmost enjoyment of his faculties within the human limits of which he, as comedian, is preeminently conscious.

CHARLES A. BEHR—*Old Comedy and the Free State*\*

This thesis examines the relation between the activity of Old Comedy and the functions of the Athenian Democracy. Since one of the most unique traits of Old Comedy is the ease with which it criticized the government—even in time of war—and the men who administered that government, the question whether Old Comedy actually violated any laws and a consideration of the legal position of Old Comedy in general are not out of place. Every reader of Aristophanes is well aware of his

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proclivities toward criticism of the Athenian people both in their private life and in their public role as the government, and further of his sharp attacks against individuals. Even a brief perusal of the fragments of other Old Comic poets shows that most of them displayed the same interest. Whether or not the comic poets' censures were motivated by a genuine concern is immaterial, for the end product, a public display of slanderous abuse, remains the same. The very fact of its known existence would seem to dispense with the necessity for any critical examination. The Athenians themselves apparently regarded such public outbursts as normal. Lysias in his *Defense of Phantias* (Athenaeus 12.551e) examples this blasé attitude well enough: "Is not Cinesias the man who has committed impieties which are shameful for others to declare, and which yearly you hear from the comic poets?" Well enough for Cinesias, but what of Pericles? Yet the state—the Athenian people—even subsidized the comic poets to slander and defame. They hired actors, provided the theater, and awarded large cash prizes to the most successful competitors. We know something of the laws of that time, and what we know does not conduce to the idea that comedy ought to have been as free as it was. We know of ways in which comedy could have been censored. And finally we know of apparent retributive actions against comedy. An evaluation of this material is offered in this thesis.

The thesis is contained in seven parts, with an appendix. The first five parts form a prologue to the sixth, and the seventh an epilogue to the whole work. The first part covers the origins of political comedy in Attica, and demonstrates that while Cratinus may have increased the pungency of comedy's attacks upon the state and the individual, such attacks must have been present also both in the comedy which was performed before the official recognition of 487 and in the even earlier *comoi*. The date of the state recognition of comedy is considered. While the recognition agrees with the other advances of the democracy, it is shown that the concept of "comedy" has no affinity whatsoever to the famed Attic "free speech," *parrhesia*, and is in fact of much earlier vintage. The comic poets' involvement in politics is traced back to their confidence in their own power in this field. But the Ciceronian notion of comedy acting as an ill-behaved censor is rejected as a distortion. The primary activity of comedy was humor, and the principal reason for its recognition by the state can be attributed to this fact, although politics may have been latent even here. The second part discusses the treatment of politics and politicians in comedy. It opens with a discussion of Pseudo-Xenophon 2.18, in which the fallacy of that author's arguments as well as of modern commentators' interpretations is shown, principally

in the matter of the *demos*. The distinction is drawn between the democracy as an abstract concept, which the comic poets are unwilling to sully, and the *demos*, the agent of the democracy, which is open to all sorts of abuse. In a running collection of comic attacks on the *demos*, the ecclesia, the war, the courts, and the demagogues, it is demonstrated that the comic poets are not antidemocratic, since they offer no positive criticism of the various facets of the constitution. The way in which political leaders of the fifth century are handled is examined, and a bias, though again a negative one, is found in the somewhat harsher treatment of the leaders of the more popular factions. Throughout, however, it is emphasized that the comic poets were interested neither in the abstraction of democracy nor even in its development, and that they confined themselves somewhat superficially to present events and present-day men. In the third part, the question of possible transgressions of comedy against the laws of slander—as far as they are known—is considered. In the matter of personal slander, some violations are found; in the matter of attacks on state officers—which were also illegal at this time—there is considerably greater disregard for the law. But when the known unwillingness of the injured to prosecute such suits and the difficulty of obtaining a favorable judgment are considered, it becomes apparent that, while the comic poets have broken the law, they have probably not done so to a degree beyond what was permitted to any citizen, and they certainly enjoyed no special privileges. On the subject of religion, the delicate treatment afforded to gods of the state cults is also noted. In the fourth part, the method by which the comic poets received the right to have their plays produced is considered; and it is shown that the occasionally encountered theory that the archon could censor objectionable material in a play or even reject the play is highly implausible. Apparent restrictions upon poets of Old Comedy, such as the need for full Attic birth, are discussed. The fifth part deals with the Hellenistic view of Old Comedy, and the incomprehensibility of the circumstances of Attic comedy to the Hellenistic man is described. From this as well as from philosophical and moral objections, beginning with Plato, the idea of a permissive law of abuse, *jus nocendi*, was conceived. With the theoretical loss of comedy's natural rights, it was easy to postulate artificial laws of restraint. These and their tradition are treated. In the sixth part the history of Old Comedy, in its relation to the state, is given. All possible examples of state interference with the functions of comedy are offered. Among these are included the decree of Eurychides, the trial of Aristophanes over the *Babylonians*, the law of Syracosios, and the terror which preceded the revolution of the Four Hundred. It is proved that state



interference at specific times and in several ways did occur, though the common sense of the comic poets may in certain instances have affected their comedies. The decline of Old Comedy in virulence and immediacy as well as in structure is next treated. An attempt is made to show that this decline was due to artistic trends, and was all the more natural since political comedy was itself an extreme development of the *comos*. The final part treats the further decline of politics in New Comedy. The theory that even in New Comedy whole plays were directed against an individual is argued to be unlikely. The apparently sacrosanct position of certain figures in the fourth century is noted, and examples are given of all the political material in the New Comic poets. An appendix contains the evidence of the growth of the Roman concept of libel as opposed to slander.

ALBERT A. BERMAN—*The Transmigrations of Form: Recurrent Patterns of Imagination in the Odyssey and the Aeneid*\*

My thesis considers the imaginative forms of the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid* as expressing representative situations in human experience, particularly that of maturing. Recourse is frequently made to parallel figures in myth, ritual, and art to establish this universality, though with the caution that the ultimate reference of a poem must be to itself.

The first chapter treats the growth of Telemachus, and its theme of maturing introduces the purpose of Odysseus' own voyages. The most important correspondences to the Adventures are in the boy's need to make a journey, his break with the ties to his mother, universally the figure of the emotional and instinctual life, and his search for a father as the ideal of the rational and independent man. In Menelaus' story of Proteus, where the boy has a glimpse of the fabulous world as the climax of his travel, the basic distinction in the poem between a real and an imaginary world is set up, most important for an understanding of the nature of Odysseus' journey. The chapter also treats in miniature the theme of man against the sea, of human will against the transformations of nature.

The next chapter sees in the travels of Odysseus a psychological journey through imaginative forms expressing the instinctual life, whereby Odysseus confirms his human will and rationality. This is made evident at the very beginning in the Lotus-eaters, and in the bag of evil winds that burst out when Odysseus falls asleep. The two chief aspects of this life, self-preservation and the erotic drive, are found in the

\* Degree in Comparative Literature, 1960.

cannibalistic Cyclops and the enchantress Circe, both deriving from universal imaginative types. Homer does not, however, reject the world of nature, but sees it as the medium in which man evolves his specifically human identity. Thus, while eating is the most characteristic act of the *Odyssey*, expressing both man's animality and his attachment to existence, with such codes as that of hospitality man adapts his instinct to his own nature. Circe expresses the widespread, especially adolescent fear of the female, but it is pointed out that in the text Odysseus must not spurn the favors of the goddess and that it is she who also restores the beasts to men.

Subsequently, in the twelfth book, Odysseus upon the sea encounters various guises of the threats of the irrational, culminating in Calypso. In this episode the word *kalyptein* occurs more frequently than elsewhere, and generally in Homer it refers to the dominance of the emotions and loss of consciousness. This book, with its symbols of the sea, the cave, and the female figure of Calypso herself, is Odysseus' ultimate experience of nature, both as vitality and as absence of humanity. It is, with its imagery of the sea, the coincidence of death and birth, as often in primitive thinking. Accordingly, it is Odysseus' rebirth into the world of men, related to a number of archetypal birth-fantasies. Its meaning is summed up at the end of Book 5, where Odysseus, in sleep, is compared to the seed of fire, the underlying potential of the self in the process of transformation.

A final chapter of the first section sees Odysseus emerging from the world of fantasy to relate himself to his contexts in the real world. His meeting with Athena is a scene of *anagnorisis* wherein he recognises the rational power that defines his nature. Penelope is the last of the female figures to whom he relates himself, while the life on Ithaca in the sequence of the generations with which the poem closes expresses both Odysseus' integration into the world of Nature and his destiny as a man.

The consideration of the *Aeneid* begins with a study of Book 2, wherein Aeneas is also called upon to make the journey of the self. The fall of Troy as a prelude to the birth of Rome signifies the paradox of change, somewhat as in the *Odyssey*, and introduces the Vergilian dialectic of past and future. The ensuing chapter, "The Sexes and Time," sees a symbolism, again as in the *Odyssey*, of the male denoting order and authority, the female, the irrational. The hostile and creative aspects of the latter, together with the themes of past and future, are believed to be represented by Juno and Venus and related to Vergil's symbolism of fire. Vergil attempts to resolve this conflict through the figure of the family, wherein, by the reproductive power, the male ideal is perpetuated within the process of time.

The voyages of Aeneas are then traced to show a definite pattern of growth in the hero, wherein the Dido episode is central. His most crucial, and most inward, development takes place in his journey to the Underworld, which reflects an extraordinary number of universal patterns. As in the *Odyssey*, the sixth book marks the death and re-birth of the hero, entailing a descent into himself, and it is shown that from earliest times the pattern has an internal application. Thus, the shaman enters upon a journey to the dead, undergoing a death and re-birth conceived as a separation from the world of ordinary consciousness and a return to it. Aeneas' descent also resembles primitive rites of initiation into manhood wherein the youth undergoes a death and re-birth, associated with the world of the dead and also with a belief in reincarnation. The symbolism of the Earth-Mother as a figure of the same conception is then taken up, together with related images such as the cave, which as an entrance into the earth is also a seat of prophecy or vision, and the labyrinth. Chthonic religion, especially in the fertility cults, becomes the analogue of personal regeneration, as found in the mystery religions of the ancient world. It is also noted that Demeter and Persephone are considered in antiquity to be not only Mother Earth and vegetation, but joint goddesses of the grain itself, the older and younger forms of the same person. Hence, Persephone constitutes a powerful symbol for the continuity of the self in the process of transformation. The golden bough is thus interpreted on the basis that the principle of sacrifice in antiquity is that what one offers to a deity stands for the deity itself. The bough is a general symbol of life in the ancient world, and on Babylonian and Cretan seals is particularly related to a young goddess. After a study of Vergil's language, with its mistletoe simile, the golden bough is interpreted as the symbol of the hero's renewal, the continuity of the inner self in the process of transformation, like the seed of fire in the *Odyssey*. With it, Aeneas, descending into the underworld of himself, encounters the specters of his past life whom he leaves behind in order to pursue his mission. He then finds the image of his father, passes from memory to vision, and takes his place within the scheme of time.

In Italy, Aeneas attempts to adapt both to his rational role and to nature. The former he does successfully, becoming the stoic hero in contrast to the energy-figure of Turnus. Italy is characterized by its groves and streams in Vergil, a land of the wild freshness of nature. To this Aeneas attempts to assimilate in his journey to the site of Rome, where Hercules is the model figure for both his roles. It is believed, however, that Vergil in the end does not effect the integration that Homer does, for the rational ideal in the *Aeneid* is too repressive. Thus Aeneas has no



counterpart of Penelope for himself after his Dido-temptation. Again, the image of the family which is the goal of the *Odyssey* opens the *Aeneid* but dwindles to the father-son tie alone, expressing Vergil's concern primarily for authority and continuity.

A brief conclusion suggests that parallels in myth and ritual are invaluable for interpreting works of literature, and that their inherent potential for symbolic meaning is best fulfilled where they are part of the artist's coherent vision of life.

CHARLES ROWAN BEYE—*The Catalogue as a Device of Composition in the Iliad* \*

The dissertation examines and discusses those passages of the *Iliad* which bear a marked resemblance to passages which are traditionally known as catalogues. These are of two distinct types, resembling either *Iliad* 2.494ff., the Catalogue of Ships, or *Iliad* 18.39-49, the Catalogue of Nereids. The former has as its structure a series of units, each more than one hexameter line, each giving several pieces of information, viz., personal and place names, the number of ships of each contingent, together with a descriptive bit which is tentatively called "anecdote." The latter, the Catalogue of Nereids, is nothing more than a list of names, usually three to the hexameter line. The catalogues which are similar to the Catalogue of Ships have a tendency towards condensation at their conclusion, the other sort generally enlarges at that point with some detail which describes the final name.

Every epic literature possesses the catalogue technique, and it manifests itself in a variety of ways. These have been examined with profit, not only to illuminate what may be a poetically reworked catalogue form in the *Iliad*, but also to help suggest a relative chronology for catalogues in their relation to the general narrative; and further, to ascertain, if possible, the chronological relationship of the two types of catalogue distinguished above.

Certain general questions guided the examination of the passages selected: (1) the conflict between the inherited material of traditional lists and the poetic, dramatic intent of the bard; (2) the differences and similarities between the organizing, scientific mentality of the author of the *Theogony* and the fictionalizing mentality of the creator of the *Iliad*; (3) the problem of understanding and accounting for the basic formal difference between the Catalogue of Nereids and the Catalogue of Ships.

A specific investigation of the Catalogue of Ships was omitted from

\* Degree in Classical Philology, 1960.

this dissertation as being something complex enough to demand a separate study, to be undertaken subsequently. Two sorts of catalogue-like passages are given the greatest attention: the *androktasiai*, and the usually brief lists of names that occur sporadically in the *Iliad*. The former frequently show many similarities to the catalogues of the type of the Catalogue of Ships; that is, each of the twenty-nine units of the Catalogue consists ideally of three parts. For example, 2.511-512 (which may be called rubric), 2.513-515 (anecdote), and 2.516 (the number of ships) correspond to 5.49-50, 5.51-54, and 5.55-58. Whether the catalogues of slayer and slain are spontaneous creations of the moment or derived altogether from tradition is difficult to say. The names in them are generally fitted to the immediate context, but others are so remote as to imply that their presence is due to tradition. The descriptive detail of each item seems most often traditional, but again appears from time to time to have been composed out of motifs and ideas of this specific story. Very likely the bard handled these *androktasiai* freely, at times enlarging the traditional list with stock names and stock details, but at times reducing everything so that he has little more than a bare list of names, similar to the Catalogue of Nereids. It is possible that the detailed items, which are in the minority, are the earlier part of a tradition which was in the process of converting all lists to the simplicity that we find in the *Theogony*.

The names which are to be found in the simple lists show that the bard was evidently far more interested in creating the notion of a group than he was conscious of the individual personalities whom he happens to name. Thus one may find stock names, repetition of the names of those who have died, and the introduction of names which bear a significance that is out of keeping with the narrative. This is also true of more prominent lists, such as *Iliad* 13.685-700 or *Iliad* 16.168-199, although, beyond the random appearance of names that derive from haphazard spontaneity or traditional metrical grouping, it is possible to see that the bard by means of these lists advances the names of his minor characters through the workings of the story. This observation suggests that he used this means to rehearse their names until the moment when they were to become a part of the narrative.

From time to time in the *Iliad* occur lists of inanimate objects, for example, 9.149-153, a list of towns, and 12.19-23, a list of rivers. All of these are in the manner of the condensed and metrically catalogued fact of the *Theogony*. The bard of the *Iliad*, however, seems often to be using these traditional lists in ignorance or defiance of the realities they invoke. Such especially is the case of the list at 9.149-153. In every such case

the student is reminded that while, on the one hand, these lists demonstrate that there was a strong codifying, antiquarian tradition (most clearly seen in the *Theogony*), there was, on the other hand, evidently a tendency to take fact of this sort for fictional poetic uses. This fact ought to be remembered in an examination of the Catalogue of Ships, or of the *Theogony* itself.

Beyond these lists, comparative study has made it seem very likely that the *teichoskopeia*, the *epipoleis*, and the beginning of Book 10 (10.1-298) are all catalogue forms of the type of the Catalogue of Ships, which have been variously reduced and rearranged to suit the dramatic moment. Their primary function has been filled by the Catalogue of Ships; their presence stems from the presumably greater length of the *Iliad*, which would increase the need for a rehearsal of the *dramatis personae* as well as for more frequent recapitulation.

HOWARD WILLIAM CLARKE—*The Lion and the Altar:  
Myth, Rite, and Symbol in the Odyssey*\*

The purpose of this dissertation is to study the *Odyssey* from the viewpoint of myth criticism. This critical approach has been used, with more or less success, to elucidate Greek drama and even to provide random insights into modern literature; however, scholars have generally agreed that Homeric epic is too legendary in its origins or too consciously literary in its form to be amenable to the theories of myth criticism. As a result, the full import of the myths of Odysseus and Achilles and of their effect in Homeric epic has been obscured or undervalued.

The first step is to formulate a working theory of mythology. Certainly the varieties of existing myths militate against any single and rigid theory of origin or function. However, since Frazer's *Golden Bough* and the studies made by the so-called Cambridge School of Classical Anthropology and by S. H. Hooke and his colleagues in the Ancient Near East, the ritual theory of myth has acquired considerable prestige and authentication. According to this theory, myth is (or once was) the spoken component of the total ritual drama, which in turn was usually centered around the king as the quasi-divine embodiment of his people's prosperity, was designed to preserve and promote community well-being, and was coordinated with the life of nature. Granted the persuasiveness of this theory, it is still true that the vicissitudes of a people's history and their traditional myths influence and illuminate

\* Degree in Comparative Literature, 1960.



each other, and that myths, once separated from their sustaining rituals and exposed to the accidents and exigencies of transmission, attract extraneous elements and continue in local tradition as legend, saga, and folktale. And the artistic potentialities of myth recommend a rigid distinction between myth and literature, although the archetypes of myth have a profound and universal durability in world literature.

The religious system of the Mycenaean age has been clarified by archaeology and the Linear B tablets. The *wanax* title and the palace-centered religious bureaucracy suggest that the Mycenaean king was the center, though not the object, of cult worship and the palace itself was the scene of ritual and the source of sacred and profane authority. Of course, the king's involvement in government and warfare inevitably affected his religious status and gave royal cults and myths their heroic setting. In fact, it is the king in his roles as priest and leader who connects seasonal cult with heroic legend.

A prime example of the survival of the Minoan-Mycenaean religion in archaic Greece were the Eleusinian Mysteries, which were, incidentally, also a clear instance of the interaction of myth and ritual. Although their origin was in agricultural ritual, their pattern of rape and rescue, renunciation and reconciliation, has its parallels in other myths, and even in Homeric poetry, where this dissertation suggests a sacral contour beneath the heroic setting and the epic form. The strength of the Mycenaean religious tradition at Athens and that city's role in preserving the oral tradition of epic poetry also suggest a far closer interpenetration of the two than has heretofore been suspected. One cannot but feel that the *Odyssey* is something more than a good yarn, and that in his reworking of the tradition Homer's creative and critical intelligence fully exploited the religious aspect of his inherited material.

Just as primitive cult celebrated the return of nature's life-giving forces, so the plot of the *Odyssey* is the return of the hero, and as king of Ithaca Odysseus is the secret of his people's strength. The Suitors are more than rambunctious young princes; they are an impostume threatening the life of the state through its ruling family, and the infection of their presence is finally excised under the auspices of Apollo, god of purifications. The starkness of the *Freiermord* is reinforced by Homer's adroit use of light and dark imagery, which illuminates the scene and symbolizes the action. Literary analysis reveals other contributing effects. First, there is the emphasis throughout the poem on food and feasting, on the purposeless, disruptive carousing of the Suitors (who eventually die at a feast) and Odysseus among them, disguised as a hungry beggar. Almost as striking is the family theme, under-

lined again and again by similes, and extending even to Nestor and his sons and Menelaus and Helen. And if one may presume to speak of abstract themes in Homeric epic, it will not violate the primary narrative interest of the *Odyssey* to characterize its hero's desire to return to his wife and family as love, and his slaying the Suitors and securing rightful control of his country as the establishment of justice. These two themes cohere in the plot, emerging notably in the oft-repeated Agamemnon motif and in a minor key in the Lay of Demodocus. The varieties of incident in the *Odyssey* have an added dimension in what might be called the poem's metaphysic: change and permanence. Odysseus survives the shifting perils of the *Apologoi* and is restored in great scenes of change in Books 6 and 23. Throughout the poem he consistently resorts to ruses, lies, and disguises until, at the end of the poem, his identity is confirmed by the full acceptance of his status in Ithaca. The returned hero is once again the great king.

The *Odyssey* is a poem of affirmation—of the need for life and its worth, of the difficulty of survival and its necessity. The process of Telemachus' initiation into that life is one of the purposes of the *Telemacheia*. Telemachus had to be baptized into the heroic life, commune with its leaders, and be confirmed in its values, or he would never be a trusted ally to his father or a fit successor to the kingship. Like Faulkner's *The Bear*, Telemachus' trip to the heroic world goes beyond the averred search for information. It is a kind of initiation rite: a journey into the exemplary past, a ceremony of attainment in which the young novice is absolved of the corrupting burdens of the historical world and born again of courage and truth.

The *Iliad* has somewhat the same setting: the lonely hero, the devastated land, and finally the epic purpose. In each case it is to rescue the captive woman—Helen from the Trojans and Penelope from the Suitors—and work the appropriate revenge on the captors. A comparative analysis shows how each poem climaxes in the return of the hero, of Odysseus from across the world and Achilles from his tent. And behind the details of their returns—the bloodshed, sacrifice, purgation, and jubilation—may be discerned typical elements of religious ritual. Of course, there are specific literary differences. For Achilles there are no trials as such, no monsters to slay or storms to survive. His suffering is infinitely more exquisite, for it is compounded of his own wounded pride, Agamemnon's contempt, and the Achaeans' suffering. Achilles' return is like a shot, Odysseus' the prepared progress of a master tactician, but the fact of the return connects the two, not only with each other but with the timeless patterns of man's concern for his existence.

ANDREW THOMAS COLE, JR.—*The Political Theory of Polybius and its Sources*\*

Previous discussions of the sources of Polybius 6 have usually come to one of two conclusions: that the historian was an eclectic in his political theory, or that he reproduced fairly consistently a Stoic or Peripatetic account. The former hypothesis is doubtless the correct one, since the anthropology of Book 6 contains elements which are irreconcilable with Peripatetic and Stoic doctrine. However, proponents of the eclectic hypothesis have not made a thorough investigation of the parallels between Polybius and earlier literature to determine the degree of the historian's indebtedness to the different sources used. Such an investigation shows that the fifth-century and Sophistic elements in Book 6 are much more numerous than has previously been supposed.

Polybius views man's original condition as one in which all relationships, those between ruler and subjects included, are governed by force. Thus, the primitive human herd acquiesces in the leadership of its strongest and boldest member, and this is the first form of government (monarchy). However, men gradually come to perceive the mutual benefits to be had from cooperation and exchange of services among one another. Social sanctions begin to be imposed against those who try to harm their fellows or receive help from them without giving anything in return. And these social sanctions are accompanied by shared attitudes as to what is right and proper. Once such attitudes have arisen, any tribal strong man who rules in accordance with popular ideas of what is just can count on the support of all members of the herd to keep him in power, even when he is old and feeble. In this manner rule based on good will and mutual cooperation (kingship) eventually replaces rule based on superior strength. There is good reason to believe that this account of the origin of society and government goes back to the fifth century and, in particular, to Democritus and his followers. The characteristic features of the Polybian analysis are its empirical psychology, its doctrine of historical gradualism, its conception of the growth of society as a process by which modes of behavior based on reciprocity and rational calculation replace those based on force and blind instinct, and its emphasis on the benefits which accrue from a fruitful interaction between gifted and public-spirited individuals and the populace which rewards and encourages them. All four features are present, either explicitly or by implication, in the fragments of Democritus and in the works of later writers—notably Diodorus Siculus and

\* Degree in Classical Philology, 1960.



the Epicureans—who have been influenced by his *Kulturentstehungslehre*. In addition to a basic similarity of viewpoint, there are numerous parallels of detail which link Polybius to the account of man's social evolution that can be reconstructed from the works of Democritus and his successors. Polybius at times uses phraseology which suggests the influence of Stoic or Platonic idealism, and parallels between his account of the beginnings of society and analogous Stoic ones suggest that the naturalism which he derives from Democritus has not escaped completely the influence of the idealist tradition of speculative anthropology. But close comparison of Polybius and the Stoic texts he resembles shows that the borrowings from that tradition are superficial, involving, in fact, little more than terminology. Whether Polybius drew the bulk of his theory from Democritus or from one of his successors is uncertain, but close parallels with the prehistory which appears in *Laws* 3—parallels which suggest derivation from a common source—show that the doctrines of Book 6, in something very much like their present form, were already formulated as early as two or three generations after Democritus.

Polybius' account of the process by which kingship is replaced by aristocracy and, eventually, democracy seems to follow so logically on what precedes that one is inclined to assume it comes from the same source. Free exchange of services, combined with social praise and blame, serves to create the common attitudes and loyalties on which society and government rest. What follows is simply a partial undoing of the same process. The institution of a hereditary kingship or aristocracy tends to make the ruler a privileged being who lives outside the social nexus of reciprocal benefits and cooperation. Having nothing in their experience to suggest to them the advantages of a policy which furthers the welfare of their fellows, the kings and aristocrats cease to pursue such a policy and so become tyrants and oligarchs. Revolution follows, tyranny being replaced by aristocracy, and oligarchy, in turn, by democracy. It is argued that the aristocratic and oligarchic stages of the political cycle are Polybius' own additions to a source which discussed merely the sequence kingship-tyranny-democracy. The suggestion can be supported both by parallels in Book 2, which trace a similar sequence of political development in Achaean history, and by duplications and inconsistencies within Book 6 itself. With this exception, the assumption of a Democritean source for Polybius' account of the transition from kingship to democracy is shown to be quite plausible. The same bipartite division of political constitutions which appears in Book 2 and seems to lie behind Book 6 is characteristic of early fifth

century thought and, to a somewhat lesser degree, of the late fifth century as well. The sequence kingship-tyranny-democracy appears in the Archaeology of Thucydides, and there are passages in Aristotle and Theophrastus that seem to derive from earlier works in which the same sequence appeared. Moreover, in the writings of Isocrates and in *Laws* 3 one finds traces of a theory which linked this sequence of constitutions to anthropological speculation in a way that recalls Polybius; and Plato, like Polybius, supports his view of the course of political change with psychological and sociological considerations so similar to those on which Democritean anthropology was constructed that the influence of Democritus on both writers can be argued with some probability.

Analysis of the Polybian account of the mixed constitution and the decline of democracy confirms the assumption of the presence of both a bipartite and tripartite scheme of constitutions and political history in Book 3. Polybius seems to view the Spartan mixed constitution as, alternately, a combination of the characteristic features of the three "best" pure forms, and as a balance of power between people and rulers in which the council of elders acts as a mediator. The latter arrangement resembles in some ways the Achaean institutions described in Book 2 and seems to derive, along with the bipartite scheme of constitutions and constitutional history, from the same source as Polybius' anthropology. That source also contained an account, preserved in part by Polybius, of how the power of a mob or a faction in a democracy might create the same sort of mentality which had, at an earlier period, produced the tyrant. The only remedy for the ensuing social disorder would be a return to one-man rule. By creating a balance of power between rulers and subjects, the bipartite mixed constitution seeks to prevent the excesses to which democracy may be led by the ambitions of factions or demagogues. The tripartite theory of the mixed constitution seems to come from a different source and to be linked with a view of government which is not, like the bipartite theory, sociological in orientation, but, rather, biological and teleological. It posits three pure forms of polity and three corrupted forms into which these are likely to degenerate in accordance with a biological law of growth and decay. When the three pure forms are combined in the mixed constitution their tendencies to decay counteract each other, and the result is a much more stable government. There is no attempt on this theory to establish a historical sequence of constitutions. Each pure political form is likely to degenerate into the particular corruption for which it has an affinity, but, apart from this, any succession of polities is possible. The political cycle of Book 6 represents an attempt to combine the six political *εἶδη*

envisioned by the biological-teleological theory into a historical scheme suggested by the succession of primitive monarchy—kingship—tyranny—democracy—one-man rule which appears in the sociological theory. The attempt has not been completely successful, and this explains some of the inconsistencies which have led certain scholars to suggest the existence of two strata of composition in Book 6.

The biological-teleological theory is Peripatetic, and the version of it used by Polybius is probably the work of one of Aristotle's successors. Part of the sociological theory goes back to Democritus. It may derive from him in its entirety; but it is more plausible to assume that its treatment of the mixed constitution and criticism of democracy represent the work of a successor—someone who added a detailed consideration of political problems to the Democritean analysis of the origins of kingship and democracy. However, there are parallels between these sections of Polybius 6 and *Laws* 3 which suggest, once again, derivation from a common source and show that the theory in its entirety arose no later than the first half of the fourth century. It seems to belong to a school of thought which was critical of certain aspects of democracy and so sought the means of creating a *ὁμόνοια* of social classes which would safeguard the interests of both rich and poor, subjects and rulers. The solution envisioned, while resembling in some ways the program of the Athenian moderates, was considerably more liberal than either the middle-class polity of Theramenes and his successors or the "guided democracy" of Isocrates.

Polybius doubtless derived his biological-teleological theory from the work of some second- or third-century Peripatetic—perhaps Critolaus. The immediate source of his sociological theory is less clear. Several indications point to the intellectual milieu of Achaean federalism and, in particular, to the philosophers Ecdemus and Megalophanes, friends of Aratus of Sicyon and disciples of Arcesilaus. Assumption of a Middle Academic source for Polybius 6 is highly conjectural, but the hypothesis is as probable a one as the fragmentary state of the evidence will allow.

#### EDWIN D. FREED—*Quotations from the Old Testament in John*\*

This study investigates the Old Testament quotations in the gospel of John to determine (1) the place of each in light of the context and in view of the composition of the gospel; (2) from what text, Hebrew or Greek, the author makes each citation; (3) whether a study of John's

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quotations throws light on the relationship of John to the synoptic gospels; and (4) what evidence there is for use of early Christian testimonies.

The source of the quotation in 1:23 is Is 40:3, but we cannot tell whether Jn used the Heb. or Gr. text. The addition of *ἐγώ* is to emphasize the view that the Baptist himself realized both his own inferiority and the superiority of Jesus. The change from *ἐτοιμάζω* to *εὐθύνω* is for moral and ethical emphasis.

The quotation in 2:17 is from Ps 69:10 and agrees with B of LXX. Evidence indicates that the verb in LXX was originally past tense and that the present reading of future is due to Christian influence from Jn. A future tense in Jn is required by the context to make the O.T. passage appear as a prediction which is fulfilled in Jesus' cleansing of the Temple.

In 6:31 the quotation appears to be a combination of Ex 16:4 and Ps 78:24, containing elements from both the Heb. and Gr. texts. There is also affinity to the Targum of Ex 16:15. Jn uses the quotation to present Jesus as "the bread of life" who stands in strong contrast to Moses, who was the first redeemer, having given the manna which the Jewish fathers ate in the wilderness and died.

The main source of the quotation in 6:45 is Is 54:13, but it is impossible to tell whether Jn used the Heb. or Gr. text. The context indicates that Jn had in mind several other O.T. passages, especially Jer 31:31-34. Jn's vocabulary seems to show influence from the Targum of Is 54:13 and Jer 31:31ff. Omission of "your sons" serves theologically to show that Jesus as "the bread of life" with his message was not limited to the children of Zion.

Evidence is not sufficient to determine the exact source of the text used in 7:37f. Among passages influencing Jn are Is 12:3; 43:19f.; 44:3; 55:1f.; 58:11; Zech 14:8; Jer 2:13; 17:13 Prov 18:4; and several from the Qumran Scrolls. The quotation is spontaneous, perhaps from memory, to support the balancing themes of Jesus as the bread of life and giver of living water.

Neither the exact O.T. source nor the text can be determined in 7:42, but likely sources are Mic 5:1; 2 Sam 5:2; 7:12; Ps 89:4f., among others. There is affinity to the Targum of Mic 5:1; Jer 23:5; 33:15; Is 11:1. The use of Mic 5:1 as a proof text is only a Christian *ad hoc* creation to confirm the tradition of Jesus' birth at Bethlehem. Jn is more directly dependent upon Mt and Lk for the source of this quotation. "From the seed of David" is Jn's equivalent of the Lucan phrase "from the house and family of David" (2:4). "From Bethlehem the village where David was" is equivalent to Lk's "to the city of David

which is called Bethlehem" (2:4). "The Christ comes" is equivalent to Mt's clause "where the Christ should be born" (2:4). Perhaps Jn was also influenced by Lk 2:11: "who is Christ the Lord, in the city of David." ἡ γράφη here is to be taken as referring only indirectly to an O.T. passage and more directly to the synoptic passages themselves.

In 10:34 the citation agrees exactly with LXX of Ps 82:6. The whole context, with the quotation, is to be understood as a literary device on the part of Jn to strengthen and present in another way his theological view of the uniqueness of Jesus.

The quotation in 12:13 is the only formal one in Jn without an introductory formula. The line from "Blessed" to "Lord" is exactly the LXX form of Ps 118:26, a literal translation of the Heb. The word ὠσαννά is a popularization or transliteration of the Heb. "hosanna," not a translation as is the σῶσον δὴ of LXX. ὠσαννά, not found in LXX, is a Christian invention to give new meaning to an old Heb. expression. In contrast to the synoptics Jn is not primarily concerned with Jesus' entry into Jerusalem; but having taken elements from the synoptic account, he has inserted them into the larger framework of the Lazarus story to bring his theme of Jesus as (messianic) king to a high point in its development.

The source for the first part of the composite quotation in 12:15 is probably Zeph 3:14ff., from either Heb. or Gr. text; the source usually given for the second is Zech 9:9. However, the quotation is a free artistic composition on the basis of Mt and Mk to give strength to the theme of Jesus as king.

In 12:38 the writer quotes exactly from Is 53:1 in its LXX form. For Jn "report" is indicative of the words of Jesus and "arm" of his deeds, both of which the Jews rejected.

Is 6:9f. is the direct source of the citation in 12:39f., but there is no certainty about whether Jn used the Heb. or Gr. text. The part from the beginning to ἵνα μὴ may be from either Heb. or Gr. Jn's theological view is responsible for making God the subject in Is (or Jesus in the text of Jn), so a change in verb form is required. Ten of the last twelve words are exactly as LXX. Barrett's conclusion is accepted: "John was quoting loosely, perhaps from memory, and adapting his Old Testament material to his own purpose . . . to emphasize the judgement as the action of God."

In Jn 13:18 the source is Ps 41:10, and about half the quotation is closer to the Heb. than to the Gr. An underlying motive for use of this citation was to supplement the synoptic account of the traitor.

It is impossible to tell from which text the quotation from Pss 35:19

and 69:5 in 15:25 is made since LXX translates the Heb. literally whereas Jn agrees with neither. The viewpoint of the writer has determined the form of the quotation.

In Jn 17:12 ἡ γραφή is not regarded as a reference to O.T. scripture but to the words of Jesus himself spoken in 6:70f. and now having fulfillment. Of alternate views we prefer the one which regards ἡ γραφή as a reference to Ps 41:10 quoted in Jn 13:18.

The passage in 19:24 is an exact quotation of LXX of Ps 22:19 where the Gr. translates the MT literally except that it renders the verbs with aorist instead of present or future. Having read Mk 15:23f., 36, and parallels, Jn makes his interpretation of the drink offered Jesus and parting of his garments clear by explaining both as fulfillment of O.T. scripture. His effort to interpret and supplement the synoptic account led to the citation of the Ps. And a curious misunderstanding of LXX which is a reproduction of the Heb. synonymous parallelism is analogous to Mt's misunderstanding of his text of Zech 9:9. Jn's misunderstanding led to embellishment with respect to the ἱμάτια and χιτῶν.

The source and text for 19:28f. are unknown but may be from Ps 69:22. Here is a clear example of Jn's creative use of synoptic material showing his own literary-theological motives.

In 19:36f. the first quotation is a free citation, perhaps from memory, of Ex 12:10 (LXX), 46, or Num 9:12 or Ps 34:21 or a combination of the Ps text with one of the others. The verb in Jn agrees exactly with the Gr. of the Ps, but the text of Jn as a whole is closer to LXX of Ex 12:10 than to any other. Jn's verb form makes better sense and satisfies his theological view of Jesus as paschal lamb. The source of 19:37 was Zech 12:10, but the reading of Jn, including ὁράω, is of Christian origin, derived from some Heb. text and may have originated with Jn himself.

Theological-literary motives determine the form of quotation. A stronger case can be made for the use of the Gr. than for the Heb. text. In eight places Jn's quotations show influence from parallel passages in the synoptics. In only 19:37 is there evidence for Jn's use of a testimony text, but there is no conclusive evidence that he used testimonies at all.

JOHN JOSEPH KEANEY—*The Structure, Dating, and Publication of Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia*\*

The first chapter of this dissertation summarily traces the development of the πολιτεία-form in Greek literature of the fifth and fourth

\* Degree in Classical Philology, 1959.



centuries B.C. The shape which it received in Aristotle's hands is related to the latest phase of his political theory, as represented by *Politics* 4-6. Attention is also drawn to Plato's *Laws* for the methodological influence which it had upon Aristotle and to the recently discovered fragment of Theophrastos' *πῶς ἂν ἄριστα πόλεις οἰκοῖντο* (*Fragmentum Vaticanum De Eligendis Magistratibus*, ed. W. Aly [Città del Vaticano 1943] = *Studi e Testi* 104), which represents the final stage in the development of a political theory largely based on empirical researches.

The second chapter concerns the existence of a detailed and deliberate formal structure in the *AthPol*. The work is divided into three parts, all of which are interrelated. The basis of the division is to be found in the second part (*AthPol* 5-41) where Aristotle makes use of a schematic pattern which he had employed in other works (G. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* [Cambridge 1957] 153) and by which he describes the development of a particular subject from a small beginning, through a long and gradual development, to a final result. In the *AthPol*, the subject is the Athenian democracy; the final result is the stabilized form which the democracy took at the end of the fifth century and which it preserved until Aristotle's time. This result, itself the final element of the full pattern, is the subject matter of the last part of the *AthPol*: chapters 42-69 describe the contemporary constitution.

The pattern concerns democracy; as such it begins only with Solon (*AthPol* 41.2: ἡ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχῇ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο). This means that the pre-Solonian period is less important to Aristotle's main theme, the growth of the democracy. Consequently, when he came to summarize the history of the Athenian constitution (*AthPol* 41), he included in his summary only those pre-Solonian elements which were relevant to his theme—the constitutional changes introduced at the time of Ion, the organization of the population by tribes, and the constitution of the time of Theseus, because he first yielded some rights to the *demos* (cf. F 4 Opp.). Aristotle omitted those elements, e.g., the quadripartite division of the kingdom by Pandion (F 2 Opp.) and the oligarchic constitution described in *AthPol* 3, which neither threw light on nor contributed to the growth of the democracy.

Aristotle conceived the essential strength of the Athenian democracy to be in the popular law courts instituted by Solon. As the democracy grows, it does so only at the expense of other political groups in Athens. The division of the *AthPol* is most apparent here, for Aristotle treats one of three groups in each of the three parts. In *AthPol* 3, which itself, like *AthPol* 41, is at once a summary and a transitional chapter, he disposes of the *arkhons* by contrasting the unlimited judicial authority

which they had in earlier times with the later limitations put upon this authority by the *demos*.

In the second part, it is the Areopagos whose claims to power the *demos* must overcome. Aristotle uses the middle elements of his schematic pattern, viz., gradual development and expansion, to show how the rise of the *demos* is balanced by the decline of the Areopagos (*AthPol* 23.1; 25.1). Finally, of the powers which the Areopagos enjoyed, some were given to the law courts and the assembly, others to the *boule*. Consequently, in the last part of the treatise, Aristotle is concerned with drawing attention to the fact that the *demos* has taken over many of the prerogatives of the *boule*.

The third chapter examines the relation which exists between the *AthPol* and the eighth book of Pollux' *Onomasticon*. It is shown that Pollux made direct use of the *AthPol*, though often in a peculiar way. Of greater moment, however, is the fact that he seems to have used a text of the *AthPol* different from that which we possess. He uses Aristotle to list four penteteric festivals in Athens, but does not know the fifth, that of Hephaistos, which, Aristotle adds, was instituted in 329/8 B.C. (*AthPol* 54.7); again, he is unaware that the name of one of the sacred triremes had been changed (*AthPol* 61.7). It is concluded that, after the *AthPol* was written, a number of changes were made in the systematic part of the treatise, which were necessitated by changes in details of the Athenian constitution. It was the first text, rather than the revised text, of the *AthPol* which Pollux used.

The question of *AthPol* 4, "constitution of Drakon" is then considered. The evidence of the text of the *AthPol*, together with external evidence provided by the lexicographer Harpokration, leads to the conclusion that *AthPol* 4 is a later interpolation which was not made by Aristotle. The fifth-century origin of the document which the interpolator used is reaffirmed. A new interpretation of the "constitution" is offered, according to which the author of the original document did not intend entirely to disfranchise the thetes: the sentence which calls for a financial qualification for citizenship (*AthPol* 4.1: ἀπεδέδου μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς ὅπλα παρεχομένοις), it is argued, is an inference on the part of the interpolator. Finally, the connection between *AthPol* 4 and Demetrios of Phaleron is examined, with some positive, though hardly conclusive results.

The fifth and last chapter considers the *testimonia* which bear on the publication of the *Politeiai*. Evidence exists to show that the series was known at Athens in the decades immediately following Aristotle's death. If we add to this that the *Politeiai* were widely transmitted through the

avenue of Alexandrian scholarship, it seems necessary to conclude that they were intended to be published for general circulation. An examination of opposite views on this problem reveals that they are based on little that is solid.

The burden of Appendix I is to show (against F. Jacoby, *FGrHist* 3 b 2.43ff.) that there is no inconsistency in the statements of Aristotle (*AthPol* 3.1-3; F 7 Opp.) about the development of the Athenian arkhonship.

Appendix II represents the first steps of an attempt to list and classify the *Politeiai*. On the basis of the preserved titles, these fall into three groups: the first describes the constitution of a *polis*, e.g., the *AthPol*; the second, that of a league or federation, e.g., the *κοινὰ πολιτεῖαι* of Arkadia and Thessaly mentioned by Harpokration; the third deals with a group of *poleis*, which were bound together ethnically or geographically, and the constitutions of which were so similar that one *Politeia* would serve to describe all, e.g., *Κυπρίων πολιτεία*.

DAVID EDWIN PINGREE—*Materials for the Study of the  
Transmission of Greek Astrology to India*\*

This thesis investigates the transmission of Greek astrological theories to India. It is based primarily on two unpublished Sanskrit texts, the Yavanajātaka of Sphujidhvaja and the Vṛddhayavanajātaka of Mīnarāja.

The first of these exists only in a palm-leaf manuscript in the Durbar Library of the Mahārāja of Nepal at Kathmandu and in a copy thereof made for a late Rājaguru, Hemarāja. The palm-leaf manuscript, irreverently exposed to the ravages of mice and insects, is zealously shielded from the devastating gaze of Western scholars, and the Rājaguru's apograph is secreted in an inaccessible chamber of the Siṃha Durbar. There have been made available for the present study, through the generosity of a learned barrister of Bombay, 15 of the 103 folia of the Mahārāja's manuscript; in addition, numerous quotations have been gleaned from the commentaries, published and unpublished, of Govindasvāmin on the Uttarakhaṇḍa of the Br̥hatpārāśarahorāśāstra, of Utpala on the Br̥hajjātaka, Br̥hatsaṃhitā, and Yogayātrā of Varāhamihira and on the Śaṭpañcāśikā of Pṛthuyāśas, of Viṣṇuśarman on the Vidyāmādhavīya of Vidyāmādhava, and of Rudra on the Br̥hajjātaka of Varāhamihira, as well as from the Sārāvalī of Kalyāṇavarman.

Sphujidhvaja wrote the Yavanajātaka in A.D. 270; it is a versification,

\* Degree in Classical Philology and Sanskrit, 1960.



in Indravajrā meter, of a prose translation of a Greek astrological text made by Yavaneśvara in A.D. 150 in the domains of the Mahākṣatrapa of Ujjain, Rudradāman I. The iconography of the signs of the zodiac in this work indicates that the Greek original was written in the first half of the second century A.D. in Egypt (probably Alexandria), whence it must have been carried by merchants to the port of Br̥ghukaccha.

The Vṛddhayavanajātaka is also composed in the Indravajrā meter. Its author, Mīnarāja, has copied much from Sphujidhvaja besides the form; it is likely that he flourished in the fourth century, also in Western India. There are a large number of manuscripts of the Vṛddhayavanajātaka, as well as extensive quotations in the Jyotiribandha of Śivarāja, in the Horāratna of Balabhadra, and in the Br̥hadyavanajātaka; the work was also used by Kalyāṇavarman and by al-Bīrūnī, and was translated into Marwari by the Slave of Delusion, Mohanadāsa.

Having established these basic facts concerning the new texts, the thesis proceeds to investigate the origins of Greek horoscopy. It is shown that many forms of divination—e.g., prediction from the heliacal risings of Sirius and Orion, brontology, conception-horoscopes, and dodecaeterides—were derived by the Greeks from Babylon, but that genethliology in its geometrically oriented form was not; for that was invented and developed in Egypt in the second century B.C. In the course of this investigation are discussed, besides the long Greek, Roman, and Byzantine traditions of the methods of divination mentioned above, the astrological doctrines of pseudo-Hipparchus, Plato, Democritus, Eudoxus, the Babylonian horoscopes of the Seleucid period, Berosus, Antipater, Achinapolus, pseudo-Zoroaster's *περὶ φύσεως*, Apollonius Myndius, Epigenes of Byzantium, Hermippus of Smyrna, and Bolus of Mendes. In an appendix the following astrological authorities are dealt with: the Salmeschoeniaca, the Hermetic writings, Nechepso and Petosiris, pseudo-Zoroaster's Apotelesmatica, Serapio of Alexandria, Critodemus, Timaeus, Manilius, Thrasyllus, Dorotheus of Sidon, Teucer of Babylon, Balbillus, Manetho, Ptolemy, Vettius Valens, Antiochus of Athens, Maximus, Porphyrius, Firmicus Maternus, Paul of Alexandria, Protagoras of Nicaea, Hephaestio of Thebes, Heliodorus, Julian of Laodicea, Palchus, Rhetorius of Egypt, John of Lydus, the Liber Hermetis, Theophilus of Edessa, Apomasar, Achmet the Persian, Gergis (George of Antioch), Theodore Prodromus, John Camaterus, and John Catrarius.

Succeeding this is a chapter devoted to the history of Indian astrology before the influence of Greek horoscopy was felt. It is suggested that certain forms of judicial astrology which are found in the Arthaśāstra of

Kauṭilya, in the Rāmāyaṇa, in the Mahābhārata, in the Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna, in the Aṅgavijjā, and in the saṃhitāskandha of jyotiḥśāstra were influenced by Babylonian theories which reached India in the Achaemenid period. In an appendix to this chapter are discussed the astrological works of Garga, Varāhamihira, Pṛthuyāśas, Parāśara, Kalyāṇavarman, Govindasvāmin, Utpala, Śrīpati, Guṇākara, Vidyāmādhava, Viṣṇuśarman, Vaidyanātha, Śivarāja, Rudra, Mantreśvara, Balabhadra, and Puñjarāja.

Successive chapters deal with the iconography of the signs of the zodiac; that of the horās; that of the decans; the characteristics of the signs; the iconography of the planets; the characteristics of the planets; and the dodecatopos. In each are given first the relevant texts of Sphuṇidhvaja and Mīnarāja and the Sanskrit tradition that derives therefrom; in the course of this presentation it is possible to demonstrate that Mīnarāja has used, besides the Yavanajātaḥ, a lost astrological poem of Satya, and that Satya has used both the Yavanajātaḥ and the Sanskrit translation of another Greek astrological work. Then the Greek tradition is presented; and it has usually been possible to show that the Indian theories are derived from the Greek, though in some instances innovations are made. At times it has also been demonstrated that certain Indian developments influenced Arab astrologers, either directly or through Sasanian intermediaries, and that some of the Indian-influenced Arabic texts were translated into Greek in Byzantium.

Thus the thesis makes it clear that in the second century at least one Greek astrological manual was translated into Sanskrit, and that this translation, and another utilized by Satya, formed the basis of Indian genethliology. It is known that Greek astronomy, both linear and epicyclic, also influenced India in a succession of translations made between c. 100 and 450 A.D., and it is probable that other Indian sciences—alchemy in particular—are indebted to Greek sources. The foreign theories were modified in India, and transmitted in their new form to the Sasanian empire, Central Asia, Tibet, and the Far East, as well as to the Arabs; by these they were taught to Byzantium and Western Europe.

FATHER GERALD J. POWER—*Richer's Utilization of his Sources*\*

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate Richer's utilization of his sources, with particular attention to the influence of Sallust. Richer wrote his *Quattuor Libri Historiarum*, a history of the West Frankish Kingdom in the tenth century, during the final decade of that century.

\* Degree in Classical Philology, 1959.

For the first half of the work, the principal source is Flodoard's *Annales*. The two final books are based largely on oral sources.

The comparison of Flodoard's *Annales* and Richer's *Historia* gives an insight into Richer's approach to history. In the prologue Richer announces his intention of expressing his material far differently from Flodoard. For the attainment of this literary ambition, Richer chose as his model the Roman historian Sallust. He made outright borrowings from Sallust, introduced Sallustian touches to describe various circumstances and situations, but especially he imitated the rhetorical, dramatic, novelistic approach of the Latin author. Events are told in terms of persons, actions are developed into episodes, decisions are arrived at only after reflection and deliberation. This personal or psychological quality of the *Historia* is a direct result of Richer's imitation of Sallust.

Richer rearranged the material provided by Flodoard in a manner that would best conduce to effective and colorful narration. He frequently sacrificed historical accuracy in order to attain this objective. The formal disposition of his material was of more importance to him than its strict exactitude. His vitiation of chronology, false precisions, circumstantial details, anecdotes, and legends make his work a much less reliable document than that of Flodoard.

Flodoard and Richer had really different objectives. The former was concerned only with the factual, unadorned narration of events as they happened. He did not impose his own interpretation, or subject his material to literary elaboration. Richer, on the other hand, was primarily concerned with the interpretation and amplification of his material. He wished to create an interesting and entertaining work, as well as an informative one.

Richer's inaccuracies and inexactitudes have brought his credibility into disrepute. Admittedly, exactitude was not his main concern, and his work should be utilized with caution. Nevertheless, Richer fundamentally is in agreement with Flodoard on most of the issues that are recorded by both authors. Granted that his chronology is unreliable, or certain details spurious, the fact remains that Richer's *Historia* remains faithful to the broad outlines of the *Annales*, and creates the same impression of that chaotic age, marked by petty feuding, civil strife, and feeble government.

Richer is a rhetorician, but not merely a rhetorician. It would be a mistake to regard him as unworthy of the name of historian because of his rhetorical propensities. As the great Roman historians have shown, it is possible to indulge in rhetoric and drama, and yet fulfill the function



of historian. Richer's concentration on the intellectual or interior aspect of history, while at the same time offering basically the same information as Flodoard, gives a heightened impression of the atmosphere and outlook of the age in which he lived. An examination of the latter part of the *Historia*, in which Flodoard's *Annales* no longer serve him, will reveal the same tendencies and characteristics that have marked the earlier portion. Speeches, reflections, episodes, imaginary details, anecdotes, and personal interpretations abound. Richer's *Historia* is not more or less reliable in this so-called original part of his work, than it is in the first two books. His continuing imitation of Sallust has given his work the same character throughout.

Richer's *Historia* must not, nevertheless, be considered as a mere slavish imitation of Sallust. Richer makes a distinctive contribution of his own, and emerges as a personality in his own right. His spirit and style are different from the spirit and style of Sallust. Richer's reflections are less philosophical and political than those of Sallust. He does not indulge in moralizing or give the impression that he is a propagandist for any cause. Richer appears as an actor in the human story that he relates, with an intense awareness of the feelings and emotions of men; Sallust stands apart as judge and critic, analyzing more objectively the various characters who are representative of Roman life. Richer's style is neat and concise, but does not approach the epigrammatic terseness, or the "immortal swiftness," of Sallust.

The *Historia* is a valuable work as an index of the cultural and academic life at Reims in the late tenth century. Richer's discussion of the academic program of Gerbert is the only source for this important matter. Furthermore, the *Historia* is the only account extant that covers the second half of the tenth century history of the West Frankish Kingdom. In spite of its limitations and inaccuracies, Richer's *Historia* has genuine merit as an historical source. One will wisely use it in conjunction with the *Annales* of Flodoard. Having discovered thereby what is genuine history and what is literary embellishment, he will be better disposed to make the corresponding distinctions when he considers the latter part of the *Historia*.

MICHAEL C. J. PUTNAM—*Patterns of Personality and Imagery in the Poetry of Catullus*\*

This thesis demonstrates anew the unity within the poetry of Catullus by tracing patterns of personality and imagery which run throughout

\* Degree in Classical Philology, 1959.

his whole output. It first attempts to show that the long poems, making allowance for their contents, display as many facets of the temperament and genius of their creator as the short lyrics. These are commonly considered the true products of Catullus, while the long poems are left to languish as obscure in content and un-Catullan in theme and manner of expression. We take the opposite approach, assuming at the start that any view of a poet that neglects almost half of his total production is invalid. Rather, we should treat the poet as a whole in order to gain a true picture of his genius. Secondly, we show not only how certain themes of personality (the most important of which we have termed *opposition* and *reversal*) run throughout the long and short poems, but also how, in all his work, the mind of the poet concentrates on a few basic symbols and accompanies his feelings with certain basic strands of imagery, no matter in what guise these feelings appear. The feeling most marked is the poet's idealism, which makes its most frequent appearance in his demand for *pietas* and *fides*, for "purity" in all aspects of existence from a manuscript and the running of a province to the most deeply felt emotional situations.

The chapters which immediately follow the introduction are devoted to two of the more important long poems, 64 and 68, examining them in detail for their own inherent beauties and at the same time showing, by appeal to the personal shorter poems, their distinctively Catullan character. Next we turn to the lyric and elegiac poems themselves, with a chapter devoted to the theme of "journey" and another to the Lesbia poems. Finally, we conclude with a detailed analysis of 63.

The chapter on 64, the longest analysis of any one poem, concentrates on proving the unity of 64 within itself, besides showing its markedly Catullan tenor. It finds Catullus entering into the figures of Ariadne and Aegeus, and maintains that the actions of Theseus are akin, in the one case, to those of Lesbia and, in the other, to those of the dead brother. The digression is then compared to the Peleus-Thetis episode which frames it, and the contrasts which their juxtaposition creates are elaborated upon. The Achilles passage is then criticized in detail. The concluding lines of the poem are viewed as commentary on the contrasts which the poem's two episodes reveal. Rather than being a mere moralistic appendage, they show the one story as the real present, the other as the ideal past. Within this general scheme, there is constant appeal to the shorter poems as commentary upon the lines at hand.

We turn, in Chapter 2, from the supposedly impersonal epic statement of 64 to the deliberately personal utterance of 68. The importance

of the simile is emphasized, and especially Catullus' own involvement in the character of Laudamia is stressed, along with the necessity of keeping the repetition of the lines on the dead brother exactly as they are. At the same time the importance of the symbol of the *domus* is recognized, and the poet's feelings about *pietas*, which are closely associated with it, receive detailed treatment.

Chapter 3 is the first of two chapters which trace themes through a series of shorter poems instead of analyzing one poem for its many ramifications. This chapter is entitled "Journey" and is devoted primarily to poems 46, 4, and 31, in that order, showing how the poet reacted to the main journey of his life. We add to this central group a study of certain other poems, such as 9 and 65, which are easily classed in the same category, though exhibiting peculiar excellencies of their own. As in the case of 68, the main crystallizing image is that of home.

Chapter 4, devoted to the Lesbia poems, divides into five sections dealing with the following poems: 2 and 3, 8, 51, 72 and 76, and, finally, 58 and 11. They go in a somewhat rough chronological order, though throughout the thesis any biographical approach is scrupulously avoided. The complicated emotional network of 2 and 3 is traced in detail (the inversion of masculine and feminine, for example, once again being operative), and a solution is offered to the main textual problem of 2. 8 is treated as a serious poem, a reversal of what its façade superficially seems to present, while 51 is set against the original of Sappho to display thereby more clearly its own individuality and, in particular, the point of the last stanza. By the time 72 was written Catullus had found his relationship with Lesbia so deteriorated that he could formulate exactly what he had sought for in their relationship and in love in general. 58 and 11 are the lyric counterparts of 76; 11 is especially important as a moving summary of the Catullan spirit.

64 was discovered to contain, somewhere in its compass, most of the poet's patterns of personality which the thesis traces. The final chapter finds 63, on the contrary, an enlargement of one particular side of Catullus' personality: his tendency to reverse male and female and to become himself one with his feminine protagonists. Attis, in other words, is shown to be Catullus, while Cybele is treated as a glorification of how Lesbia came ultimately to appear to the poet. Strands of symbolism and imagery are traced here in greater detail than usual, as they contribute more than a little to the poem's power and tension.



LUCY CURTIS TURNBULL—*Some Aspects of Greek Geometric Bronzes*\*

Among the Geometric bronzes found in Olympia and elsewhere, many groups and figures are of interest both for their artistic value and for their associations with religion, as well as the evidence they afford of contact with foreign lands. They also give useful evidence about the development of sculpture in the Geometric period.

One small group of bronzes from Arcadia and Olympia shows a nude female figure seated sidesaddle on horseback, usually holding out her arms in a wide, embracing gesture. Another nude female figure on horseback appears at Samos in about the same period, but differs from the mainland examples in having a child in her arms. Probably this is a mother goddess, and certainly it is of foreign origin. There are few images of Oriental goddesses riding horses, but the Hittites had a horse-goddess called Pirva, and Ishtar was also sometimes associated with horses. It was probably through an identification of Samian Hera with an Anatolian horse- and mother-goddess that this bronze came to be dedicated at Samos.

Those from the mainland can also be identified as goddesses by their gesture of raised arms, which is a variation of a well-known divine gesture of power and blessing. On Geometric objects from Tegea and Olympia this gesture is made by a goddess standing on a horse, who is probably to be identified with the seated goddess. The act of standing on horseback suggests a connection with the East, particularly with Luristan, where divinities frequently stand on the backs of horses, but none of the objects showing a figure in this pose can be surely dated, and the connection remains obscure. The gesture itself is Greek, and the act of standing on horseback is attested only by these two objects; it is something of a freak, and was probably the result of a chance contact, not of a religious movement. The goddess of Samos, being a mother goddess, is no argument for the wholesale importation of a pure horse-goddess.

There is more evidence that the goddess is Greek, and very ancient. The goddesses of the sanctuaries in which the bronzes were dedicated were all different in classical times, but in this early period they may either have been the same goddess, not yet differentiated into Hera, Artemis, and Athena, or they may have been different goddesses who had taken over the attributes of an earlier, more generally worshipped goddess. Two of the three sanctuaries in which the bronzes were found were Arcadian, and in Arcadia the people were always tenacious of old

\* Degree in Classical Archaeology, 1960.

customs and rites. Perhaps, then, this is a survival from the Mycenaean goddess, who often appears sitting sidesaddle on a fantastic animal and sometimes on a horse, and always making the same gesture with her arms. At least once, moreover, she is nude, like the Greek examples. The gesture is certainly an indication of divinity in the Mycenaean period too, for it appears on cult statues in Crete. There is, moreover, some evidence of the continuity of cult or occupation at both Tegea and Olympia, and at several other sites where there are traces of the goddess on horseback, notably at Sparta and the Argive Heraion. Probably the goddess on horseback is a survival of the Mycenaean Mistress of Animals, in her aspect of Mistress of Horses.

Another important group of bronzes comes from a single workshop, located not at Olympia but at Tegea, and is an important addition to the number of local "schools" of the Geometric period. The bronzes represent men sitting with their hands on their knees, or with their elbows on their knees and their hands holding something to their mouths. There are also figures of centaurs. The figure with elbows on knees seems to be the result of an importation; a few objects showing apes or monkeys probably came to Greece via Rhodes, and the result was two local groups of bronzes, one in Northern Greece and one in the Peloponnese. The early figures of the northern bronzes are very ape-like in appearance, but the type degenerates into an abstract pattern. In the Peloponnese it becomes a human figure, not an ape at all; both cases indicate a single contact and a lack of understanding of the animal represented. This was an importation of objects, not of any underlying idea of importance for Greek religion, and the type does not last long.

The centaurs seem to be native to Greece, and in legend, indeed, they live in this very area of Arcadia, the region of Mt. Pholoe. Their significance as a subject of religious dedications is not clear; they may be Pholos himself or some other mythical person or monster.

A third group of bronzes shows men or women performing a circle dance; these objects come from Olympia and Arcadia. Those from Olympia can probably be associated with the cult of Hera, in which there were dances; the nudity of the figures suggests an orgiastic dance such as was performed in the cult of Artemis in Laconia and elsewhere. These orgiastic dances are evidently descended from dances of women in the Mycenaean tree cult.

The group from Arcadia shows ithyphallic male dancers with animal heads which are probably masks; these again probably can be connected with orgiastic masked dances in the cult of Artemis. At Lycosoura too there is evidence for a dance of votaries wearing animal masks. It is

possible that in the Mycenaean religion too there were votaries masked as animal-headed daimones, usually connected with the tree cult, but there is not enough evidence to show there were masked dances. However, the tradition of animal-headed daimones may have survived in Arcadia. It is probably such daimones that the dancers of the bronze group are imitating; they are shown as ithyphallic to express the idea that by imitating these daimones they receive and transmit their power to induce fertility in man, beast, and field. The dedication of such a bronze group of dancers ensures that the dance will be perpetually performed, and the dedicator correspondingly blessed. The same idea is probably behind the dedication of dancers at Olympia.

Another interesting group of bronzes is that of the chariot groups from Olympia. These are of sufficient quality and quantity to allow a chronological sequence to be set up, running from the beginning almost to the end of the eighth century B.C.

The groups do not seem to be connected with the Olympic Games. None is so late as the beginning of the seventh century, and the tradition that the chariot race was introduced in Olympiad 24, 680 B.C., seems to be reliable. Their actual purpose is shown by several indications; the tall, back-curving headdress that most of them wear seems to be, at least in Geometric sculpture, an attribute only of gods and heroes. The type of chariot they drive is almost unknown elsewhere in Greece, and was introduced into Greece in the Mycenaean period, though it was always rare. A strong reason, such as religious conservatism, seems necessary to explain its survival. Finally, the bronzes are found only at Olympia, nowhere else in Greece. All of this suggests a connection with Pelops, the hero who was honored in Olympia more than anywhere else, and the suggestion is strengthened by the fact that all the bronzes that could be precisely located were found in the area of the Pelopion.

Finally, these objects and groups must be considered as part of the development of the group in Geometric sculpture. The general development is from two-dimensional, static groups like the goddesses on horseback, through more ambitious groups like the charioteers, to a final departure from the two-dimensional point of view allowing the figures to act in three-dimensional space. Along with this development goes another, a development in the relationship of the various parts of the group to one another, which runs from simple juxtaposition to complex interaction. The two developments are not always coordinated; groups in which the action and relationships of the parts are very complex may be reduced in physical expression to a mere silhouette. This is the result of the application to sculpture of a convention alien to it, the "Geo-



metric style" proper, which was suited to painting but not to sculpture. The reduction of the parts of the body to geometric figures like triangles and the arcs of circles and the arrangement of the figures themselves in rigid patterns require a sacrifice of the three-dimensional qualities of volume and space proper to sculpture. This was a dead end as far as sculpture was concerned; the best of the groups are those that have broken with the traditional conventions in action and conception.

The groups of figures discussed in the preceding chapters belong stylistically early in the development, though they may be late in time. Religious conservatism might well be at work in the retention of such a crude style as is shown by the dancing figures, which are not necessarily very early.













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